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Abstract 
This thesis is an evaluation of the World Bank's policies and strategies on anti-corruption 
work in the context of the global aid regime. In 1997, the Bank announced a four-pronged 
strategy to help its borrowers combat corruption, despite claiming in the past that it could not 
conduct work of this kind given the Bank's non-political mandate. Indeed, in the early 1990s, 
the Bank's General Counsel provided a new interpretation of the Bank's Articles of 
Agreement that still excluded work on corruption. Despite many attempts to reshape the 
discourse on corruption from a political one into an economic one, this issue of the non-
political mandate has never been satisfactorily addressed. Instead, the Bank's anti-corruption 
work has become increasingly politicised as it moves from traditional public sector reform 
work to work on community empowerment and civil society. Additionally, the Bank has 
sought to mainstream this work on corruption into all of its programmes and regions, resulting 
in a programme that is overly complex and threatens the Bank's overall capacity as an 
institution. However, there is much good work being done - in upgrading the Bank's 
procurement work, strengthening internal ethics, improving work on public sector reform and 
bringing international attention to the problem of corruption. This thesis argues that the Bank 
should focus on its strengths and avoid the more controversial and ineffective components of 
its anti-corruption programme, which threaten the credibility of the programme as a whole. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The Research Questions 
This thesis is an examination of the origins and development of the World Bank's anti-
corruption programme. In 1997, the World Bank announced its intention to provide a 'systematic 
framework for addressing corruption as a development issue in the assistance it provides to countries 
and in its operation work more generally'.' This included: 
• Preventing fraud and corruption within Bank-financed projects. 
• Helping countries that request Bank support in their efforts to reduce corruption. 
• Taking corruption more explicitly into account in country assistance strategies, country lending 
considerations, the policy dialogue, analytical work, and the choice and design of projects. 
• Adding voice and support to international efforts to reduce corruption.2 
Although the Bank acknowledged that some of these areas were new territory and would require new 
staff, new areas of expertise, new procedures and new lending instruments, it claimed that it had long 
been concerned with corruption. Indeed, a recent report asserts that the Bank has been 'in the business' 
of combating corruption, 'since its very inception'.3 
However, until the mid-1990s, the Bank always argued that its Articles of Agreement, the 
rules that govern its activity,4 prohibited it from making decisions based on political considerations, 
and a country's political structure, its human rights record and corruption were all too political for the 
Bank to consider. Instead, if there was an economic case for lending to a corrupt and abusive regime, 
then the Bank was obligated to do so. Despite the fact that these same Articles of Agreement also 
require the Bank to ensure that its funds are spent as intended, it continued lending to corrupt regimes 
even when it was aware that Bank funds were being siphoned off. The Bank defended this by arguing 
firstly, that corruption is a political issue and therefore not part of its mandate, and secondly, that even 
if only a fraction of aid reached a country's poor, it is still better than no aid at all. Therefore, contrary 
to claims, the Bank's new framework for combating corruption does indeed mark a departure from its 
past approach. 
As with any international organisation, the Bank has evolved as an institution since its 
1 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank. Washington DC: 
World Bank, p. 2. 
2 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 3. 
3 Linn, J. (2001). "The World Bank's New Approach to Good Governance: Promises and Risks'. Transition 
Newsletter. 12(2), p. 2. 
4 World Bank (1944). Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(amended 1989). Internet. 4 November 1998. Available: http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/backgrd/ibrd 
/arttoc.htm. See Appendix 1 for an overview of the organisational iructurc of the Bank and its Articles of 
Agreement and Appendix 2 for Bank's organisational chart. 
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inception after World War I I . This change has come about in part because o f the historical environment 
in which it works. Changes in the developing countries that are its clients impact the way in which the 
Bank must do business, as do the political and economic needs o f the developed countries that provide 
funding for the Bank's work. Change has also come about in part because o f the evolutions in 
development theory, particularly regarding the role o f the state in relation to development. The gradual 
shifts in belief concerning the role that the state plays - planner, facilitator, problem or supporter - is 
important for understanding how and why the Bank developed its anti-corruption programme. 
This thesis develops an evaluation o f the World Bank's policies and strategies on anti-
corruption work in the context o f the global aid regime and the activities o f other agencies and 
institutions. This involves developing a history o f the Bank to understand its origins, character and 
mission; producing a history and analysis o f the Bank's involvement o f anti-corruption work; and 
situating the Bank's work in the context o f other anti-corruption strategies. Within the thesis, there are 
two major research questions: 
• Why and how the Bank arrived at its current position on anti-corruption work. 
• What components make up the Bank's anti-corruption programme. 
Under these headings, I also look at more detailed questions which help me to answer the larger 
questions. 
Regarding the first major research question - why and how - I have looked at several 
subsidiary questions. Was this brought about by a change o f mind within the Bank regarding 
corruption? Was it influenced by a change o f leadership within the Bank? Was it the result o f external 
influence or pressure, or was it instead a response to internal concerns? Was it the result o f a changing 
intellectual or ideological climate both inside and outside the Bank? Was this a top down or bottom up 
process within the Bank? Can the evolution o f policy be logically, politically or legally explained? Is 
anti-corruption work a fad - an obsession o f one Bank president - or is it structurally embedded and 
part o f the 'group mind'? 
The second major research question - the programme's components - requires a similar 
approach. Is there a clear line from the 1997 statement to the present day, or have there been diversions 
or blind alleys? Why were some components chosen and not others? Are some components particularly 
suitable or unsuitable for the Bank? Do the components ' f i t ' , or are they instead a set o f spare parts for 
an engine that has not yet been designed, let alone built? Is the programme coherent? I f not, why not? 
Is it internally consistent? I f not, why not? How does it f i t into the growing international effort to 
combat corruption? How does i t compare with other aid agency policies? Has it shaped the components 
o f other organisations' anti-corruption programmes? 
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The Bank is considered a leader among development agencies, because o f the resources it has 
available to spend on lending as well as on research, and this work has attracted much attention. 
Although there has been great interest from outside the Bank in its anti-corruption efforts, there has 
been no comprehensive study o f it. This makes this thesis particularly timely and important. 
In introductory section o f this chapter I have introduced the area under study - the World 
Bank's anti-corruption programme - and presented some o f the questions that w i l l be addressed in this 
thesis. In the next section, I provide an overview o f the contested nature of the Bank's non-political 
mandate, key to understanding the debate surrounding the development o f the Bank's programme. 
Finally, I set out my methodology and the thesis structure. 
Background: The Bank and Politics 
Throughout the thesis, I w i l l refer to the Bank's 'non-political mandate'. Unlike bilateral 
donors, the Bank ought not to take political considerations into account when making lending 
decisions. This non-political mandate was devised by the Bank's founders to protect it from the 
political vagaries o f the Cold War and was designed to 'assure all members [of the Bank] o f equality 
before the law...because membership involves both obligations and rights' . 5 The Bank is required to 
ensure that the money is used for the purposes o f the ban, 'w i th due attention to considerations of 
economy and efficiency and without regard to political and other non-economic influences or 
considerations' (Art. I I I . Sec. 5(b)). Art. 10. Sec. 10. states, "The Bank and its officers shall not 
interfere in the political affairs o f any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the 
political character o f the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be 
relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed inpartially in order to achieve the 
purposes stated in Art . I ' . 
The founders were all too aware o f the relationship between politics and economics. Indeed, 
'...such cognisance prompted them to emphasise the need to allow the Bank to operate as a universal, 
financial institution'. 6 In addition to protecting the Bank from Cold War politics, the mandate was 
designed to protect its reputation as a conservative, technocratic financial institution. 'Political 
considerations are supposed to be irrelevant..."especially as the Bank's credibility and strength has 
traditionally depended on its status as a quintessential technocracy exclusively concerned with 
economic efficiency"'. 7 According to the Bank itself, 'As a reflection o f the strength of the institution's 
capital backing as well as its prudent financial policies and risk controls, bonds issued by the World 
Bank have been AAA-rated since 1959... We have a record o f consistent profitability with annual net 
income exceeding USD 1 bil l ion for the past 15 years. World Bank lending is limited to sovereign-
5 Gold, Sir J. (1983). 'Political Considerations are Prohibited By Articles of Agreement when the Fund Considers 
Requests for Use of Resources" IMF Survey. 23 May, p. 147. Although Gold is referring specifically to the IMF, 
the same applies to the Bank. 
6 Shihata, I . (2000). The World Bank in a Changing World (Vol. III). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 
165. Ibrahim Shihata is the former General Counsel of the World Bank. 
7 George, S. & Sabelli, F. (1994). Faith and Credit: The World Bank's Secular Empire. London: Penguin Books, 
p. 150. Contains a partial quote from Shihata, I . (1991). The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays. 
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guaranteed projects and the Bank enjoys a preferred creditor status with its borrower-shareholders. I t 
has never declared a loan loss nor rescheduled any loan. Strict concentration limits and broad sector 
diversification further minimise lending risks. The Bank is one o f the most prudent and conservative 
financial institutions in the wor ld . ' 8 This preferred status enables the Bank to raise capital at favourable 
rates in order to lend at high volumes with low interest rates. 
Several authors refer to this as its 'apolitical mandate'.9 The Bank itself refers to its 'non-
political mandate'. There is a subtle distinction here. Apolitical means 'not political, [or] not 
concerned with pol i t ics ' . 1 0 This may describe the way the Bank used to look at development up until 
the 1980s, as this thesis w i l l show; however, it now accepts the role that politics plays in development 
and impacts its own projects. Nevertheless, because o f its mandate, the Bank may be concerned wi th 
politics but it is not allowed to work in the political sphere or to advocate one particular political 
system over another. This then is 'non-political' rather than 'apolitical ' , and I w i l l refer to it as such. 
Critics have accused the Bank o f behaving as a political actor, despite the Bank maintaining 
that it acts without political considerations. I t claimed this when it lent to non-democratic regimes, 
despite popular sentiment against such lending (e.g. South Afr ica under apartheid). I t has claimed this 
when lending to one o f its largest clients, China, despite the protests o f the US and various human 
rights groups. 1 1 However, this principle has not been consistently applied, and w i l l often depend on the 
amount o f leverage the Bank has in the borrowing country. 1 2 
According to Ayres, 'Political factors seemed to enter in to a greater extent for countries that 
were highly salient to the interests o f the foreign policy o f the most important donor countries (most 
notably the United States) or countries whose development policies, for whatever reasons, were highly 
conflictual and thus the subject o f relatively intense international attention and controversy'. ' 3 US 
involvement in the Bank has long been controversial. Critics o f the Bank have claimed that the Bank is 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
8 World Bank (2001). 'Financial Strength'. 1 February. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/debtsecurities/htnil 
/financiaLstrength.html. See Moody's (http://www.moodys.com) and Standard & Poor's 
(http://www.standardandpoors.com) for confirmation of the Bank's high credit rating. 
9 See, for example, Nelson, P. (1995). The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations: The Limits of 
Apolitical Development. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd.; Weaver, C. (2000). 'The Discourse of law and 
Economic Development in the World Bank'. Paper given at the MacArthur Conference on the Changing Role of 
Law in Emerging Markets and New Democracies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 24-26 March; Fleck, R. & 
Kilby, C. (2001). 'World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of U.S. Influence'. Mimeo. 
1 0 Pollard, E. (ed) (1994). The Oxford Paperback Dictionary (4th ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 33. 
1 1 See Hutchings, G. (1989). 'China Worried at Economic Cost of Crushing Dissent'. The Daily Telegraph. 20 
June. 
1 2 The Bank has little leverage over those countries who borrow little from it and can find adequate private finance 
- such as Botswana. In addition, it has little leverage over those countries with very high borrowing levels and 
who also find adequate private finance - such as India and China. It is the countries in between who are the most 
susceptible to Bank conditionality. Caufield writes, 'As [World] Bank officials are fond of observing - on 
condition of anonymity - i f you owe a bank $100,000, you worry; i f you owe it $100 million, the bank worries'. 
Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations. New York: Henry Holt and 
Co., p. 24. 
1 3 Ayres, R. (1883). Banking on the Poor: The World Bank and World Poverty. London: The MIT Press, pp. 72-
73. 
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subservient to US interests. Baldwin noted that these claims were usually rejected by the Bank itself, as 
well as by some academics. However, he did identify certain facts o f l i fe which should be taken into 
account. The US holds the largest number o f votes and is the largest potential contributor. The Bank 
has traditionally found a good deal o f its funding on the US capital market, although it has diversified 
its portfolio considerably since the 1970s.1 4 Finally, by unwritten agreement, the Bank president is 
always an American, and therefore is likely to have at the least an American cultural outlook. 1 5 
In 1988, the then Bank president Barber Conable said, ' " A l l o w me to be blunt: the political 
uncertainty and arbitrariness evident in so many parts o f Sub-Saharan Africa are major constraints on 
the region's development.../ am not advocating a political stance here, but I am advocating increased 
transparency and accountability in government, respect for human rights and adherence to the rule o f 
l a w " ' . 1 6 By now, many scholars saw the Bank's non-political stance as a myth, arguing that lending to 
nations is inherently political, especially because o f the influence o f powerful members, like the United 
States.17 Miller-Adams explains that '[t]he Bank's apolitical orientation, embodied both in the Articles 
o f Agreement and in the values and beliefs o f its staff, is a key example o f what sociologists call an 
"organisational myth". The point about such a myth is not whether i t is true or false, but that it plays an 
essential role in an institutions self-conception and quest for legi t imacy' . 1 8 
Gillies provides us with a useful typology to view the changing approach to politics within the 
World Bank (see Table 1.1). I f we compare Gillies typology to the f low chart on the changing role o f 
the state found on page two o f this chapter, we can see how they are linked. Chapters Two and Three o f 
this thesis elaborate on this. 
Table 1.1: Gillies' Four Eras of Politics in World Bank Lending 
1946-mid-1970s 
Mid-1970s to 1980 
1980s 
Late 1980s onwards 
Avoided politics by-and-large to build its reputation and credibility and also 
to stay out o f the Cold War 
Carter's human rights legislation; 'hotch potch application' 
Reagan influenced for geopolitical and ideological reasons 
Rise o f political conditionality and good governance 
Source: Gillies, D. (1996). 'Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance: Stretching the World Bank's 
Policy Frontiers'. In Griesgraber, J.M. & Gunter, B. (eds). The World Bank: Lending on a Global Scale. 
London: Pluto Press, p. 119. 
1 4 See Chapter Two for discussion of Bank funding. 
1 5 Baldwin, D. (1966). Economic Development and American Foreign Policy 1943-1962. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, p. 32. A recent statistical analysis suggests that US interests do play a role in some Bank lending 
decisions, but that patterns differ depending on US administration and economic and political circumstances. This 
relationship is thus, according to the study, evolving rather than stable. See Fleck, R. & Kilby, C. (2001). 'World 
Bank Independence', Mimeo. 
1 6 Cited in Gillies, D. (1996). 'Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance', p. 115 (emphasis in original). 
1 7 Gillies, D. (19%). 'Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance', p. 105. 
1 8 Miller-Adams, M. (1997). "The World Bank in the 1990s: Understanding Institutional Change'. Unpublished 
PhD thesis, Columbia University, p. 64. 
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Through the decades that followed its inauguration in 1944, this non-political mandate 
accorded with theories on development and the general consensus on the role o f multilateral versus 
bilateral aid and the largely technical nature o f Bank lending (e.g., road building, dam building). Wi th 
the large amount o f capital available for developing countries f rom private banks, the Bank had to keep 
lending just to retain the Bank's position as leader, regardless o f the nature o f the regime. 1 9 
Furthermore, according to Mason and Asher, the Bank often cut lending to newly democratic countries 
because o f their unsatisfactory economic performance, while concurrently increasing loans to military 
dictatorships with the power to implement austerity measures.20 
Until the late 1980s, the Bank maintained, as did many others in both aid agencies and 
academia, that authoritarian regimes were the best facilitators o f economic development, especially in 
light o f the politically unviable austerity programmes prescribed by the Bank under structural 
adjustment. 2 1 It was widely agreed that authoritarian regimes were better at managing economic 
development and growth, as well as maintaining a stable political climate. Even liberal donors such as 
Sweden lent to brutal regimes in the belief that the poor would be better o f f with the help than 
without. 2 2 Indeed, the Bank argued that its work in non-democratic countries was vital because its 
mission was to help the poor regardless o f the regime, and the 'worst' countries might have found it 
diff icul t to f ind funding elsewhere.2 3 Table 1.2 lists the Bank's top twenty recipients o f loans and 
credits f rom 1948 to 1980. Countries that have had authoritarian governments at some point during that 
period are highlighted. As we can see, only India has been a democracy during the entire period. I f the 
Bank had only financed democracies, it would have had a very limited lending portfolio indeed. 
1 9 Shapley, D. (1993). Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Co., pp. 544-547. 
2 0 Mason, E. and Asher, R. (1973). The World Bank Since Bretton Woods. Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institutions, p. 478. Caufield gives the examples of Romania, Brazil and Bangladesh, which all received large 
loans from the Bank under aithoritarian regimes, but had their funding cut after subsequent (or in the case of 
Brazil, prior) democratic transitions. In these cases, right-wing authoritarian regimes were perceived as more 
effective managers of the economy, because they 'could move fester than the public will tolerate'. Caufield, C. 
(1996). Masters of Illusion : The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations. New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., pp. 
209-212. 
2 1 For a more in depth discussion of the relationship between democracy and development, see Chapter Three. 
2 2 Nelson, J. (1992). 'Good Governance: Democracy and Conditional Economic Aid ' . In Mosley, P. (ed). 
Development Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Conditionality in Less Developed 
Countries. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., p. 310; Hoogvelt, A. (1997). Globalisation and the Post-Colonial 
World: The New Political Economy of Development. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., p. 172; Shapley, D. (1993). 
Promise and Power, p. 546. 
2 3 Ayres, R. (1983). Banhngon the Poor, p. 56. 
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Table 1.2: Twenty Largest Recipients of Bank Loans, IDA Credits, and Bank/I DA Resources 
Combined, Cumulative, 1948 to 1980 (in US$ millions) 2 4 
Bank IDA Bank/IDA 
Brazil 5,313.7 India 8,285.2 India 11,055.8 
Mexico 4,113.6 Bangladesh 1,454.2 Brazil 5,313.7 
Indonesia 3,056.0 Pakistan 1,244.9 Mexico 4,113.6 
South Korea 2,948.5 Indonesia 931.8 Indonesia 3,987.8 
India 2,770.6 Egypt 783.6 South Korea 3,059.3 
Colombia 2,761.4 Tanzania 538.7 Colombia 2,780.9 
Yugoslavia 2,684.1 Sudan 522.5 Yugoslavia 2,684.1 
Turkey 2,407.4 Kenya 408.3 Turkey 2,585.9 
Philippines 2,389.9 Sri Lanka 369.6 Philippines 2,512.1 
Thailand 1,960.4 Ethiopia 368.1 Pakistan 2,128.9 
Romania 1,502.8 Burma 363.0 Thailand 2,089.9 
Morocco 1,437.3 Zaire 277.0 Egypt 1,908.6 
Nigeria 1,380.7 Madagascar 255.2 Romania 1,502.8 
Argentina 1,350.3 Nepal 235.7 Bangladesh 1,500.3 
Iran 1,210.7 Cameroon 230.5 Morocco 1,488.1 
Malaysia 1,132.6 Yemen Arab 208.3 Nigeria 1,416.2 
Republic 
Egypt 1,129.0 Senegal 187.7 Argentina 1,350.3 
Algeria 1,091.0 Ghana 179.0 Iran 1,210.7 
Pakistan 884.0 Turkey 178.5 Kenya 1,197.6 
Japan 862.9 Mali 173.2 Malaysia 1,132.6 
Source: Ayres, R. (1983). Bankingon the Poor, p. 258. 
During the bipolar race for balance o f power during the Cold War, both the US and USSR 
sought to 'purchase' the loyalty o f developing nations through aid, 2 5 and recipients often held a degree 
of power in these negotiations. Fearing that rejected states would turn instead to communist countries 
for aid, the West propped up several totalitarian regimes in order to stabilise the political climate. 2 6 
Some more notorious examples include Chile under Pinochet, the Philippines under Marcos, Uganda 
under Amin, Equatorial Guinea under Macias, and perhaps most famously, Zaire under Mobutu. It was 
not only this unique political climate that encouraged both bilateral and multilateral donors to support 
authoritarian regimes. There were simply many more dictators in the developing world than there are 
today (see Table 1.3 below). As the norm, rather than the exception, donors were unlikely to take the 
nature o f a political regime into account when distributing aid. I f they did, there would indeed be few 
recipients to take advantage o f aid. 
2 4 Bank lending commenced in 1948; IDA lending commenced in 1961. 
2 5 Illustrated by a 1976 quote from Henry Kissinger 'Disaster relief is becoming increasingly a major part of our 
foreign policy'; cited in De Waal, A. (1997). 'Democratising the Aid Encounter in Africa'. International Affairs. 
73(4), October, p. 625. 
2 6 Hoogvelt, A. (1997). Globalisation and the Post-Colonial World: The New Political Economy of Development. 
London: Macmillan Press Ltd., p. 172. 
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Table 1.3: Democratisation in the Modern World 2 7 
Year Democratic States Non-democratic 
States 
Total States Percentage 
Democratic o f 
Total States 
1922 29 35 64 45.3 
1942 12 49 61 19.7 
1962 36 75 111 32.4 
1973 30 92 122 24.6 
1990 59 71 130 45.4 
Source: Huntington (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, p. 26. 
The fa l l o f communism in the late 1980s ended this almost universal consensus, and instead 
democratic governments were seen as the best facilitators o f development. The Bank joined other 
donors in promoting the idea that good governance was a pre-condition for economic growth, including 
accountable and transparent decision-making, an independent judiciary, a free press, increased popular 
participation through a vital c iv i l society, and finally, a commitment to combating corruption. Many 
donors now require a commitment to democratisation as a condition o f aid, which includes respect for 
the principles listed above, but only the Bank has stopped short o f calling this 'democracy'. 
Work on corruption makes the Bank's non-political mandate much more problematic. In 
recent texts on anti-corruption work, the Bank has become much more explicit in referring to the role 
of politics in combating corruption. A report on corruption in transition countries highlights the 
importance o f political competition for increasing the accountability of leaders.28 The same report 
defines political accountability as referring to 'the constraints placed on the behaviour o f politicians 
and public officials by organisations and constituencies having the power to apply sanctions to them' . 2 9 
In other words, the Bank is advocating the need for competitive elections to combat corruption. 
Looking at public sector reform, another recent Bank document highlights three important 
'drivers' o f reform: rules and restraints (including constitutional separation o f powers), participation 
(including representative decision-making and political oversight) and competition (including political 
competition). 3 0 However, ' [ i ] t is not being suggested that active involvement to build all o f these types 
o f institutions falls within the Bank's mandate'. 3 1 Clearly, this is an important caveat given that the 
Bank is proposing liberal democracy as a means o f reforming the public sector. Referring to 
decentralisation as important for fostering participation, the report states, '[t]he political rationale for 
Huntington defines democracy as those with open, free and fair elections; limitations on power; stability of 
institutions; and with electoral competition and widespread voting participation. Waves of democratisation are 
defined as 'a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period 
of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time'. 
Huntington (1991). The Third Wave, pp. 9-12, 15. This estimate of regime numbers omits countries with 
population of less than one million. 
2 8 World Bank (2000). Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate. Washington DC: World 
Bank, pp. 40-41. 
2 9 World Bank (2000). Anticorruption in Transition, p. xxii. 
3 0 World Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank Strategy. 
Washington DC: World Bank, p. 23. 
3 1 World Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance, p. 23. 
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decentralisation is the desire to move decision-making closer to people to foster greater democracy. 
The economic rationale is based on gains in allocative ef f ic iency ' . 3 2 One is left to guess where the 
Bank has learned o f the 'political rationale for decentralisation' as there are no references available, 
and it does not take into account the many established democracies with highly centralised 
administrations, especially in Europe. 
In the Africa region, the Bank speaks o f '[a]mending the constitution to redefine the role o f 
the state, introduce new governance arrangements, change the machinery o f government or alter the 
balance o f power among the executive and the parliament', 3 3 as i f these things are the same as a 
management restructure. Goran Hyden has asserted that governance is really like business management 
theory: "Tn the same way as business management theory treats the organisation as crucial to business 
success, the governance approach treats regime - the organisation o f political relations - as essential 
for social and economic progress'". 3 4 Herein lies the danger in trying to take the politics out o f things 
that are inherently political, such as regime choice, participation and government structure. It is simply 
not possible to do and is likely to fail or to drive the Bank into a more explicitly political direction. 
Increasingly, voices within the Bank are calling out for it to cast aside its non-political 
mandate and embrace democracy as a condition for Bank lending. Joseph Stiglitz, formerly the Bank's 
Chief Economist, connected its work on corruption to democratisation. 'Earlier, discussions of 
corruption would have been o f f limits for the World Bank, which was generally proscribed from 
engaging in political matters not directly related to development. But the new thinking argues that there 
is no bright line o f demarcation: corruption, though a matter o f politics, is at the heart o f 
underdevelopment. But once that line has been broached, the limits o f what should be h the Bank's 
purview are no longer clear. Openness, transparency, and democratic processes provide an important 
check on the operation o f special interest groups and the extent o f corrupt ion. ' 3 5 Indeed, Stiglitz calls 
on the Bank to 'support democratic p lura l ism' . 3 6 
Another statement made by former World Bank Vice President for East Asia and the Pacific, 
Jean-Michel Severino, 3 7 could have far-reaching implications for the Bank as a whole. Referring to 
Indonesia, he said, ' I t is very clear that i f we came to a situation where these governance, democracy 
and human rights goals were not present in the government, I don't see how there could be any 
financial, political or technical support from the international community ' . 3 8 Furthermore, these 
World Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance, p. 24. 
3 3 World Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance, p. 77. 
3 4 Cited in Saul, J. (1997). 'For Fear of Being Condemned as Old Fashioned: Liberal Democracy versus Popular 
Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa'. Review of African Political Economy. 24(73), p. 347. Hyden is Professor of 
Political Science at the University of Florida and worked as a consultant for the World Bank on governance issues. 
3 5 Stiglitz, J. (2000). 'Introduction'. In Gilbert, C. & Vines, D. (eds). The World Bank: Structure and Policies. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 3. 
3 6 Stiglitz, J. (2000). 'Introduction', p. 4. 
3 7 Soon after these interviews were given, Mr. Severino left the Bank to return to the French Finance Ministry. 
3 8 World Bank.(2000). 'World Bank Ties $4.7 BLN Jakarta Support to Democracy, Rights', Development News, 
212. 
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conditions apply to all countries, not just Indonesia. Mr. Severino is also said to have acknowledged the 
role o f World Bank efforts to spread democracy. 3 9 It w i l l be interesting to see i f democracy is to 
become an overall condition o f lending, or i f this is simply an overzealous staff member speaking out 
o f turn. It is too early to tell. One thing is for certain: i f the Bank is to require moves towards 
democratisation as a condition for lending, it w i l l have to amend its Articles o f Agreement!*0 
Significantly, during separate interviews wi th three senior Bank staff, I was told that 'we're pushing the 
envelope' on the Board to approve this sort o f amendment. 
Kapur and Webb refer to the 'legal wriggles' needed to address corruption because o f the 
Bank's mandate. ' I f it is true that one cannot wade into water without getting wet, [governance-related 
conditionalities (GRCs), including corruption] w i l l inevitably increase the politicization o f the 
[international financial institutions (IFIs)], tarnishing the technocratic smock that provides credibility to 
their prescriptions. I f the IFIs have always been vulnerable to the political pressures o f their mam 
shareholders, GRC opens the door more widely' . 4 1 
Since the early 1990s, the World Bank has been responsible, directly or indirectly, for the 
majority o f research available on corruption. The research is economics-led and avoids, for the most 
part, directly addressing overtly political issues, which the Bank says includes 'election processes or 
the structure and financing o f political parties' . 4 2 Table 1.4 highlights areas o f primary concern for anti-
corruption strategies for select donor agencies, including the Bank, and it illustrates how all-
encompassing the Bank's approach is. There are also many areas - including accountability, human 
rights, a free media, and civi l society- that are associated wi th notions o f democracy. 4 3 
3 9 Cited in World Bank (2000). 'World Bank Official Warns Asia to Fight Corruption'. Development News, 14/2. 
Original: International Herald Tribune, 12/2, p. E. Mamadou Dia, World Bank Country Director for Cote 
d'lvoire, told a news briefing that the Bank only dealt with 'constitutional governments', unless it could be proven 
that 'de facto' governments were stable and upheld international obligations. World Bank (2000). 'World Bank 
Warns of Aid Suspension for Cote d'lvoire'. Development News, 4/2. Although a constitutional government need 
not be a democracy, it is another example of the Bank publicly choosing one form of government over another. 
4 0 'An amendment of the Bank's Articles of Agreement requires a formal approval by Bank members through a 
process which ultimately needs a majority of 60 percent of the members having 85 percent of the total voting 
power (80 percent in the case of IDA) ' . Shihata, I . (2000). The World Bank in a Changing World, Vol. III. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 152, note 35. 
4 1 Kapur, D. & Webb, R, (2000). 'Governance-related Conditionalities of the International Financial Institutions'. 
G-24 Discussion Paper No. 6, New York: UN, p. 16. 
4 2 World Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance, p. 62. 
4 3 Few would agree with Przeworski et al. who declare that '...we do not think that "accountability", 
"responsibility", "responsiveness" or "representation" should be treated as definitional features of democracies'. 
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J.A. & Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy and Development: Political 
Institutions and Weil-Being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 33. This 
reduces democracy to the notion of freely contestable elections, a dissatisfying notion of democracy for most. 
24 
Table 1.4: Donor Approaches to Anti-Corruption' 
World 
Bank 
USAD3 UNDP DflD E U 
Accountability X X X X X 
Civil society x X X X X 
Decentralisation X X 
Democracy X X X X 
Human rights X X X X X 
Legal reform X X X 
Media X X 
NGOs X X X X X 
Partnership building X X X 
Private sector X X X 
Privatisation X X 
Public sector X X X X X 
Service delivery X X X 
Transparency X X X X X 
Watchdogs X X 
Source: Marquette, H. (2001). "Comiption, Democracy and the World Bank'. Crime, Law & Social Change. 36(4), p. 
401. 
The Bank's research on corruption attempts to separate the political and economic from issues 
like c iv i l society. It assumes that issues like privatisation are inherently economic, ignoring political 
arguments about the role o f the state and the provision o f public services. As Fil l ip points out, "The 
assumed ability to separate the economic and political dimensions o f governance [and corruption] is 
what allows the Bank to address governance issues without going beyond its mandate'. 4 5 The Bank 
continues to churn out research at an astounding rate to remind us o f the economic implications o f 
these issues and to de-emphasises the political. It is this research that drives the direction o f the Bank's 
anti-corruption w o r k . 4 6 
In a current study o f the World Bank's work on legal reform, Weaver addresses the challenges 
that the Bank's non-political mandate poses for this work, which it claims 'can be addressed through 
apolitical, technical assistance as allowed under the Bank's mandate'. 4 7 She cites Lawrence Tshuma, 
who writes o f the inherently political nature o f legal reform. '"Despite its claims to the contrary, by 
advising governments on, and by lending for, law reform programmes, the Bank is involved in a 
process o f social restructuring which involves the use o f state power and is therefore po l i t i ca l ' " . 4 8 
Referring to a number o f studies o f legal reform in Latin America, Weaver concludes that 'clinging to 
the myth o f apolitical development and fail ing to take political factors into account may hinder the 
effective design and implementation o f legal reform projects ' . 4 9 
A blank space does not imply disagreement with or indifference with the approach. The Bank does identify 
human rights as an important issue, but de-links rights from political issues. See World Bank (1992), Governance 
and Development. Washington DC: World Bank. 
4 5 Fillip, B. (1997). 'The World Bank and Governance', p. 70. 
4 6 Chapter Four covers this topic in depth. 
4 7 Weaver, C. (2000). 'The Discourse of Law and Economic Development in the World Bank', p. 19. 
4 8 Cited in Weaver, C. (2000). 'The Discourse of Law and Economic Development in the World Bank', p. 19. 
Original: Tshuma, L. (1999). 'The Political Economy of the World Bank's Legal Framework for Economic 
Development'. Social & Legal Studies. 8(1), pp. 75-96. 
4 9 Weaver, C. (2000). 'The Discourse of Law and Economic Development in the World Bank', p. 20. 
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Speaking before a group o f NGOs in 2000, James Wolfensohn, the current Bank president, 
explained how the Bank became interested in tackling corruption: 
Let me say f i rs t -off that until three years ago, the word 'corruption' was never mentioned 
at the World Bank. As some o f you may know, the true story that when I got to the Bank, 
the General Counsel called me in to give me my briefing on what I could do and what I 
could not do as President o f the Bank. And he said the one thing you cannot do is to talk 
about the 'c ' word. And I said what is the 'c ' word? He said the V word is corruption. 
And under the charter o f the Bank you are not allowed to talk about politics and 
corruption is politics. Therefore, don't talk about the 'c ' word. You can talk about 
anything else. You can talk about social justice, you can talk about poverty, but for 
God's sakes don't talk about the V word because you w i l l get fired. Your shareholders 
won't like it. 
And that is not an allegorical story. That is, in fact, a true story. I took this for about two 
years until I recognized that there was no way to deal with the issue o f equity and 
poverty and development without tackling the question o f corruption. So, I came out in 
my Annual Meeting speech, I said corruption is a cancer and it is not political but it is 
social and it is economic and, therefore, I am allowed to talk about i t . And i f you 
politicians think that it is political, that is your problem. I think it is social and economic. 
Therefore, I can talk about i t . 5 0 
Wolfensohn has been backed by the US government, which blames the previous lack o f focus on 
corruption on 'overly restrictive interpretations o f their Articles o f Agreement against consideration o f 
noneconomic factors in their activities' and 'reluctance' on the part o f the Executive Directors to tackle 
the issue. 5 1 
The former Gsneral Counsel o f the World Bank, Ibrahim Shihata, referred to in the above 
quote from Wolfensohn, has highlighted his areas o f particular concern: lack o f competence, the Bank 
acting as both judge and j u ry to determine the quality o f a country's political system, the implications 
for the Bank's reputation on the financial markets and the impact on the poor. 'Conferring on the 
World Bank a direct and explicit political role for which it has neither the mandate nor the competence 
would...raise major legal and political issues...Plainly, these provisions do not envisage a role for the 
World Bank in the political reform o f its borrowing members'. 5 2 
5 0 Wolfensohn, J.D. (2000). 'NGO Meeting with Mr. Wolfensohn'. Prague, Czech Republic, 22 September. 
Available at http://www.wroldbank.org/htmiyextdr/am00/ts092200a.htm. 
5 1 Center for Strategic and International Studies (1998). The United States and the Multilateral Development 
Banks. Washington DC: The CSIS Press, p. 40. It should be noted that the US Executive Director has shown no 
such reluctance. Indeed, the US government strongly supports the World Bank's anti-corruption initiatives and the 
changes initiated by Wolfensohn. See USGAO (2000). 'World Bank: Management Controls Stronger, but 
Challenges in Fighting Corruption Remain'. Report to Congressional Committees, GAO/NSIAD-00-73, April. 
26 
Even i f it were to amend the Articles, a di f f icul t and laborious process, its entire culture would 
require restructuring as well . The Bank is staffed largely by economists, and its programmes evolve out 
of the perceived primacy o f economic concerns. A new emphasis on democracy would require that 
more political scientists, anthropologists and sociologists jo in the Bank. I would also require new 
products, new monitoring systems, a switch to qualitative, rather than quantitative measurements for 
assessment, in addition to the acceptance o f the international community as a whole that the Bank 
belongs in the 'democracy game'. As this thesis w i l l show, there have been some changes made to 
accommodate the needs o f this new work but it is not clear i f enough has been done, or indeed i f the 
changes that have already been made are appropriate given the Bank's nature as an institution. 
Methodology 
In order to address my research questions, I have used both data analysis and interviews (face-
to-face and phone). The World Bank has had a reputation for being reticent in releasing information to 
the public, making analysis o f its projects and programmes by outsiders problematic. This has changed 
somewhat over the past few years following the implementation in 1993 of the Disclosure o f 
Information Policy (currently under review). 5 3 As the Bank began to require transparency and 
accountability from its borrowers, it was subject to similar calls from its members (notably the US) and 
from critics. It now makes much more information available but maintains discretion on this 
availability. 'External release o f some information may be precluded on an ad hoc basis when, because 
of its content, wording, or timing, disclosure would be detrimental to the interests o f the Bank, a 
member country, or Bank s taf f . ' 5 4 In addition, all documents must pass through a lengthy vetting 
process in order to move into the public realm. The combination o f this ad hoc approach to publication 
and the vetting process leaves considerable gaps in information within Bank documents, despite the 
new approach to disclosure. 
Bank documents are therefore vital but not sufficient to build an understanding o f its anti-
corruption programme. The vetting process ensures that material considered inappropriate is deleted 
(e.g., confidential information, explicit criticisms, anything that contradicts off ic ia l policy or strategy). 
Despite this process, conflicts do arise within documents and need to be clarified. Furthermore, it is 
often the things that documents leave unsaid that are the most vital to understanding the Bank's 
strategy. In addition, omissions and ambiguities in documents allow staff with differing viewpoints to 
coexist without facing a confrontation. It is important to distinguish between, and understand, these 
instances and those where errors in the editing process lead to inconsistencies. Therefore, I have used a 
number o f face-to-face interviews o f key Bank personnel and other relevant agencies to build a more 
complete analysis. Where appropriate, I have also used phone interviews and personal correspondence 
to achieve similar results. M y interviewees were selected ushg the following criteria: (a) staff involved 
early on with programme development, (b) policy-making staff (c) regional representatives, (d) staff 
5 2 Shihata, I . (2000). The World Bank in a Changing World, Vol. Ill, p. 152-153, 148. 
5 3 World Bank (2000). 'World Bank Policy on Information Disclosure (Discussion Draft)'. Internet. Accessed 
September 2000. Available at htt^://www.worldbank.org/hrml/pic/a^sclosure/draftpolicy-en.pdf. 
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responsible for internal controls, (d) staff responsible for research and evaluation, (e) executive 
directors with stated interest in the programme, ( f ) academics working with the Bank to develop the 
programme, and (g) NGOs working with the Bank. I used semi-structured interviews to clarify 
documentary inconsistency or omissions and to ver ify information gleaned from other interviews. 
In some cases I chose to tape the interviews, but this rarely occurred in my interviews with 
Bank staff. I found that interviewees were more relaxed and open i f I did not produce a tape recorder. 
Instead, I recorded the interviews on paper and typed it up as soon as possible after its conclusion, 
preferably within the hour. Although these transcripts are not as complete as those that were taped, the 
actual data gathered is likely to be superior. A t the beginning o f each interview I explained my interest 
and that the interview could be used as part o f my thesis. Interviewees then made distinctions between 
on-the-record and off-the-record information. No off-the-record information in included here, although 
sometimes organisational sensitivities prevent me from identifying sources. These are referred to in the 
text as 'confidential personal communication' or 'senior staff member'. Appendix 3 provides an 
overview o f my methodology, with descriptions o f documents consulted and in-depth information 
regarding interviewees. Appendix 4 provides a list o f interviewees including their institutional 
affiliation. 
I would also like to offer a couple o f caveats here. Firstly, the Bank is a vast and complex 
institution. It appears to some as an unchanging and highly technocratic bureaucracy that either does its 
job well and is a highly efficient leader in the global marketplace, or instead a behemoth that never 
learns the lessons o f its failures and always insists on 'business as usual'. On the other hand, some see 
it as a vastly changing and f lu id institution that either easily adapts to the changing political and 
economic environments in a way that reflects the needs o f its members, or instead insists on simply 
tacking on new philosophies and new sectors without any real rethink o f the needs o f its members. The 
truth is that the Bank can be all o f these things at the same time. By using documents, news reports and 
interviews, you can shed different light and shadow on the same issues depending on the sources used, 
thus highlighting the need for openness and alertness when analysing the data. In addition, when the 
Bank does change, it does so rapidly. I have had to be flexible in the development o f this research to 
accommodate many changes in a vast programme that the Bank refers to as 'evolving'. Because o f this 
I have tried to balance detailed analysis with some broad generalisations. 
Structure o f the Thesis 
Chapter Two looks at the way the Bank has developed as an institution since its inception 
in 1944 to show how it reacts as an institution to changes in the political and theoretical environments. 
The direction that Bank policy has taken in the past has largely been the result o f changes in its 
environment, and this chapter provides the basis to show that good governance and anti-corruption 
See http://www.worldbank.Org/whatwedo/policies.hhn#disclosure. 
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work are no different f rom past efforts. Indeed, we can see how the Bank has been largely a reactive 
force in development, rather than a proactive one, despite its claims that it has often acted as a 'leader'. 
Chapter Three builds an in-depth analysis o f the introduction o f good governance and 
anti-corruption work at the Bank. Anti-corruption work has developed out o f its interest in good 
governance, and the two are inextricably linked. Digging back through Bank documents and through 
interviews with key Bank staff, I show that the Bank has long had an interest in working on corruption. 
However, the prevailing political climate needed to change before it was able to address the issue as it 
had long desired. These changes finally came with the end o f the Cold War and the continuing failure 
o f structural adjustment to make a significant impact on economic growth in developing countries. 
Increased media attention to the problems o f corruption for development, largely as a result o f the work 
o f Transparency International, also helped the Bank to explicitly address the issue without amending its 
non-political mandate. 
Using Bank documents, media accounts, and interviews, Chapter Four provides a 
thorough analysis o f the Bank's current anti-corruption work by focusing on its four-part strategy: 
minimising corruption in its own work; helping countries build anti-corruption programmes; 
mainstreaming corruption as a focus in its lending operations; and forming international coalitions to 
fight corruption. Although this chapter appears to cover a very narrow area, it is actually broad, 
encompassing areas like procurement, public sector management, community empowerment, civil 
society, the media, international organisations, financial management, often both from a procedural and 
a theoretical perspective. The result is an anti-corruption programme at the Bank that is impressive in 
parts but unmanageable in its entirety. 
Chapter Five focuses on the notion o f 'comparative advantage', wi th bilateral and 
multilateral donors each claiming advantage in some aspect o f anti-corruption work. This chapter w i l l , 
in the first section, provide an overview o f major donors' programmes, highlighting the area identified 
by that organisation as its area o f 'comparative advantage'. The second section offers an evaluation o f 
these claims and how they impinge on the future work o f the World Bank. Finally, Chapter Six 
concludes the thesis. 
29 
Chapter Two: The Emergence of a Development Agency, 
1944-1981 
In 1997, the World Bank announced a commitment to combating corruption within its own 
projects and within its client countries. The first has always been a concern o f the Bank since its 
inception. The second marked a complete departure from past Bank activity, where the Bank had dealt 
with some o f the world's most notoriously corrupt dictators and political regimes, often in the face o f 
heavy criticism from many o f its shareholders. This current focus on corruption at the World Bank 
must thus be seen both within the context o f an overall international movement and as the result o f 
certain historical events. I t is important to examine the changing philosophy o f development at the 
Bank, wi th the Bank both informing and being informed by changes in development theory, and also 
the significance o f changes in Bank leadership. 
The Bank does not formulate policy in a bubble. 5 5 In turn, its position as a leader among 
development agencies, and the propensity o f donors to develop policies through a process o f osmosis 5 6 
means that any changes at the Bank gradually trickle down into other donor programmes. When 
producing an analysis o f the Bank's anti-corruption programme, it is important to develop an 
understanding o f where it has come from - both in a historical context and in a theoretical one. The 
Bank is affected by both external factors and actors. It is subject to the vagaries o f history - such as war 
and social upheaval - just like any international organisation. Its work also has a symbiotic relationship 
with development theory. It feeds o f f o f existing theory and practice but also contributes greatly to the 
discourse through its own vast research.57 In the words o f its former General Counsel, 'The World 
Bank does not exist in a vacuum. It deals with a world that undergoes constant changes in a fast 
increasing pace. Changes occur not only in the economic conditions and relationships the Bank is 
meant to address, and in their underlying political, social and environmental underpinnings, but also in 
the expectations o f its members, the ideological orientation o f its work and continuously evolving 
development economic theories'. 5 8 
For an analysis of the way policy is developed at the Bank, see Miller-Adams, M. (1997). 'The World Bank in 
the 1990s: Understanding Institutional Change'. Unpublished PhD thesis, Columbia University. 
3 6 Biersteker refers to the 'mimetic' nature of the multilateral development bank (MDBs) and donor agencies. See, 
Biersteker, T. (1990). 'Reducing the Role of the State in the Economy: A Conceptual Exploration of IMF and 
World Bank Prescriptions'. International Studies Quarterly, 34, pp. 477-492. 
5 7 This role has grown in recent years. According to the Bank, 'The World Bank Group embarked on a new vision 
in 1996—to become a Knowledge Bank that spurs the knowledge revolution in developing countries and acts as a 
global catalyst for creating, sharing, and applying the cutting-edge knowledge necessary for poverty reduction and 
economic development'. See http:Www.worldbank.org/knowledgebank/. 
5 8 Shihata, I . (2000). The World Bank in a Changing World, Vol. III. Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International, p. vii . 
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Figure 2.1: Evolutionary Process: Anti-Corruption Work at the World Bank 
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This chapter w i l l trace this historical trajectory from the Bank's early focus on project-based 
lending to the important shift to policy-based lending under Robert McNamara, and w i l l highlight 
certain internal and external factors which led to today's policy on corruption. This evolutionary path 
can be seen in Figure 2.1. This is important in order to understand the evolutionary process o f such a 
significant shift in focus, leading as i t does to an increased politicisation o f Bank policy. I w i l l locate 
myself back into the introduction o f anti-corruption work into its agenda in the fol lowing chapter. 
The World Bank and Bretton Woods 
During World War I I , allied government officials, especially in the US and U K , realised that 
stability o f international economic markets and reform o f the international trade system would be 
essential factors in the ultimate establishment o f long-term peace.5 9 Two of the most prominent 
economists o f the time independently developed plans for international economic institutions which 
5 9 See, for example, Morganthau, H. (1945). 'Bretton Woods and International Co-operation'. Foreign Affairs. 
23(2), pp. 182-194. 
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would bring about stability in the post-war world, separately and without one another's knowledge. 
Harry Dexter White, the director of the Division of Monetary Research and chief economic advisor to 
US Treasury Secretary Henry Morganthau, developed the American plan. The British plan was 
developed by Lord John Maynard Keynes, the pre-eminent economist of the age and an advisor to the 
British Treasury. 
In 1944, President Roosevelt invited the forty-four Allied nations to the Mount Washington 
Hotel near the Bretton Woods resort in the White Mountains of New Hampshire to discuss the 
American and British Joint Statement.60 In July, more than four hundred delegates arrived, in order to 
spend twenty-one days discussing the Joint Statement, using it as a framework to draft the Articles of 
Agreement, as well as establishing organisational details and dealing with the special interests of 
member countries.61 It was at Bretton Woods that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, or World Bank) were born in order 
' [t]o assist in the reconstruction and development.. .of members by facilitating the investment of capital 
for productive purposes...to promote foreign investment...[and] to promote the long-range balanced 
growth of international trade'.6 2 However, the introduction of the Marshall Plan6 3 in the same year left 
the Bank without its primary goal of reconstruction. Work on development had been an afterthought, 
pushed for by Latin American delegates to Bretton Woods. The Bank had faced immediate.criticism 
from the developing world that its management team cared more about placating Wall Sreet than 
aiding less developed countries (LDCs), but with the Marshall Plan, the Bank turned its full attention to 
the LDCs. 6 4 
White and Keynes originally intended to head the IMF and Bank, respectively, setting 
precedent for one to be headed by an American and one by a European. The death of Keynes and 
murmurs in Washington about White's alleged Communist ties6 5 made this impossible, so Camille 
Gutt, the former finance minister of Belgium, was appointed as president of the IMF on 7 May 1946. 
No financiers were found willing to deal with the inevitable politics of heading the Bank, so Truman 
finally appointed Eugene Meyer, publisher of The Washington Post on 25 June. Meyer believed that 
Prepared by the Americans and British in Atlantic City in late June 1944. 
6 1 Mikesell, R. (1994). 'The Bretton Woods Debates: A Memoir'. Essays in International Finance No. 192, 
Princeton University, pp. 4-5. 
6 2 Article 1 of the Bank's Articles of Agreement, in World Bank (1944). Articles of Agreement of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (amended 1989). Available at 
httpy/www. worldbank.org/html/extdr/backgrd/ibrd/ 
arttoc.htm. 
6 3 The Marshall Plan, formally known as the European Recovery Programme, was established by US Secretary of 
State, George C. Marshall, to provide credit for rebuilding Western Europe, the costs of which were severely 
underestimated by the drafters of the Bank. In total, over US$12.5 billion in aid was transferred to sixteen 
countries in Europe from 1947 until the Plan was phased out in 1951. See Mason, E. & Asher, R. (1973). The 
World Bank Since Bretton Woods. Washington DC: The Brookings Institutions, p. 3. 
6 4 Mason, E. & Asher, R. (1973). The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, p. 51. 
6 5 Four years after Bretton Woods, White was named as a Communist spy, and was forced to testify before the 
Committee on Un-American Activities on 13 August 1948. Although acquitted, he died of a heart attack three days 
later. See Boughton, J. (1998). 'Harry Dexter White and the International Monetary Fund'. Finance & 
Development, 35(3), pp. 39-41. 
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the new Bank would have to make very prudent initial lending decisions in order to build a solid 
reputation among investors; however, his directors wanted to begin disbursing funds immediately.66 
Chile was the first developing country to apply to the Bank for funds in September 1946, only 3 
months after its opening. The $40 mill ion 6 7 loan application presented only a vague outline of possible 
projects for its use. At the time, Chile was in default on over $300 million in foreign bonds, and Meyer 
refused to make the loan, to the consternation of his directors. The US executive director, Emilio G. 
Collado and Meyer argued vehemently over whether or not the Bank should 'simply hand out money' 
or make decisions based on sound judgement.68 Confrontations such as this led to Meyer's resignation 
in December, a mere six months after accepting the presidency. Chile did eventually became the first 
recipient of a Bank loan for development, but not until March 1948, in the amount of $13.5 million for 
the building of a dam. 
Mikesell claims that challenges faced by the Bank after its establishment 'do not reflect the 
high competence of its originators. This failure was due in part to the national political pressures on all 
the participants and in part to the conflicted attempt to create institutions that would both address the 
immediate post-war financial problems and provide a long-term framework for an international 
system'.69 Several factors were not foreseen by the drafters. First and foremost was the Cold War. 
Second, the underestimation of the cost of reconstruction. Third, the time necessary to re-establish 
normal international trade and payments relationships was also underestimated. Fourth, the rapid nature 
of independence in the colonial world drastically changed the nature of Bank membership. Finally, the 
drafters did not understand the differences between the needs of the industrialised world in comparison 
with the needs of the developing one.70 
Meyer was replaced three months later by John J. McCloy, a Wall Street lawyer and former 
assistant secretary of war. McCloy brought with him two colleagues from Wall Street - Eugene Black, 
vice-president of Chase National Bank, to replace Collado as US executive director, and Robert 
Garner, former treasurer of Guaranty Trust, as vice-president. This change in management heartened 
the financial community, which recognised the solid reputations of the new appointments. Wall Street 
responded positively to the Bank's first public sale of bonds on 15 July 1947. By noon, the $250 
million offering was oversubscribed.71 It was clear that despite early concerns, investors believed that 
the Bank had a future as a development institution. 
6 6 Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations, New York: Henry Holt 
and Co., Inc., p. 51. 
6 7 Unless otherwise noted, all currency denoted by '$' will refer to US dollars. 
6 8 Mason, E. & Asher, R. (1973). The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, p. 47. 
6 9 Mikesell, R. (1994). "The Bretton Woods Debates', p. 1. 
7 0 Mason, E. & Asher, R. (1973). The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, pp. 3-4. 
7 1 Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion, p. 53. 
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The Rise of Development Theory 
As the Marshall Plan worked to rebuild Europe, a wave of independence rolled throughout 
the colonial world - starting in India and, over time, throughout Asia and Africa. The Bank's first 
quarter century saw its membership grow from thirty-eight countries in 1946, to one hundred sixteen 
countries in 1971. 7 2 Although the weighted voting structure still allowed these new countries minimal 
input into lending decisions and policy making, their external influence was felt most strongly within 
the Bank vis -a-vis a shift in development ideology. 
In the early 1950s, the general consensus was that the neo-classical model of economics 
based on the free market had failed capitalist countries during the Depression, leading Myint to 
describe the 'anti-neo-classical' nature of development theory at the time. Myint explains 
The consensus.. .was that the problem of economic development was essentially 
'dynamic' and could not be satisfactorily considered in terms of the 'static' neo-classical 
theory of resource allocation. It was also believed that economic development would not 
take place simply by relying on the market forces, but needed development planning to 
push through massive investment programs.73 
Roger Stone, director and president of the Sustainable Development Institute, asserts, '...the early 
World Bank model is often described as "neo-Keynesian"74 in recognition of its emphasis on 
government planning and job creation in the context of a free economy'.75 Many countries and 
institutions, including the Bank, turned therefore to the Soviet Union as a model for rapid development, 
as it had risen from a primarily peasant economy at the turn of the century to the second most powerful 
nation in an increasingly bipolar world. 7 6 According to Dobb, '...[the Soviet system] affords a unique 
example of the transformation of a formerly backward country to a country of extensive 
industrialisation and modern technique at an unprecedented tempo.. .As such it seems likely in turn to 
become the classic type for the future industrialisation of the countries of Asia' . 7 7 
7 2 Mason, E. & Asher, R. (1973). The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, p. 799. 
7 3 Myint, H. (1987). 'Neo-classical Development Analysis: Its Strengths and Limitations', in Meier, G. (ed). 
Pioneers in Development (2"^ Series). Oxford: Oxford University Press (for the World Bank), pp. 105. 
7 4 The Keynesian approach asserts that increased government spending is appropriate i f the total current 
expenditure is not enough to produce full employment. The multiplier effect would encourage economic activity, 
raising tax receipts and paying off the government deficit. See Preston, P.W. (1996). Development Theory: An 
Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., pp. 154-55; also see Kurihara, K. (1959). The Keynesian Theory 
of Economic Development London: George Allen & Unvin Ltd. 
7 5 Quoted in Bello, W. (1994). Dark Victory: The United States. Structural Adjustment, and Global Poverty. 
London: Pluto Press, p. 12. Original: Stone, R. (1992). The Nature of Development: a Report from the Rural 
Tropics on the Quest for Sustainable Economic Growth. New York: Alfred Knopf, p. 37. 
7 6 See, for example, Wiles, P. (1953). 'The Soviet Economy Outpaces the West'. Foreign Affairs. 31(4), pp. 566-
580; Dunayevskaya, R. (1944). 'A New Revision of Marxian Economies'. American Economic Review, 
XXXIV(3), pp. 531-537; Dobb, M. (1948). Soviet Economic Development Since 1917. London: Routledge & 
Kegal Paul Ltd 
7 7 Dobb, M. (1948). Soviet Economic Development Since 1917, p. 2. 
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The rhetoric of nationalist developmentalism, according to Preston, had been 'used by local 
leaders in pursuit of independence' and 'affirmed the model of independent statehood which was to be 
the vehicle of the achievement not merely of political freedom for the elite but also growth and welfare 
for the masses'.78 The Soviet model of economic growth attracted rrany new countries, such as India 
and China, and many African nations as well. As James explained, 'The new states searched for a 
particular economic strategy appropriate to their particular political condition. Their answer often lay in 
a partial disengagement from the world economy, and a reluctance to accept the goal of currency 
convertibility, or to see any substantial advantages in trade liberalisation'.79 
Growth theory fit into the political environment of the time. It managed to combine 
development through industrialisation, loosely based on a Soviet-style system of planning, with an 
emphasis on the free market and international trade. Theories of economic growth had been in 
on 
existence for some time, most prominently those by List, Toennies and, of course, Marx. However, 
the most institutionally influential of the twentieth century growth theoreticians is Rostow, who 
developed a model known as 'modernisation theory'. Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth: A 
Non-Communist Manifesto81 sets forth his theory of development, based on that of List, whose model 
of development also had five stages. The first is the 'traditional society', with its focus on the family 
and on agriculture. The second stage is the 'preconditions for take-off. According to Rostow, this 
stage started in Europe in the late sixteenth century. Preconditions include, among other things, a 
political system, banks, and growing merchant class. The third stage is the 'take-off, which he defined 
earlier as 'an increase in the volume and productivity of investment in a society, such that a sustained 
increase in per capita real income results'.82 During the take-off, new industries expand, profits are 
reinvested, savings increase, society and political structures change, and production exceeds 
consumption. The fourth stage is the 'drive to maturity', where the economy continues to grow at a 
steady pace. The final stage is the 'age of mass consumption', where production turns to service-based 
industries and the focus on social security and the welfare state begins. 
Rostow's model was criticised by economic and political theorists alike. Hoselitz wrote, 
'Economists have, on the whole, seen little usefulness in the various theories of economic stages'.83 
7 8 Preston, P.W. (1996). Development Theory., p. 159. 
7 9 James, H. (1996). International Monetary Co-operation Since Bretlon Woods. New York: Oxford University 
Press (for the IMF), p. 122. 
8 0 See, for example, List, F. (1885). The National System of Political Economy, trans. Loyd, S. London: Longmans, 
Green and Co.; Hoselitz, B. (1960). "Theories of Stages of Economic Growth', in Hoselitz, B. (ed). Theories of 
Economic Growth. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, pp. 193-238; Cahnman, W. & Heberle, R (1971). Ferdinand 
Toennies on Sociology: Pure, Applied, and Empirical. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; Gottlieb, R. 
(1992). Marxism 1844-1990: Origins, Betrayal, Rebirth. London: Routledge. 
8 1 Here Rostow clearly sets his theory of economic growth apart from Marx, creating a capitalist 'alternative' to 
communism that developing countries could follow. 
8 2 Rostow, W.W. (1960). The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 103-104 (emphasis in original). This text follows on a 1953 book by Rostow, The Process of 
Economic Growth. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
8 3 Hoselitz, B. (1960). 'Theories of Stages of Economic Growth', p. 234. 
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Meier and Baldwin stated, 'Almost all historians now recognise the limitations of such a linear 
conception of history and no longer attempt to classify countries according to stages of development'.84 
After giving several pages of empirical data, Kuznets scathingly replied, 'Unless I have completely 
misunderstood Professor Rostow's definition of take-off and its statistical characteristics, I can only 
conclude that the available evidence lends no support to his suggestions'.85 Politicians, on the other 
hand, as well as international institutions such as the World Bank and the UN, welcomed his theory8 6 
In it they found a non-Soviet justification for development through industrialisation, appealing to both 
nationalist elements in the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa and to capital-exporting 
industrialists in the developed world. 8 7 
The Bank and Development in the 1950s and 1960s 
The Bank, meanwhile, had yet to achieve a stable management environment by the end of 
the 1940s. McCloy resigned relatively soon after taking the helm, in June 1949. A primarily political 
animal, he left the Bank to become the US high commissioner of Germany, leaving Eugene Black as 
his successor. Black worked closely with clients and created rapport. 'His personality, his reputation 
for soundness, and his stature were vital attributes in securing a doubling of the capital subscriptions of 
the Bank by 1959'.8 8 In its first eighteen months of business, the Bank received only three loan 
applications from developing countries - Chile, Iran, and Mexico. Indeed, Bank staff had to go out into 
the field to elicit interest in loans; and when applications did come in, they were vague and for 
unspecified projects. To address this, Black decided that the Bank should offer developing countries its 
technical expertise in designing projects for lending.8 9 
Meier, G. & Baldwin, R. (1957). Economic Development: Theory, History, Policy. New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., p. 145. 
8 5 Kuznets, S. (1965). Economic Growth and Structure: Selected Essays. London: Heinemann Educational Books 
Ltd., p. 227. 
8 6 In addition to a post-war State Department role as Assistant Chief of the German-Austrian Economic Division, 
Rostow served in several positions for the US government. According to his biography at the University of Texas: 
'In January 1961 President Kennedy appointed Mr. Rostow as Deputy Special Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs. He served in that capacity until December 1961 when he was appointed counsellor of 
the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State; in May 1964 the 
President appointed him to the additional duty of United States Member of the Inter-American Committee on the 
Alliance for Progress (CLAP) (with the rank of Ambassador). He served in these latter two capacities until early 
1966, when President Johnson called him back to the White House as his special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, where he remained until January 20, 1969. In 1969, he returned to the University of Texas, where he 
remains. See http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Rostow/biography.html. 
8 7 Preston, P.W. (1996). Development Theory, p. 177. 
8 8 Mason, E. & Asher, R. (1973). The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, p. 97. 
8 9 In 1949, Colombia became the first country to ask for the Bank's assistance in drawing up a plan for a loan 
application. Black sent a fourteen person team (which included twelve Americans) to Colombia, resulting in a six 
hundred forty-two page, five-year plan. The Bank then helped the Colombian government set up a Commission on 
Economic Development (counselled by Bank staff) to analyse the report in order to determine whether or not to 
endorse it. When this was completed and the report had official government backing, the Bank helped to establish 
a National Planning Council to oversee execution of the plan (with Bank staff hired as permanent advisors). 'The 
Bank was now the driving force behind the decisions Colombia was making about its long-term development'. 
Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion, pp. 58-59. 
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Within the first five years of Black's presidency, ninety-six loans were made, totalling over 
$1.8 billion, in twenty-eight member countries and three overseas dependencies, with $1 billion of that 
total spent outside of Europe.90 Black also made the first loan to Sub-Saharan Africa in 1952, to the 
Belgian Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). This was a twenty-five year loan, in the 
amount $40 million, at a rate of 4.5%, and guaranteed by Belgium. The loan was part of the Congo's 
Ten Year Development Plan, which called for public investment of up to $800 million for transport, 
communications, electric power, water supply, housing, health, education, and research. A large 
component of the plan involved locating private investment in mining, manufacturing, large-scale 
agriculture, and commerce, in order to raise exports 30-50% over a ten year period. The Bank's loan 
was to be used to import the capital equipment necessary to put the plan into motion.9 1 
In keeping with modernisation theory, the Bank believed that modern infrastructure was the 
key to successful development. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) said that the key was 
improved agriculture; the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) said it was 
education; and the World Health Organisation (WHO) said it was health. Only the Bank could back up 
its theory with money. 'It was the availability of financing for such undertakings that stimulated 
philosophising about the vital role of economic infrastructure in the development process, rather than 
the reverse'.92 In order to reinforce this philosophy throughout the developing world, the Bank 
established its Economic Development Institute (EDI) in 1956, funded by the Ford and Rockefeller 
foundations, in order to educate potential development professionals from developing countries. 
Black resigned in 1963, after thirteen years as Bank president. During his term, three 
hundred seventy loans were made, totalling over $7 billion, with no defaults, a net income in his last 
year of $83 million, and no taint of corruption or mismanagement. Caufield notes, 'Under Black's 
leadership the Bank was more than a mere lender. It became a diplomat, acting as a middleman in 
disputes between nations. It became a force in academia, shaping the newly emerging field of 
development theory. It became the unofficial planning agency for the Third World, co-ordinating the 
lending of other aid donors. It became an international phenomenon'.93 
Development theory truly came into its own during the 1960s, dubbed 'the Decade of 
Development' by President Kennedy in his Foreign Aid Message of March 1961. He stated, 
The 1960s can be - and must be - the crucial 'decade of development' - the period when 
many less-developed nations can make the transition into self-sustained growth - the 
period in which an enlarged community of free, stable, and self-reliant nations can 
9 0 World Bank (1954). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1946-1953. Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins Press, p. 9. 
9 1 World Bank (1954). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1946-1953, pp. 135-136. 
9 2 Mason, E. & Asher, R. (1973). The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, p. 62. 
9 3 Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion, p. 71. 
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reduce world tensions and insecurity...For we are launching a 'decade of development' 
on which will depend, substantially, the kind of world in which we and our children will 
The importance of development to the American government was duly noted by the developing 
countries, who recognised the opportunity presented by Kennedy's announcement. 
In the United Nations, the newly independent countries exerted a considerable amount of 
influence. At the Sixteenth Session of the UN General Assembly in 1961, LDCs proposed a conference 
dealing with trade issues. Their primary concern lay with the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT), which they saw as inadequate for dealing with trade problems endemic to LDCs. They also 
disliked GATT's Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and reciprocity provisions, which can be argued are 
applicable only i f trading partners are on equal terms of trade.95 The Group of 77 9 6 emerged from the 
first UN Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD I), held in Geneva in 1964, as an 
'unofficial but very influential group of LDCs within the UN General Assembly.97 
The head of UNCTAD, Raul Prebisch, is generally accepted as the founder of structuralist 
economics, which rejects the formalism of neo-classical and modernisation models of development, 
focusing instead on the substantive historical reality of economic activity.9 8 Hettne explains that 
modernisation was an example of positivism, or 'value-free' social science, which objectively views 
things as they are, not as they should be. The dependency theories which grew out of Prebisch's 
structuralism are instead examples of normativism, which instead looks at development as what should 
happen, and acknowledges that different circumstances imply that cases should be looked at 
subjectively.99 Prebisch theorised that those countries which existed in the periphery (the 
underdeveloped South) of the market (controlled by the developed world in the North at the core) were 
unable to develop because they were dependent upon declining terms of trade with the core. In other 
words, the periphery would have to export more and more to the core in order to import the goods that 
the core produced.100 To counter this imbalance in terms of trade, he recommended that LDCs support 
programmes of import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) on a regional basis to build economies of 
scale, while focusing on exporting manufactures. He also recommended that LDCs pursue policies of 
9 4 Quoted in Mikesell, R. (1994). "The Bretton Woods Debates', p. 6. 
9 5 Williams, G. (1987). Third World Political Organisations (2nd ed). London: Macmillan Press Ltd., pp. 4-6. 
9 6 The Group of 77 now consists of 133 nations. 
9 7 Williams, G. (1987). Third World Political Organisations, p. 12. 
9 8 Preston, P.W. (1996). Development Theory, p. 183. 
9 9 Hettne, B. (1995). Development Theory and the Three Worlds (2nd ed). Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman 
Ltd., pp. 251-252. 
1 0 0 Prebisch, R. (1964). Toward a New Trade Policy for Development. New York: UNCTAD; also, Prebisch, R. 
(1971). Change and Development: Latin America's great task: report submitted to the Inter-America Development 
Bank. New York: Praeger. 
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income redistribution, promote education, redistribute land from the hands of a few elites to the 
masses, and therefore create the greater social mobility he believed was necessary to make ISI work. 1 0 1 
Dependency, a neo-Marxist theory, grew out of Prebisch's structuralist theory. Frank stated 
that dependency of the periphery was intentionally maintained by the core in order to exploit its 
resources. The only way out of this state, according to Frank, was through socialist revolution resulting 
in the collapse of the capitalist system.102 Cardoso and Faletto disagreed with Frank's belief that the 
periphery had no choices other than revolution, but rather focused on the role of the dominant class and 
the ownership structure of domestic industry.103 Both Nkrumah and Woddis explained that political 
imperialism had been replaced with economic neo-imperialism in an attempt by the North to exploit the 
South's resources, to preserve the North's strategic interests, and to prevent the spread of socialism.104 
According to Nkrumah, 'The essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in 
theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its 
economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside'.1 0 5 
Black was replaced by George Woods, a board member of the Henry J. Kaiser Co. 1 0 6 and 
chairman of First Boston Corporation, as president of the World Bank. His five-year term was marked 
by two ironies. Hrstly, he wanted to make the Bank more 'responsive' to the needs of developing 
countries, but his undiplomatic dealings and tough economic demands soured his relationships with the 
Bank's borrowing members. Secondly, he suffered great embarrassment at the Bank's prosperity, 
which had reserves of almost $1 billion when he took over from Black. With the encouragement of the 
US and Germany, he started transferring portions of this surplus from the IBRD to the International 
Development Association ( I D A ) 1 0 7 - over $200 million from 1964 to 1966. 
"" Prebisch, R. (1964). Toward a New Trade Policy for Development, pp. 25-26, 113-114. 
1 0 2 Frank, A. (1967). Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
1 0 3 Cardoso, F. & Faletto, E. (1979). Dependency and Development in Latin America. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
1 0 4 Nkrumah, K. (1965). Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd.; 
Woddis, J. (1967). Introduction to Neo-Colonialism. New York: International Publishers. 
1 0 5 Nkrumah, K. (1965). Neo-Colonialism, p. ix. 
1 0 6 The Henry J. Kaiser Co. was involved in a clear example of politically motivated lending and US political 
involvement in Bank affairs before Woods arrived at the Bank. In 1957, President Nkrumah of Ghana wanted to 
dam the Volta River to generate electricity for the processing of bauxite deposits into aluminium. The US 
government wanted the Bank to fund the project, rather than allowing Nkrumah to elicit funding from the Soviets, 
despite two separate Bank evaluation missions which determined the project was unattractive. The loan was 
initially declined but then the US State Department discovered that Nkrumah was flying to Moscow. Despite then 
Bank president Eugene Black's claim that, 'It isn't our business to make loans to prevent the spread of 
communism', the Bank quickly reversed their decision and approved the loan in 1961. Cited in Caufield, C. 
(1996). Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations. New York: Henry Holt and Co., Inc., p. 
83. The consequences of this ill-advised project included the displacement of over eighty thousand villagers, a 
dramatic increase in disease, extensive famine, and loss of income from fishing due to increased salinarion in the 
water supply. George Woods became Bank president shortly after this transaction (1963-1968), replacing Black. 
Woods was a board member of the Henry J. Kaiser Co. and returned to the board upon his departure from the 
Bank. Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion, pp. 79-83. 
1 0 7 The IDA is an agency of the World Bank that provides loans to the poorer countries at more favourable rates of 
interest and repayment and is funded solely through contributions from member countries. See Williams, M. 
(1994). International Economic Organisations and the Third World. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 101-109. 
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A World Bank oral history records Woods asking, '"Do you really think that a development 
finance agency ought to measure its success by the lack of defaults? We shouldn't be concerned by 
whether a country is able to service a loan. We should be more concerned with what good it is doing 
for the country"'. 1 0 8 In an article for Foreign Affairs, he warned that LDCs were devoting over one-
tenth of their foreign exchange earning to debt service, and yet still had not achieved the 'precondition 
of industrialisation, including stable government, an acquisitive outlook, and technical capacity'.109 
Woods' term as president stands out as being unremarkable, but he did pave the way for a more 
dramatic role for the Bank in the next decade. His essay contains 'one of the most widely quoted 
statements of the first 'Development Decade',110 in which Woods claimed, 'A preliminary study made 
by the World Bank staff.. .suggests that the developing countries could put to constructive use, over the 
next five years, some $3 to $4 billion more each year than is currently being made available to 
them'. 1 1 1 This statement greatly influenced the next Bank president, Robert McNamara, who took over 
after Woods retired in 1968. 
A Turning Point for the Bank 
The late 1960s marked a extraordinary shift in the World Bank's development ideology. This 
transformation can be partially attributed to the arrival of the remarkable McNamara as president, who 
possessed a completely different background and ideas than those held by any of his predecessors. In 
addition, upheavals in the political environment around this time forced McNamara to rethink the 
Bank's entire approach to development. Eichengreen and Kenen identify four major changes that 
altered the raison d'etre of the World Bank and IMF: (1) the global economic dominance of the United 
States; (2) the small number of countries involved in the design of the Bank and IMF; (3) the 
protectionist stance taken by many developed countries (DCs); and (4) the success of DCs in managing 
domestic change.112 
The Bretton Woods system as envisioned by its founders ended abruptly on 15 August 1971, 
when US President Nixon announced his New Economic Policy (NEP). The booming American post-
war economy was in a state of crisis by the beginning of the 1970s. Industrial productivity was down, 
excessive domestic inflation existed, unemployment levels were at their highest since the 1930s, and 
there were also massive short-term capital flow problems. The US faced balance of payments 
deterioration due to an import increase resulting from increased demand from consumers and industry 
1 0 8 Quoted in Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion, p. 91. 
1 0 9 Woods, G. (1966). 'The Development Decade in the Balance'. Foreign Affairs. 44(2), p. 206 (emphasis added). 
1 1 0 Mason, E. & Asher, R. (1973). The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, p. 99. 
1 1 1 Woods, G. (1966). "The Development Decade in the Balance', p. 214. 
1 1 2 Eichengreen, B. & Kenen, P. (1994). 'Managing the World Economy Under the Bretton Woods System: An 
Overview', in Kenen, P. (ed). Managing the World Economy Fifty Years After Bretton Woods. Washington DC: 
Institute for International Economics, pp. 5-6. 
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and massive military spending on Vietnam. 1 1 3 Importantly, it faced increased competition from a 
recovered European Community as well as from Japan, with the three becoming increasingly 
interdependent. Instead of seeking a way to work within the state of increasing interdependence, the US 
suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold, destroying the pegged rate system of Bretton 
Woods. 1 1 4 This had the effect of 'shattering the linchpin of the entire international monetary system -
on whose smooth functioning the world economy depends'.115 The NEP also imposed several new 
import surcharges; set up export subsidies and a business development incentive program which 
discriminated against foreign inputs; reversed traditional US policy regarding protectionism and free 
trade; and Nixon himself broke tradition by calling for a decrease in foreign aid, taking domestic 
political credit for the action. 1 1 6 A weakening global economy forced the Bank to justify its existence 
and its need for financial contributions from DCs by changing its overall approach and introducing an 
emphasis on morality and on poverty. 
Poverty and the Change to Policy-Based Lending 
Robert McNamara joined the Bank in June 1968, and was the first Bank president (and the 
last, thus far) to hold a high-level political position. As early as 1966, while still US Secretary of 
Defence, McNamara gave a speech in which he announced that US security interests lay in LDCs 
because he believed there existed a correlation between poverty and violence. He stated, 'There is an 
irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness...In a modernising society, 
security is development...A developing nation that does not in fact develop simply cannot remain 
secure'.117 His ideology became known as 'containment liberalism', whereby 'the poor could gain a 
larger share of the national wealth without political and social upheaval or without seriously depriving 
local elites'. 1 1 8 Achieving balance between the poor and elites was, in McNamara's opinion, the key to 
successful development and also the key to global stability. He was therefore distressed to find, upon 
his arrival at the Bank, that Congress held de facto control over many of the IDA's lending decisions, 
because of its unique funding position.1 1 9 When McNamara asked staff why there was no lending in 
certain areas, '[h]e was told that Indonesia was a pariah to the American government; Egypt was 
unpopular with Congress; Africa was too backward to benefit from the Bank anyway'. 1 2 0 
1 1 3 Keohane, R. (1984). After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, pp. 9, 206-207; Peterson, P. (1971). The United States in the Changing World 
Economy. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, pp. ii , 11. 
1 1 4 Keohane, R (1984). After Hegemony, p. 186. 
1 1 5 Bergsten, C.F. (1994). 'Managing the World Economy of the Future', in Kenen, P. (ed). Managing the World 
Economy Fifty Years After Bretton Woods. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, p. 199. 
1 1 6 Peterson, P. (1971). The United States in the Changing World Economy, p. 1; Bergsten, C.F. (1994). 'Managing 
the World Economy of the Future', pp. 199-200. 
1 1 7 Cited in Shapley, D. (1993). Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co., p. 381. 
1 , 8 Shapley, D. (1993). Promise and Power, p. 546. 
1 1 9 Unlike the IBRD, which raises funds by selling its bonds in the financial markets and charges market rates for 
the money it lends, the IDA offers the poorest countries interest-free loans from funds that it receives from donor 
countries. 
1 2 0 Shapley, D. (1993). Promise and Power, p. 469. 
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In his inaugural address to the Bank's Board of Governors in September 1968, he established 
his desire to set a 'development plan' for each LDC with a list of projects that would receive support i f 
money was no object.1 2 1 He stated a firm commitment to double Bank lending in the following five 
years from that lent in the previous five, as well as to increasing lending in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America, with new projects for sectors previously untouched - education, health, family planning and 
agriculture. During his first five-year term, McNamara kept his promise to double lending in 
comparison to the previous five years. As a matter of fact, he succeeded in doubling lending in 
comparison to the previous twenty-Jive years. In West Africa, there were almost three times the number 
of project commitments in his first five years than in the previous twenty-five. In East Africa, as well 
as Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, the total number of money committed almost doubled 
during the same period. Under McNamara, Bank spending increased from approximately US$2.7 
billion in 1970 to US$8.7 billion by 1978, with the aim of alleviating poverty and maintaining political 
stability in the developing world. This additional funding was created by tapping the previously under-
utilised European financial markets, which not only increased finance available to the Bank but also 
decreased reliance on the US capital market. 
Table 2.1: Bank Group Financial Commitments to Developing Countries by Region ($ in 
millions) 




Region 1946-1968 1969-1973 1946-1968 1969-1973 
East Africa 78 104 $834 $1,099 
West Africa 35 102 522 891 
Europe, Middle East, 
North Africa 
113 168 1,785 3,198 
Latin America, 
Caribbean 
281 176 3,554 3,734 
Asia 201 210 3,927 4,496 
Total 708 760 $10,622 $13,418 
Source: McNamara, R. (1981). The McNamara Years at the World Bank, p. 234. 
Table 2.1 shows that the total amount committed and the number of projects grew, but the 
average amount spent per project declined. This is due to a change in focus from project finance to 
policy finance. Singer claims McNamara 'seized eagerly upon an academic doctrine by the name of 
"fungibility", which maintains that i f high priority projects are funded, it frees up government reserves 
which would have been spent on that project and can now be spent instead on things like the military, 
high civil service salaries, and pet projects'.1 2 2 Hence, lending for individual projects could distort 
1 2 1 McNamara, R. (1981). The McNamara Years at the World Bank: Major Policy Addresses of Robert S. 
McNamara 1968-1981. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, p. 6. 
1 2 2 Singer, H. (1994). 'Aid Conditionality'. IDS Discussion Paper No. 346, December, p. 2. 
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overall development priorities. In this vein, McNamara recognised that building a dam is not enough 
to encourage development. A country must also have engineers and managers to ensure the dam 
produces results after it is built, and it must also have healthy people ready to take advantage of the 
benefits a dam could bring. McNamara believed that current Bank lending presented a disjointed 
approach to development, and that, 'What we need - and what we must design - is a comprehensive 
strategy that will constitute an overall plan into which particular policies and individual projects can be 
fitted as logical, integral parts'.1 2 4 This included a shift in focus from project lending, for things like 
dams and airports, to policy lending, for health, education and improvements in agriculture. 
The consensus which emerged under McNamara's leadership became one based upon poverty 
alleviation, rather than simply economic growth, with the following considered necessary: '(1) 
investment in education, health, nutrition, low-income housing, communications, and information; (2) 
employment generation through economic growth; (3) support of small enterprise development through 
credits, technical assistance, the provision of information, and clear, secure property rights; and (4) the 
provision of efficient public or private safety nets'.1 2 5 The language and concepts introduced were 
foreign to the Bank as a financial organisation. McNamara discussed redistribution of income and land 
reform. Ffc insisted that 'the rich and powerful have a moral obligation to assist the poor and the 
weak'. 1 2 6 The sweeping goals he set for himself and his staff were criticised by many within the 
organisation as unquantifiable and fiscally unsound,127 but became the backbone of its lending strategy 
despite this. 
OPEC and the Effect on ODA 
In 1973, five years after McNamara became Bank president, the price of oil doubled.1 2 8 The 
increased price shocked both developed and developing countries, as the average price per barrel of oil 
rose seven-fold in three years, from approximately $2.00 in 1972 to approximately $14 in 1974. 1 2 9 
1 2 3 This problem of fungibility is still acknowledged by the Bank and is cited as one of the main reasons for the 
new Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), currently being piloted in Ghana. Interview with Polly 
Jones, Washington DC, 2 February 2000. See Chapter Four for a discussion of the CDF. 
1 2 4 McNamara, R. (1981). The McNamara Years at the World Bank, p. 73. 
1 2 5 Ardito-Barletta, N. (1994). 'Managing Development and Transition', in Kenen, P. (ed). Managing the World 
Economy Fifty Years After Bretton Woods. Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, p. 176. 
1 2 6 McNamara, R. (1981). The McNamara Years at the World Bank, p. 240 (emphasis added). 
1 2 7 Shapley, D. (1993). Promise and Power, p. 669. 
1 2 8 The Shah of Iran announced that consumer nations 'will have to realise that the era of their terrific progress and 
even more terrific income and wealth based on cheap oil is finished.' 'Gulf States Will More than Double Oil 
Prices from New Year's Day'. The Times (London). 24 December 1972, p. 1. This should not have been surprising 
to oil-importing countries. As early as 1960, the Financial Times reported that oil-producing countries had met to 
discuss raising oil prices to the level existing prior to the cuts made by Western oil companies, which generally 
owned the oil supplies in a 50-50 split with the host governments. Williams, G. (1987). Third World Political 
Organisations (2na" ed). London: Macmillan Press Ltd., p. 87. In 1971, the first threat of uniform action by the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was announced, and The Times warned that 'the 
exploitation of natural resources of less developed countries by outside interests' must end, and that 'failure to do 
so may simply be building up a much more intractable set of problems for the future.' 'OPEC States Its Terms'. 
The Times (London). 8 October 1973, p. 25. 
1 2 9 World Bank (1980). World Development Report New York: Oxford University Press, p. 14. 
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Global inflation rates soon soared and other commodities, many produced in the developing world, 
followed suit. 1 3 0 Unfortunately, the oil embargo proved costly to the oil-importing LDCs, and the 
benefits received from inflated commodities prices were short-lived. The cost of oil imports increased 
by $10 billion, or 40% of the entire net inflow of external capital to LDCs in 1973.131 DCs, facing 
increased pressure at home, sought to decrease their contributions to the IDA, limiting the Bank's 
ability to increase lending to the very poorest countries at a time when the need for aid had greatly 
increased. McNamara told the Board of Governors in 1974, '...aid is not a luxury - something 
affordable when times are easy, and superfluous when times become temporarily troublesome. It is 
precisely the opposite. Aid is a continuing social and moral responsibility, and its need now is greater 
than ever'.1 3 2 
Table 2.2: Inflation - Index of International Prices' 
1956 1968 1972 1973 1974 
Index: 1967-1969 = 
100 
94 98 128 154 175 
% change over 
previous year 
2.3 -1.4 10.1 20.5 14.0 
Source: McNamara, R. (1981). The McNamara Yearsatthe World Bank,?- 274. 
To offset the decrease in IDA funding, McNamara arranged a meeting with the Iranian Shah 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to explain the detrimental effects of the embargo on the world's poor. In 
February 1974, the Shah promised that OPEC would establish a fund in order to make concessional 
loans for growth, one-third administered by the Bank's LDC Board of Governors, one-third by OPEC, 
and one-third by the DCs. The plan never materialised, because other OPEC countries were angered at 
not being consulted, and Nixon and Congress used their 23% vote in the Bank to block i t . 1 3 4 However, 
it did bring attention to the need for further bilateral aid. 1 3 5 As we can see in Table 2.3, overall OECD 
aid increased fivefold from 1960 to 1980, although it decreased as a percentage of GNP. OPEC 
countries began giving foreign aid in 1975, contributing a significant amount compared to OECD 
countries, i f one looks at percentage of GNP. 
For example, a poor sugar harvest in Cuba, the USSR and Europe, combined with the OPEC oil embargo, 
forced sugar prices through the roof. In 1973, the world market price was OB£99.46, but increased to GB£305.13 
in 1974; see, Mahler, V. (1981). 'Britain, the European Community, and the Developing Commonwealth: 
Dependence, Interdependence, and the Political Economy of Sugar'. International Organisation. 35(3), Summer, 
p. 477. 
1 3 1 McNamara, R. (1981). The McNamara Years at the World Bank, p. 275. 
1 3 2 McNamara, R. (1981). The McNamara Years at the World Bank, p. 291. 
1 3 3 An index of capital goods and manufactured exports prices of major developed countries. The index also 
reflects changes in exchange rates. 
1 3 4 Shapley, D. (1993). Promise and Power, p. 518. 
1 3 5 Williams, G. (1987). Third World Political Organisations, p. 82. 
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Table 23: Official Development Assistance (ODA) from OECD and OPEC Members, 1960-1980 
(selected years) 1 3 6 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
OECD ($ in 
millions) 
4,628 6,478 6,967 13,820 13,829 15,680 19,994 22,267 24,594 
OECD (as % of 
donor GNP) 
.51 .49 .34 .36 .33 .33 .35 .34 .34 
OPEC ($ in 
millions) 
n/a n/a n/a 5,516 5,596 5,866 4,344 4,711 n/a 
OPEC (as % of 
donor GNP) 
n/a n/a n/a 2.71 2.27 1.96 1.35 1.28 n/a 
Total ($ in 
millions) 
4,628 6,478 6,967 19,336 19,425 21,546 24,338 26,978 24,594 
Source: World Bank (1980). World Development Report,^. 140-141. 
The Debt Crisis 
During the period of buoyant commodity prices in the early 1970s, many developing countries 
borrowed heavily from private foreign commercial banks against future commodity earnings, 
calculated at the inflated prices which existed at the time. Private investment by commercial banks in 
LDCs picked up in the 1960s and soon surpassed that of the World Bank in the 1970s. This was due 
mainly to the rise of the 'Eurodollar', the term used to describe US dollars held outside the US.1 3 7 
Bankers everywhere saw possibility in this. They could trade in US dollars, the currency of 
international trade, while bypassing restrictive US laws. Even US banks began opening branches 
overseas to take advantage of this. In 1960, only eight US banks held branches overseas, but this figure 
had risen to one hundred and seven by 1972.1 3 8 
After the OPEC embargo, new oil millionaires began to invest in Eurodollar accounts in 
international banks at high rates of interest. The banks, faced with a massive increase in deposits, 
sustained these high interest rates with loans made to LDCs, also at high rates of interest.139 Few of the 
new lenders had experience in making capital risk assessments for LDCs, and did not pay attention to 
how the money was being spent or to the management of the currency composition of the debt.1 4 0 
These loans were so profitable, bankers went out actively seeking LDC governments to offer finance, 
whether needed or not. These lending decisions were based upon the belief that unlike individuals, 
'governments...never willingly default on sovereign debt'. 1 4 1 In the words of Caufield, 'To paraphrase 
Figures for OECD members were converted into 1978 prices. 
1 3 7 In 1949, when the Communists came to power in China, they transferred seized dollars to the Soviet-owned 
Banque Commerciale pour L'Europe du Nord in Paris, creating the Eurodollar. 
1 3 8 Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion, pp. 127-128. 
1 3 9 Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion, pp. 127-128. 
1 4 0 For example, if the debt is in DM but export earnings are in US$, the price of US$ to DM affects the borrower's 
ability to pay. Ducker, J. (1998). 'Muath Welfare Trust: Investing in a Better World'. Paper presented at the 
People's Summit Programme, Birmingham, 17 May, p. 6. 
1 4 1 Mosley, P. et al. (1991). Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending (Vol. 1). London: 
Routledge, p. 6. 
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Oscar Wilde's characterisation of fox hunting, the lending boom of the 1970s and early 1980s was the 
uninformed in pursuit of the uncreditworthy'.142 
Despite the growing atmosphere of uncertainty and turmoil, McNamara insisted that LDCs 
deeply in debt continue to borrow, reasoning that debt is not a liability but rather a catalyst for growth. 
Speaking to the Board of Governors in 1978, he said, 'While a number of analyses have concluded that 
there is no general problem of middle-income developing countries being unable to service debt, 
individual countries may run into liquidity problems. The availability of private capital to a broader 
range of middle-income developing countries would make the market less sensitive to developments in 
a restricted few ' . 1 4 3 However, unanticipated exogenous shocks, such as the decline in commodity 
prices, unprecedented oil prices, declining terms of trade, increased trade protectionism in developed 
countries, high interest rates, a strong dollar, and adverse weather conditions, and further endogenous 
shocks such as capital flight, inefficient state enterprises, and poor fiscal management by debtor 
governments precipitated a debt crisis by 1982.1 4 4 LDCs were left with high levels of external debt and 
no means with which to obtain the foreign exchange required to pay. In 1970, total external debt owed 
by LDCs was $17 billion, but by 1978 this figure stood at $55 bill ion. 1 4 5 
In 1976, Zaire stopped payment of over $700 million owed to private banks. The banks did 
not want to reschedule for fear of setting precedent; instead, Citibank called on creditors to lend a 
further $250 million to cover the overdue payments. Zaire was unwilling to adopt required economic 
reforms, and instead defaulted on a further $800 million owed to bilateral and multilateral agencies. 
The IMF placed Erwin Blumenthal, a former Bundesbank official, in charge of Zaire's central bank, 
but he took only a year to determine that the situation was hopeless. Therefore, most creditors had to 
write off their loans.146 Zaire was followed by Peru (1977), Turkey (1978), Iran (1979) and Poland 
(1981). 
1 4 2 Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion, p. 131. 
1 4 3 McNamara, R. (1981). The McNamara Years at the World Bank, p. 494. 
1 4 4 See, for example, Sachs, J. (ed). (1989). Developing Country Debt and the World Economy. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press; Commins, S. (ed). (1988). Africa's Development Challenges and the World Bank: 
Hard Questions, Costly Choices. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.; Mosley, P. et al. (1991). Aid and 
Power; World Bank (1981). Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action. Washington 
D.C.: The World Bank. 
1 4 5 World Bank (1980). World Development Report, p. 138. 
1 4 6 Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion, p. 135. 
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Table 2.4: Borrowings of the Middle Income Countries from the World's Private Banking 
System ($ in billions) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Claim of private banks on 
LDCs - year end 
30 37 44 53 72 92 110 151 204 251 
Increase in bank's claims 
on LDCs 
n/a 7 7 9 19 20 18 41 53 47 
Source: McNamara, R. (1981). The McNamara Yearsatthe WorldBank,?- 627. 
Table 2.5: Total LDC Foreign Debt ($ in millions) 




Avg. grace period 
(years) 
1970 1982 1970 1982 1970 1982 1970 1982 
Low-
income 
3,008 10,046 2.8 4.9 31 30 9 7 
Middle-
income 
10,585 76,755 6.0 11.7 17 12 4 4 
Source: World Bank (1984). World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 250-251. 
The gravity of the matter became apparent when Mexico announced in 1982 that it could not 
pay the $81 billion owed to foreign creditors. To illustrate the serious nature of this announcement, 
two-thirds of Citibank's net corporate assets were held in Mexican loans, and over 80% of the Bank of 
Tokyo's. I f other Latin American countries were to default as well, the top six US banks would go 
bankrupt. The IMF was forced to step in. It gave Mexico emergency loans with conditions of austerity 
and the promise to keep up interest payments on existing debt. It also arranged for $5 billion more in 
loans from private banks by threatening to let Mexico default.148 With this, a new role for botfi the IMF 
and World Bank emerged. 
McNamara and Politics 
Robert McNamara's time as Bank president provides interesting examples of the Bank's 
political involvement in US foreign affairs, not necessarily surprising considering that McNamara is a 
former US Secretary of Defence. On 4 November 1979, as McNamara argued with Congress that the 
IDA required more funding to help offset the oil price shocks, the US embassy in Iran was invaded. 
According to Shapley, 'The mighty United States, long-term protector of Iran and largest financier of 
the Bank and IDA, had been spit in the eye. So much for foreign aid ' . 1 4 9 Congress pounced on the issue 
and refused to release funds to the IDA unless it received a guarantee from the Bank that the funds 
would not be lent to Iran, and also Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Laos, Angola, or the Central African 
1 4 7 Includes small amounts loaned to low-income countries which could not be separated out of the total. 
1 4 8 Makin, J. (1984). The Global Debt Crisis. New York: Basic Books, pp. 14-15, 136. 
1 4 9 Shapley, D. (1993). Promise and Power, p. 561. 
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Republic. Although this violated the Bank's non-political mandate, McNamara agreed. This action 
immediately undermined the Bank's credibility as an international (as opposed to US) organisation, 
and McNamara was forced to retract his statement.150 
Following the election of US President Jimmy Carter, Senator James Abourezk, a Democrat 
from South Dakota, accused the Bank of seeming to favour non-democratic military regimes in its 
lending portfolio. He cited Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, and the Philippines, which were each scheduled 
to receive loans at that time totalling $664 million, despite accusations by the international community 
of gross violations of human rights.1 5 1 Congress passed the 'International Financial Institutions Act, 22 
USC 262 g ' 1 5 2 to require US executive directors to use their votes in the IFIs to 'advance the cause of 
human rights', by avoiding lending to torturers or those regimes who give refuge to terrorists.153 A 
further bill in the Senate required 'U.S. delegations to international financial institutions to vote against 
loans for gross violators of human rights, unless funds directly benefit basic human needs'.154 
However, these bills caused great controversy within the US government. Liberals in Congress who 
had lobbied for and pushed through the legislation balked at the idea of cutting off funds to the IFIs in 
order to influence policy on human rights, because they believed the IFIs were good for development 
overall and thought cutting off funds would adversely impact the poor. 1 5 5 Carter himself opposed the 
legislation 'as an unwise restriction on executive authority and a politicisation of the multilateral 
bank'. 1 5 6 Even the US administration wanted to uphold the Bank's non-political mandate. However, the 
legislation was passed by Congress, although it has not always been consistently applied. 
Conclusion: The Advent of Structural Adjustment 
Meanwhile, politicians in the North were facing a changing of the guard, especially in the US 
and UK. Conservative Margaret Thatcher was elected Prime Minister of Britain in 1979. Within a 
month, the new government cut taxes and spending, including foreign aid. 1 5 7 When Republican Ronald 
Reagan was elected US president in 1980, he appointed David Stockman, one of Reagan's infamous 
'Whiz Kids', as director of the Office of Management and Budget. The many supporters of 'supply-
side economics' believed the budget could be balanced through tax cuts, which would increase the 
incentives to earn and hence increase overall tax revenues in the long-term. Stockman realised that in 
order to finance this tax cut and the increased defence spending required by Reagan, overall spending 
would have to be cut by approximately $40 billion in fiscal year 1982 in order to produce the balanced 
1 5 0 Shapley, D. (1993). Promise and Power, pp. 570-572. 
1 5 1 Rich, B. (1994). Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of 
Development. Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 99-100. 
1 5 2 Amendment to Sec.701 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 
1 5 3 Forsythe, D. (1988). Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered. Gainesville: University 
of Florida Press, p. 183. 
1 5 4 Senate Bill No. HR5262 (18/6/77), cited in Forsythe, D. (1988). Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 30. 
1 5 5 Forsythe, D. (1988). Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 154. 
1 5 6 Forsythe, D. (1988). Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 60. 
1 5 7 Shapley, D. (1993). Promise and Power, pp. 572-573. 
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budget promised by Reagan during his campaign. One of his first casualties was the then unpopular 
budget for foreign aid, especially for the I D A . 1 5 9 In Stockman's own words: 
The Gramm-Stockman budget plan had called for deep cuts in the foreign economic aid 
on the basis of pure ideological principle. Both [Phil] Gramm and I believed that the 
organs of international aid and so-called Third World development - the UN, the 
multilateral banks, and the US Agency for International Development - were infested 
with socialist error. The international aid bureaucracy was turning Third World countries 
into quagmires of self-imposed inefficiency and burying them beneath mountainous 
external debts they would never be able to repay.160 
In order to exist in this new antagonistic environment, it was obvious that the Bank had to 
change. McNamara was aware of this need, even before the elections of Reagan and Thatcher. 
Speaking to the Board of Governors in Belgrade in 1979, McNamara announced a new kind of lending 
that the Bank was possibly looking to implement that would assist in export promotion and prevent 
balance of payment difficulties in LDCs, which would be known as structural adjustment.161 The first 
structural adjustment loan (SAL) was made in March 1980 to Turkey for $200 million, with a total of 
$1.5 billion scheduled over a four-year period. 1 6 2 McNamara did not see out the programme he 
initiated. Despondent after the death of his wife and discouraged by the failure of his 'war on poverty', 
he retired in June 1981 and was replaced by A.W. 'Tom' Clausen, the former head of the Bank of 
America.1 6 3 
Intending to find ways to trim the Bank's US financing, the Treasury department investigated 
the usefulness of the Bank for US interests, but found that 'the United States is without question the 
major influence in the Bank'. 1 6 4 Examples of US influence included 'McNamara's 1979 pledge not to 
lend to Vietnam, the Bank's refusal to lend to Chile while Allende was in power, and its willingness to 
lend generously to friends of the United States, such as Zaire, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, 
even when they failed to meet the Bank's normal standards of creditworthiness'.165 The administration 
lobbied for, and won, an increase in its contributions to the Bank and IMF in light of its approval for 
the Bank's role and its structural adjustment programmes.166 It backed off, for the most part, from 
See Hogan, J. (1988). 'The Office of Management and Budget and Reaganomics: The rise and decline of a 
presidential staff agency', in Lees, J.D. & Turner, M. (eds). Reagan's First Four Years: A New Beginning? 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 95-121. 
1 5 9 Shapley, D. (1993). Promise and Power, pp. 578-579. 
1 6 0 Stockman, D. (1986). The Triumph of Politics: The Crisis in American Government and How it Affects the 
World. Sevenoaks, Kent: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., p. 124. 
1 6 1 McNamara, R. (1981). The McNamara Years at the World Bank, pp. 549; 602-603. 
1 6 2 Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion, p. 146. 
1 6 3 Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion, pp.140-144. 
1 6 4 Cited in Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion, p. 200. Original: US Dept. of Treasury (1982). United States 
participation in the multilateral development banks in the 1980s. Washington DC: GPO. 
1 6 5 Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion, p. 200. 
1 6 6 Cingranelli, D. (1993). Ethics, American Foreign Policy, and the Third World. New York: St Martin's Press, 
Inc., pp. 196-197. 
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trying to influence Bank lending for human rights considerations, reflecting a different approach to 
human rights in the new administration.167 
The debt crisis helped to discredit McNamara's 'containment liberalism', after which Bank 
policy institutionalised neo-liberalism within the aid agenda. The crisis was blamed in part on 
government mismanagement, so neo-liberalism argued 'for the abandonment of economic planning 
directed by the state and for a return to free markets, the principles of comparative advantage, and the 
development of entrepreneurial spirit ' . 1 6 8 This ideology became popularly known as 'the Washington 
Consensus', which 'begins with the view that decentralised, market-driven or market-oriented 
economies are the best performers in terms of production and economic growth, economic efficiency, 
and flexibility and adaptability to change in the international situation caused by economic cycles and 
by secular changes in technology, information, relative prices, factor mobility, and consumer 
preferences'.169 Within the first week of Clausen's term, he made it known that he disagreed with 
McNamara's focus on poverty and with the overall version of 'Keynesian economics' followed by the 
Bank up to that point. Instead he believed in 'supply-side economies', really a version of'trickle-down 
economies', where the benefits of economic growth 'trickle-down' from the rich to the poor, with 
growth stimulated by the private sector.'70 
The Berg report, published in 1981, set out the Bank's plans for structural adjustment, and is 
often credited with engendering neo-liberalism. It stated that Sub-Saharan Africa's poor economic 
performance was based on rapid population growth, the legacy of colonialism, poor crop performance 
due to inclement weather, and poor public policy. Declaring that 'increased aid together with policy 
reform holds the promise of a highly fruitful investment which will be able to accelerate growth during 
the 1980s',171 the Bank proposed the establishment of 'structural adjustment programmes' (SAPs). The 
four main elements of SAPs are currency devaluation, reduction of the state's role within the economy, 
elimination of subsidies in order to improve price incentives and the liberalisation of trade.172 The 
intent of SAPs are to 'support programmes of specific policy changes and institutional reforms in order 
to achieve improvements in the balance of payments, maintain economic growth in the face of severe 
constraints and increase inflows of external assistance'.173 
Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion, p. 204. As Caufield points out, this does not mean that it did not 
influence the Bank to make improper loans for political reasons. One example is a $1.25 billion loan to Argentina, 
made in 1988, despite Bank staff objections to the country's fiscal policies. Secretary of State Baker, a close friend 
of Bank president Barber Conable, 'wanted to forestall social unrest in Latin America during the run-up to the US 
presidential election'. The Bank was forced to cancel the loan four months later when it proved unviable (p. 204). 
1 6 8 Dickson, A. (1997). Development and International Relations: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, p. 141. 
1 6 9 Ardito-Barletta, N. (1994). 'Managing Development and Transition', p. 175. 
1 7 0 Caufield, C. (1996). Masters of Illusion, p. 144. 
1 7 ' World Bank (1981). Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, pp. 121 -122 (emphasis in original). 
1 7 2 Gordon, D. (1992). 'Conditionality in Policy-Based Lending in Africa: USAID Experience', in Mosley, P. (ed). 
Development Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Conditionality in Less Developed 
Countries. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., p. 30; Riddel], R. (1987). Foreign Aid Reconsidered. London: James 
Currey Ltd., p. 214. 
1 7 3 Williams, M. (1994). International Economic Organisations and the Third World. London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, p. 117. 
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SAPs have indeed succeeded in achieving this final aim - to increase flows of external 
assistance, both in grant form and in loans. Total external debt owed by LDCs was $106 billion in 
1980, but was a remarkable $535 billion in 1995, constituting 38.7% of LDC GNP and 183.9% of 
exports.174 Furthermore, in 1980, 22% of Sub-Saharan Africa's external debt was owed to multilateral 
agencies (such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund [IMF]). In 1995, this figure 
was 40%, 1 7 5 indicating not only an overall increase in external debt since SAPs were introduced, but 
also that a larger percentage of this debt is owed to the multilateral institutions. 
Edward Jaycox, formerly Vice-President for Africa at the Bank, explains that 'the Bank's 
main goal as a development institution is to assist a country both to accelerate its economic growth and 
reduce domestic poverty', 1 7 6 but many critics believe that SAPs have had the opposite effect on Sub-
Saharan Africa. Not only have the poor themselves been adversely affected by SAPs, but their ranks 
have swelled since their implementation. In the 1980s, incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa fell by an 
average of 20%, unemployment quadrupled, investment fell to pre-1970 levels, and its share of global 
trade halved to 2%. 1 7 7 In 1994, the World Bank claimed that, ' In African countries that have 
undertaken some reforms and achieved some increase in growth, the majority of the poor are probably 
better of f and almost certainly no worse o f f . 1 7 8 In 1992, the World Development Report showed a 
mixed review to SAPs. It estimates that middle-income countries showed growth rates four percent 
higher than would have occurred without SAPs, but lower-income (mostly in sub-Saharan Africa) 
results were mixed. 1 7 9 Table 2.6 shows a comparison over time of GNP growth or decline between 
Sub-Saharan Africa, with a high proportion of countries under Bank-directed adjustment, and 
Southeast Asia, where adjustment was rare. 52% of all countries surveyed in Sub-Saharan Africa show 
a decrease or stagnation in GNP, while the same figure for Southeast Asia is only 13%.' 8 0 
1 7 4 World Bank (1997). World Development Report New York: Oxford University Press, p. 246. 
1 7 5 World Bank (1997). World Development Report, pp. 246-247. 
1 7 6 Jaycox, E. (1988). 'What Can Be Done in Africa? The World Bank's Response', p. 20. 
1 7 7 Oxfam (1995). A Case for Reform: Fifty Years of the IMF and the World Bank. Oxford: Oxfam Publications, p. 
9. 
1 7 8 World Bank (1994). Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 7 (emphasis added). 
1 7 9 World Bank (1992). World Development Report New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 68-69. 
1 8 0 The disappointing results for SAPs is only one important factor which should be taken into account to explain 
the poor performance of Sub-Saharan African countries. Other factors include the continuing weakening of 
primary commodity and agricultural prices, high population growth, lack of foreign investment, and so on. 
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Table 2.6: Comparison of GNP Per Capita Change in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, 
1984-1994 
Country 1984 GNP Per Capita 1994 GNP Per Capita (I)ncrease, 
in USD in USD (D)ecrease, (S)ame 
Benin 310 410 I 
Burundi 280 210 D 
Cameroon 890 820 D 
Cape Verde 350 850 I 
Central African 310 410 I 
Republic 
Comoros 340 510 I 
Congo 1180 1030 D 
Cote d'lvoire 950 670 D 
Ethiopia 140 110 D 
Gambia, The 360 370 I 
Ghana 360 450 I 
Guinea 310 510 I 
Guinea-Bissau 170 220 I 
Kenya 390 310 D 
Lesotho 510 590 I 
Madagascar 320 230 D 
Malawi 210 210 S 
Mali 180 310 I 
Mauritania 470 530 I 
Mauritius 1240 2700 I 
Niger 310 280 D 
Nigeria 860 320 D 
Rwanda 260 250 D 
Senegal 490 780 I 
Sierra Leone 390 170 D 
Tanzania i in n Z o U 1 1 1 / U 
Togo 340 390 I 
Uganda 230 170 D 
Zimbabwe 850 570 D 
China 310 470 I 
Indonesia 580 670 I 
Korea, Republic of 1910 6790 I 
Malaysia 1860 2790 I 
Papua New Guinea 820 950 I 
Philippines 820 770 D 
Solomon Islands 660 710 I 
Thailand 790 1840 I 
Source: World Bank (1984). World Development Report; World Bank (1994). World Development Report. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Structural adjustment has attracted much criticism. 1 8 1 Some critics argue that the targeting of 
services which greatly affect the most disadvantaged are not sustainable politically in the medium or 
See, for example, Adepoju, A. (ed) (1993). The Impact of Structural Adjustment on the Population of Africa: 
The Implications for Education, Health and Employment London: James Currey Ltd.; Caffentzis, C.G. (1993). 
'The Fundamental Implications of the Debt Crisis for Social Reproduction in Africa'. In Dalla Costa, M & Dalla 
Costa, G. (eds). Paying the Price: Women and the Politics of International Economic Strategy. London: Zed 
Books, pp. 15-41; Mehrotra, S. & Jolly, R. (eds). (1997). Development with a Human Face: Experiences in Social 
Achievement and Economic Growth. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Simon, D. (1995). 'Debt, Democracy and 
Development: Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s'. In Simon, D. et al. (eds). Structurally Adjusted Africa: Poverty, 
Debt and Basic Needs. London: Pluto Press, pp. 17-44; Elson, D. (1991). 'Male Bias in Macro-economics: The 
Case of Structural Adjustment'. In Elson, D. (ed). Male Bias in the Development Process. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, pp. 164-189; George, S. & Sabelli, F. (1994). Faith and Credit: The World Bank's Secular 
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long-term, while Bello argues that SAPs actually weaken the domestic entrepreneurial groups 
necessary to the 'supply-side', by 'eliminating protectionist barriers to imports from the North and by 
lifting restrictions on foreign investment'.183 Chossudovsky even goes so far as to accuse the World 
Bank of having a 'hidden agenda', whereby the 'compression of wages in the Third World and Eastern 
Europe supports the relocation of economic activity from the rich countries to the poor countries'; in 
other words, 'the development of a world -wide cheap-labour export economy'.1 8 4 
Ponte takes a more pragmatic approach, explaining that the Bank's claims of success must be 
re-evaluated using its own figures and methodology. His study criticises the inclusion of some 
countries in Bank calculations, and the exclusion of others. Furthermore, his own calculations adjust 
the time periods examined, and therefore show the Bank's estimates to be over-optimistic. Importantly, 
he points out that Bank evaluations exclude vital factors, such as the state of the international economy, 
terms of trade, price variations, the weather and the initial condition of individual economies.185 
Mosley asserts that although the Bank is quick to explain that each SAL is custom-designed 
and not a standard 'one-size-fits-all', it is easy to see patterns emerging. After pointing out the many 
similarities in SAL design, Mosley goes on to explain that there seems to be no rhyme nor reason in the 
implementation process. Malawi, with a debt-service ratio of 3.2% from 1978-80, received an SAL 
with very tight conditions attached, while Bolivia, with a ratio of 36.3% in the same time period, 
received very loose conditions.186 Moreover, Pakistan complied with 90% of the conditions in its first 
SAL, but was turned down for a second, while Kenya complied with only 38%, and yet received two 
additional SALs. 1 8 7 Evidence such as this led Mosley to conclude, 'First impressions therefore suggest 
that the relative bargaining strength of donor and recipient, rather more than considerations of strict 
economic appropriateness, may have exerted an influence on the World Bank's conditional aid 
Empire. London: Penguin Books; Mosley, P. (ed) (1992). Development Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in 
Theory and Practice of Conditionality in Less Developed Countries. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.; Bush, R. 
(1996). 'The Politics of Food and Starvation'. Review of African Political Economy, 23(68), pp. 169-
195.;Marquette, H. (1998). 'The Role of the World Bank in Promoting Sustainable Development through Family 
Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical Examination'. Unpublished MA dissertation, University of Durham, 
UK; Lugalla, J. (1995). 'The Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies on Women's and Children's Health in 
Tanzania'. Review of African Political Economy. 22 (63), pp. 43-53. 
1 8 2 Chen, L. & Desai, M. (1997). 'Paths to Social Development: Lessons from Case Studies'. In Mehrotra, S. & 
Jolly, R. (eds). Development with a Human Face. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 421-434. 
1 8 3 Bello, W. (1994). Dark Victory: The United States, Structural Adjustment, and Global Poverty. London: Pluto 
Press, p. 5. 
1 8 4 Chossudovsky, M. (1997). The Globalisation of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms. London: 
Zed Books Ltd., p. 76. 
1 8 5 Ponte, S. (1994). "The World Bank and "Adjustment in Africa"'. Review of African Political Economy. 66, pp. 
539-558. 
1 8 6 This is the ratio that compares debt service payment proportionate to export earnings, reflecting the ability to 
service debt. 
1 8 7 Mosley (1987). 'Conditionality as Bargaining Process: Structural Adjustment Lending 1980-86'. Essays in 
International Finance, No. 168, October. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 8-9, 21. 
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programmes'. In other words, those Borrowers who need the money the most may be in a weaker 
overall bargaining position, regardless of compliance with conditions..189 
What many critics of SAPs point out, either implicitly or explicitly, is that it is an imposition 
of economic and political conditions upon a recipient of a loan by the donor, and that the relationship 
between the two parties is inherently unequal. Its goals can be contradictory when applied across 
countries,190 and often implemented as i f in a vacuum, with one set of rules applying to poor countries 
and another for the rich. As Bromley points out, 'Since the neo-liberal discourse assumes away any 
specific problems of development, it naturally argues for a position wherein all the policy adjustment 
lies on the side of the developing countries, in their conforming to the "realities" of the world 
market'.1 9 1 In their criticism of The Berg Report, Sender and Smith state that the most obvious problem 
is that adjustment does not deal with Africa's political conflicts, wars and class realities. It instead 
assumes that state intervention in the economy has been based on ignorance and the errors of African 
bureaucrats.192 
The failure of adjustment led donor agencies, and in particular the World Bank, to conclude 
that factors in governance, and not just economic errors, on the part of recipients were to blame and 
that future lending would need to take governance into account in order to be successful. The 1990s 
saw a complete rethinking of the role of the state in the development process, and an introduction of 
political conditions into donor agendas, in addition to existing economic ones, rather than a complete 
rethinking of the use of conditionality in general. 
Mosley (1987). 'Conditionality as Bargaining Process', p. 22. Mosley's overall point is supported by others; 
for example, Kahler, M. (1992). 'External Influence, Conditionality, and the Politics of Adjustment'. In Haggard, 
S. & Kaufmann, R. (eds). The Politics of Economic Adjustment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 89-136. 
1 8 9 Currently, Pakistan has a portfolio with the Bank of fifteen projects totalling $1.4 billion, whereas Kenya has 
twelve projects totalling $662 million. See http://www.worldbank.org. 
1 9 0 For example, encouraging both Guinea and Brazil to increase their cocoa exports will only drive the price of 
cocoa down, reducing export earnings for both. 
1 9 1 Bromley, S. (1995). 'Making Sense of Structural Adjustment'. Review of African Political Economy. 65, p. 340 
(emphasis in original). 
1 9 2 Sender, J. & Smith, S. (1984). 'What's Right with the Berg Report and What's Left of Its Critics?'. IDS 
Discussion Paper, June, pp. 11-12. 
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Chapter 3: The Path to the WorBd Bank's Anti-Corruption 
Programme, 1981-1997 
Conditionality in aid is not a new phenomenon, and there is extensive literature about it. 
Different analysts offer different definitions. Nherere defines conditionality as 'the granting, 
withholding, suspension or reduction of economic aid, or other benefits, being made conditional upon 
the recipient country's performance against other standards',193 whereas Mosley defines it as 
'negotiation with the recipient government of a set of changes in economic policy that the recipient 
must implement in return for a loan or grant'. 1 9 4 Gordon refers to conditionality as a set of 'agreements 
between donors and recipients that exchange financial transfers (either grants or loans) by the donors 
for policy changes by the recipients'.195 Karl and Schmitter define it as 'linking specific rewards 
explicitly to the meeting of specific norms, or even to the selection of specific institutions'.196 Hewitt 
and Killick describe it as 'leverage' to achieve policy change.197 To simplify, conditionality can be 
defined as a system of rewards and punishments. Funding is received for meeting the donor's 
objectives, with sanctions applied i f the objectives are not met. There are several ways to apply 
negative sanctions: withholding grants and loans, terminating funds and technical support for projects 
in progress, restrictions on trade or economic and political sanctions. The innovation in aid in the 
1990s, therefore, is not the introduction of conditionality on lending, but rather the increasingly 
political nature of the conditions themselves. 
Robinson explains, 'Political conditionality refers to the linking of aid to administrative and 
political reform in recipient countries, in the pursuit of what is termed "good governance". There are 
four components to this: sound economic policies, that is, adherence to market principles and economic 
openness; competent public administration; open and accountable government; and respect for the rule 
of law and human rights'.198 According to Baylies, 'Political conditionality in its broadest sense - with 
its concerns for human rights, pluralist politics and efficient government - focuses directly on the state 
in its relationship to society and more importantly, its relationship with the economy.'1 9 9 The main 
point to remember is that political conditionality specifically links the provision of aid to political 
Nherere, P. (1995). 'Conditionality, Human Rights and Good Governance: a Dialogue of Unequal Partners'. In 
Ginther, K. et al. (eds). Sustainable Development and Good Governance. Dordrecht: Martinus NijhofT Publishers, 
p. 289. 
1 9 4 Mosley, P. (1987). 'Conditionality as Bargaining Process', p. 1. 
1 9 5 Gordon, D. (1992). 'Conditionality in Policy-Based Lending in Africa: USAID Experience'. In Mosley, P. (ed). 
Development Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Conditionality in Less Developed 
Countries. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., p. 25. 
1 9 6 Karl, T. & Schmitter, P. (1996). 'Democratisation Around the Globe: Opportunities and Risks'. In Jameson, K. 
& Wilber, C. (eds). The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment New York: McGraw-Hill, 
Inc., p. 175. 
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p. 324. 
55 
reform in recipient countries, and that for donors, the ideas for what constitutes political reform are 
naturally based largely on Western concepts of liberal democracy.200 
The Changing Orthodoxy on Democracy and Development 
The relationship between development and democracy has been the subject of much recent 
debate and is important for understanding the justifications for the Bank's anti-corruption programme. 
In a recent book, Sandbrook, an expert on democratisation in Africa, provides us with an important 
caveat: 'In all of this, certainly, we must step carefully, for debates about democracy, development, and 
globalisation will surely lead us into an ideological minefield'. 2 0 1 Pye also warns that 'Ideologues of 
the right should...be cautious about proclaiming the victory of capitalism and democracy. It is 
precisely the relationship between economics and politics that needs to be re-examined in the light of 
current developments and in a spirit that is as neutral of old ideologies as is possible in a scholarly 
environment.'202 Kausikan reminds us of 'the common failure to make a critical distinction between 
democracy as a political theory of legitimisation of government and democracy as a mechanism or 
instrument of government'.203 The first he describes as almost universal while the second is more 
flexible. 
In the years following World War I I , scholars from both the right and the left tended to agree 
that democracy was a 'luxury' that followed economic development and would fail in poor countries, 
with states forced to make a 'cruel choice' between development and democracy.204 In an early and 
very influential article, Lipset argued that economic development would bring a rise in education, 
leading to the development of a political culture supportive of democratic practices.205 In other words, 
There is a significant body of scholarly literature on liberal democracy and on its link to development. Some 
works of note include Dahl, R (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University 
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(1992) . Political Studies: Prospects for Democracy. XL(Special Issue); Lipset, S.M. (1959). 'Some Social 
Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', American Political Science Review, 
LIII(l), pp. 69-105; Lipset, S.M. (1994). "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited', American Sociological 
Science Review, 59, pp. 1-22; Sandbrook, R. (1988). 'Liberal Democracy in Africa: A Socialist-Revisionist 
Perspective'. Canadian Journal of African Studies, 22(2), pp. 240-267; Swensen, G. (1998). Democracy and 
Democratisation: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World (2"^ed). Boulder Westview Press; Pinkney, R. 
(1993) . Democracy in the Third World. Buckingham: Open University Press; Leftwich, A. (ed) (1996). 
Democracy and Development. Cambridge: Polity Press; Potter, D. et al. (eds) (1997). Democratisation. Milton 
Keynes: Open University; Diamond, L. & Planner, M. (eds) (1999). Democratisation in Africa. London: The John 
Hopkins University Press; Robinson, M. & White, G. (eds) (1998). The Democratic Developmental State: Politics 
and Institutional Design. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Ake, C. (1996). Democracy and Development in 
Africa. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution. 
2 ' Sandbrook, R. (2000). Closing the Circle: Democratisation and Development in Africa. London: Zed Books 
Ltd., p. 2. 
2 0 2 Pye, L. (1990). 'Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism'. American Political Science Review. 
84(1), p. 17, note 4. 
2 0 3 Kausikan, B. (1997). 'Governance That W'orks'. Journal of Democracy. 8(2), p. 25. 
2 0 4 Cited in Maravall, J.M. (1994). "The Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage'. Journal of Democracy. 5(4), p. 18. 
Original: Kohli, A. (1986). 'Democracy and Development'. In Lewis, J. & Kallab, V. (eds). Development 
Strategies Reconsidered. Washington DC: Overseas Development Council, p. 156. 
2 0 5 Lipset, S.M. (1959). 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy', p. 79. 
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'The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy'. Along with 
higher education levels, he also believed that hcreased levels of urbanisation, high literacy rates, 
increased wealth, a higher national income, strong civil society and an effective and legitimate political 
system were essential for the emergence of a democratic polity. Therefore, 'Given the existence of 
poverty-stricken masses, low levels of education, an elongated, pyramid class structure, and the 
"premature" triumph of the democratic left, the prognosis for the perpetuation of political democracy in 
Asia and Africa is bleak'. 2 0 9 
In an equally influential historical study, Moore concluded that there are three routes to 
modern society: a bourgeois revolution that leads to capitalist democracy (England, France, US); a 
revolution from above that leads to capitalist fascism (Germany, Japan); and a peasant revolution that 
leads to communism (Russia, China). 2 1 0 Although capitalism plays a role in the first two paths of 
modernisation, it only leads to democracy in one, and in historical examples, capitalism always 
precedes democracy. Rustow concurred, arguing that neither democracy nor communism were 
applicable for developing countries because a certain level of modernity was required for both. 2 1 1 
Picking up Moore's thread on the role of capitalism, Friedman pointed out that, 'History suggests only 
that capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom...It is therefore clearly possible to have 
economic arrangements that are fundamentally capitalist and political arrangements that are not free 
[e.g., Italy, Germany, Japan, Spain under Franco]'. 2 1 2 
Huntington argued that 'rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into 
politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions' would lead to inevitable instability 
and an environment not conducive to democracy.213 To Huntington, stability was more important than 
democracy because it facilitated political institutionalisation. I f an authoritarian regime could bring 
both economic development and stability, then it was preferable to unstable democracy. Finally, Rawls 
did not believe that liberty could be maximised at low-income levels, adding the caveat that, '[t]he 
2 0 6 Lipset, S.M. (1981). Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Orig. 1959. Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, p. 31. 
2 0 7 Lipset explained that this is the 'capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing 
political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society'. Lipset, S.M. (1959). 'Some Social 
Requisites of Democracy', p. 86. 
2 0 8 Lipset, S.M. (1959). 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy', pp. 79-86. 
2 0 9 Lipset, S.M. (1959). 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy', p. 101. Interestingly, Lipset revisited' his 1959 
article in 1994 and reached similar conclusions. The 1994 article is more ideological though, with democracy 
clearly labelled 'desirable' and not just as the product of modernisation. This perhaps reflects the changing 
orthodoxy of the times. Lipset, S.M. (1994). 'The Social Requisites of Democracy revisited'. American 
Sociological Review. 59( 1), pp. 1 -22. 
2 1 0 Moore, B. Jr. (1966). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the 
Modern World. London: Penguin University Books, pp. 413-414. 
2 1 1 Rustow, D. (1967). A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernisation. Washington DC: The Brooking 
Institutions, p. 104. 
2 1 2 Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 10. Friedman 
here is arguing against socialism and not necessarily for democracy. 
2 1 3 Huntington, S. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 4. For a 
similar argument, see Przeworski, A. & Limongi, F. (1995). 'Political Regimes and Economic Growth'. In Bagchi, 
A.K. (ed). Democracy and Development: Proceedings of the IEA Conference held in Barcelona, Spain. London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd./International Economic Association, p. 4. 
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denial of equal liberty can be accepted only i f it is necessary to enhance the quality of civilisation so 
that in due course the equal freedoms can be enjoyed by a l l ' . 2 1 4 
The advent of SAPs in the 1980s brought economists to the forefront of this debate. They 
often argued that the economic liberalisation taking place required a strong and autonomous state to 
implement policies that would most likely prove unpopular in the short-term, a risk democracies could 
do without. 2 1 5 Scholars such as Rao 2 1 6 and L a i 2 1 7 argued that economic development would indeed 
have to precede democracy, especially in the context of the promotion of neo-liberal policies, and 
suggested that, 'A courageous, ruthless and perhaps undemocratic government is required to ride 
roughshod over these newly-created special interest groups' who might undermine the process of 
liberalisation.218 This was fully accepted by the World Bank and other proponents of adjustment until 
the end of the Cold War. 
In the early 1980s, a number of liberal scholars, mostly located in the US, took a fresh look at 
Kant's principle of perpetual peace,219 arguing that democracies do not go to war against each other 
because of institutional constraints (elections/checks and balances) and shared democratic norms and 
culture. They do, however, go to war against non- democracies.220 The Reagan administration jumped 
upon this new 'democratic peace theory'. According to Doyle, 'In a speech before the British 
parliament in June of 1982, President Reagan proclaimed that governments founded on a respect for 
individual liberty exercise "restraint" and "peaceful intentions" in their foreign policy. He then 
announced a "crusade for freedom" and a "campaign for democratic development'".221 In his 1994 
State of the Union address, President Clinton also asserted, 'Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our 
security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies 
do not attack each other. They make better trading partners, and partners in diplomacy.' 2 2 2 The belief 
2 1 4 Cited in Frohock, F. & Sylvan, D. (1983). 'Liberty, Economics and Evidence'. Political Studies. XXXI(4), pp. 
543. Original: Rawls, J. (1973). A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 542. 
2 1 5 In this context, Cold War scholars made the distinction between capitalist/authoritarian regimes (i.e., the South) 
and communist/totalitarian regimes (i.e., the East). See Karl, T. & Schmitter, P. (1996). 'Democratisation Around 
the Globe: Opportunities and Risks'. In Jameson, K. & Wilber, C. (eds). The Political Economy of Development 
and Undevelopment. 6* ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., pp. 170-171. This distinction is important in that the 
major proponents of this hypothesis came from the right. For example, referring to the NICs, Huntington spoke of 
'the need...to generalise from the East Asian experience and derive from that experience a development model of 
a society that is authoritarian, stable, economically dynamic, and equitable in its income distribution'. Huntington, 
S. (1987). 'The Goals of Development'. In Weiner, M. and Huntington, S. (eds). Understanding Political 
Development. Boston: Little, Brown, pp. 25-26.1 am grateful to Dr. Anna Dickson for this point. 
2 1 6 Rao, V. (1984-85). 'Democracy and Economic Development'. Studies in Comparative International 
Development. XIX(4), pp. 67-81. 
2 1 7 Lai, D. (1983). The Poverty of 'Development Economies'. Hobart Paperback No. 16. London: Institute of 
Economic Affairs. 
2 1 8 Lai, D. (1983). The Poverty of 'Development Economics', p. 33. 
2 1 9 Kant, I . (1891). Kant's Principles of Politics including his Essay on Perpetual Peace Orig. 1795. Ed. & tr. by 
Hastie, W. Edinburgh: T & T Clark 
2 2 0 See Doyle, M. (1983). 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1'. Philosophy and Public Affairs. 
12(3), pp. 205-235; Doyle, M. (1983). 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2'. Philosophy and 
Public Affairs. 12(4), pp. 323-353; Doyle, M. (1986). 'Liberalism and World Polities'. American Political Science 
Review. 80(4), pp. 1151-1169; Oneal, J. & Russett, B. (1999). "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of 
Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organisations, 1885-1992'. World Politics. 52(1), pp. 1-37; Weart, 
S. (1998). Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
2 2 1 Cited in Doyle, M. (1986). 'Liberalism and World Polities', p. 1151. 
2 2 2 Cited in USAID (1999). Center Report on Assistance for Democratic Development. Washington DC: USAID-
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that liberal democracy is the ultimate achievement of mankind and ensures the best hope for peace was 
famously expounded by Fukuyama in his End of History and the Last Man.223 
There are many critics of democratic peace theory, who question both the theoretical 
framework and the empirical work done to support i t . 2 2 4 Zakaria asked: does the American Civil War 
count? What has been the role of nuclear weapons? At would point in time did these democracies come 
into existence? With so few democracies throughout modern history, is it just a statistical luck of the 
draw? 2 2 5 Layne used four comparative historical case studies to show that it was realism that prevailed, 
and not liberalism Indeed, 'It is only intellectual suppleness - the continual tinkering with definitions 
and categories - that allows democratic peace theorists to deny that democratic states have fought each 
other', using the examples of the War of 1812, the US Civil War and World War I . 2 2 6 
Layne points out that '[pjolicymakers who have embraced democratic peace theory see a 
crucial link between America's security and the spread of democracy, which is viewed as the antidote 
that will prevent future wars'. 2 2 7 Walt reflects, 'Because the idea of a democratic peace is so flattering 
to our own values, we may embrace it even when the evidence is ambiguous and its long-term validity 
uncertain'.228 Even proponents of democratic peace theory, such as Doyle and Russett, question how 
policymakers have interpreted their findings, justifying the use of force to 'encourage' democracy in 
the Third World. Nonetheless, many on the right argued for support for the spread of democracy 
through aid (or by force). This, of course, had a profound impact on how the right also saw the 
relationship between democracy and development. 
This changing orthodoxy turned the discourse on its head. Using a series of complex (and not 
so complex) econometric calculations, economists have worked to prove that democracies are in fact 
better at generating economic growth. 2 2 9 Gillies announced, '[T]here is a growing appreciation that 
fostering democratic processes in government and society contributes to economic development by 
releasing creative energies, enhancing accountability and deepening participation. Development 
agencies, including the World Bank, must therefore go beyond poverty alleviation (often equated with 
CDG,p.3. 
2 2 3 Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin Books Ltd. Based on his 
original article of 1989, 'The End of History?'. The National Interest. 16(Summer), pp. 3-18. 
2 2 4 For an interesting statistical analysis to show its empirical flaws, see Spiro, D. (1994). 'The Insignificance of 
the Liberal Peace', international Security. 19(2), pp. 50-86. 
2 2 5 Zakaria, F. (1997). 'Illiberal Democracy'. Foreign Affairs. 76(6), p. 36. See also, Walt, S. (1999). 'Never Say 
Never Wishful Thinking on Democracy and War'. Foreign Affairs. 78(1), pp. 146-151. 
2 2 6 Layne, C. (994). 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace'. International Security. 19(2), p. 40. To 
illustrate this point, Doyle disregards the War of 1812 because he only considers Britain a democracy from 1832, 
when suffrage was extended. However, de facto suffrage in the US at the time was no greater. 
2 2 7 Layne, C. (994). 'Kant or Cant', p. 5. 
2 2 8 Walt, S. (1999). 'Never Say Never', p. 146. 
2 2 9 O'Donnell writes of the 'overshadowing' of political scientists in this field by economists, 'often "leveraged" 
by jobs in international financial institutions', but clearly sees no problem with this situation, instead focusing his 
criticism on the lack of an effective typology of democracy for econometric research. O'Donnell, G. (1995). 'Do 
Economists Know Best?'. Journal of Democracy. 6(1), pp. 23-28. 
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social and economic rights) to embrace issues of empowerment and participation - the essence of civil 
and political rights'. 2 3 0 
Most of the literature on democracy and development appears both very ideological and ful l 
of assumptions.231 In the section, 'Rethinking the State', the 1991 World Development Report reveals 
that, 'Political and civil liberties are not, contrary to a once-popular view, inconsistent with economic 
growth'. 2 3 2 There is little evidence provided, however, to support this view. Klitgaard attempts to 
provide it in a study in which he concludes that 'politically open societies' had annual per capita 
growth of 2.5% compared to 1.4% for 'politically closed societies' for the period 1973-80, findings he 
describes as 'striking'. 2 3 3 His methodology is remarkably simplistic and he does acknowledge its 
limitations, but 'many variables we would want to include are simply not available'.2 3 4 Similar work 
has been done by Knack and Keefer, individually or in partnership, focusing on democratic notions of 
institutions and social capital and the relationship with growth. 2 3 5 In a recent study, a link is drawn 
between levels of prosperity and levels of liberty. Eighty-one 'unfree' economies have an average per 
capita income of $2,800, while seventy-four 'free' economies have an average per capita income of 
$21,200.236 Hence, the authors conclude that more freedom equals more prosperity.237 Although the 
focus here is economic freedom and not political freedom, the methodology is essentially the same and 
draws the same conclusion, disregarding all political and historical factors, and also the essential 
economic fact that average per capita income is not a measure of distribution or prosperity. 
2 3 0 Gillies, D. (1996). 'Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance: Stretching the World Bank's Policy 
Frontiers'. In Griesgraber, J. & Gunter, B. (eds). The World Bank: Lending on a Global Scale. London: Pluto 
Press, pp. 109-110. This is despite the fact that the evidence from established democracies in the developing world, 
such as India aid Jamaica, shows that democracy does not necessarily lead to popular participation. Socio-
economic factors, such as wealth and education, are the big determining factors. See Robinson, M. (1998). 
'Democracy, Participation, and Public Policy: The Politics of Institutional Design'. In Robinson, M. & White, G. 
(eds). The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 190-181. 
2 3 1 A comparison could be drawn between this work by economists trying to prove that democracy is indeed good 
for economic growth and work done by Biblical archaeologists who use the Bible to interpret findings, rather than 
the other way around, as is the norm. 
2 3 2 World Bank (1991). World Development Report 1991. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 4. 
2 3 3 KJitgaard, R. (1994). 'Do Better Polities Have Higher Economic Growth?'. IRIS Working Paper No. 113, June, 
p. 6. The data Klitgaard uses is found in Scully, G. (1992). Constitutional Environments and Economic Growth. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 176. 
2 3 4 Klitgaard, R. (1994). 'Do Better Polities Have Higher Economic Growth?', p. 8. 
2 3 5 Knack and Keefer both work in the World Bank's research department. See Knack, S. & Keefer, P. (1997). 
'Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of an Institutional Explanation'. Economic Inquiry. 
XXXV(July), pp. 590-602; Keefer, P. (1993). 'Checks and Balances, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development'. 
IRIS Working Paper No. 29. College Park, MD: IRIS; Knack, S. & Keefer, P. (1995). 'Institutions and Economic 
Performance: Cross Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures'. Economics and Politics. 7(3), pp. 
207-227; Knack, S. & Keefer, P. (1997). 'Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Country 
Investigation'. IRIS Working Paper No. 197. College Park, MD: IRIS. 
2 3 6 Measures of freedom include banking and finance, capital flows and foreign investment, monetary policy, the 
fiscal burden of government, trade policy, wages and prices, government intervention in the economy, property 
rights, regulation, and black markets. 
2 3 7 Driscoll, G. Jr., Holmes, K. & Kirkpatrick, M. (2000). 'Who's Free, Who's Not: The difference between 
prosperity and poverty is liberty'. Wall Street Journal. 1 November. See also, Heritage Foundation (2000). 'Global 
Economic Freedom Continues to Gain, Survey Shows'. The Heritage Foundation News, 1 November; Driscoll, G. 
Jr., Holmes, K. & Kirkpatrick, M. (2000). 2001 Index of Economic Freedom. Washington DC: Heritage 
Foundation & the Wall Street Journal. 
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The non-political nature so characteristic of this kind of economic work is the key to 
understanding the Bank's anti-corruption programme. Regime type, all important in earlier discussions 
of democracy and development, became irrelevant. Autonomy of the decision-making processes are 
important, not the regime, and importantly, 'Authoritarianism is neither necessary nor sufficient for this 
insulation'.2 3 8 The state here becomes an efficient manager for development: a naTve vision of Weber's 
bureaucratic administrative state that excludes political considerations.239 Donors only insist it must be 
capitalist but prefer it is democratic. 
Table 3.1: Democracy: Does it promote or impede economic development? 
Democracy impedes economic 
development 
Democracy can promote 
economic development 
Economic reasons Democracy is unable to reduce 
consumption in favour of 
investment. Thus, economic 
growth suffers. 
Democratic investment in basic 
human needs is good for 
economic growth. 
Political reasons Democracy increases the 
pressure on weak institutions. 
Concerted state action is more 
difficult. The state is weak. 
Democracy provides a stable 
political environment and the 
basis for economic pluralism. 
Democracy means legitimacy. A 
strong state is often also a 
democratic state. 
Source: Serensen, G. (1991). Democracy, Dictatorship and Development: Economic Development in Selected 
Regimes of the Third World. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., p. 68. 
Sarensen summarised the four main arguments for democracy as a pre-condition of economic 
growth: 
• Public expenditure on health and education increases human capital and is more likely to be 
supported by a democratic government. 
• Democracy provides the stability to support investment. 
• Civil and political liberties allow citizens to pursue economic growth. 
• A strong state does not have to be an authoritarian one. 2 4 0 
The problem for the World Bank is not that these arguments are completely incorrect, but rather that 
for every example that proves it, there is another that disputes it. Cuba scores highly on health and 
education indicators. Democratic regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa lack both stability and investment. 
High levels of economic growth in Southeast Asia have often allegedly depended upon the restriction 
of civil and political liberties. Finally, a strong state does not have to be an authoritarian one, but then it 
2 3 8 Bardhan, P. (1990). 'Symposium on the State and Economic Development'. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 
4(3), p. 5. 
2 3 9 See Weber, M. (1964). The Theory of Social and Economic Organisations. Tr. by Henderson, A.M. & Parsons, 
T. New York: The Free Press. Ironically, Weber said, 'It is completely ridiculous to attribute to today's advanced 
capitalism an elective affinity with "democracy" not to mention "freedom" (in any meaning of the word).' Cited in 
Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. & Stephens, J. (1992). Capitalist Development and Democracy. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, p. 21. Original: Weber, M. (1906). 'Zur Lage der burgerlichen Demkratie in Russland'. Archiv fur 
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik. N.S. 22, p. 347. 
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does not have to be democratic either. Much work has gone into proving that authoritarian 
governments are no better for development than democratic ones. The World Bank claimed that the 
evidence on regime type does not show that liberal democracy spurs growth but it does not hinder it 
either. Authoritarian regimes do not, on average, spur growth either, h addition, democracies tend to 
be associated with better health and education indicators.241 Maravall criticised earlier writers, 
explaining that a move from emphasising the accumulation of investment, an area where authoritarian 
regimes are thought to have a distinct advantage over democracies, to the productivity of investment, 
where the advantage is with democracies, disproves the 'pro-authoritarian' thesis.242 
The majority of work in this area tends to follow these same lines. Definitions of both 
democracy and authoritarianism tend to either be narrow or broad in the extreme, rendering both 
worthless. For example, Przeworski et at. define democracy as 'a regime in which those who govern 
are selected through contested election', and authoritarian regimes arc simply 'not democracies'.243 
This over-simplified notion of democracy makes their conclusions problematic. They argue, 
'democracies are more likely to be found in the more highly developed countries. Yet the reason is not 
that democracies are more likely to emerge when countries develop under authoritarianism, but that, 
however they do emerge, they are more likely to survive in countries that are already developed'.244 If 
authoritarianism is simply anything that is not a democracy, would not all countries be authoritarian 
before democracy emerges? And i f democracy is more likely to survive in economically developed 
countries, should not the conclusion be that authoritarianism is better for economic development? The 
authors can be criticised for concluding prematurely that the debate has been 'much ado about nothing' 
and that 'we did not find a shred of evidence that democracy need be sacrificed on the alter of 
development'.245 
Their evidence as presented is rather tenuous as well. They dispute Marx's claim that 'private 
property and universal suffrage are incompatible',2 4 6 instead claiming that although most dictators 
protect private property, so do most democracies.247 This does not really prove that democracy is better, 
but that a fundamental part of capitalism is the protection of private property, regardless of regime. As 
far as economic growth is concerned, they show that although total income and consumption grew 
faster for authoritarian regimes, per capita income and consumption grew faster for democracies (see 
2 4 0 Serensen, G. (1991). Democracy, Dictatorship and Development, pp. 66-67. 
2 4 1 World Bank (1991). World Development Report 1991, pp. 9-10. 
2 4 2 Maravall, J.M. (1994). "The Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage', p. 19. 
2 4 3 Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J.A. & Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy and Development: Political 
Institutions and Weil-Being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 18. 
2 4 4 Przeworski, A. et al. (2000). Democracy and Development, p. 106. 
2 4 5 Clearly there are pre-existing moral judgements at work here about the value of democracy itself. Przeworski, 
A. et al. (2000). Democracy and Development, pp. 178, 271. 
2 4 6 Cited in Przeworski, A. et al. (2000). Democracy and Development, p. 210. Original: Marx, K. (1952). The 
Class Struggle in France, 1848 to 1850. Moscow: Progress Publishers, p. 62. In a different text, Przeworski also 
contradicts Marx's theory on the Bonapartist dictatorship, arguing instead that in capitalist democracies, 
democracy protects capitalists' interests through participation. Przeworski, A. (1985). Capitalism and Social 
Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 142-143. See Marx, K. (1934). The Eighteenth Brumaire 
of Louis Bonaparte. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 
2 4 7 Przeworski, A. et al. (2000). Democracy and Development, p. 211. 
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Table 3.2). The authors argue that significance of this is that well-being, the ultimate goal of 
development for the authors, depends on the individual so per capita measurements are more indicative 
than the total. However, per capita figures do not explain issues of equality and distribution and have 
long been discarded by many scholars of development as an adequate measurement of well-being. 
Total income and consumption are similarly flawed measurements which do not take into account 
population size. It is rarely used in this fashion because of this. 2 4 9 
Table 3.2: Growth of Income and Consumption under Different Regimes (in percentage) 


















Source: Przewoiski, A. et al. (2000). Democracy and Development, p. 216. 
The authors' results are entirely dependent upon how they define regime types and how 
individual countries are classified during specific time periods. Although their classification system is 
well-presented, it is not without controversy. To illustrate, Botswana is considered a 'Bureaucracy', a 
form of authoritarianism, throughout the period because elections may be contested but are very 
predictable. Unpredictability, for the authors, is key to ensuring fair elections. The assumption is that in 
a predictable election, voters do not vote for the opposition in order to avoid having a 'wasted' vote. 
Another example is India, a democracy throughout the period, despite its state of emergency in the 
mid- 1970s, even though this sort of 'blip' is taken into account in other cases. 
Przeworski et al. should not be singled out for criticism for their simplistic and flawed 
methodology. In an earlier work by Przeworski and Limongi, they questioned studies of the 
relationship between democracy and development between 1966 and 1992. Prior to 1988, eight of the 
eleven studies found in favour of authoritarianism. After 1988, none of the nine studies did. According 
to the authors, '...since this difference does not seem attributable to samples or periods, one can only 
wonder about the relation between statistics and ideology'.2 5 0 As White points out, 'there has been a 
tendency to use empirical data like the proverbial drunk uses the lamp-post - for support rather than 
illumination'. 2 5 1 Earlier work, such as that by Dick, announced that the data does not show that 
'authoritarian governments perform better than competitive governments do in the earliest stages of 
2 4 8 The use of 'well-being' rather than economic growth is of great significance. Traditionally, development has 
been measured in terms of economic growth, but a growing number of scholars argue that economic growth is not 
sufficient because it does not measure factors such as income distribution. This argument culminated in the annual 
publication of the UN's 'Human Development Index', which measures growth, in addition to factors such as 
literacy and infant mortality rates. Although there is a great deal to be said for this alternative view of 
development, the World Bank sticks to the orthodox measurements of growth and only pays lip service to this 
notion of'well-being'. 
2 4 9 For example, i f China's total income in 1998 was $928.9 billion and Ireland's total income was $67.5 billion, it 
appears that China is significantly wealthier than Ireland. However, with a Chinese population totalling over 1.2 
billion and an Irish population of only four million, per capita incomes are $750 and $ 18,340, respectively, telling 
a different story entirely. I am grateful to Dr. Mark Aspinwall for clarification here. Income figures from World 
Bank (2000). World Development Report 1999/2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 230-231. 
2 5 0 Przeworski, A. & Limongi, F. (1995). 'Political Regimes and Economic Growth', pp. 11-12. One can only 
guess at how the authors' views changed so dramatically from 1995 to 2000. 
2 5 1 White, G. (1998). 'Constructing a Democratic Developmental State'. In Robinson, M. & White, G. (eds). The 
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development', relying on ahistorical, simplistic methodology. Even those scholars whose 
methodology is much more impressive, such as Dasgupta,253 fail to conclusively prove that a 
democratic regime is indeed a more effective facilitator of economic growth, believed to be essential 
for development by the World Bank. 2 5 4 Instead there is merely the belief that democracy is a better, 
more moral system of government, and this belief seems to drive the research.255 
One of the most important recent scholars in this field is Larry Diamond, editor of the Journal 
of Democracy and co-director the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for 
Democratic Studies, a conservative US think-tank. Diamond does not dispute the work done by Lipset 
and others, but argues instead that the 'globalisation of democracy' in recent years may have weakened 
the earlier causal relationship between economic development and democracy.256 Indeed, it is no longer 
economic growth that is important but the resultant socio-economic changes that economic growth can 
bring about. Human Development Index (HDI) indicators, such as improved water, education, health 
and security, 'better predict the presence and degree of democracy than does the level of per capita 
national wealth'. 2 5 7 He further argues that economic development is not a prerequisite for democracy 
as long as the appropriate 'civic culture' 2 5 8 is established, that 'emphasize[s] tolerance, inclusion, 
participation, and accommodation'.259 Because of this, his policy recommendations for donors includes 
focusing on basic human needs, improving institutions and empowering civic society2 6 0 all of which 
have been taken up by the World Bank in recent years. 
According to Leftwich, 
[T]his general view about the developmental efficacy of democracy appears to assume 
that there are no tensions between the many goals of development such as growth, 
democracy, stability, equality and autonomy. Furthermore, the new orthodoxy implies 
that democracy can be inserted and instituted at almost any stage in flie developmental 
process of any society - whether Rwanda or Russia, Chile or China - irrespective of its 
Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 22. 
2 5 2 Dick, G.W. (1974). 'Authoritarian versus Non-authoritarian Approaches to Economic Development'. Journal 
of Political Economy. 82(4), pp. 822-823. 
2 5 3 Dasgupta, P. (1993). An Inquiry into Weil-Being and Destitution. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
2 5 4 The basic assumption that underpins the Bank's work is that economic growth is essential for development, and 
has been held by the Bank since its inception, despite various manifestations within its development philosophy. 
Despite recent in-house criticism of this approach, as well as extensive outside criticism, the Bank stands by the 
assumption that growth is essential for development. 
2 5 5 A clear example of this is Ake, who presents a paradigm of development in which development equals human 
well-being, rather than economic growth, and in which democracy is vital for human well-being. See Ake, C. 
(1996). Democracy and Development in Africa. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, especially Chapter 5. 
Dasgupta's argument is similar. 
2 5 6 Diamond, L. (1992). 'Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered'. American Behavioral Scientist. 
36(4/5), p. 460. 
2 5 7 Diamond, L. (1992). 'Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered', p. 486. 
2 5 8 He refers here to the landmark study by Almond and Verba. See Almond, G. & Verba, S. (1963). The Civic 
Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
2 5 9 Diamond, L. (1992). 'Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered', p. 487. 
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social structure, economic condition, political traditions and external relations, and that it 
will enhance development.261 
Saul accuses Diamond and friends as 'marketing almost pure ideology', with work that neglects the 
negative impact of capitalism in Africa and the role of the state in the NICs. 2 6 2 Looking at the new 
orthodoxy, Dickson states, 
It is astonishing that this assumption can be made for the Third World when there is 
practically no empirical basis for it. The states which have been the most successful in 
World Bank economic terms are those which have tightly managed the economy - South 
Korea, Singapore - without democracy. Those countries which have remained 
democratic throughout their post-colonial history - the ex-British Caribbean, India - are 
not models of economic development.263 
As a matter of fact, these ideological proponents of democracy have little explanation for the 
success of the newly-industrialised countries (NICs) in East and South-east Asia, which have achieved 
remarkable economic growth rates under largely authoritarian regimes.264 Having said that, there is a 
strong sense of discomfort even among those who argue that autonomous, authoritarian governments 
are part of the reason these countries have been successful. Haggard writes, 
I f a link does exist between authoritarianism and economic development, it should 
operate through the ability of authoritarian governments to pursue growth-promoting 
policies that would not be possible under democratic auspices. Crucial policy reforms in 
the NICs have historically been associated with authoritarian rule; any assessment of the 
NICs must weigh this high cost of 'success'. Nonetheless, important caveats, 
qualifications, and objections must be addressed. There are no theoretical reasons to 
think that authoritarian regimes are uniquely capable of solving the collective-action 
problems associated with development. This absence provides hope that newly 
2 6 1 Leftwich, A. (1996), 'On the Primacy of Politics in Development'. In Leftwich, A. (ed). Democracy and 
Development. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 4. 
2 6 2 Saul, J. (1997). '"For Fear of Being Condemned as Old Fashioned": Liberal Democracy vs. Popular Democracy 
in Sub-Saharan Africa'. Review of African Political Economy. 24(73), p. 341. 
2 6 3 Dickson, A. (1997). Development and International Relations: A Critical htroduction. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, p. 140. Leftwich adds to this list: Malaysia, Botswana, Taiwan, Indonesia, China and Thailand. 
2 6 4 There is not room in this thesis for an in-depth treatment of the NIC paradox, but excellent discussions can be 
found in Haggard, S. (1990). Fathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrialising 
Countries. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Moran, J. (1999). 'Patterns of Corruption and Development in East 
Asia'. Third World Quarterly. 20(3), pp. 569-587; Moon, C. & Kim, Y. (1996). 'A Circle of Paradox: 
Development, Politics and Democracy in South Korea'. In Leftwich, A. (ed). Democracy and Development: 
Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 137-167; Gills, B. (1993). 'Korean Capitalism and Democracy'. 
In Gills, B., Rocamora, J. & Willson, R. (eds). Low-Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World 
Order. London: Pluto Press, pp. 226-257. Prior to the late 1990s financial crisis, the World Bank argued that 
developing countries should model themselves on the East Asian model. See World Bank (1993). The East Asian 
Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The financial crisis changed this, 
which the Bank blamed, in part, on an invasive and corrupt state. See, for example, Claessens, C. & Glaessner, T. 
(1997). Are Financial Sector Weaknesses Undermining the East Asian Miracle?. Washington DC: World Bank. 
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democratising countries will develop institutions conducive to both political liberty and 
economic growth. 2 6 5 
Sandbrook and Oelbaum ask, is democratisation '"a gamble worth taking, not only for its intrinsic 
value as a defence against tyranny but for its instrumental value in institutional change and improved 
value? Or is democracy another false start in poor countries attempting costly economic reforms?'"2 6 6 
Referring both to Hitler and to the NICs, Wintrobe says, 'This threat - namely, that an authoritarian, 
cohesive, organised, and disciplined society is capable of levels of economic performance that are 
simply impossible in a democracy - is the spectre that haunts democracy'.267 
This has created a significant dilemma for the left. Even those who do not subscribe to the 
changing orthodoxy have trouble prescribing authoritarianism for developing countries, given the 
potential implications for civil and political liberties. Instead, some critics on the left have argued that 
the evidence merely points to the existence of what has been called 'developmental states', a phrase 
coined by Chalmers Johnson in his seminal work on Japan, or a 'state-guided market system'.2 6 8 The 
developmental state, as defined by Leftwich, is one 'whose internal politics and external relations have 
served to concentrate sufficient power, authority, autonomy, competence and capacity at the centre to 
shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by 
establishing and promoting the conditions of economic growth, or by organising it directly, or a 
varying combination of both. ' 2 6 9 This state could be democratic or it could be authoritarian, but it has 
to be strong. He further indicates seven features of successful developmental state: (1) de facto or de 
jure one-party states; (2) relatively uncorrupt elites; (3) relatively autonomous elites; (4) powerful and 
competent bureaucracy; (5) weak civil society; (6) the nature of the state established early on; and (7) 
unpleasant from a liberal or socialist point of view because of restrictions on civil and political 
liberties.270 White believes that the strength of the developmental state is its ability to deal with its 
internal issues (such as class); its politico-administrative capacity, helpful for spreading ideology and 
formulating and implementing policy; and the autonomy of its 'specific modes of involvement of state 
organisations in social and economic processes to further industrialisation,' such as regulation, 
institutions and infrastructure.271 
2 6 5 Haggard, S. (1990). Pathways from the Periphery, pp. 255-256. 
2 6 6 Cited"in Doig, A. (2000). 'In the State We Trust? Democratisation, Corruption and Development'. In Doig, A. 
& Theobald, R. (eds). Corruption and Democratisation. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., p. 13. Original: 
Sandbrook, R. & Oelbaum, J. (1997). 'Reforming Dysfunctional Institutions Through Democratisation? 
Reflections on Ghana'. Journal of Modern African Studies. 35(4), p. 608. 
2 6 7 Wintrobe, R. (1998). The Political Economy of Dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 128. 
2 6 8 Johnson, C. (1982). MITT and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, p. vii. 
2 6 9 Leftwich, A. (1996). 'Two Cheers for Democracy? Democracy and the Developmental State'. In Leftwich, A. 
(ed). Democracy and Development. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 284. 
Leftwich, A. (1994). 'Governance, the State and the Politics of Development'. Development & Change. 25(2), 
pp. 377-381. 
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Moving from the notion of the 'developmental state', White argues instead for a 'democratic 
developmental state', which has 'sufficient political authority' and administrative capacity to manage 
conflicts and effective regulative, infrastructional and redistributive functions.272 He focuses on the 
type of authoritarian regime, highlighting the major differences between, for example, South Korea and 
Zaire. Serensen also insists on this distinction when arguing that authoritarian regimes make good 
'developmental states'.273 Wintrobe's typology of dictatorship (Table 3.3) expresses the differences 
between regimes. His 'timocracy', which exercises a 'capitalist authoritarianism' and 'combinefs] 
market economics with autocratic political systems,'274 helps us to understand what is meant by non-
Table 33: Wintrobe's Typology of Dictatorships 
Totalitarian USSR, Nazi Germany, Mussolini 
Tinpot Patrimonial, personal rule, includes many Latin 
American and African examples 
Tyranny Mobutu, Amin, Duvalier 
Timocracy Ideal type with no real examples, but close ones 
include Pinochet, Lee Kwan Yew 
Source: Wintrobe, R. (1998). The Political Economy of Dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 7-
15. 
democratic developmental states. He also debunks previous theories on the importance of democracies 
for redistribution of growth to enhance well-being. Referring to NICs and timocracies such as Chile, 
'(1) These economies perform well, not because they don't redistribute but because they do. (2) The 
redistribution in Ihe case of these regimes happens to be toward groups that especially profit from 
economic growth. ' 2 7 5 
Leftwich maintains, 'Unattractive as many of these states may be from a liberal or socialist 
point of view, they have been highly effective in raising the material welfare of the majority of their 
citizens within a generation.'276 White calls Leftwich a 'pessimist', despite acknowledging the 
contextual and historical reasons for his pessimism.277 He cannot justify the existence of authoritarian 
regimes, but cedes, 'Perhaps the most we can grant the "rational authoritarian" argument is that, where 
a non-liberal democratic regime demonstrates a clear capacity to govern effectively and bring about 
real improvements in the lives of its citizens and is not engaged in gross violations of their civil rights 
and personal security, it should not be pushed willy-nilly into a wholesale and immediate adoption of a 
liberal-democratic poli ty ' . 2 7 8 Once again we can see the pre-conceived notion that liberal democracy is 
inherently 'good' and authoritarian regimes should only be 'tolerated' i f they can prove worth from a 
development point of view. 
2 7 2 White, G. (1998). 'Constructing a Democratic Developmental State', p. 29. 
2 7 3 Serensen, G. (1991). Democracy, Dictatorship and Development, p. 184. 
2 7 4 Wintrobe, R. (1998). The Political Economy of Dictatorship, pp. 7-14. 
2 7 5 Wintrobe, R. (1998). The Political Economy of Dictatorship, p. 149 (emphasis in original). 
2 7 6 Leftwich, A. (1994). 'Governance, the State and the Politics of Development', p. 365. 
2 7 7 White, G. (1998). 'Constructing a Democratic Developmental State', p. 23, 42. His contextual reasons include 
asking whether a change in regime really will make a difference for development? What other constraints exist? 
Historical reasons include the paths followed by the West, the USSR, Germany and Japan prior to World War II, 
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What remains are texts that come to no conclusion at all. Rueschemeyer et al. provides a 
salient example. Their study on Capitalist Development and Democracy combines quantitative cross-
national comparisons and qualitative comparative historical studies to conclude that regime type does 
not matter as much as capitalism in facilitating economic development.279 Healey and Robinson 
conclude hat the evidence does not show that democracy is more effective for growth or income 
equality, but then neither does it show it for authoritarianism.280 In addition, 'Third World experience 
so far does not give any assurance that political liberalisation or more representative government will 
per se result in better economic management or more decisive or effective adjustment policies, faster 
economic growth or less inequality'.281 Roemer produced a complex politico-economic equilibrium 
model to conclude 'that there are no simple explanations of the link between political democracy and 
economic development'.282 Despite this lack of evidence or consensus, donors insist that 
democratisation should be a condition of aid, and this type of ideologically-biased research continues. 
Criticisms of Political Conditionality 
Economic conditionalities have not brought about successful change in policy reform, 
reduction of debt or significant economic growth in recipient countries. There is no indication that 
political conditionalities will prove more effective. The consensus of most observers outside the donor 
agencies themselves is just the opposite. Criticism of political conditionality comes from authoritarian 
leaders in the South worried about upholding the status quo, but also claiming that rapid liberalisation, 
imposed from outside, could lead to ethnic unrest and civil troubles. Moi has claimed this in Kenya, as 
has Museveni of Uganda, among others. Criticisms also come from intellectuals worried about a 
'hidden' donor agenda - the imposition of a Western-designed 'new world order' or an attempt to 're-
colonise' the South.283 More criticism come from those concerned with more technical aspects of 
political conditionality, especially problems of evaluation. 
This problem of evaluation comes up often in the academic literature. Economic 
conditionalities have proven difficult enough to monitor, both within the Bank itself and for outside 
observers. This does not bode well for political conditionalities. Whereas economic conditions often 
involve objectives such as exchange rates and tariff barriers, political conditionalities may require free 
and fair elections, a free media, transparent government and respect for human rights. Nelson contends 
RueschemeyeT, D., Stephens, E. & Stephens, J. (1992). Capitalist Development and Democracy, pp. 5, 302. See 
also, Huber, E., Rueschemeyer, D. & Stephens, J. (1993). 'The Impact of Economic Development on 
Democracy'. The Journal ofEconomic Perspectives. 7(3), pp. 71-86. 
2 8 0 Healey, J. & Robinson, M. (1992). Democracy, Governance and Economic Policy: Sub-Saharan Africa in 
Comparative Perspective. London: Overseas Development Institute, p. 122. 
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that some political goals are eascr to achieve than others. By way of illustration, a condition might 
state that there should be greater freedom of speech and association, which a recipient could comply 
with vis-a-vis lifting restrictions on the media and loosening laws on labour unions. However, a 
condition requiring a more responsible press is not within the government's power to control, and 
makes it harder for the donor to monitor results. 2 8 4 
Cassen asserts that in order to improve the efficacy of political conditionality, greater 
deliberation must be paid to donor strategy implementation. His keys to success are as follows: 'the 
availability of adequate resources to sustain adjustment programmes; the analytical and negotiating 
capacities of recipients; and the ability of donors to comprehend local circumstances and respond 
flexibly to changes in the assumptions or forecasts upon which programmes are based.'285 These keys 
incorporate the belief that aid agendas must include 'government ownership' of reform projects. I f a 
recipient is unable to properly negotiate their own position in the aid agenda, but they also need the aid, 
it is not unrealistic to believe that perhaps conditions will not be met in full , or they may even be 
fraudulently made to look like there is compliance, ultimately making a mockery of the entire 
Paul Collier, director of the Development Research Department at the World Bank Institute 
(WBI), has taken an explicit look at the use of conditionality by the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) for the pursuit of policy change by recipients, and his conclusions are far from 
positive. His particular research focuses on the relationship between risk ratings and investment in 
Africa, and he concludes that 'the high-risk, low-investment environment in Africa that this 
conditionality as it has been practised for the past decade has failed to establish a credible policy 
environment. That is, to date, donor conditionality has not constituted an effective agency of 
restraint'.289 In other words, as of the late 1990s, Bank conditionality simply has not brought in private 
investment to Africa. The main problem for investors, as Collier sees it, is one of credibility - they 
simply do not believe that governments in Africa have a true commitment to reform. This is partly 
because there is a general lack of investor knowledge about Africa in comparison to other regions, but 
mostly because of the high donor profile in Africa, compared to other regions and, in countries like 
China, for example. '[H]owever opaque the political process in China, investors cannot seriously 
2 8 4 Nelson, J. (1992). 'Good Governance: Democracy and Conditional Economic Aid'. In Mosley, P. (ed). 
Development Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Conditionality in Less Developed 
Countries. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., p. 313. 
2 8 5 Cassen, R. (1994). Does Aid Work? (2nd ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 59. 
2 8 6 Nelson, J. (1992). 'Good Governance', p. 315. 
2 8 7 Collier is professor of economics at Oxford University and director of the Centre for the Study of African 
Economies, currently on leave to head the Bank's research division. 
2 8 8 Here Collier is referring to the economic conditions of SAPs, but he transfers this same reasoning to his more 
recent forays into political conditions, especially for anti-corruption work. 
2 8 9 He defines an 'agency of restraint' as 'the institutional arrangement whereby a government locks itself into a 
policy'. Collier, P. (1999). 'Learning from Failure: The International Financial Institutions as Agencies of 
Restraint in Africa'. In Schedler, A., Diamond, L. & Plattner, M. et al (eds). The Self-Restraining State: Power and 
Accountability in New Democracies. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., p. 314. 
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imagine that policy reform has been purchased by the World Bank'. It is the conditionality itself that 
plays a role in putting off investors. 
According to Collier, there are three types of governments which accept aid with conditions 
attached: 
(1) Governments who know that the required reforms will be beneficial in the long-term, 
and then use the aid to offset any short-term costs. 
(2) Governments who were going to implement the required reforms anyway, so are then 
able to use the aid as a 'windfall'. 
(3) Finally, governments with no intention of implementing the reforms in the long-term, 
and who reverse any required reforms when the aid stops.291 
The problem of differentiation breeds further investor concern over credibility, and also raises the 
question of how donors can differentiate between these three types of governments as well. 
What many of these critics keep coming back to is the concept of ownership of both economic 
and political conditionalities on the part of recipients and commitment to reform. A final criticism of 
political conditionality is that it presents a difficult paradox, one quite similar to the paradox blamed for 
the failure of adjustment, in that the minimalist state required by structural adjustment is often unable 
to implement sweeping economic reforms, let alone tackle new political ones 2 9 2 Contrary to the 
principles of neo-liberalism put forward by the Bank in the 1980s, Nelson suggests evidence shows 
economic reform has taken place most effectively in states with an authoritative political system and 
small, centralised government293 Baylies identifies an important paradox here, in that adjustment 'rests 
on an assumption that state capacity and legitimacy are crucial for the enactment of economic reforms 
and represents a response to a paradox inherent in previous orthodoxy, whereby structural adjustment 
programmes both relied on the state to institute reforms and undermined its capacity to do so'. 2 9 4 
This paradox highlights a conflict within the Bank in existence since its inception, that is, 
what is the role of the state? In the post-war period, the emphasis was placed on the state as a 
'facilitator* of economic growth, a position largely unchallenged until the debt crisis in the late 1970s. 
Following this, the Bank instead insisted that the state hindered economic growth, and insisted that a 
minimalist, 'rolled back' state would instead foster economic growth. 2 9 5 This claim has quickly been 
proven as simplistic and unfounded, both in the West and in the LDCs. In the 1990s, after a period of 
2 9 0 Collier, P. (1999). 'Learning from Failure', pp. 314-315. 
2 9 1 Collier, P. (1999). 'Learning from Failure', pp. 316-317. 
2 9 2 Baylies, C. (1995). '"Political Conditionality" and Democratisation', p. 325. 
2 9 3 Nelson, J. (1992). 'Good Governance', p. 312. 
2 9 4 Baylies, C. (1995). '"Political Conditionality" and Democratisation', p. 324. 
2 9 5 In his 1980 inaugural address, Reagan famously said, "Government is not the solution to our problem; 
government is the problem'. Quoted in Hogan, J. (1988). 'The Office of Management and Budget and 
Reaganomics', pp. 97-98. 
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vast political change, the Bank has insisted that the state does indeed have a role - as a facilitator of 
administrative capacity. According to James Wolfensohn, the Bank's current president, 
'[Development requires an effective state, one that plays a catalytic, facilitating role, encouraging and 
complementing the activities of private businesses and individuals. Certainly, state-dominated 
development has failed. But so has stateless development...Wihout an effective state, sustainable 
development, both economic and social, is impossible'.296 This new position on the role of the state has 
led to a rethinking of the use of conditionality by the Bank, introducing a new explicitly political 
dimension to its lending in the form of good governance and anti-corruption work. 
Looking at the introduction of governance into the agenda, Cassen opines, 'It was as i f the 
donors were going up the ladder of causation, from projects to policies to the way in which countries 
were governed'.297 The earlier orthodoxy of authoritarian regimes as enablers of economic growth and 
reform changed, and it instead became accepted by donors that authoritarian regimes in the South, with 
bloated and often corrupt governments, in fact hindered economic growth. Burnell explains, 
In what is little more than a reworking of the old jibe that some governments lack 
"political commitment to development", the root of the problem is presently laid at the 
door of non-accountable, corrupt, and incompetent regimes - regimes who extract 
resources from society and misappropriate the economic surplus for dubious 
expenditures and their own selfish purposes. According to this view, the state has ceased 
to be part of the solution to underdevelopment, and instead is an embodiment of the very 
problem. 2 9 8 
In this sense, donors are excused from the failures of adjustment. After all, it is not the design or even 
concept of adjustment that is to blame for poor African performance in the 1980s: it is the 
implementation of these theoretically sound policies by the Africans themselves. Using this logic, 
Collier warns, 'the only policies African governments are clearly identified as owning are those that are 
bad.' 2 9 9 
There are other critics who argue that the new focus on governance 'greatly increased the 
complexity of the [Bank's] operations. Their erstwhile mission, to facilitate economic growth via 
projects with a high rate of economic return, was difficult enough to achieve. But now "development" 
is seen to encompass multi-dimensional objectives, embracing social, cultural and even political 
domains'.300 Others believe that this new complex nature of the Bank's operations could have the effect 
2 9 6 World Bank (1997). World Development Report 1997. New York: Oxford University Press, p. i i i . 
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of undermining its credibility on Wall Street, and Ardito-Barletta even claims that the reason that the 
Bank did not focus on governance before was in order to 'protect its portfolio' . 3 0 1 Finally, in a paper 
that harshly criticises the Bank's good governance agenda, Mahbub ul Haq, formerly McNamara's 
'right-hand man', declares, '...the IMF and the World Bank are no longer institutions of global 
management; they are now primarily institutions to police the developing wor ld ' . 3 0 2 This criticism from 
within the Bank's elite highlights not only the significant shift in policy from McNamaa's presidency 
but also the dramatic impact this new agenda has had on the Bank's role in the developing world and 
on its overall international position. 
Good Governance, Anti-Corruption Work and the World Bank 
The new approach to the role of the state and the introduction of more explicitly political 
conditions into Bank lending took place within a unique historical context. The great political upheaval 
of the early 1990s changed the way all donors approached foreign aid, and ushered in a focus on good 
governance.303 Along with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of command economies, came 
what has been referred to as a "Third Wave' of democratisation in the developing world. 3 0 4 Combined 
with the rise of neo-liberalism, ever-shrinking aid budgets and increased media attention on dictatorial 
Third World regimes squandering foreign aid, 3 0 5 bilateral donors have offered support for the spread of 
democracy in the Third World, in the form of election assistance, and also judicial reform, training of 
the media and support for civil society. 
Development, Democracy and Corruption 
Concurrent with assistance for democratisation efforts has been a growing concern with the 
effects of corruption on development, and an increasing emphasis within the donor community on 
assistance for anti-corruption strategies. Few people now believe that corruption, in any form, is 
beneficial for economic growth or development. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, a group of scholars 
saw a direct link between the modernisation process and corruption and argued that 'corruption seems 
to exist and thrive in countries at similar stages of development regardless of cultural differences'.306 
Press, p. 65; see also Gordon, D. (1992). 'Conditionality in Policy-Based Lending in Africa: USAID Experience'. 
In Mosley, P. (ed). Development Finance and Policy Reform: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Conditionality 
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These 'functionalists' believed that corruption helped aid social and political integration during times 
of great social change and filled needs not met by official means.307 Leys and Leff both argued that 
bribes can in fact overcome the obstacles arising from inefficient bureaucracy308 while Nye discussed 
three ways corruption can help political development by helping economic development. Firstly, it aids 
capital formation when tax systems are weak and private capital scarce.309 Secondly, as Leys also 
indicated, corruption can help cut unnecessary and debilitating red tape. Finally, corruption can 
encourage entrepreneurship by creating competition. This can be especially important i f the 
entrepreneurial class is a ethnic, racial or religious minority lacking legitimate access to the political 
system.310 However, Nye did put a disclaimer on his theory. Problems can arise from corruption i f 
actors waste resources, vis-a-vis capital flight, improper investment, waste of skills and the loss of 
foreign aid. 3 1 1 It can delegitimisc the government in the eyes of the people, possibly leading to social 
revolution, military coups and ethnic unrest. It also can reduce governmental administrative capacity.312 
Scott suggested that 'corruption can often more profitably be seen as one of many processes of 
political influence than as simply the misuse of office in violation of community norms'. 3 1 3 In LDCs 
with low literacy rates and where wealth and power are controlled by a small elite, the majority are able 
to influence politicians more at the 'enforcement stage', that is after laws have been passed, than in the 
pre-legislation stage, when pressure groups, such as business groups or trade unions, are more 
effective. 3 1 4 Huntington argued that higher levels of corruption coincided with rapid social and 
economic modernisation and helped to offset some of the destabilising factors brought about by these 
rapid changes. Even though corruption tends to weaken political development, it can also strengthen it 
by strengthening opposition parties and other institutions that otherwise lack access to the state.315 
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Development through Bureaucratic Corruption'. In Heidenheimer, A. (ed). Political Corruption: Readings in 
Comparative Analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., p. 510. Originally appeared under the same 
title in (1964). American Behavioral Scientist 8(3), pp. 8-14. The authors were quick to point out that 'can' is not 
the same as 'will '. 
3 0 9 However, it is important to note that this is only the case if the money ends up in capital investment and not in 
Swiss bank accounts. 
3 1 0 Nye, J.S. (1970). 'Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis'. In Heidenheimer, A. (ed). 
Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., pp. 567-
568. Originally appeared under the same title as (1967). American Political Science Review. LXI(2), pp. 417-427. 
3 , 1 Interestingly, as early as 1967, Nye wrote, ' I f corruption is a consideration with donors (presumably it weighs 
more heavily with multilateral institutions), it is not yet a primary one'. Nye, J.S. (1970). 'Corruption and Political 
Development', p. 570. Nye did not explain his presumption, but it does at least indicate an early academic concern 
with corruption and the World Bank. 
3 1 2 Nye, J.S. (1970). 'Corruption and Political Development', pp. 570-572. 
3 1 3 Scott, J.C. (1969). 'The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations'. Comparative Studies in Society & 
History. 11(2), pp. 324-325. 
3 1 4 Scott, J.C. (1969). "The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations', pp. 326-327; Scott, J.C. (1970). 
'Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change'. In Heidenheimer, A. (ed). Political Corruption: Readings in 
Comparative Analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., p. 549. Originally appeared as (1969). 
'Corruption, Machine Politics, and Social Change'. American Political Science Review. 63(4), pp. 1142-1159. See 
also, Scott, J.C. (1972). Comparative Political Corruption. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
3 1 5 Huntington, S. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 69. 
73 
This idea of corruption serving several functional roles in development was criticised by a 
new generation of scholars, again mostly economists, in the late 1970s and beyond,316 and it is this 
school of thought that has influenced the World Bank's anti-corruption programme. Earlier in the 
1970s, economists such as Myrdal 3 1 7 and Krueger318 developed the idea of 'rent-seeking', defined as 
'situations where people use resources both for productive purposes and to gain an advantage in 
dividing up the benefits of economic activity'. 3 1 9 Rent-seeking forms of corruption, which include 
bribery, 'speed money', smuggling and the black market, do not cut down on bureaucracy or open the 
state to the excluded, but rather add 'additional welfare costs' to transactions with the state.320 Instead 
of speeding up transactions, rent-seeking actually causes civil servants to slow transactions down in 
order to collect more bribes.321 Myrdal claimed, 'Where corruption is widespread, inertia and 
inefficiency, as well as irrationality, impede the process of decision-making and plan fulfilment' . 3 2 2 
Waterbury, a political scientist, agreed with Myrdal and Krueger and disagreed with the likes of Leff 
and Nye that corruption can be beneficial. Using Morocco as a case study, he concluded that bribery 
did not create more efficiency, eliminate red tape or include minority interests in the political process. 
Instead, those paying bribes were rarely the most efficient but instead were usually speculators or elites 
with money and access to the state. Red tape was often created in order to collect a 'fee.' It helped to 
keep resources within the elite and served to maintain the current regime. 3 2 3 
This approach to the impact of corruption on development was given real voice by two 
economists in particular, Rose-Ackerman324 and Klitgaard.3 2 5 Both have worked as consultants to the 
World Bank on corruption issues and continue to greatly influence the direction its work has taken.326 
3 1 6 See Williams, R. (1999). 'New Concepts for Old?'. Third World Quarterly. 20(3), p. 506. 
3 1 7 Myrdal, G. (1970). 'Corruption: Its Causes and Effects'. In Heidenheimer, A. (ed). Political Corruption: 
Readings in Comparative Analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., p.p. 540-545. Originally appeared 
under the same title in (1968). Asian Drama: An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations (Vol. II). Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, pp. 951-958. 
3 1 8 Krueger, A. (1974). 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society'. The American Economic Review. 
64(June), pp. 291-303. See also, Buchanan, J. (ed) (1980). Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. Texas: 
Texas A & M University Press; Bhagwati, J. (1982). 'Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities'. 
Journal of Political Economy. 90(5), pp. 988-102. 
3 1 9 Rose-Ackerman, S. (\999).Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 2. 
3 2 0 Krueger, A. (1974). 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', p. 295. 
3 2 1 Myrdal, G. (1970). 'Corruption', p. 541. 
3 2 2 Myrdal, G. (1970). 'Corruption', p. 541. 
3 2 3 Waterbury, J. (1973). 'Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime'. World Politics. 25(4), pp. 
543-555. 
3 2 4 Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978). Corruption: A Study in Political Economy. New York: Academic Press. 
3 2 5 Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling Corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
3 2 6 Klitgaard has worked as a consultant to the Bank on corruption, while Rose-Ackerman was also a visiting 
scholar at the Bank in the mid-1990s. While working as a visiting scholar at the World Bank, Rose-Ackerman 
published the following papers: (1996). 'The Political Economy of Corruption - Causes and Consequences'. 
Public Policy for the Private Sector Note No. 74. Washington DC: World Bank; (1996). 'Redesigning the State to 
Fight Corruption'. Viewpoint Note No. 75. Washington DC: World Bank; (1996). 'Democracy and "Grand" 
Corruption'. International Social Science Journal. 48, pp. 365-380; (1996). 'Is Leaner Government Cleaner 
Government?'. Published in Spanish as '<,Una Administracion Reducida Significa una Administracion Mas 
Limpia?'. Nueva Sociedad. 145(Sept-Oct), pp. 66-79; with Coolidge, J. (1997). 'High-Level Rent-Seeking and 
Corruption in African Regimes'. Policy Research Working Paper No. 1780. Washington DC: World Bank; (1997). 
'When is Corruption Harmful?'. Background paper for 1997 WDR. Washington DC: World Bank; (1997). 
'Corruption, Inefficiency and Economic Growth'. Nordic Journal of Political Economy. 24, pp. 3-20; (1997). 'The 
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Both worked within the framework of a principal-agent model, where an agent acts on behalf of a 
principal vis-a-vis a client, where all may act corruptly i f the 'likely net benefits from doing so 
outweigh the likely net costs'.327 Both argue that some corruption is normal in any political system and 
that 'the optimum level of corruption is not zero'. 3 2 8 Both argue that a free market is essential for 
combating high levels of corruption and that 'corrupt incentives are the nearly inevitable consequence 
of all government attempts to control market forces'. 3 2 9 Both see corruption primarily in terms of 
bribery. Both offer solutions that can be taken up by the World Bank and other development agencies. 
Klitgaard's involves, (1) distinguishing between 'ostensible' and 'strategic' issues in fighting 
corruption;330 (2) cultivating political support; (3) getting the public involved; (4) breaking the culture 
of corruption; (5) moving positively as well as negatively; (6) linking anti-corruption measures to the 
development agency's main mission; and finally, finding 'Mr. Clean' and supporting h im. 3 3 1 Rose-
Ackerman's direct recommendations to the Bank on corruption, published in a 1997 article entitled 
'The Role of the World Bank in Controlling Corruption', include, (1) tackling corruption in its own 
projects and being ready to cancel projects i f corruption is detected; (2) supporting international efforts 
to reduce bribery and establish universal financial management standards; and (3)creating grant and 
loan projects that create 'an environment favourable to shared growth and the alleviation of poverty. 
The Bank could select a few countries with supportive governments and work with them to design 
programs that could serve as examples for others. Country officials, working with Bank staff, should 
design programs that reduce underlying corrupt incentives, facilitate civil service reform, open 
government to outside scrutiny, and strengthen formal institutions of oversight and control (such as the 
courts). This sounds like a large order, but piecemeal efforts are unlikely to do much good'. 3 3 2 As 
Chapter Four shows, this is exactly the direction in which the Bank's anti-corruption programme has 
evolved. 
My intention here is not to prove conclusively, one way or the other, the relationship between 
democracy, corruption and development. Rather, I have shown the lack of scholarly consensus 
regarding this relationship. The significance for this thesis lies in the Bank's use of one side of the 
debate to justify its own work on corruption. Ignoring one-half of this important debate leaves the Bank 
theoretically stranded and without a clear mandate to push ahead with the more political aspects of its 
work. 
Political Economy of Corruption'. In Elliot, K. (ed). Corruption aid the Global Economy. Washington DC: 
Institute for International Economics, pp. 31-60; (1997). 'The Role of the World Bank in Controlling Corruption'. 
Law & Policy in International Business. 29(1), pp. 93-114; with Stone, A. (1998). 'The Burden of Bribery on 
Private Business: Evidence from World Bank Surveys'. Draft working paper. Washington DC: World Bank; 
(1998). 'Corruption and Development'. In Pleskovic, B. & Stiglitz, J. (eds). Annual World Bank Conference on 
Development Economics, 1997. Washington DC: World Bank, pp. 35-57. 
3 2 7 Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling Corruption, p. 22. 
3 2 8 Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling Corruption, p. 24; see also, Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978). Corruption, p. 9. 
3 2 9 Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978). Corruption, p. 9 (emphasis in original). 
3 3 0 Ostensible involves determining the treatment while strategic involves how to get it implemented. 
3 3 1 Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling Corruption, pp. 183-189. 
3 3 2 Rose-Ackerman, S. (1997). "The Role of the World Bank in Controlling Corruption', pp. 113-114. 
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Ball reminds us of early work by economists, such as Schumpeter and Downs, who 
produced the 'economic theory of democracy', which 'recasts democracy in the idiom of economics, or 
more specifically of neo-classical economic theory and the more recent "rational choice" research 
programme predicated on i t . ' 3 3 5 Political scientists should not be surprised by the results of this work, 
as 'economics is in no small part persuasive speech. That discipline's increasingly technical and formal 
character tends to discourage or disable critics who are not economists, even as it lends an aura of 
scientific legitimacy to those who speak its idiom' . 3 3 6 The 'economic theory of corruption' put forward 
by the Bank is inevitably flawed by its insistence that corruption can be simply an economic issue. 
Even its definition of corruption lacks the nuance and depth of earlier definitions, being simply: 'the 
abuse ofpublic office for private gain'.331 This means everything and nothing at the same time, and it 
allows the Bank great scope for work on corruption because it presents few limitations. 
Donors and Good Governance 
For most donors, good governance equals democratic government, and anti-corruption work 
tends to be placed within an overall strategy of assistance for democratisation efforts, which also 
includes related themes such as enhanced participation, strengthening of the rule of law, multi-party 
elections, institution building and making governments more accountable to their electorates. Donor 
strategies have developed in this way despite the criticism from some that there is no evidence to 
suggest that democracy is a necessary pre-condition of development. This is not to suggest that all 
donors share the same priorities or that approaches towards good governance within the donor 
community are identical, but there are similarities. These include helping to promote competition 
among political parties, high levels of participation and sufficient levels of civil and political 
liberties.338 
Schumpeter, J. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: George Allen & Unwin. 
3 3 4 Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row Publishers. 
3 3 5 Ball, T. (1988). Transforming Political Discourse: Political Theory and Critical Conceptual History. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell Ltd., p. 122. Both Klitgaard and Rose-Ackerman are proponents of rational choice theories of 
corruption. 
3 3 6 Ball, T. (1988). Transforming Political Discourse, p. 136. An interesting example of this is found in a paper by 
Klitgaard, in which he includes an anecdote about meeting Raymond Gastil, author of Freedom in the World, who 
expressed displeasure that his index of political and civil rights was being linked to economic growth in 
Klitgaard's work. Klitgaard says that he tried to explain the methodology to Gastil but he did not seem to 
understand. With the tone in which Kllitgaard recounts this story, one can almost imagine a wink at his fellow 
economists. Klitgaard, R. (1994). 'Do Better Polities Have Higher Economic Growth?'. IRIS Working Paper No. 
113, p. 5. 
3 3 7 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank. Washington DC: 
World Bank, p. 8 (emphasis in original). For an excellent approach to the problems of defining corruption, see 
Philp, M. (1997). 'Defining Political Corruption'. Political Studies: Special Issue - Political Corruption. 45(3), pp. 
436-462. In the most recent World Development Report, the Bank refers to its definition as 'the classic definition 
of corruption'. World Bank (2001). World Development Report 2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 101. 
The Bank should perhaps draw a distinction between 'often-cited' and 'classic'. 
3 3 8 Serensen, G. (1998). Democracy and Democratisation: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World, 
Boulder Westview Press, pp. 12-13.; see also, Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
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The important exception is the World Bank. The Bank is primarily an economic institution, 
and its non-political approach to anti-corruption reflects both this and its Articles of Agreement. The 
Bank also sees corruption as a symptom of weak institutions, accountability, rule of law, low levels of 
participation, and so on; but, unlike other donors, there is no insistence that democratisation is the 
answer. Using this logic, anti-corruption strategies can work as well in authoritarian states as in 
democratic ones, 3 3 9 and the Bank's lending in this area reflects this. Therefore the Bank's anti-
corruption programme as it now manifests itself claims to exclude political considerations from an 
issue generally seen as primarily a political phenomenon. 
The different approach taken by the Bank can be shown by comparing its definition of good 
governance to those of other donor agencies (Box 3.1). 
Box 3.1: Different Donor Definitions of Good Governance 
World Bank 'governance is defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a 
country's economic and social resources for development. Good governance, for the World Bank, is 
synonymous with sound development management'.340 
UNDP: 'the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a nation's 
affairs...Sound governance, taken a step further, is a subset of governance wherein public resources 
and problems are managed efficiently and in response to the critical needs of society. Effective 
democratic forms of governance rely on public partic ipation, accountability and transparency.'341 
USAIL> linked to democratisation efforts; includes focus on human rights, informed participation, 
public sector accountability, rule of law, 'democratic institutions, free and open markets, an informed 
and educated populace, a vibrant civic society, and a relationship between state and society that 
encourages pluralism, inclusion, and peaceful conflict resolution'.3 4 2 
DfJD: good government means the promotion of 'sound economic and social policies.. .the competence 
of governments and other institutions.. .and respect for human rights and the rule of l aw ' ; 3 4 3 work is 
undertaken by the Governance Department, whose 'approach.. .coverfs] a number of strands -
democratic accountability, fundamental freedoms, corruption, service delivery for all, due process 
rights and security - which, when brought together should lead to governance which is representative 
of, and accountable to all its people and effective in realising their rights'.344 
EU: good governance has often been 'closely linked with the respect for and enjoyment of fundamental 
human rights'.345 
3 3 9 For example, Singapore not a liberal democracy but has low levels of corruption, partly as a result of its 
successful Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), established in 1952. 
3 4 0 World Bank (1992). Governance and Development. Washington DC: World Bank, p. 1. 
3 4 1 UNDP. (1997). Corruption and Good Governance. New York: UNDP, p. v. 
3 4 2 USAID. (1996). 'USAID's Strategies for Sustainable Development: Building Democracy'. Available at 
http://www.info.usaid.gov/democracy/strategy.htm. 
3 4 3 Chaulker, L. (1991), 'Good Government and the Aid Programme', Speech given at the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London, 25 June. 
3 4 4 DfID (2000). 'Governance Department'. Available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk. 
3 4 5 EU (1989). 'Fourth Lome Convention'. Document 29IA0817(01). Available at http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/lif/dat/1991/en_29IA0817_01.html. The EU has taken the longest of all major donors to articulate a 
cohesive governance agenda, but this reflects the uniqueness of its aid programme and its relationship with the 
majority of LDCs through Lom6. A recent article by Dickson shows how human rights and democracy have crept 
into the EU's agenda with its ACP partners. Dickson, A. (2000). 'Bridging the Gap: Great Expectations for EU 
Development Co-operation Policies'. Current Politics and Economics of Europe. 9(3), pp. 275-296. Refer also to 
specific articles in The Courier, including 'Memorandum on the Community's Development Policy', The Courier, 
No. 76, November-December 1982, pp. 48-74; 'Negotiations Diary', The Courier, No. 83, January-February 1984, 
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DANIDA: 'includes the creation of transparency, openness, and responsibility in political and 
administrative decision-making processes. The population must be guaranteed access to information on 
the decisions made by a country's authorities to ensure inter alia that resources are applied according to 
the needs of the population'.3 4 6 
The World Bank, with its non-political mandate, focuses on economic management. UNDP, a 
multilateral agency that assists countries without conditions (and is not a donor agency), highlights 
issues of efficiency, accountability and transparency. Both USAJD and DflD make democracy a key 
element in their definitions of good governance, while the EU focuses primarily on human rights. 
Finally, DANIDA, as representative of the Scandinavian donors, stresses the need for accountability 
and participation by all. These variations reflect differences in overall agency missions and approaches 
to development aid. The World Bank and the UN, as multilateral agencies, exist to serve the needs of 
member countries and must not be seen to be acting on behalf of any one country or region. 
It is also important to remember the difference between bilateral and multilateral aid. 
Bilaterals have much more flexibility than multilaterals because they are under no obligation to lend to 
any particular country.347 Bilateral donors give aid for many reasons - humanitarian, security, 
commercial, and so on - but these factors can and do change rapidly, as do favoured recipients. 
However, multilateral institutions, such as the Bank, do not share the same reasons for lending and are 
intended to provide financing to either the most needy or the most creditworthy. I f one compares 
regional disbursement of aid by donor, some interesting comparisons can be drawn. Figure 3.1 
illustrates the political nature of bilateral aid. As evidenced, the majority of donor aid is not necessarily 
given to the most needy or most deserving recipients, but rather to Ihose whose poverty may pose a 
strategic threat or which have colonial ties to the donor. For example, the majority of French aid goes 
to its former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa, the US to the Middle East and Japan to Asia. Here, there 
is no way to disguise the political nature of bilateral aid, and the World Bank stands out. Nearly all of 
the regions that received the highest levels of aid from the Bank are only largely eligible for IBRD 
loans, not IDA credits, and have some of the largest economies in the developing world. For an 
institution like the Bank interested in maintaining its AAA bond rating, higher incomes equal lower 
risk and therefore more aid can be justified. 3 4 8 This could explain why the Bank consistently lends 
more than any other donor to all regions except Sub-Saharan Africa, where incomes are the lowest; 
pp. i-xvi; 'Brussels - Second Ministerial Meeting in the ACP-EEC Negotiations', The Courier, No. 84, March-
April 1984, pp. i-xxii; 'Negotiations Update', The Courier, No. 85, May-June 1984, pp. i-xii. See Chapter Five for 
more detail. 
3 4 6 DANIDA. (1997). Denmark's Development Assistance 1996. Copenhagen: DANIDA; see also, Marquette, H. 
(1999). 'Selected European Countries' Approaches to Development and Good Governance'. Briefing paper for 
DflD, mimeo. 
3 4 7 Interview with Paul Collier, 1 February 2000, Washington D.C. 
3 4 8 Many other factors also affect the Bank's decision, such as the nature of the projects, etc., but restrictions of 
space and time preclude a discussion. 
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therefore, countries in this region only generally qualify for IDA credits, the soft loan arm of the Bank, 
with less money to lend. 3 4 9 
Figure 3.1: Regional Disbursement of PDA by Donor 3 5 0 
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Sources: World Bank (1999). 'World Bank Lending Rises in Fiscal 1998'. News Release No. 99/1884/S; 
OECD (1999). 'Aid at a Glance'. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/htm. 
The first major Bank publication to focus on good governance was the 1989 Bank publication, 
Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Development, often referred to as the Long-Term 
Perspective Study (LTPS). Although the 1989 study was considered groundbreaking by both academics 
and aid practitioners, it built upon work within the Bank throughout the 1980s. Papers written by Bank 
staff with a governance dimension, or directly relating to governance, continued to appear in the early 
1990s, offering definitions and much analysis, culminating in the 1992 discussion paper Governance 
and Development. Although not part of a concrete policy on governance, these publications provide 
evidence of a growing concern with the issue as opposed to a completely ad hoc reaction to the 
changing political climate of the early 1990s. However, governance issues during this time were kept 
as small segments within regular publications, such as annual reports and World Development Reports 
(WDRs) and generally related to public sector reform, often using African examples (despite the 
majority of lending for the public sector going to Latin America). 
3 4 9 In 2000, IBRD disbursed $10.9 billion, with Sub-Saharan Africa receiving only 1% of that total, while IDA 
disbursed $4.4 billion, with 47% going to Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank (2000). World Bank Annual Report 
2000. Washington DC: World Bank, pp. 9-10. The Bank also lends comparatively little to the Middle East, where 
demand for Bank loans has historically been very low and bilateral funding is plentiful. 
3 5 0 World Bank figures for Europe include Central Asia and cannot be separated out of the total. 
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As we have seen, the Berg Report (1981) introduced the concept of policy reform and raised 
concern over inefficient and bloated public sectors.351 The 1983 WDR looked at public sector reform, 
and extended it to discussions on state-owned enterprises (SOEs), decentralisation, the private sector, 
government watchdogs, accountability, transparency and corruption, providing the first explicit 
reference to corruption by the Bank. 3 5 2 Political issues are also addressed in the context of governance 
and the public sector. 'When political leaders are recognised for their integrity, visbn and concern for 
the public welfare, these qualities can be reflected in the ethos and performance of the public service 
and will have a profound effect on all sections of society. But i f corruption is rife, public bureaucracy is 
likely to become demoralised and self-serving.'3 5 3 Here the report draws a direct link between the 
quality of political leadership and efficiency in the public sector. 
The 1983 WDR contains several references to corruption. It emphasises the need for popular 
participation in Bank project and programme design to increase the accountability of Bank field staff to 
local people.354 It points to the need for long-term solutions through public sector reform and increased 
accountability. 'Corruption is usually better fought by a combination of fewer, better-paid officials 
controlling only what really needs to be (and can effectively be) controlled in the full light of public 
scrutiny, than by occasional anti-corruption "campaigns'".355 The role of institutions and political 
organisations as tools to combat 'overstaffed bureaucracies and cumbersome procedures' and 
patronage are briefly touched upon as we l l . 3 5 6 Finally, a specific case is highlighted in which an 
irrigation scheme funded by the Bank exposed customary staff kickbacks and overcharging. The Bank 
argues, 'Safeguards against corruption are needed at every level. Politically, the accountability of 
officials to ministers, and ministers to the general public, is a well-tried way to minimise abuse. For 
3 5 1 World Bank (1981). Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action. Washington DC: 
World Bank, pp. 40-41. 
3 5 2 World Bank (1983). World Development Report 1983. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
3 5 3 World Bank (1983). World Development Report 1983, pp. 5-6. 
3 5 4 World Bank (1983). World Development Report 1983, p. 94. 
3 5 5 World Bank (1983). World Development Report 1983, p. 117. 
3 5 6 World Bank (1983). World Development Report 1983, p. 116. 
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programmes, pressure on corrupt managers can also be increased by making clients (especially the 
poor) more aware of their rights'. 3 5 7 
This forthright acknowledgement of corruption by the Bank did not resurface in its literature 
for four years. The 1987 WDR discusses rent seeking, 'directly unproductive profit-seeking activities' 
(DUPs) and corruption, claiming that DUPs have been estimated to account for twenty-four percent of 
Kenyan GDP in 1982. 3 5 8 The Bank's 1990 and 1991 annual reports also touch on public sector reform 
and restructuring.359 The 1991 report, in particular, highlights complex governance-related topics 
usually considered outside the Bank's mandate, including political and civil liberties, claiming that 
'[p]olitical and civil liberties are not, contrary to a once-popular view, inconsistent with economic 
growth'. 3 6 0 The report looks at the link between democracy and growth and concludes that there is no 
hard evidence to suggest that democracy actually fosters growth, but neither does it hinder it. However, 
other evidence suggests that there is a correlation between political and civil liberties and high health 
and education levels.3 6 1 
To support this, two tables are provided to see i f a link can be drawn between political 
systems and the success of SAPs. 
Table 3.4: The success of economies with differing political systems in implementing an IMF 
adjustment programme (percent)362 
Percentage of Continuous Continuous Transitional 
adjustment years democratic system authoritarian system democratic system 
In which fiscal 
deficits fell 49 50 25 
In which expenditures 
as percentage of GDP 
fell 
38 46 29 
In which credit 
expansion slowed 61 62 43 
3 5 7 World Bank (1983). World Development Report J983, p. 95. 
3 5 8 World Bank (1987). World Development Report 1987. Washington DC: World Bank, p. 75. 
3 5 9 World Bank (1990). The World Bank Annual Report 1990. Washington DC: World Bank, p. 89; World Bank 
(1991). The World Bank Annual Report 1991. Washington DC: World Bank, p. 68. 
3 6 0 World Bank (1991). The World Bank Annual Report 1991, p.4. 
3 6 1 World Bank (1991). The World Bank Annual Report 1991, pp. 9-10. The Bank refers here to work by R. Gastil 
(1989). Freedom in the World. New York: Freedom House, published annually since 1978. 
3 6 2 Based on reform episodes in seventeen countries from the 1950s through the 1980s. 
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Table 3.5: The success of economies with differing political systems in controlling rapid 
inflation363 
Measure Democratic systems Authoritarian systems 
Percentage of inflation episodes 
which ended in stabilisation 
In nonpolarized environment 75 62 
In polarized environment 29 67 
Percentage of adjustment 
programs that led to breakdown 
of system 12 months or less after 
program started 
11 14 
Source: World Bank(199l). World Development Report 199l,p. 134. 
These tables hardly provide conclusive proof that a democratic system provides a better environment 
for adjustment programmes; however, they do provide proof that the Bank has been thinking about 
issues of governance, even explicitly political aspects, for many years.364 
The first draft of the 1989 LTPS report approached political issues tentatively, but found 
encouragement within Africa to delve more deeply i i its final draft. According to a study by Miller-
Adams, 'The first draft of this study prepared by the Bank and circulated to member countries, avoided 
any mention of how politics had affected Africa's economic progress out of deference to the 
governments involved. The Africans consulted about the report insisted that political issues be 
addressed in order to make its conclusions more realistic and useful' . 3 6 5 The LTPS then is an attempt to 
address Africa's development concerns within a framework that allows political analysis. The Bank's 
findings, such as, 'Underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of 
governance,'366 are supported by quotes from some African leaders, including the now famous quote 
from President Abdou Diouf of Senegal: 'Africa needs not just less government but better 
3 5 3 Based on 114 standby agreements from 1954 to 1984 signed by nine Latin American countries. 
3 6 4 The report does not provide definitions for either authoritarianism or democracy, instead listing some 
components of democracy (political checks and balances, a free press, open debate on government policy) and 
interchanging 'authoritarian' with 'dictatorship'. This is not the same as providing clear definitions, but rather 
assumes that the reader understands what the report means by the terms. See World Bank (1991). World 
Development Report 1991, pp. 132-134. 
3 6 5 Miller-Adams, M. (1997). "The World Bank in the 1990s: Understanding Institutional Change'. Unpublished 
PhD thesis, Columbia University, p. 67. See also, World Bank (1992). Governance and Development, p. 58, note 
2; Agarwala, R. & Schwartz, P. (1994). ' Sub-Saharan Africa: A Long-Term Perspective Study'. Paper prepared 
for the World Bank Workshop on Participatory Development, 17-20 May 1994. 
3 6 4 World Bank (1989). Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (A Long-Term Perspective 
Study). Washington DC: World Bank, p. 60. The background papers for this report have also been published and 
volume 3 is especially relevant. See World Bank (1990). The Long-Term Perspective Study of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Volume 3: Institutional and Socio-political Issues. Washington DC: World Bank, especially the contributions by 
Tarr, B. 'Political Developments and Environment in Africa', pp. 32-42; Hyden, G. 'The Changing Context of 
Institutional Development in Sub-Saharan Africa', pp. 43-59; and Hyden, G. 'Creating an Enabling Environment', 
pp. 73-80. 
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government'.367 As well as generating interest in the topic, the report also resulted in the formation of 
the African Capacity Building Initiative. 3 6 8 
Importantly, the report also provides an early Bank definition of governance: 'the exercise of 
political power to manage a nation's affairs' . 3 6 9 Ibrahim Shihata,370 the Bank's General Counsel at the 
time and responsible for interpreting the Articles of Agreement, felt that it had to tread carefully. 
Shihata admits the difficulty of the Bank actively involving itself in governance issues while 
maintaining its non-political stance. He remarks, 
The Bank's efforts in this respect are likely to concentrate on the effectiveness of its 
assistance, the strengthening of relevant government institutions and the streamlining of 
their rules and procedures to ensure discipline, accountability and predictability, rather 
than on the broader political considerations which the Bank is prohibited under its 
Articles from taking into account. This task seems, however, to take the Bank beyond the 
traditional role of ensuring that the funds it provides or administers on behalf of other 
donors are put to good use. It increasingly involves the Bank in assisting governments in 
their more difficult efforts of ensuring that the economy as a whole will be managed 
according to appropriate policies and rules which are applied by effective institutions.371 
In 1990, he laid out five aspects of governance prohibited by the Bank's mandate: the Bank 
cannot be influenced by the political character of a member; it cannot interfere in the domestic or 
foreign partisan politics of a member; it cannot act on behalf of donor countries to influence a recipient 
member's political orientation or behaviour; it cannot allow political factors to influence its decisions 
3 6 7 World Bank (1989). Sub-Saharan Africa, pp. 5, 55. 
3 6 8 The ACBI, now known as the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), originated from a World Bank-
convened meeting in Kenya between Bank staff and African policy-makers, economic managers and academics in 
1988. The meeting established a lack of capacity as the main reason for continuing African underdevelopment. 
Results were presented to donors at the Rockefeller Foundation in New York in 1989. Working with the African 
Development Bank (AfDB), UN Development Programme (UNDP) and other donors, the Bank launched ACBF in 
1992 (see http://www.acbf-pact.org). In 1997, Wolfensohn announced that 'efforts are now underway to establish 
both an international consultative group for capacity building in Africa and an accompanying trust fund', as 
outlined in a report by the African Governors of the World Bank entitled 'Partnership for Capacity Building in 
Africa: Strategy and Program of Action'. World Bank (1997). 'Bank Embraces New Push for Capacity Building in 
Africa'. World Bank News, 9 May. The Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa (PACT), established in 
January 2000, focuses on building capacity in the public and private sectors, as well as civil society, and 
supporting regional research and training. The Bank has provided a $30 million grant, with a further SI50 million 
awaiting Board approval, and a total initial pledge from donors of $1 billion. See http://www.acbf-pact.org; World 
Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank Strategy. Washington 
DC: World Bank, pp. 75-76, 84. PACT is fully implemented by ACBF and not by the AFR Region of the Bank. 
Instead, a representative from the Bank sits on ACBF's Board. Interview with Brian Levy, 9 January 2001, 
Washington DC. Although PACT is held up by the Bank as an 'African-owned initiative, with twelve Africans on 
the twenty-two member Board (the rest are donors), it is hard to see any instance in its history where the Bank has 
not been at the forefront of initiatives. 
3 6 9 World Bank (1989). Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 60. 
3 7 0 Shihata was most recently Professor at Dundee University's Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, 
teaching in the international business transactions programme, but he passed away in May 2001. The current 
General Counsel is Ko-Yung Tung, appointed in 1999. 
3 7 1 Shihata, I . (1991). The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, p. 40. 
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unless there is an 'obvious' economic effect; and its staff must not build their assessment on the 
possible reactions of a particular Bank member or members.373 This obviously excludes any discussion 
of democracy and possibly human rights from the Bank's agenda. It does, however, leave some room 
open for anti-corruption activities, but within a well-defined framework. Areas with potential impact on 
corruption that fall into the Bank's mandate include civil service reform, legal reform, accountability 
for public funds, budget discipline and popular participation 'in the design and implementation of a 
specific development project or program' (as opposed to popular participation in general).374 
Another early work by Landell-Mills and Serageldin provided a very political definition of 
governance: 'how people are ruled, and how the affairs of a state are administered and regulated. It 
refers to a nation's system of politics and how this functions in relation to public administration and 
law' . 3 7 5 These definitions proved too political for the Bank, and its Board eventually required a more 
'formal interpretation' of governance to set perimeters for Bank action, resulting in the 1992 discussion 
paper, Governance and Development?76 
A new definition emerged in the 1992 paper: 'governance is defined as the manner in which 
power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for 
development'.377 Therefore, according to the Bank, good governance equals 'sound development 
management'.378 The report goes on to identify four areas 'consistent with the Bank's mandate: public 
sector management, accountability, the legal framework for development, and information and 
transparency'.379 Two of these areas - public sector management and legal reform - are areas where the 
Bank has considerable experience, but the other two offered new challenges to its staff. 
In 1994, the Bank published Governance: The World Bank's Experience, a progress report on 
governance activities. The main focus of this report is the Bank's public sector management activities, 
for a number of reasons. First, it is where the most experience lay, and therefore the greatest number of 
3 7 2 However, 'a question which is traditionally considered as "political" cannot be turned into an economic issue 
just because of minor possible economic effects'. Shihata, I . (1991). The World Bank in a Changing World, p. 84. 
Despite this, 'Much of what the Bank now considers "economic", and therefore appropriate for its attention, would 
even a decade ago have been considered inappropriate'. Blackden, CM. (1996). 'Human Rights, Development, 
and the World Bank: Economics vs. Politics?'. Trialogue. April, p. 3. 
3 7 3 Shihata, I . (1991). The World Bank in a Changing World, pp. 82-84; see also World Bank (1992). Governance 
and Development. Washington DC: World Bank, p. 5. 
3 7 4 Shihata, I . (1991). The World Bank in a Changing World, pp. 88-93. 
3 7 5 Landell-Mills, P. & Serageldin, I . (1992). 'Governance and the External Factor'. Proceedings of the 1991 
World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, p. 304. This same paper includes the caveat that 
external agencies, such as the World Bank, should not impose 'a particular democratic system' on a country, but 
should consider withdrawing funding unless there is at least 'some minimal level of popular support' for the 
government' (pp. 311-312). This caveat contains the a priori assumption that the political system in question is 
democratic, and does not take into consideration that almost all governments, with rare exception, have at least 
'some minimal level of popular support'. This includes governments that wholly contradict the Bank's notion of 
good governance: Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Castro in Cuba, Wahid in Indonesia, and even the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. 
3 7 6 Fillip, B. (1997). "The World Bank and Governance', p. 58. 
3 7 7 World Bank (1992). Governance and Development, p. 1. 
3 7 8 World Bank (1992). Governance and Development, p. 1. 
3 7 9 World Bank (1992). Governance and Development, p. 2. 
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projects as well. Also, it was easy to account for due to existing accounting controls on projects. The 
report admitted that it was hard to measure governance activities because of the way the accounting 
system worked. Despite this, it was able to provide some measurement of governance work by looking 
at 455 projects in three regions during the fiscal period 1991-1993, highlighting the following 
characteristics linked to governance. 
Table 3.6: World Bank Measurements of Governance Within Its Projects, 1991-93 
Category Proportion of lending operations with 
governance content (percent) 
Legal framework 6 
Participation 30 
State-owned enterprises reform 33 
Economic management 49 
Capacity building 68 
Decentralisation 68 
Source: World Bank(1992). Governance and Devebpment, p. xv. 
According to the 1992 report, public sector reform had undergone a major transformation 
since lending began in the early 1980s. Public sector reform was about 'improving the management of 
project-related agencies'. However, with the switch from project to policy lending, it had become much 
more complex, 'addressing such systematic constraints on sound management as weaknesses in the 
civil service, in wage structures, and in the central economic agencies that are responsible for policy 
formation'. 3 8 0 Because 'the World Bank's interest in governance arises from its concern for the 
effectiveness of the development efforts it supports',381 its efforts focus on areas perceived to impact 
development efforts. These are often linked to the public sector, including, 'weak institutions, lack of 
an adequate legal framework, weak financial accounting and auditing systems, damaging discretionary 
interventions, uncertain and variable policy frameworks, and closed decision-making, which increases 
risks of corruption and waste.' 3 8 2 
Referring to the rule of law, Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, the Bank's Senior Counsel, explains, 
From the outside, the World Bank's approach...may seem fragmented. From the Bank's 
perspective, however, it is a consistent and coherent concept, albeit complex in its 
operation, that has evolved from the Bank's perspective of its economic and social 
development mandate and its experience in realising the goals assigned to it in its 
mandate. The Bank's concept may, in a nutshell, be referred to as including formal (or 
0 World Bank (1992). Governance and Development, p. 2. 
1 World Bank (1992). Governance and Development, p. 3. 
2 World Bank (1992). Governance and Development, p. 4. 
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content/value-neutral) aspects.. .and material (or substantive or content/value-loaded) 
^ 383 
aspects. 
The same could be said about the Bank's approach to good governance and its approach to corruption. 
The Bank's governance work is selective because of the potentially sensitive nature of many 
of these areas, and yet highly integrated with the Bank's overall activities. Almost any project can have 
a governance component in it, which is why there is no separate vice-presidency in charge of 
governance. All divisions are supposed to take governance issues into account when designing projects 
and strategies. This rather ad hoc approach towards governance has been evident since its inception 
and has had a tremendous impact on the evolution of the Bank's current anti-corruption programme. 
Criticisms of Good Governance 
The Bank's current definition of governance is 'the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country's economic and social resources for development. Good governance, for the 
World Bank, is synonymous with sound development management'.384 In a conference on good 
governance in Africa, Adamolekun, a researcher for the Bank, explained that 'the term governance is 
used here in preference to politics to cover the totality of institutions which are related to the governing 
of a modern state'.385 However, the Bank has since developed an understanding that politics cannot be 
divorced from economics, especially in work on governance, and also in anti-corruption work. Indeed, 
in a recent report the Bank stresses, 'Increasingly, it is recognised that a critical component of anti-
corruption programming has been lacking in the Bank's involvement: the political dimension. In 
addition to working with parliamentarians...[the Bank's] work is now focusing on such issues as press 
freedom, access to information, and media accountability.'386 Nevertheless, its definition of governance 
remains unchanged. 
Putting aside the question of the Bank's non-political mandate, we can find in the literature 
two interrelated criticisms of this new approach to politics. Firstly, there is the quite sudden recognition 
by the Bank in the early 1990s of political factors. Referring to a Bank report on adjustment, which 
claims that weakness of political institutions has 'proved unexpectedly serious as constraints to better 
performance', Callaghy emphasises the change in perception and understanding at the Bank, and the 
3 8 3 She defines formal aspects as including institutions and processes, while material aspects includes strategies 
that are market-friendly, socially considerate and culturally sensitive. Schlemmer-Schulte, S. (2001). 'The World 
Bank's Role in the Promotion of the Rule of Law in Developing Countries'. In Schlemmer-Schulte, S. & Tung, K. 
(eds). Liber Amicorum Ibrahim F.I. Shihata: International Finance and Development Law. The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, p. 722. 
3 8 4 World Bank (1992). Governance and Development, p. 1. 
3 8 5 Adamolekun, L. (1990). 'Institutional Perspectives on Africa's Development Crisis'. African Governance in the 
1990s: Objectives, Resources and Constraints. The 2nd Annual Seminar of the African Governance Program, The 
Carter Center, Atlanta, 23-25 March, p. 82, note 5. 
3 8 6 World Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank Strategy. 
Washington DC: World Bank, p. 152. 
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growing realisation that politics impacts economics. In the context of structural adjustment, 
Abrahamsen argues, 'democracy or good governance is not valued in its own right but is seen first and 
foremost as a means to the end of economic growth. Governance issues were grafted on to neo-liberal 
economic policies, giving them a more democratic and humanitarian facade and thereby constructing a 
new legitimacy for the severely criticised structural adjustment programmes'.388 Indeed, Martin claims 
that the Bank's approach to governance is simply re-working the state to suit globalisation.389 George 
and Sabelli also attribute the Bank's interest in good governance to the failure of its structural 
adjustment programmes. 'Governance provides a new tool-kit, an instrument of control, an additional 
conditionality for the time when the traditional blame-the-victimdefence again becomes necessary'.390 
Secondly, we find criticisms of the Bank's assumptions regarding the nature of politics. 
Manor says, '...we see analysts in powerful development agencies - including the World 
Bank.. .setting out a sanitised notion of politics which implies naive expectations about how politicians 
actually behave when reforms are being implemented.'391 Parekh argues, 'The principles of good 
government can be genuinely universal (in their scope and content) and binding only i f they are freely 
negotiated by all involved and grounded in a broad global consensus. It would be wholly naive to 
imagine that all governments and all men and women everywhere will ever agree on them'. 3 9 2 Leftwich 
also refers to the naive assumptions of good governance, which 'seemed to assume that there were no 
inherent tensions, conflicts or difficult trade-offs over time between the various goals of development -
such as growth, democracy, stability, equity and autonomy'.3 9 3 
Anti-Corruption at the World Bank 
Anti-corruption, as now exists, did not develop concurrent with governance, as one would 
expect. Instead, it was still seen at the time as too politically sensitive by the Bank's General Counsel, 
senior management and the majority of Bank staff. 3 9 4 According to Bottelier, "The subject of corruption 
was regarded as too difficult and controversial to deal with outside the context of Bank funded projects, 
3 8 7 World Bank (1988). Adjustment Lending. Washington DC: World Bank, p. 3, cited in Callaghy, T. (1990). 
'Lost Between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria'. In 
Nelson, J. (ed). Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, p. 318 (emphasis added by Callaghy). 
3 8 8 Abrahamsen, R., (2000). Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa. 
London: Zed Books Ltd., p. 42. 
3 8 9 Martin, B. (2000). New Leaf or Figleaf? The Challenges of the New Washington Consensus. London: Bretton 
Woods Project & Public Services International. 
3 9 0 George, S. & Sabelli, F. (1994). Faith and Credit: The World Bank's Secular Empire. London: Penguin Books, 
p. 142. 
3 9 1 Manor, J. (1998). 'Democratisation and the Developmental State: The Search for Balance'. In Robinson, M. & 
White, G. (eds). The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 129. 
3 9 2 Parekh, B. (1992). 'The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy'. Political Studies/Special Issue: Prospects 
for Democracy. Vol. XL, p. 173 (emphasis in original). 
3 9 3 Leftwich, A. (2000). States of Development: On the Primacy of Politics in Development Cambridge: Polity 
Press, p. 129. 
3 9 4 Interview with Mike Stevens, 2 February 2000, Washington D.C. 
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or as not important enough to warrant the Bank's explicit attention. However, it would be a mistake 
to believe the Bank was not interested in corruption until it developed a concrete policy in 1997. 
Although corruption itself was rarely mentioned in earlier documents, there is at least one early report 
primarily concerned with it. This is a 1983 paper by Gould and Amaro-Reyes, entitled 'The Effects of 
Corruption on Administrative Reform: Illustrations from Developing Countries'.3 9 6 This paper provides 
a brief survey of empirical literature with examples from Asia (the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, 
India, Indonesia), Africa (Ghana, Nigeria, Zaire, Uganda), Latin America (Mexico) and the Middle 
East (Lebanon). It also reflects the contemporary discourse on limiting the role of the state, 
highlighting evidence that suggests that government interference in the economy opens up 
opportunities for corruption and breeds investor uncertainty.397 Gould and Amaro-Reyes declare the 
timely importance of their paper because, 'Governments and international donors have increasingly 
turned their attention to the importance of management in development. Moreover, corruption has 
become critical as governments struggle with alternative development strategies, administrative 
arrangements, and implementation problems'.3 9 8 Here the authors draw a definite link between 
structural adjustment and a concern with corruption. It is thus surprising that this is the only example of 
work published by the Bank directly focused on corruption until the 1990s, when the efficacy of 
adjustment was already widely questioned. 
As with the governance agenda, the Bank's Qneral Counsel played an important role in 
dictating what the Bank could and could not do with anti-corruption.399 There is no real indication why 
corruption work was still considered to be 'taboo', while other areas covered as 'governance' were 
open for attention. Despite objections, however, work on corruption did go in within the Bank under a 
number of guises. Some staff members did feel that it was a question of development effectiveness, and 
should therefore be on the Bank's agenda, despite the lack of a forum for discussions. 
It is very difficult to find consensus within the Bank regarding which department originally 
initiated work on anti-corruption. There is no documentary evidence, so instead I have turned to 
interviews with Bank staff for clarification. I received several contradictory responses. According to 
Mike Stevens, a member of the original team who wrote the 1992 governance report, procurement 
specialists primarily concerned with the use of Bank resources originally raised the issue.400 However, 
3 9 5 Bottelier, P. (1998). 'Corruption and Development'. Remarks for the International Symposium on the 
Prevention and Control of Financial Fraud, Beijing, 19 October, p. 1. Available at 
http://www.woridbank.org/htmyextdr/offrep/eap/pbspl01998.htm. 
3 9 6 Gould, D. & Amaro-Reyes, J. (1983). 'The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance: Illustrations 
from Developing Countries'. World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 580, October. Washington DC: The World 
Bank. This publication contains a forward by Pierre Landell-Mills, another Bank specialist on corruption, who 
commissioned the paper as background material for the 1983 World Development Report, which Landell-Mills 
directed. 
3 9 7 Gould, D. & Amaro-Reyes, J. (1983). "The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance', pp. 15, 17. 
3 9 8 Gould, D. & Amaro-Reyes, J. (1983). 'The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance', p. 2. 
3 9 9 In addition to his own work, cited throughout this chapter, the significance of his role is highlighted in 
Schlemmer-Schulte, S. & Tung, K. (eds) (2001). Liber Amicorum Ibrahim F.I. Shihata: International Finance and 
Development Law. The Hague: KJuwer Law International. 
4 0 0 Interview with Mike Stevens, 2 February 2000, Washington D.C. 
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Jean-Jacques Raoul, the Manager of the Procurement Policy and Services Group, disagrees. He says 
that procurement specialists were 'naive' and did not understand the scope of fraud occurring under 
Bank contracts. He also points out that it was not until Wolfensohn came on board that they really 
considered making changes to policy to deter fraud and corruption in the procurement process.401 
Helen Sutch, Sector Manager of the Public Sector Group, claims to be the first Bank employee 
to work on anti-corruption operations in the field, pioneering the Bank's approach with Mike Stevens. 
My understanding is that work originated in the Africa (AFR) Region, and I clarified this seeming 
contradiction with Stevens. According to Stevens, AFR did indeed do the first work on corruption but 
only within the context of good governance. Sutch was the first to do operational work on corruption 
but only after Wolfensohn had committed the Bank to working on it. AFR was therefore first 
conceptually while the Europe and Central Asia Region (EGA) was first operationally.402 In late 1996, 
Sutch was working in the field in an Eastern European country and was approached by the Prime 
Minister, who wanted to do work on corruption with the Bank. He insisted that this work remain 
confidential until such a time as he felt confident making it public. This took eighteen months, by 
which time the Bank had release its 1997 report enabling it to conduct such work in the open. 4 0 3 
Clearly, these individuals and the departments they work in contributed to the early strategy 
on corruption within the Bank; however, there is not enough corroborative evidence to work with at 
this point, but there is documentary evidence to highlight three important individuals who publicly led 
anti-corruption at the Bank: Petter Langseth, Peter Eigen and James Wolfensohn, the current president. 
Early Work by EDI 
As early as 1990, the Bank's Economic Development Institute (EDI) expressed an interest 
in corruption in the context of civil service improvement. During a one-week workshop in December 
1989 organised by EDI, attendees highlighted areas of concern in the civil service. The most often cited 
problems included low morale, pressures on resources, brain drain, lack of responsiveness to the 
public, excessive politicisation and, finally, corruption.405 However, the word 'corruption' was not 
repeated throughout the rest of the workshop review document, which instead discussed 'service 
delivery', morale, pay, 'ghost' workers, 'accountability' and 'clear ethical standards'. Nevertheless, the 
document remains significant as evidence that some staff within the Bank were concerned with the 
impact of corruption on its programmes long before an official strategy developed, and may have been 
testing the water at this time. 
4 0 1 Interview with Jean-Jacques Raoul, 9 January 2001, Washington DC. 
4 0 2 Stevens, M. (2001). Email to the author, 2 February. 
4 0 3 Interview with M. Helen Sutch, 8 January 2001, Washington DC. 
4 0 4 Now known as the World Bank Institute (WBI), as a result of a recent merger between the Learning and 
Leadership Centre, which provided training for staff, and EDI, which provided training for clients. 
4 0 5 Adamolekun, L. & Shields, E. (1990). 'Civil Service Improvement'. EDI Review, July, p. 5. 
89 
In the early 1990s, Petter Langseth (EDI) established service delivery surveys (SDSs) of 
ordinary people in Africa. Because Bank funding was unavailable at the time for work of this kind, he 
instead approached Scandinavian donors for the money. The surveys led to workshops designed to start 
debates that would lead to the development of action plans for anti-corruption. These activities were 
still seen as outside the Bank's mandate; however, Langseth had high-level local support, including 
Judge Wairoba (of the Wairoba Report fame) in Tanzania407 and the Inspector General of Uganda, 
which may have helped rally Bank support, or at least tolerance, for his work. According to Langseth, 
'EDI only becomes involved on invitation by the government.. .This is in accordance with the policy 
articulated by the Bank's President and serves to protect the institution from any suggestion that it is 
interfering with the internal politics of the client country."*08 It has been said that, 'Langseth was able 
to demonstrate to sceptics in the Bank that it was possible to become engaged in anti-corruption work 
without courting controversy, provided the work was implemented with a partner NGO' . 4 0 9 
Work on corruption remained active and quite high profile in EDI thanks to Langseth's 
untiring support for the topic. A large body of literature emerged during this period, as one can see in 
Appendix 5. During the seven-year period, 1990-1997, at least twenty-nine documents produced by 
EDI directly addressed corruption within a wide range of topics. EDI's specialisation in providing 
training for its borrowing clients is reflected within the literature, with the majority used to arrange 
workshops on a range of governance issues (fourteen) or to train journalists and parliamentarians 
(eleven), and the rest looking at the use of surveys in individual country context (four). There was little 
empirical research produced by EDI at this time, no suggestion of relating its work to Bank policy and, 
importantly, almost all of its work on corruption was based h Sub-Saharan Africa, where Langseth 
worked as Chief Technical Advisor to the Civil Service Reform Program in Uganda.410 
4 0 6 The SDS is used to measure sectoral performance by surveying both users and suppliers of public services in 
order to improve results and capacity. See Langseth, P. (1995). 'Service Delivery Survey (SDS): A Diagnostic 
Tool'. Paper presented at the Workshop on Civil Service Reform in Anglophone Africa, Somerset West, South 
Africa, 24-28 April. 
4 0 7 The Wairoba Commission, headed by the former Tanzanian Prime Minister J.S. Wairoba, was appointed by 
President Mkapa in January 1996 to report on corruption within the public service. It produced a report of findings 
in December 1996. The move surprised many. As Riley points out, 'very few African governments investigate 
themselves, though they are very willing to investigate their political opponents'. Riley, S. (1998). 'Anri-
Corruption Strategies in Africa'. In Robinson, M. (ed). Corruption and Development. London: Frank Cass, pp. 
143-144. See also, Wairoba, J.S. (1997). 'Corruption and the State II: Extracts from Joseph Wairoba's Report'. 
Soundings. 7(Autumn), pp. 198-208. Six months after the report was published, Mkapa had not acted decisively on 
many of its recommendations, refusing to declare his assets and disciplining few of the individuals named within 
his own party. Kilimwiko, L. (1997). 'Tanzania dithers over corruption'. Mail & Guardian, 20 August. 
4 0 8 Langseth, P. (1997). 'EDI's New Approach to Governance: Principles and Modus Operandi for EDI's 
Governance Work'. In Kpundeh, S. & Langseth, P. (eds). Good Governance for Private Sector Development and 
Investment in Africa: A Regional Ministerial Seminar. Entebbe, Uganda, 16-19 March, p. 14. (Emphasis in 
original) 
4 0 9 In this case, Transparency International. Gaining, F. & Pope, J. (1999). 'The Global Coalition Against 
Corruption: Evaluating Transparency International'. In Schedler, A., Diamond, L. & Plattner, M. et al (eds). The 
Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. London; Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 266. 
4 1 0 This could provide one explanation for why the Bank's current work on corruption is so much more advanced 
in Uganda than in many other African countries. 
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Ties with Transparency International (TI) 
Another early supporter of anti-corruption at the Bank was former staff member Peter Eigen, 
the founder of TI. In 1990, Bank staff in Africa met in Swaziland to discuss the recently published 
LTPS. At this meeting, Eigen, then regional director for East Africa in Nairobi, brought corruption onto 
the table for discussion. 'The response was enthusiastic, and it was agreed that the time had come to 
develop an anti-corruption agenda within the World Bank'. 4 1 2 They were disappointed at the reaction 
from Washington, especially the Legal Department, who voiced concerns because of the non-political 
mandate. Galtung and Pope tell us that 
This viewpoint seemed to dominate senior and middle-management circles. In spite of 
encouragement from the field (very likely generated from what staff there were 
experiencing), from within the Bank itself, and from some (but by no means all) political 
leaders in the Africa region, it was felt at the time that to tackle corruption would so 
clearly interfere with the Bank's charter's claimed 'requirement' to abstain from 
'political' considerations in lending decisions as to completely rule out explicit action on 
its part. 4 1 3 
4 1 1 The bulk of this section is drawn from Galtung, F. & Ibpe, J. (1999). "The Global Coalition Against 
Corruption', pp. 257-282. The reason for this is quite simple - there is no other large-scale study of the 
organisation, despite the important role it has played in bringing international attention to corruption. Work that 
has been done tends to focus solely on the CPI and its methodology. One exception, cited within Galtung & Pope, 
is a 1996 piece by Espinosa, entitled 'Corruption: Una agenda necesaria', in Espinosa, S. (ed). Corruption: 
Epidemia de fin de sigb. Quinto: ILDIS, Cedep, & Fundacion J. Peralta, pp. 77-93. He is quoted in Galtung & 
Pope as saying that TI is 
hija legitima de padre neoliberal y de madre modernizadora tanto porque la transparencia es una 
condition de credibilidad para el processo privatizador, para la inversion extranjera y para la ayuda 
intemacional al desarollo, como porque los neoliberales han hecho de la afinidad y mutua 
apetencia entre Estado omnipotente y corrupcion un eficaz instrumento de propaganda sobre la 
necesidad de reducir el tamafio del estado (Espinosa, p. 82; cited in Galtung & Pope, note 13, p. 
280). 
Roughly translated, Espinosa says that TI is 'the legitimate daughter of the neoliberal father and modernisation 
mother, so much because transparency is a condition of credibility for the privatisation process, for external 
influence and for international aid for development; also because the ncoliberals have made an affinity and mutual 
link between the omnipotent State and corruption an efficient instrument of propaganda about the necessity to 
reduce the size of the state'. Galtung and Pope offer no further analysis on this quite stark observation on 
Espinosa'spart. 
4 1 2 Galtung, F. & Pope, J. (1999). 'The Global Coalition Against Corruption', pp. 257-258. 
4 1 3 Galtung, F. & Pope, J. (1999). 'The Global Coalition Against Corruption', p. 258. In a footnote to the above 
passage, Galtung and Pope write, 
The prohibition against taking political considerations into account in lending decisions was clearly 
designed to provide protection for countries with one-party state systems of government -
monarchies and the like - and to prevent discrimination on constitutional grounds. In our view, it 
cannot reasonably be read as excluding the Bank from taking into account the likelihood that elites 
would loot the treasury and distort public decisions, leaving the people of the country to meet the 
costs. We see their view as substantiated by the Bank's 180-degree U-turn on the issue and this 
without any amendment to the charter, (note 3, p. 279). 
The authors do not address the historical context behind the inclusion of the non-political mandate in the Bank's 
articles nor its role in protecting the Bank itself against outside political influence, shielding it from external 
criticism and ensuring its integrity on the world's capital markets. 
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Here the authors refer to the time when Shihata, the General Counsel, largely dictated the Bank's 
policies regarding governance issues. 
Discouraged, Eigen decided to take early retirement.414 He travelled around the world, 
meeting with interested people to find support for an NGO with one focus - to combat corruption, and 
was fortunate enough to have financial support from the German technical assistance agency (GTZ) in 
order to do this. By 1992, he had drummed up enough support to form a board of directors and an 
advisory council, and TI was established. Its original aim as to curb corruption in the South and 
eliminate bribe-paying in the North. Importantly, it was not established to expose individual acts of 
corruption, but instead to work with partners within countries in order to foster long-term efforts for 
reform. 
Several donor agencies were represented at the TI launch in May 1993, including the Bank, as 
well as representatives from national governrrents in the South and multinational corporations 
(MNCs). Staff had received an invitation from TI , who invited several donor agencies and international 
organisations. Despite not having an official mandate to be there, interested staff persuaded their 
managers that it was 'important that someone from the Bank was there to show interest and to 
understand where TI might be heading'.4 1 5 After this meeting, these Bank staff tried to get a small grant 
of about $250,000 for TT's work from Lewis Preston, then Bank president, through the Institutional 
Development Fund (IDF). After they put together the grant application, a committee reviewed it, but 
the General Counsel would not agree to allow it. The applicants then got five VPs, including the VP for 
Africa, to sign a special letter to Preston, asking him to overrule Shihata. Their application was 
unsuccessful416 
Leadership Commitment to Fighting Corruption 
One reason for this hesitant approach was therefore a lack of leadership commitment. As one 
senior Bank staff member interested early on in corruption was told by his boss, '...don't say anything. 
Wait for a signal from senior management'.417 This signal came with the arrival of Wolfensohn in 
1995. At that time, most Bank staff still believed that corruption was too political and too difficult in 
I have been told that Eigen believed that his chance of advancement in the Bank had been damaged due to his 
insistence on raising the anti-corruption issue and thus resigned. This has not been confirmed though. Confidential 
personal communication. 
4 , 5 Stevens, M. (2001). Email to the author, 2 February. 
4 1 6 A senior World Bank staff member told me that the memo received in reply was a 'very big slap on the wrist 
for even daring to become involved in this nonsense'. 
4 1 7 Interview with Mike Stevens, 2 February 2000, Washington DC. 
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terms of translating into practice on the ground.418 Despite this, Wolfensohn 'was determined to 
mainstream the issue within the core of Bank activities.' 4 1 9 
Wolfensohn has often been credited with bringing corruption into the Bank's agenda. Celarier 
places great importance on his decision to begin spot audits of projects in 1996, starting with Poland, 
Kenya and Pakistan. According to the Bank's chief procurement officer at the time, '"We want to put 
the fear of God in them'". 4 2 0 These are strong words presaging a strong stance. In the Guardian, Frank 
Vogl, vice-chairman of TI-USA and a former director of external affairs at the Bank, was quoted as 
saying, "Tt is to Wolfensohn's great credit that he embraced the corruption question'" 4 2 1 The author of 
the article himself asserts that 'Wolfensohn has made it [the Bank] overtly more political' by 
conducting a 'public crusade against corruption world-wide', despite earlier fears of 'being seen as 
overtly political and interfering in the internal affairs of client nations' 4 2 2 Shihata also gives credit to 
Wolfensohn, maintaining that 'the Bank's explicit concern with corruption as a general development 
issue came with the assumption of James D. Wolfensohn of its Presidency in mid-1995. Soon 
thereafter, he highlighted the issue in his first speech before the Annual Meeting of the Board of 
Governors (in September 1995). He then asked this writer, as the Bank's General Counsel, to review all 
proposals and consider initiatives for possible actions by the Bank'. 4 2 3 
Wolfensohn sees Shihata's contribution in a different light. Speaking to the World Congress 
of Accountants in Paris in 1997, he said, 'Take corruption. Eighteen months ago I couldn't talk about 
corruption. Eighteen months ago I was told that corruption was a political not an economic issue. Since 
that time we have come a long, long way. ' 4 2 4 In another speech at the US State Department in 1999, he 
explained, 
It is true that when I came to the World Bank, I was given an admonition by our general 
counsel that I should read the Articles of the Bretton Woods agreements. In there it says 
that I am to deal with economic matters and that as an international civil servant, I should 
not, i f I want to keep my job, talk about political matters. And I was then told that there 
was one word I could not use, which was the "C" word, the "C" word being corruption. 
Corruption, you see, was identified with politics, and i f I got into that, I would have a 
terrible time with my Board. Well, I then visited quite anumber of countries, and I 
4 1 8 Interview with Mike Stevens, 2 February 2000, Washington D.C. 
4 1 9 Galtung, F. & Pope, J. (1999). 'The Global Coalition Against Corruption', p. 267. 
4 2 0 Quoted in Celarier, M. (1996). 'Corruption: The Search for the Smoking Gun'. Euromoney, p. 37. 
4 2 1 Quoted in Brummer, A. (1999). 'The People's Plutocrat'. The Guardian (London). 12 June, p. 6. 
4 2 2 Brummer, A. (1999). "The People's Plutocrat', p. 6. 
4 2 3 Shihata, I . (1997). 'Corruption and the Role of the World Bank'. Dickinson Journal of International Law. 
15(3), p. 475. 
4 2 4 Wolfensohn, J. (1997). 'Accountants and Society: Serving the Public Interest'. Remarks to the World Congress 
of Accountants, Paris, 26 October. 
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decided in 1996 that I would redefine the "C" word not as a political issue but as 
something social and economic.425 
It would then appear that Wolfensohn's often quoted 1996 speech where he declared, 'we need to deal 
with the cancer of corruption^16 was a way of 'throwing down the gauntlet' to Shihata and making 
very public his policy intentions. 
During his first year in office he invited a TI group to Washington DC to conduct a half-day 
seminar on corruption for him and his senior staff; thereafter, TI was engaged as a consultant to assist 
the World Bank in developing its own strategy against corruption.427 Here, Galtung and Pope refer to 
the creation of the Corruption Action Plan Working Group in mid-1996, of which TI was a member428 
The group eventually drafted the landmark 1997 publication, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: 
The Role of the World Bank. This document sets out the Bank's strategy regarding anti-corruption and 
continues to guide its evolution.4 2 9 
One very interesting trend during Wolfensohn's tenure as President has been the transition in 
emphasis from governance work to fighting corruption. In 1996, the Bank explained that it had 'taken 
many steps to address corruption, internally and externally'. 4 3 0 These steps included: 4 3 1 
4 2 5 Wolfensohn, J. (1999). 'Opening Remarks'. Conference on Corruption, US State Department, Washington DC, 
24 February. 
4 2 6 Wolfensohn, J. (1996). '1996 Annual Meetings Speech'. Address to the Board of Governors, World Bank/IMF, 
Washington DC, 1 October (emphasis in original). 
4 2 7 Galtung, F. & Pope, J. (1999). "The Global Coalition Against Corruption', p. 267. 
4 2 8 The group was co-ordinated by Mike Stevens and included Ladipo Adamolekun, Peter Calderon, Michael 
Cohen, Alejandro Escobar, Gunnar Eskeland, Louis Forget, Anthony Gaeta, Cheryl Gray, Daniela Gressani, Rohil 
Hafeez, Ernesto Henriod, Petter Langseth, Kathryn Larrecq, Karin Millett, John Nellis, Klaus Rohland, Malcolm 
Rowat, Alfonso Sanchez, Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, Paul Siegelbaum, Raghavan Srinivasan, Frederick 
Stapenhurst, Stephen Weissman, Jim Wesberry and Myla Williams, with additional support from Peter Eigen and 
Jeremy Pope of TI. Many of these participants are still actively involved in anti-corruption work both within and 
outside the Bank. Daniel Kaufinann, an important force in the Bank's on-going anti-corruption effort as Chapter 
Four will indicate, was working at Harvard as a visiting scholar at this time. However, while there he published a 
paper entitled 'Listening to Stakeholders Spell the C Word: The "Tackling-Corruption-is-Taboo" Myth meets 
some Evidence'. An annotated bibliography of anti-corruption sources published by the World Bank describes this 
paper as advocating that the Bank emphasise reducing corruption in its approach to lending. Prior to this, 
Kaufmann worked as Bank Chief of Mission in Ukraine, and other papers he published at Harvard focus on 
corruption in Ukraine. It is interesting that he was away from the Bank working on corruption at the time when the 
Bank's original anti-corruption strategy was being devised, and then returned from Harvard to head WBI's anti-
corruption initiatives. 
4 2 9 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, Washington DC: The 
World Bank, p. 3. 
4 3 0 World Bank (1996). 'Bank Takes Anti-Corruption Stance'. World Bank News. 11 October. 
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Guarding against corruption in Bank projects 
Governance, as an overall objective for the Bank, has here been relegated to a subset of objectives 
under the auspices of fighting corruption. Wolfensohn has successfully taken a policy agenda 
suggested by predecessors and put his own personality on it by changing its focus to a subject about 
which he clearly feels strongly. Indeed, he has been said to have 'staked his reputation on efforts aimed 
at stamping out corruption'. 4 3 2 Indeed, former US Deputy Secretary of the Treasure, Stuart Hzenstat, 
has warned, 'The future credibility of our multilateral development institutions may very well depend 
on their sensitivity in dealing with [corruption].' 4 3 3 This has had a tremendous impact on the manner in 
which the policy has developed since the 1997 document. 
In his foreword to the 1997 strategy document, Wolfensohn declares: "The time for action is 
now. ' 4 3 4 This document sets out the Bank's strategy while allowing for its evolution. It provides the 
framework but not the details. Significantly, it sets out a four-pronged strategy for the Bank's work on 
corruption: 
•Preventing fraud and corruption within Bank-financed projects 
• Helping countries that request Bank support in their efforts to reduce corruption 
• Taking corruption more explicitly into account in CAS, country lending 
considerations, the policy dialogue, analytical work and the choice and design of 
projects 
• Adding voice and support to international efforts to reduce corruption 4 3 5 
As the next chapter shows, this remains the framework for the Bank's anti-corruption programme. 
4 3 2 World Bank (1999). 'World Bank Chief Highlights Anti-Corruption Fight'. Development News. 12 October. 
4 3 3 Eizenstat, S. (1999). 'An Anti-Corruption and Good Governance Strategy for the Twenty-First Century'. 
Speech given at the Global Forum on Fighting Corruption, Washington DC, 24 February. 
4 3 4 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 2. 
4 3 5 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 3. The next chapter looks at these four strategies 
Conclusion: The 1997 Strategy Document 
in detail. 
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The 1997 strategy document highlights particular areas of concern for the Bank. Firstly, anti-
corruption work is explicitly linked with structural adjustment. It argues that it is important to continue 
to pay close attention to economic reforms. Answering critics of adjustment, the Bank argues, 'The 
answer is not to forgo reform, but to consider and help strengthen institutional capacity in tandem with 
policy design'.4 3 6 Secondly, because of this tie to adjustment programmes and the Bank's legal 
requirement to lend directly to governments, anti-corruption work is concerned only with public and 
not private sector corruption. However, it believes that its public sector work can help eliminate 
corruption in the private sector 'by helping countries strengthen the legal framework to support a 
market economy and by encouraging the growth of professional bodies that set standards in areas like 
accounting and auditing'. 4 3 7 Thirdly, civil society and the media are seen as 'the two most important 
factors in eliminating systemic corruption in public institutions'.4 3 8 Referring to existing work, it 
points out that 'EDI normally seeks both a government and a civil society partner'.439 Lastly, 
considerations for lending decisions must look at the following: 
• Whether Bank projects are likely to be affected by corruption during design or 
implementation, or thereafter. 
• The extent to which the achievements of development objectives is compromised by 
corruption. 
• The willingness of the government to act to control corruption i f it threatens the 
effectiveness of Bank projects and/or economic and social development.440 
I f problems are found, the Bank will reassess the particular project, sector or the entire country i f need 
be, but always within the scope of its Articles of Agreement.441 
In other words, the keys to the Bank's anti-corruption strategy are as follows: 
• economic reform through structural adjustment 
• strengthening institutional capacity 
• focusing on the public sector 
• helping the private sector through legal and other reforms 
• assisting civil society and the media 
• taking corruption into account when making lending decisions 
• finding the necessary political will 
4 3 6 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 6. 
4 3 7 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, pp. 11-12. 
4 3 8 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 44. 
4 3 9 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 47, note 46. 
4 4 0 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 51. 
4 4 1 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 52. 
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• and ensuring that all must take place within the framework provided by the Articles of Agreement. 
The next chapter looks at the evolution of the Bank's anti-corruption programme and addresses each of 
these issues in turn. 
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Chapter 4: The World Bank's Anti-Corruption Programme 
Previous chapters have built a theoretical and historical context for the Bank's anti-corruption 
programme. This chapter will set out the programme in its current incarnation, as it stands in early 
2001. I have broken the chapter into four sections based upon the Bank's own four-pronged anti-
corruption strategy: 
• Preventing fraud and corruption within Bank-financed projects 
• Helping countries that request Bank support in their efforts to reduce corruption 
• Taking corruption more explicitly into account in CAS, country lending considerations, 
the policy dialogue, analytical work and the choice and design of projects 
• Adding voice and support to international efforts to reduce corruption.4 4 2 
All Bank strategy documents since 1997 refer to these four prongs, and the Bank's anti-corruption 
website also presents material in this fashion (see Appendix 6). Therefore, it is useful to analyse the 
programme in this same way. 
I deliberately refer here to 'strategy' rather than 'policy'. There is no official operational 
policy on anti-corruption activities for the Bank. According to the Bank's Operational Manual, 
operational policies (OPs) 'are short, focused statements that follow from the Bank's Articles of 
Agreement, the general conditions, and policies approved by the Board. OPs establish the parameters 
for the conduct of operations; they also describe the circumstances under which exceptions to policy 
are admissible and spell out who authorises exceptions'.443 There are OPs on the environment, gender, 
dams and tobacco, among others. Instead of an OP on corruption, there are instead policies that 'govern 
the use of Bank funds'. 4 4 4 This includes policies on procurement, the disbursement of funds and audit 
procedures. However, these only fit into the first prong of the Bank's strategy: preventing fraud and 
corruption within Bank-financed projects. The Bank instead has a 'strategy' on corruption that 
encompasses the others, with no officially delineated parameters. 
Staff working on corruption do not seem, in the main, to distinguish between policy and 
strategy. Either they fail to recognise the difference, or feel it is unimportant to differentiate the two. 
When interviewed, John Heilbrunn indicated that the 1997 document, Helping Countries Curb 
Corruption, is a policy statement, because it was cleared by the Board.4 4 5 However, all documents 
published by the Bank have a lengthy clearing process with ultimate approval by the Board, and this 
4 4 2 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank. Washington DC: 
World Bank, p. 3. 
4 4 3 World Bank (2001). 'The World Bank Operational Manual'. Internet. Accessed February 2001. Available at 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/institutional/manuals/opmanual.n.sf/textdefinition 1 ?opennavigator. 
4 4 4 See http://www.worldbank.org/whatwedo/policies.htm. 
4 4 5 Interview with John Heilbrunn, 1 February 2000, Washington DC. 
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has never been the sole determinant for making official policy statements. Mike Stevens, an original 
architect of the programme in Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) but now in the 
Africa region, pointed out a specific passage in the 1997 document and described it as the policy 
statement: 'Where corruption is widespread and affects a country's development objectives and Bank-
financed projects, the Bank needs to raise the issue with borrowers and seek ways to help governments 
and civil society address i t . ' 4 4 6 This statement was also highlighted as Bank 'policy' by Anita Baker, 
Manager of the Office of Professional Ethics (OPE) at the International Institute for Public Ethics Year 
2000 Conference.447 Cheryl Gray, Director of PREM's Public Sector Thematic Group, contradicted 
these co-workers, saying that there is no policy statement in the form of one document, describing the 
1997 document as a report and nothing more than that.4 4 8 
This lack of policy may be partly due to the complexity of the strategy as it is being 
implemented. But it is interesting that there is a policy on gender but not on corruption, as gender can 
be as all-encompassing as the Bank claims its work on corruption is, and is often as controversial.449 
One explanation for this is that there already exists a significant body of scholarly literature on the 
impact of gender on development. A general consensus exists between donors, academics and NGOs 
that women's needs must be taken into account when both designing and implementing development 
projects, with evidence taken over several years to support this. 4 5 0 Although most agree that corruption 
has a negative overall impact on economic development, a similar consensus does not exist on the 
relationship between good governance and development. 
Since the early 1990s, the majority of work on this relationship has been published by the 
Bank or by academics who regularly work as Bank consultants. Bank documents often refer to its own 
work when making claims about this relationship, and the same papers are cited repeatedly. The main 
strategy document, published in 2000, refers to the 'now well-documented contribution of good 
governance to growth', 4 5 1 pointing to a list of sources in its Annex. Out of the fifty documents 
identified, forty-two have been written by Bank staff or consultants. Another interesting example 
comes from a draft paper from the Operations Evaluations Department (OED) preparing a framework 
for an evaluation of the anti-corruption programme. This paper reiterates that, 'A wide consensus has 
also recently emerged that corruption is a symptom of failed governance [referring to the strategy 
World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 7; Interview with Mike Stevens, 2 February 
2000, Washington DC. 
4 4 7 Baker, A. (2000). 'Ethics: The View from Multilateral Institutions - WBG: A Framework of Integrity'. 
Presentation at the International Institute for Public Ethics Year 2000 Conference, 27 September (mimeo). 
4 4 8 Interview with Cheryl Gray, 2 February 2000, Washington DC. 
4 4 9 For example, in countries where women's rights are restricted by law, some Middle Eastern countries for 
example, requiring that their interests are taken into account in project design and implementation can be very 
controversial indeed. 
4 5 0 The literature on this topic is vast, but some interesting starting points include, Visvanathan, N. et al. (eds). 
(1997). The Women, Gender & Development Reader. London: Zed Books Ltd.; Porter, M. & Judd, E. (eds). 
(1999). Feminists Doing Development: A Practical Critique. London: Zed Books Ltd.; Dasgupta, P. (1993). An 
Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution. New York: Oxford University Press; Sen, A. (1999). Development as 
Freedom. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; Dalla Costa, M. & Dalla Costa, G. (eds). (1993). Paying the Price: Women 
and the Politics of International Economic Strategy. London: Zed Books Ltd. 
4 5 1 World Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions & Strengthening Governance: A World Bank Strategy. 
Washington DC: World Bank, p. 2. 
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document]'.45 A total of forty-five texts are cited in the bibliography, and thirty-three of these have 
been written by World Bank or IMF staff or consultants. So the evaluation is being designed using the 
work that the Bank itself produces to justify the direction that the programme is taking. This seems a 
narrow basis for a 'wide consensus'.453 Furthermore, of the seventy-nine papers listed on WBI's 
website, all published between 1997 and 2000, Daniel Kaufmann is author or co-author on forty-eight 
of them. This is in addition to his non-research based work as manager of WBI's governance division, 
which one can only assume is a very busy position in its own right. Clearly, as manager, one could 
argue that Kaufmann would naturally be the driving force behind WBI's work in corruption. However, 
as this research drives the direction the Bank's programme is taking, it does raise the question of the 
usefulness of a great deal of WBI's published research. 
Even Peter Eigen of TI has expressed concern on this point, saying, 
The World Bank...plays a significant, often leading, role in research and the 
development of new concepts. The same organisation that is responsible for the arduous 
task of putting such concepts into practice, simultaneously assesses the performance of 
the development system critically and recommends which future practice ought to be 
implemented - immediately. The conflicting roles of giving conceptual guidance and 
being the world's largest player in development assistance lead the World Bank and its 
management into frequent crises of credibility. There is a need to separate out roles of 
design and implementation from that of evaluation - as any good auditor will tell you. 4 5 4 
Over the past three years, the Bank's anti-corruption programme has continued to gained 
momentum, developing as its research develops. On the one hand, the Bank's work, by necessity, must 
develop in incremental stages, as it is conducting work that has never before been attempted on this 
scale or by an international agency such as itself. This makes developing policy very difficult. The 
work is 'evolving', 4 5 5 and an operational policy with defined parameters would not allow the rather ad 
hoc implementation that results from not knowing where the programme will go next. The research 
base is too narrow and insufficiently diverse to inform the Bank's broad and diverse anti-corruption 
programme. However, it could also be argued that this only provides an excuse for work that is done 
haphazardly, organised by a small group of people using largely their own work to both design the 
programme and justify positions already decided upon. 
In the follow-up report to the 1997 strategy document, the Bank's approach to anti-corruption 
is described as follows: 
4 5 2 Huther, J. & Shah, A. (2000). 'Anti-corruption Policies and Programs: A Framework for Evaluation'. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2501, December, p. 2. 
4 5 3 1 presented this methodological weakness to Mr. Shah in an email, but he would not comment on it. 
4 M Eigen, P. (2000). 'Introductory statement by Peter Eigen for the press conference on the role of the World Bank 
in the fight against corruption'. TI Press Release, 31 August. It could be argued that Eigen sees an opportunity here 
for an expanded role for TI. 
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The Bank views corruption as a symptom of underlying institutional dysfunction, and 
thus employs a proactive and holistic approach that attempts to help clients strengthen 
governance and public sector management, to improve economic policies and 
legal/judicial systems, and to develop and implement specific anticorruption measures. 
The Bank has made strengthening borrower capacity a priority through increased 
lending, enhanced country-level advisory service, and the inclusion of 'good and dean 
governance' as one of the central pillars of the Comprehensive Development Framework 
[CDF] ' . 4 5 6 
The CDF, which is the cornerstone of Bank strategy under Wolfensohn, is described as, 
a holistic approach to development. It seeks a better balance in policymaking by 
highlighting the interdependence of all elements of development - social, structural, 
human, governance, environmental, economic, and financial. It emphasises partnerships 
among governments, donors, civil society, the private sector, and other development 
actors. Perhaps most important, the country is in the lead, both "owning" and directing 
the development agenda, with the Bank and other partners each defining their support in 
their respective plans.457 
The Bank's anti-corruption assistance programmes reflect both the 'holistic approach' to development 
prescribed by the CDF and the Bank's overall commitment to long-term capacity building. As a matter 
of fact, Wolfensohn explains that the key to CDF is good government and combating corruption.458 
Capacity building does indeed form the basis of the CDF. Often used interchangeably with the terms 
'institutional reform' or 'institution building', capacity building has been defined by the Bank in both 
narrow and broad terms. Narrowly, it is 'the provision of training and materials to build skills within 
organisations', while broadly, it refers to 'reforms of incentives and institutions as well as 
strengthening skills and resources'.459 
Appendix 7 shows a blank CDF matrix, with structural issues in the first 'pillar'. These 
include good and clean government, the justice system, financial systems and social safety nets and 
social programs. Partners in this process include the government, multilateral and bilateral institutions, 
civil society and the private sector.460 All sectors within the Bank are encouraged to adopt this CDF 
approach and 'mainstream' governance activities into their own work, be it health, education, water, 
transport, and so on. A completed CDF matrix for Bolivia is shown in Appendix 8. Here, specific anti-
Interview with Brian Levy, 9 January 2001, Washington DC. The Bank's website also refers to its 'evolving 
strategy'. See http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticomjpt/helping.htm. 
4 5 6 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 4. 
4 5 7 See http://www.worldbank.org/cdf. 
4 5 8 Wolfensohn, J.D. (1999). 'A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework: A Discussion Draft'. 21 
January. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/cdr7cdf.pdf. 
4 5 9 World Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance, p. 13. 
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corruption initiatives are represented by the implementation of a National Integrity System,461 working 
in partnership with TI. Other areas with an anti-corruption component include improving regulations, 
privatisation, participatory projects, decentralisation, and institutional and judicial reform. 4 6 2 
This comprehensive approach to anti-corruption is reflected in all four prongs of its strategy, 
and especially in the second - 'helping countries that request Bank support in their efforts to reduce 
corruption.' According to the editor of the IMF magazine Finance & Development, 'Like the 
mythological hydra, corruption is a many-headed foe that insinuates into every part of the social fabric, 
weakens the body politic, and jeopardises prospects for economic growth'. 4 6 3 This rather dramatic 
analogy is illustrative of how the Bank is approaching anti-corruption work - tackling its impact in 
every sector of the Bank's work, from public sector management to health to forestry and so on. In 
order to 'kill the beast', the Bank is trying to attack it at its institutional core rather than deal with one 
'head' at a time. 
This CDF-based approach to anti-corruption does not lack controversy and appears to split 
opinion within PREM and the AFR Region. Gray believes that the AFR Region's capacity-building 
work with civil society and community empowerment (see below), leading to 'bottom-up' demand for 
anti-corruption work, is the most exciting work being conducted in this area by the Bank. 4 6 4 However, 
Sutch is not convinced. She believes that capacity building suggests a lack of skill or ability, as i f the 
people concerned are not intelligent enough to know how to do things properly and just require 
'technical assistance'. This view is very patronising, in her opinion. She asserts that i f the demand were 
there, people would know the steps that need to be taken. However, the current situation benefits those 
in power, and until that changes, no amount of 'capacity building' is going to change that.465 Stevens is 
concerned that the anti-corruption emphasis can get too big and be seen as an end in itself. He thinks 
they should go back into a broader public sector reform agenda, with the ultimate goal to help LDCs 
develop more effective government.466 Despite these internal concerns, the programme does not show 
any signs of returning to a simpler and more manageable public sector approach or a move away from 
the philosophy of capacity building. 
Wolfensohn, J.D. (1999). 'A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework', p. 32. 
4 6 1 "The expression [National Integrity System] is of recent origin, having emerged from discussions within the 
Transparency International movement and widely popularised by development agencies.' Transparency 
International (2000). 77 Source Book 2000. Berlin: Transparency International, p. 32. TI has produced a Source 
Book to assist countries in building a National Integrity System, with an emphasis 'integrity pillars', including the 
executive, parliament, the judiciary, civil service, "watchdog" agencies, civil society, mass media and 
international agencies. 
4 6 2 Wolfensohn, J.D. (1999). 'A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework', p. 35. 
4 6 3 McDonald, I . (2000). 'From the editor'. Finance & Development. 37(2). 
4 6 4 Interview with Cheryl Gray, 2 February 2000, Washington DC. 
4 6 5 Interview with M. Helen Sutch, 8 January 2001, Washington DC. An evaluation conducted by the Swedish 
development agency, SIDA, backs this up. It found that projects on capacity building too often assumed 
incorrectly that 'the beneficiary is willing and able to develop his/her capacity'. SIDA (2000). The Evaluability of 
Democracy and Human Rights Projects: A Logframe-related assessment. SIDA Studies in Evaluation - IT AD 
LtdyODI. Gothenburg: SIDA, p. 53 (emphasis in original). 
4 6 6 Interview with Mike Stevens, 2 February 2000, Washington DC. 
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The complexity of the CDF approach also means that one has to have a full understanding of 
how the Bank works in order to evaluate its anti-corruption programme: its lending programmes and 
products, its evaluation processes, interactions between regions and sectors and its external relations. 
However, the size of the project undertaken means I must restrict myself to the Bank's key four-prong 
strategy. As OED points out, '...the menu of potential actions to curtail corruption is very large so a 
framework is needed that provides guidance on ordering potential actions'.4 6 7 I have used the Bank's 
own strategy to guide my evaluation and recommendations, following the logic of Bade Onimode, 
editor of the 1989 text IMF, the World Bank and the African Debt, who stated, 'To evaluate the World 
Bank's programmes, we should...use their own figures, their own language, to see whether what they 
set out to do has been done'.4 6 8 The rest of the chapter sets out this strategy. Where possible, I have 
tried to provide illustrative examples of work on the ground, moving beyond strategy into 
implementation. 
Preventing Fraud and Corruption within Bank-financed Projects 
The Bank has an obligation under its Articles of Agreement to ensure that the funds it 
disburses are used for the purpose intended. According to Art.3.5(b), 'The Bank shall make 
arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the purposes for which the loan 
was granted'.4 7 0 In addition, the Bank identifies the 'development effectiveness' of its projects as a 
reason for its interest in preventing corruption in its own projects.471 It is also important that the Bank 
be seen to be doing its part to ensure its own operations are as corruption-free as possible, when it is 
demanding the same from its borrowers. Therefore, considerable effort has gone into both defining the 
issue and implementing a highly visible and relatively transparent programme designed to provide 
oversight into the design and implementation of all Bank projects. 
According to Art. 1.15(a) of the Bank's 'Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA 
Credits (rev. 1/99)'4 7 2 and Art. 1.25(a) of its 'Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by 
World Bank Borrowers': 
4 6 7 Huther, J. & Shah, A. (2000). 'Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs', p. 2. 
4 6 8 Cited in Simon, D. (1995). 'Debt, Democracy and Development: Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s'. In Simon 
D. et al (eds). Structurally Adjusted Africa: Poverty, Debt and Basic Needs. London: Pluto Press, p. 24. 
4 6 9 In a recent publication, this has changed from 'preventing' fraud to 'minimising' fraud. World Bank (2000). 
Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Progress at the World Bank Since 1997. Washington DC: World Bank, p. 
7. This may reflect the acceptance that some minimal level of corruption B to be expected, especially in an 
organisation the size of the Bank, and this new wording could help deflect criticism i f corruption is found which 
involves Bank staff. I posed this question to Helen Sutch, and she first replied that the change is insignificant. She 
then paused for a moment and replied that it must be significant and agreed with my conclusion. Interview with 
Helen Sutch, 8 January 2001, Washington DC. 
4 7 0 World Bank (1944). 'Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(amended 1989)'. Washington DC: World Bank. Art.5.1(g) of the IDA's Articles contains similar wording. 
4 7 1 Aguilar, M , Gill, J. & Pino, L. (2000). Preventing Fraud and Corruption in World Bank Projects: A Guide for 
Staff. Washington DC: World Bank, pp. 2-3; World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 29. 
4 7 2 The procurement guidelines were revised to include corruption language in 1997. The 1999 revision was done 
to include the euro. Interview with Jean-Jacques Raoul, 9 January 2001, Washington DC. The 1997 revision was 
the result of a paper presented to the Executive Directors entitled, 'The World Bank Procurement Function -
Adjusting to Emerging Needs', on 20 November. Document SecM97-854, cited in World Bank (2000). The World 
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(i) 'corrupt practice' means the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of 
anything of value to influence the action of a public official in the 
procurement process or in contract execution. 
(ii) 'fraudulent practice' means a misrepresentation of facts in order to 
influence a procurement process, or the execution of a contract, to the 
detriment of the Borrower, and includes collusive practices among 
bidders designed to establish bid prices at artificial non-competitive 
levels to deprive the Borrower of the benefits of free and open 
• • 473 
competition. 
Unlike the Bank's more general definition of corruption (see Chapter 3), these have been carefully 
chosen to reflect the special needs of the Bank and of its Borrowers, and to also reflect the Bank's 
strong belief in openness and competition as protection against the corruption that might result from 
monopolistic bidding practices.474 
On 31 March 1997, the Board endorsed the Bank's Strategic Compact, which has given 
$250 million over a thirty-month period for improvements to Bank procedures, including those for 
procurement and financial management. For example, $30 million was spent over a three year period to 
pay for new procurement476 and financial management staff, to increase the number of Country 
Procurement Assessment Reviews (CPARs)4 7 7 done, to finance post reviews of procurement contracts 
Bank Procurement Function Annual Report FY99. Procurement Board/Operational Core Services Network, 16 
February (Internal document), p. vii. 
4 7 3 World Bank (1999). Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits. Washington DC: The 
World Bank, pp. 7-8. The wording in the consultants guidelines is slightly altered to reflect its different purpose. 
See World Bank (1997). Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers. 
Washington DC: World Bank. 
4 7 4 Klitgaard uses the formula: C = M + D - A, or Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion - Accountability, in a 
paper first published for OED, and which is quoted in the 1997 corruption report. The Bank likes this formula and 
refers to it often. See Klitgaard, R. (1997). 'Cleaning Up and Invigorating the Civil Service'. Public 
Administration & Development 17(5), pp. 500-501; World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, 
p. 21, note 5; Huther, J. & Shah, A (2000). 'Anti-Corruption Policies & Programs', p. 3; World Bank (2000). 
Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate. Washington DC: World Bank, p. 1. 
4 7 5 According to the 1997 World Bank Annual Report, "The Strategic Compact is a plan for fundamental reform to 
make the Bank more effective in delivering its regional program and in achieving its basic mission of reducing 
poverty'. World Bank (1997). World Bank Annual Report. Washington DC: World Bank, p. 1. It is the Bank's 
official business strategy. For more information, see http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/backgrd/ibrd/ 
comsum.htm. 
4 7 6 Fifty-three new procurement staff have been hired since June 1997 (sixteen in Washington and thirty-seven in 
country offices). The majority of new staff have gone to the ECA and AFR regions. World Bank (2000). The 
World Bank Procurement Function Annual Report FY99, p. 3. 
4 7 7 'The CPAR is intended to be a useful tool to diagnose the health of the existing procurement system in a 
country and, in the process, generate a dialogue with the government focused on needed reforms. The main 
purpose of the CPAR is to establish die need for and guide the development of an action plan to improve a 
country's system for procuring goods, works and services'. World Bank (2000). 'Country Procurement Assessment 
Reports (CPARs)'. Internet. Accessed November 2000. Available at http://wwwl.woridbaiik.org/publicsector 
/cpar.htm. The CPAR has been used since the early 1980s but was redesigned in 1998. The old CPAR looked into 
the accountability of national bidding procedures, used when a contract was unlikely to attract foreign competition, 
to see i f they were acceptable. The Bank decided this was not a particularly useful tool. Instead, the CPAR is now 
used as a diagnostic tool for the Bank and donors in general. They 'broadened the scope' from individual Bank 
projects to an assessment of overall procurement capacity as an element of governance. The CPAR is conducted 
jointly with the Borrower and the Bank, with other donors sometimes involved as well. This self-assessment 
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(see Table 4.1) and to support a financial management reform programme. A further $6 million was 
spent in FY 1999 to investigate allegations of corruption, with an additional $6.9 million budgeted for 
FY2000. 4 7 8 
Table 4.1: Summary of Special Procurement Audits in FY99 
Region Number of audits Countries 
AFR 30 Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania 
EAP 8 China, Thailand, Indonesia 
ECA 6 Romania, Russia, Turkey 
LCA 14 Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela 
MNA 3 Yemen, The West Bank & Gaza, Egypt 
SAR 4 Bangladesh, India, Pakistan 
Source: World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 15. 
In a recently produced guide for its staff, the Bank identifies four important areas where 
corruption and fraud may occur within Bank projects: (1) the project design stage, (2) the procurement 
stage, (3) the implementation stage, and (4) the financial management stage.479 With the above 
definitions in mind, the Bank outlines the opportunities for both corrupt and fraudulent practices within 
each of the four crucial stages (see Table 4.2). 
component is intended to ensure givernment ownership. Interview with Jean-Jacques Raoul, 9 January 2001, 
Washington DC. 
4 7 8 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, pp. 7-9. 
4 7 9 Aguilar, M. et al. (2000). Preventing Fraud and Corruption in World Bank Projects, pp. 3-9. 
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Table 4.2: How and When Frand and Corruption May Occur in Bank Projects 
Stage Corrupt & Fraudulent 
Practices 
Project (a) overstate requirements to 
Design increase earnings 
(borrower and (b) manipulate design to benefit 
supplier) certain parties 
(c) allow government officials 
'unfettered' discretion to allocate 
resources 
(d) allow management discretion to 
divert funds for unauthorised 
purposes 
(e) create weak oversight 
mechanisms 
(f) alter timing to suit 'vested 
interests' 
Procurement Borrower Supplier 
(a) insufficient or inadequate (a) unjustified 
advertising complaints 
(b) excessively short bidding time (b) collusion 
(c) bidding time allowed is apparent, schemes 
not real (c) misleading bids 
(d) misuse of legal and (d) malicious 
administrative requirements 'front-loading' 
(e) inappropriate bidding procedures 
(f) procedures that violate the 
secrecy of bidding 
Implemen- (a) corrupt contract amendments 
tation (b) unjustified complaints 
(borrower or (c) overbilling/overpayment 
supplier) (d) lower than specified quality 
(e) flagrant theft 
(f) manipulation of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
procedures 
Financial (a) duplication of payments 
Management (b) alteration of and tampering with 
(borrower) invoices and other supporting 
documents 
(c) adulteration or duplication of 
accounting records 
(d) lack of supporting records 
(e) ineligible payments 
(f) misuse of funds 
(g) unauthorised advance payments 
without guarantee 
(h) unauthorised use of project 
property 
(i) excessively high operational 
expenditures 
(j) unreported discounts 
Source: Aguilar et al. (2000). Preventing Fraud and Corruption in World Bank Projects, pp. 3-9. 
This list is intended to provide staff with a fairly comprehensive list of different ways fraud 
and corruption may occur during different stages in the project. The document provides training and 
guidance to staff in the field with varying degrees of experience in project management in order to 
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improve capacity and limit the opportunities for fraud. For example, an increased awareness among 
staff might prevent fraudulent activities, such as roads being built that serve only the business interests 
of a few government officials, advertising for bids in specific publications that are read by only a select 
few, billing for materials that do not exist and the private use of project vehicles. 
The Bank's internal mechanisms have been designed to prevent the above occurrences within 
each individual stage. For example, the Bank has produced Standard Bidding Documents (SBDs) and 
Standard Contracts that help to simplify both the bidding procedure and Bank oversight of the process. 
These documents reiterate the Bank's procurement policy on corrupt and fraudulent behaviour 
according to its Guidelines within the General Conditions of the Contract and the Information for 
Bidders.4 8 0 Samples of these bidding documents can be found in Appendix 9. Similar standard 
documents also exist for the employment of consultants, including standard and sample contracts for 
complex tirre-based and small assignments.481 
The Bank also ensures that each project Task Team includes both a procurement specialist and 
a financial management specialist. The procurement specialist wil l help ensure that the Task Team 
realistically analyses the borrower's capacity for public procurement, preferably utilising a CPAR i f 
available, ultimately 'taking into account the borrowing country's capability and experience in 
supplying the goods and services and constructing the works included in the project'. 4 8 2 This could help 
avoid problems such as drafting unrealistic goals and including local firms when they are in fact unable 
to provide the goods and services to the specifications required. Likewise, the financial management 
specialist will help the Task Team analyse the most recent Country Financial Accountability 
Assessment (CFAA) 4 8 3 to ensure the borrowing country's capacity to handle the financial, accounting 
and auditing components of the project.4 8 4 
During the actual project implementation stage, Bank staff are expected to ensure borrower 
compliance with the terms of the project; analyse any waivers and exceptions to Bank rules or 
procedures, especially when these may have been introduced to give personal benefit to an interested 
party; inspect project sites to ensure progress is as reported; and ensure that proper auditing procedures 
have been implemented and are being followed. This has always been the case. When a project 
commences, procurement staff assess borrower capacity. During project implementation, they assess 
transactions, either by prior review (for large transactions) or by reserving the right to conduct ex post 
4 8 0 World Bank (1999). 'Master Bidding Documents: Procurement of Goods and Users' Guide'. Internet. 
Accessed October 2000. Available at http:/Avww.worldbank.org/htrnl/opr/procure/mdbgoods.html. 
4 8 1 World Bank (1997). 'Standard Request for Proposals: Selection of Consultants'. Internet. Accessed October 
2000. Available at http://www.woridbank.oi^tmiVopr/consult/iip/r-ntlpg.htr^ 
4 8 2 Aguilar, M. et al. (2000). Preventing Fraud and Corruption in World Bank Projects, p. 14. 
4 8 3 'The CFAA is a diagnosis of a country's private and public financial management systems. It's purpose is 
twofold: (i) to help the borrower and the Bank assess and manage the risk that public funds will be used other than 
for agreed purposes (the fiduciary objective), and (ii) to support the borrower in the design and implementation of 
financial management capacity-building programs (the developmental objective)'. World Bank (2000). 'Country 
Financial Accountability Assessment'. Internet. Accessed November 2000. Available at 
httpy/wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/cfaa.htm. 
4 8 4 Aguilar, M. et al. (2000). Preventing Fraud and Corruption in World Bank Projects, pp. 15-16. 
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reviews (for smaller transactions). Regardless of the size of the transaction, they can choose to do 
either or both (or neither, for that matter). The only real change since 1997 has been an increase in 
resources to conduct more of these reviews, as well as the improvements to the CPAR. 4 8 5 
New lending instruments have also been introduced that give Bank staff more control over the 
funds it disburses. The Loan Administration Change Initiative (LACI), endorsed by the Board in 1998, 
was introduced to assess project financial management systems in order to assure that borrower 
capacity is taken into account at the planning stage with regular monitoring by the Bank. 4 8 6 As the 
Bank explains, 
Instead of being disbursed against individual expenditure transactions or statements of 
expenditure, the proposal is to disburse loans in quarterly payments against supporting 
documentation and other information derived from borrower financial management 
systems and reported quarterly in an integrated Project Financial Management Report, to 
include a project progress report, financial statements, and a procurement management 
report. This would strengthen the linkage between financial information and the physical 
progress of a project. 4 8 7 
Implementation of LACI (recently renamed the Financial Management Initiative or F1NMI) is 
currently underway and has received mixed reviews. Although there have been important increases in 
staff and borrower capacity, as well as procedural development, implementation has been problematic. 
LACI was introduced late into project cycles which caused disruption, and the clients themselves are 
not yet convinced of its potential. 4 8 8 
The Bank has another new lending product called Adaptable Programme Lending (APL). 
'APLs are used when sustained changes in institutions, organisations, or behaviour are key to 
successfully implementing a program.' 4 8 9 It is a long-term instrument which commits the Bank for a 
period of approximately ten to twelve years. It involves three flexible phases and streamlined 
documentation. As the recipient completes each phase, the money for the next one is automatically 
released, no matter how quickly or how long it takes to complete the requirements. Ghana's new public 
sector loan is designed this way. 4 9 0 This also works as a good risk management tool for the Bank. I f 
requirements are not fulfilled, or are not fulfilled as set out in the loan contract, the Bank can just pull 
out of the project without any other commitment to it. So unlike in the past, it will not have to continue 
4 8 5 Interview with Jean-Jacques Raoul, 9 January 2001, Washington DC. See World Bank (1999). Guidelines, 
Appendix 1, pp. 39-42. 
4 8 4 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, pp. 10-11. 
4 8 7 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 33. 
4 8 8 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 12. There is no further information available as 
to why clients are unhappy, although presumably there are issues about delays in payments as well as the problem 
of explaining the lack of progress in programmes and projects. 
4 8 9 World Bank (2000). World Bank Lending Instruments: Resources for Development Impact. Washington DC: 
World Bank, p. 8. 
4 9 0 Interview with Polly Jones, 2 February 2000, Washington DC. See also, World Bank (2000). Reforming Public 
Institutions and Strengthening Governance, p. 80. 
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with projects which are problematic, either from design or implementation or even corrupt 
procurement. 
The Bank's framework for ensuring that the funds it disburses are spent on the intended 
purposes places the onus for implementation and maintenance on the borrower, with the Bank in a 
supervisory capacity. As shown in Table 4.3, this supervisory role is broken down into three main 
areas: project preparation, appraisal and approval; implementation and supervision; and other oversight 
functions. 
Table 4.3: Management, Procurement and Financial Controls in Bank-Financed Investment 
Projects 
Project Preparation, Appraisal & Approval Project preparation - The Bank helps 
establish proper procurement procedures and 
financial controls. 
Project appraisals - The Bank ensures that 
the borrower has the necessary institutional 
capacity. 
Loan negotiation - The Bank sets its 
procurement and financial management 
policies within the Loan Agreement. 
Implementation & Supervision Procurement - The Bank acts as monitor but 
overall responsibility lies with the borrower. 
Financial management - The borrower must 
use proper accounting and auditing 
procedures and submit reports to the Bank. 
Disbursement - The Bank supervises project 
implementation arrangements prior to 
disbursing funds until the project is 
completed. 
Field Supervision - The Bank visits projects 
in the field about twice a year to ensure the 
documentation is supported by evidence. 
Other Oversight Functions Internal Auditing, Loan and Legal 
Departments 
Quality Assurance Group 
Procurement Policy and Services Group 
Operational Core Services Network (OCS) 4 9 1 
Oversight Committee on Fraud and 
Corruption 
Source: World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, pp. 8 -9. 
The oversight role has seen several innovations since 1997. Various methods have been 
introduced in order to assist Bank staff, consultants, temporary employees, government officials, 
contractor employees and the general public to report fraud and corruption within Bank projects.492 The 
Bank is primarily interested in the following occurrences: contract irregularities and violations of the 
Bank's procurement guidelines, bid rigging, collusion by bidders, fraudulent bids, fraud in contract 
performance, fraudulent contract, fraud in an audit inquiry, product substitutions, defective pricing or 
4 , 1 OCS was established in July 1997 to bring together procurement, financial management and quality control. In 
February 1999, the head of OCS was made a Vice-President, which 'helped emphasise to staff the importance that 
management was placing on an integrated system of financial management, procurement, and supervision 
oversight, and on the quality assurance processes developed by OCS'. World Bank (2000). Helping Countries 
Combat Corruption, p. 10. 
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parts, cost and labour mischarging, bribery and acceptance of gratuities, misuse of Bank funds or 
positions, travel fraud, theft and embezzlement, reprisals and gross waste of Bank funds. One method 
for reporting such occurrences is the telephone hotline established on 19 October 1998. 4 9 3 The hotline 
is operated by The Pinkerton Company, an independent company renowned for providing security 
services to companies around the world. 4 9 4 The hotline, available since late 1998, is completely 
confidential and anonymous i f requested and is used to report any corruption by Bank staff or 
involving Bank projects. Those who initiate a report can expect to verify its status within a week, and 
the Bank tries to conclude investigations within ninety to one hundred twenty days, depending of 
course on the complexity of the particular case. As of 14 March 2000, the hotline has received one 
hundred fifty-six calls, although the number of these that have led to investigation has not been made 
In May 1998, the Bank established the Oversight Committee on Fraud and Corruption 
Involving World Bank Group Staff. The Committee meets weekly, reports directly to the President and 
has the power to conduct periodic audits. It is chaired by a Managing Director of the Bank, and also 
includes the Deputy General Counsel (Administration, Finance & Institutional Affairs), the Auditor 
General (Internal Audit Department (IAD)), the Manager of the Office of Professional Ethics (OPE), a 
representative from the Operational Core Services Network, the Chief of Security, and senior managers 
from the IFC or MIGA, i f those agencies are involved. Figure 4.1 provides a complete organisational 
chart. 




of the Internal Audit Department 
Office of 
Professional Ethics 
Daoud Khairallah, Vice-Chairperson 
Deputy General Council for 
Administrative, Finance & 
International Affairs 
Shengman Zhang 






Chief of Security 
General Services Department 
Anita Baker 
Manager of the Office 
of Professional Ethics 
Kathy Sierra 
Vice-President 
Operational Core Services 
Network 
The Committee's mandate is to oversee the investigation of all allegations of corruption 
within the Bank Group itself and within Bank-financed projects. It must ensure that all investigations 
4 9 2 This information can be found on the Bank's website at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/acfiu/acfhiweb.nsf. 
4 , 3 World Bank (1998). 'World Bank Sets Up Hotline'. News Release, 30 October. 
4 9 4 See http://www.pinkertons.com/. 
4 9 5 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 17. 
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are 'thorough, prompt, and responsibly carried out'. It also must determine i f investigations should 
be given to the IAD, the OPE or to outside specialists. In addition, it has the power to create internal 
policies to combat corruption. The Committee is supported by a Secretariat located in the Legal 
Department, which reports directly to the Vice-Chairperson (in this case, Daoud Khairallah). It is the 
'executing arm' of the Committee, responsible for receiving all allegations and determining that they 
meet the criteria before passing them on to the Committee. It has control over any cases forwarded on 
and must 'ensure that investigations are carried out promptly, efficiently, and rigorously'.497 The 
Secretariat then reports on cases to the Oversight Committee, which then presents recommendations on 
any cases worthy of civil or criminal action to the Bank President. 
The Bank takes these investigations very seriously, and will disbar any firm or individual 
found to have defrauded a Bank project, in accordance with Art. 1.15(d) of the Procurement Guidelines: 
'[the Bank] will declare a firm ineligible, either indefinitely or for a stated period of time, to be 
awarded a Bank-financed contract i f it at any time determines that the firm has engaged in corrupt or 
fraudulent practices in competing for, or in executing, a Bank-financed contract'.498 This is handled by 
the Sanctions Committee, which is appointed by the President, and currently includes two Managing 
Directors (one of whom acts as Chairman), the General Counsel, two Vice Presidents (including the VP 
of the Operational Core Services Network), and the Legal Advisor of Procurement and Consultant 
Services, who acts as Secretary.499 When the Sanctions Committee reviews an investigation report 
given to it by the Oversight Cornmittee, it will send a Notice of Disablement Proceedings to the firm or 
individual in question, in order to allow response in writing or in person. I f there is sufficient evidence, 
the Sanctions Committee passes the case to the President, who then makes a decision on it based on the 
Committee's recommendations. See Appendix 10 for a list of firms and individuals disbarred as of 29 
February 2000. 
Importantly, the Bank has also re-emphasised the ethics standards of its own Staff. According 
to Wolfensohn, 
[W]e need to ensure that we have the proper mechanisms in place to minimise fraud and 
corruption within our own organisation - and to respond swiftly and effectively when it 
does occur. I want to emphasise that I have full confidence in the integrity of the staff of 
our institution. Those instances where staff have not conducted themselves in accordance 
with the World Bank Group's ethical standards are very rare. I do not believe we have a 
widespread problem in this regard. We cannot be too complacent, however. As I have 
said before, even one case of fraud or corruption is one too many. 5 0 0 
Wolfensohn, J.D. (1998). 'New Measures to Combat Fraud and Corruption'. World Bank StafTMemo, p. 3. 
Wolfensohn, J.D. (1998). 'New Measures to Combat Fraud and Corruption', p. 3. 
World Bank (1999). Guidelines, p. 8. 
See http /^www.woridrjank.org^)ubUcsector/anticorrupt/prevent.htn for more information. 
Wolfensohn, J.D. (1998). 'New Measures to Combat Fraud and Corruption', p. 1. 
I l l 
The Bank's Code o f Professional Ethics, issued in 1994, 'stresses that the highest level o f professional 
ethics is expected from staff members ' . 5 0 1 Staff Rule 8.01 was amended to 'provide for mandatory 
termination for Staff who defraud the Bank.. .where Staff have engaged in the misuse o f Bank Group 
funds or other public funds for private gain in connection with their Bank activities or employment, or 
the abuse of their position in the Bank for financial g a i n ' . 5 0 2 OPE was strengthened in 1998 with 
support from the Strategic Contract. Activities that it has undertaken since then includes the 1999 
publication o f Living Our Values,soi staff ethics training through Integrity Awareness Seminars, 
establishing an Ethics Helpline for staff along with an Ethics web page, 5 0 4 and the introduction o f 
policies and procedures for the termination o f staff for fraud and corruption (November 1996) and also 
for protection o f whistle-blowers (March 2000) . 5 0 5 
Out o f f i f t y - fou r projects audited by independent f i rms hired by the Bank so far, 
misprocurement was found on forty contracts totalling almost $40 mill ion (see Table 4.4 for details for 
FY99). This is out o f approximately 45,000 contracts totalling $45-50 bil l ion. The Bank's own 
investigations led to the termination o f two staff members for misuse o f $110,000 o f trust funds, wi th 
their termination benefits withheld. Some of this money has already been recovered as part o f an 
ongoing investigation. Furthermore, another c iv i l lawsuit was f i l ed against a former staff member and a 
contractor. The case, originating h October 1997, was won by the Bank in February 1999. These 
investigations led to a decision in the Spring o f 1998 to create a special unit within the I A D which 
includes outside specialists. This unit works closely with OPE and the Legal Department and w i l l 
publish updates and results on the Bank's website. 
Sierra, K. (1998). 'Ethical Guide for Bank Staff Handling Procurement Matters in Bank-Financed Projects'. 
World Bank Operational Core Services Memo. 
502See http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/acfWacfiuweb.nsf/(WebDisp]ay)/AboutlhelnvestigationsUnit?opcn 
document. I asked the Ethics Department why this rule was amended as late as 1997 and what happened to staff 
involved in fraud prior to this. The response contradicted the information available on the website. Staff have 
always been fired for involvement in fraudulent activities involving Bank funds and this amendment reflected 
'what was in fact already happening in the case of staff fraud'. Winborne, S. (2001). Email to the author, 7 
February. When I requested further clarification, I was referred to her manager. Ms. Baker concurred that staff 
have always been terminated for fraud, and that the amendment to Staff Rule 8.01 merely provided protection for 
whistleblowers. Last year, seven people were fired, with five for fraud and two for falsification of documents (two 
are currently appealing their termination). The Bank, like other multilateral institutions, is unique in that it has 
immunity and cannot be sued by its employees, current or former. Therefore, a great deal of attention must be 
taken to ensure that the due rights of staff are taken into consideration in these matters. Ironically, Baker says that 
more people were fired before 1990 for fraud than now because of the complex appeals process put into place to 
ensure the protection of staff rights. Interview with Anita Baker, 14 February 2001, Phone. 
5 0 3 World Bank (1999). Living Our Values. Washington DC: World Bank. 
5 0 4 See http://www.worldbank.org/ethics. 
5 0 5 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, pp. 18-19. This amendment about whistleblowers 
is definitely 'a response to and part of anti-corruption initiatives' at the Bank. It is very difficult to write policy for 
whistleblowers, but it is vital for improving the workplace atmosphere and for providing an ethical workplace. 
Staff must have a safe way to raise issues and concerns without fear of repercussions. Interview with Anita Baker, 
14 February 2001, Phone. 
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Table 4.4: FY99 Bank-Declared Misprocurement 




# of Misprocurements 
India 15,000,000 41.0 1 
Haiti 6,200,000 16.9 5 
Turkmenistan 4,402,440 12.0 3 
Brazil 4,341,094 11.9 3 
Indonesia 3,805,170 10.4 2 
Kenya 1,100,000 3.0 
Belarus 531,527 1.5 1 
C h a d 400,000 1.1 1 
Ghana 362,232 1.0 1 
China 228,094 0.6 
Pakistan 126,168 0.3 2 
C6te d'lvoire 100,000 0.3 1 
Total 36,596,725 100.0% 22 
Source: World Bank (2000). The World Bank Procurement Function Annual Report FY99, p. 21. 
There has been considerable effort to publicise fraudulent cases. One incident involved 
consultant trust fund activities administered by the Bank fo r the Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, Dutch, 
Spanish and Swiss governments. Three staff members have been dismissed for fraudulent activities 
totalling $900,000. 5 0 7 Another case involves allegations o f fraud totalling $80 mill ion at the Nigerian 
Industrial Development Bank (NIDB) , largely funded by the World Bank. N I D B has denied the 
allegations, and the case is still being investigated. 5 0 8 The Bank also reported on a fraudulent scheme 
by individuals in West Afr ica claiming to be Bank auditors in order to collect 'processing fees ' . 5 0 9 
Recently, a two month investigation into allegations o f fraud in East Timor has resulted in the 
cancellation o f a contract totalling 'thousands o f do l la r s ' . 5 1 0 The Bank has also cancelled a $100 
mil l ion water project loan to Ghana because o f allegations o f a $5 mil l ion bribe paid to senior officials 
by Azurix, the US company which had been awarded the contract. Furthermore, Ghana is to pay the 
Bank $800,000 in costs for the project's preparation. 5 1 1 Recently, the Bank has launched an criminal 
investigation into allegations o f corruption against its former task manager for the Kenya Transport 
Infrastructure Project, as well as blacklisting several related consultants and consulting f i r m s . 5 1 2 
In Apr i l 2000, the US General Accounting Office (GAO) published a study o f the Bank's anti-
corruption efforts. The report is generally positive about the internal controls the Bank has put in place 
5 0 6 Including Brazil's $4,341,094 and Indonesia's $3,634,525 in July 1999 (FY00). 
3 0 7 Fidler, S. (2001). 'Corruption leads to freeze on trust funds: World Bank five European governments act after 
organisation's staff were found to have received kickbacks'. Financial Times. 7 Feb; World Bank (2000). 'World 
Bank Investigation Reveal Three Staff Members and Swedish Firms Engaged in Corruption; Staff Members Fired, 
Funds to be Reimbursed'. News Release No. 2001/144/S, 6 December, World Bank (2000). 'World Bank Fires 
Three Staffers for Alleged Corruption'. Development News, 7 December. 
508 ' N I D B denies fraud allegation, states position'. The Guardian (Nigeria). 13 December 2000; 'Nigeria to probe 
corruption in industrial bank'. South African Broadcasting Corporation, 29 January 2000; World Bank (2000). 
'Briefly Noted'. Development News, 31 January. 
3 0 9 World Bank (2000). 'World Bank Warms of Investment Schemes Misrepresenting its Name'. News Release 
No. 2000/345/S, 17 May. 
5 1 0 World Bank (2001). 'Crackdown on Corruption in East Timor'. Press Release, 25 January. 
3 1 1 TI (2000). 'Ghana: World Bank turns o f f the taps on water project'. 77Newsletter, October, p. 11. 
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or strengthened, but wi th several caveats. Lack o f borrower capacity w i l l obviously weaken any 
internal Bank measures, and the Bank needs to see this as a long-term problem. I t does not sufficiently 
take risk into account when lending for anticorruption work. Looking at twelve projects approved since 
November 1998, GAO found five with little borrower capacity, according to Bank staff and records; 
six which did not meet the minimum financial management requirements; three with weak procurement 
capacity, according to the Bank; and four lacked the key implementing agencies and staff required by 
the Bank. In response, 
Bank officials told [GAO] that it is common practice for borrowers to delay 
fu l ly establishing project-implementing organisations until after projects are approved by 
the Board. These officials indicated that most management deficiencies would be 
corrected, as a legal condition o f the loan, before any Bank funds are actually disbursed. 
However, even with required corrective actions, the ability o f these agencies to exercise 
proper financial management and procurement functions is unproven, given the agencies' 
lack o f experience. 5 1 3 
Furthermore, Bank monitoring and supervision procedures are not seen as adequate, and 
problems do not often make it far enough up the chain o f command. Finally, although much more 
information is now available to the public, the Bank has not done enough to publicise its new 
initiatives, such as the hotline and Oversight Committee, to the development community and especially 
to N G O s . 5 1 4 Although the Bank argued during the writ ing o f the GAO report that the measures taken 
were sufficient to assure that funds were being spent as intended, GAO believes 'the Bank is not in a 
position at the time to gauge the extent to which this is the case due to the weaknesses in its current 
systems o f controls ' . 5 1 5 In his response to the report, Wolfensohn agrees with the findings and points 
out efforts that are being made to address those issues (Thomburgh's evaluation o f the Oversight 
Committee [see below], increased funding for capacity building, staff training, increased emphasis on 
risk in the country assistance strategy [ C A S ] 5 1 6 document and greater publicity o f the ho t l ine) . 5 1 7 In its 
own progress report, the Bank highlights the report and states that it is an important independent review 
that provides guidance for the future o f the programme. 5 1 8 
5 1 2 'World Bank Launches Investigations Against its Former Manager'. The Nation (Kenya). 12 December. 
5 1 3 USGAO (2000). 'World Bank: Management Controls Stronger, but Challenges in Fighting Corruption 
Remain'. Report to Congressional Committees, GAO/NSIAD-00-73, April, pp. 15-16. 
5 , 4 USGAO (2000). 'World Bank', pp. 5-7. In 1998, US Senator Mitch McConnell, a member of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee which approves funding levels for the Bank, expressed great concern about alleged 
corruption at the Bank and called for the GAO report. He accused the Bank of being 'secretive and rife with 
"cronyism and deceit" and called for the immediate resignation of US Executive Director Jan Piercy 'for failing 
"to serve US interests'". Ms. Piercy was defended by her boss, US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, who 
nonetheless expressed concern over the corruption allegations. It is thus in the Bank's best interest to ensure a 
transparent and well-publicised investigation process to ward of f this type of attack. 'World Bank President 
Defends Handling of Corruption Cases'. Bloomberg, 17 July; 'Rubin Calls Allegations of World Bank Corruption 
"Serious"'. Bloomberg, 17 July. 
5 1 5 USGAO (2000). 'World Bank', p. 34. 
5 1 6 The CAS is handled in detail later in the chapter. 
5 1 7 Letter from Wolfensohn to Benjamin F. Nelson, Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, dated 
16/3/00, in USGAO (2000). 'World Bank', pp. 52-55. 
5 1 8 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, pp. 19-20. 
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A review o f the hotline's effectiveness was conducted for the Bank by Richard Thornburgh of 
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP, a former US Attorney General and Deputy Under Secretary to the U N , 
and published in January 2000 (although circulation is restricted). The report goes beyond the original 
remit o f the audit and makes three principal recommendations regarding the Bank's internal practices: 
• The Oversight Committee should be policy-making and the 'principal vehicle for establishing 
responses to fraud and corruption' and for 'the conceptualisation and delivery o f national assistance 
programs'. I t should also be renamed the Oversight Committee on Fraud and Corruption Policy. 
• Investigative functions should be handled by a new independent department that reports to the 
President and has the authority to conduct its own investigations. This should be named the 
Department o f Institutional Integrity. 
• The Sanctions Committee should publish guidelines for sanctions and should not be subject to 
review by the President. 5 1 9 
In Apr i l 2001, the Bank appointed Maarten de Jong as Director o f its Department o f 
Institutional Integri ty. 5 2 0 Mr. de Jong is in charge o f advising senior management in fraud investigation 
cases, developing investigative strategies and procedures and contributing to policy and programmes 
on cor rup t ion 5 2 1 Also in Apr i l 2001, the Oversight Committee was renamed the Corporate Committee 
on Fraud and Corruption Policy. 'This new group, composed o f senior staff from the Bank, IFC and 
M I G A , works to ensure that the World Bank Group develops poverty-reducing, co-ordinated and 
effective anti-corruption policies and implementation strategies'. 5 2 2 
The Department for Institutional Integrity consolidates the Investigations Unit with the Ethics 
Department. Because investigations o f fraud in projects could also involve misbehaviour on the part o f 
Bank staff (which was part o f the Ethics Department's remit), it made sense to bring the two 
together. 5 2 3 In addition to investigations, the new department also works towards promoting a culture o f 
integrity through existing staff and participating in the training o f new staff. A n example o f work that 
they are currently is updating the staff rules to include outside interests, trying to take into account the 
many cultures found within the Bank and not just producing a legalistic approach. 
5 1 9 Thomburgh, R., Gainer, P. & Walker, C. (2000). 'World Bank: Concerning Mechanisms to Address Problems 
of Fraud and Corruption'. Report to Shengman Zhang, Managing Director and Chairman of the Oversight 
Committee on Fraud and Corruption, 21 January (rev.), (internal document), pp. 2-3,41-42. 
5 2 0 It is too early to report any institutional or procedural changes that will come out of this. Even though there are 
some likely, I have chosen to keep this section much as it had been written before April 2001. At this point in time, 
this is more a consolidation of existing practice rather than an example of new practice, and much remains the 
same but under a different body. 
5 2 1 Mr. de Jong was previously Managing Director of the European Institute for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
(EULEC). United Nations (2001). 'Worid Bank Names Law Enforcement Expert to Fight Fraud and Corruption'. 
Internet. Accessed 23 April. Available at http://www.allamca.com/stories/printable/200101160187.htnil; World 
Bank (2001). 'Fighting Fraud: World Bank appoints Maarten de Jong as director of Institutional Integrity'. 
Development News, 12 April. 
5 2 2 See http-y/wwwl.woridbank.org/pubiicsector/anticorrupt/prevent.htm. 
5 2 3 Interview with Skip White, 12 July 2001, Phone. 
115 
The Corporate Committee on Fraud & Corruption Policy, is now a policy-making body, 
fol lowing the Thomburgh report's recommendation. This refers to internal policy though, and not 
programme design. Skip White, Co-Manager o f the Investigations Unit, did not think there would be an 
operational policy forthcoming, or at least did not know i f there would be or not. 
Neither o f these two bodies constitutes a VP for Corruption. Programme design w i l l still be 
handled by PREM and W B I , as i t has been f rom the start. 5 2 4 However, the new department wi l l work 
with PREM when appropriate. For example, they are advocating stronger audit rights for the Bank, 
trying to get borrowers to include this language in loan contracts. PREM lacks the authority to impose 
it upon a borrower, but they can certainly advocate it . 
The Thornburgh evaluation also flags as an area for concern the fact that '...there is no 
central authority below the President that, as a practical matter, is in a position to assure that the Bank's 
efforts are consistent in policy direction, focused, comprehensive, co-ordinated, and interbalanced in a 
cost-effective manner' . 5 2 5 It stops short o f recommending a separate VP for Anti-Corruption. There is 
currently a VP for Gender and a VP for Environment, for example, but there has been no move to 
centralise the anti-corruption initiatives under one VP, as one would expect, perhaps for the same 
reason there is also no one central operational policy. 
Despite these criticisms, this work is quite rightly placed at the top o f the Bank's strategy. For 
Borrowers to accept any o f its other anti-corruption work, it must be seen to be doing all that it can to 
minimise the fraud found within its own activities. The integrity o f the entire programme demands that 
contracts where fraud has been found must be cancelled, and any Staff involved must be dismissed. In 
addition to this, in today's climate, few investors would regard any business that did not take internal 
fraud seriously as a sound investment. The Bank's work to enhance its procedures and programmes to 
l imit the opportunities for fraud is, for the most part, both impressive and necessary. 
Helping Countries that Request Bank Support in Their Efforts to Reduce Corruption 
The two main actors within the Bank's anti-corruption programme are the Public Sector Group 
within the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network (PREM) and The World Bank 
Institute (WBI) . As we saw in Chapter 3, W B I 5 2 6 used to concern itself with anti-corruption action plan 
preparation and support, diagnostic surveys, training workshops, anti-corruption courses, policy advice 
and technical assistance, but not coherently or with a Bank-sanctioned mandate. However, fol lowing 
Wolfensohn's speech in 1996, the Bank has sought to 'mainstream' anti-corruption work, and ' W B I 
has been amongst those at the forefront o f this process, which has entailed an expansion and evolution 
o f WBI ' s program'. There is now a dedicated division within W B I for anti-corruption and other 
The roles of PREM and WBI are explained in the next section. 
5 2 5 Thornburgh, R. et al. (2000). 'World Bank', p. 25. 
5 2 6 Parts of this section draws on WBl's website. This is available at http://www.woridbank.org/wbi/governance/. 
See Appendix 11 for a copy of the website's index. 
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governance issues called the Governance, Finance and Regulatory Reform Group (WBIGF). This 
reorganisation can be seen in Fig. 4.2. This is a loosely-based organisation, without a highly-tiered 
hierarchy. As a W B I staff member explained, 'We have a team o f different people who are 
implementing these [anti-corruption programmes] in different countries... and we keep some kind o f 
informal communication' . 5 2 7 This informal structure reflects both the highly varied nature o f the work 
W B I is doing and also its emphasis on partnership and team-building, 
Fig. 4.2: W B I G F Organisational Chart (as of April 2001) 
Drain 
Programme Manager 
Economic Policy S Environment & Governance, Kurran Development Knowledge Products & S i s 
Poverty Reduction Natural Resources Regulation & 
Finance 











W B I focuses on research and education and the improvement o f institutional capability in 
its borrowing members. Accordingly, 'The goal o f the Governance Programme, in collaboration with 
the rest o f the World Bank Group and outside partners, is to help 
countries in developing effective programmes to improve governance o f their public institutions, 
capacity-building and efficiency in public sector performance and service delivery'. I t recently issued a 
formal strategy statement and identified its approach to anti-corruption. It 's strategy 'takes an 
integrated approach to capacity building, governance, and anticorruption' , 5 2 8 and emphasises: 
5 2 7 Interview with Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, 2 February 2000, Washington DC. 
5 2 8 WBI's approach has been summed up as a formula: GI & AC = F (KI , LE, CA), or 'Successful Governance 
Improvement (GI) and Anti-Corruption programs (AC) are dependent on the public availability of Knowledge and 
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• Going beyond public sector dysfunction (the 'symptom') to assist countries in integrating 
institutional, regulatory and economic reforms (the 'fundamentals'); 
• Implementing rigorous empirical diagnostics and analysis; 
• Bringing about collective action, through participation and broad based bottom up 
coalitions; 
• Building partnerships within countries, the World Bank Group, and other international or 
regional institutions; 
• Moving beyond conventional training to knowledge dissemination, policy advice based 
on the latest research and operational findings, and participatory and consensus-building 
activities; 
• Scaling up the impact o f our activities, utilizing new tools for knowledge dissemination, 
innovating, and taking managed r isks. 5 2 9 
PREM falls under the remit o f Sven Sandstrom, the Managing Director, and can be described 
as a small group o f staff drawn f rom different areas with decision making based on both functional and 
geographical lines. Figure 4.3 is a series o f organisational charts to show how functions have been split. 
As we can see, the Council is split into regions and also into thematic groups. Within the thematic 
groups, there is a split into regions and also into further thematic groups. This is intended to allow the 
greatest interaction between different areas o f expertise within an informal network. 5 3 0 
Figure 4.3: P R E M Organisational Charts 
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Information (KI) plus political Leadership (LE) plus Collective Action (CA)'. The F apparently stands for 
'Formula'. 
5 2 9 See http://www.worldbank.orgAvbi/govemance/overview.htm#strategy. 
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WBI's emphasis is on research and education, and PREM's mandate also focuses on 
dissemination o f information with the intent to both educate the public and influence those who make 
important policy decisions. However, PREM is also responsible for policy and is the 'central 
clearinghouse' for anti-corruption work in the regions. 5 3 1 Operational areas o f focus include 
incorporating anti-corruption language into the Country Assistance Strategies (CASs) and evaluative 
country reports on Economic and Sector Work (ESW). There is also a strong focus on staff training and 
research related to corruption. PREM is all about 'action' - lobbying donors and international 
organisations to increase attention paid to corruption within their own activities, investigating claims o f 
corruption within Bank projects, and designing loan products which take corruption into account. 
' Interview with John Heilbrunn, 1 February 2000, Washington DC. 
119 
The Bank's strategy for helping countries combat corruption is shown below in Figure 4.4. 
This strategy involves building Borrower capacity in these five main areas of concern (economic policy 
reform, administrative and c iv i l service reform, legal and judicial reforms, financial management and 
public oversight), and work is handled by both WBI and PREM. WBI conducts training workshops for 
staff and clients, while PREM has responsibility for the anti-corruption aspect of investment and 
adjustment loans and also for Institutional Development Grants (IDGs) for anti-corruption work. Both 
departments devise and utilise diagnostic tools and assist clients in building anti-corruption 
programmes. 
Figure 4.4: Mul t ip ronged Strategy for Combating Corrupt ion 
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Source: World Bank (2000) . Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 22 
According to the 1997 report, 'Anticorruption bodies appear to be a promising option i f they 
can be made truly independent of the executive and i f there is a strong and independent judiciary. 
However, we need to better understand the experiences of these bodies - where they have been 
effective and where they have failed - before recommending them to governments' . 5 j 4 The Bank's 
findings continue to support th i s . 5 j 5 It does not believe that special anti-corruption bodies are generally 
World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 44. The Bank does no! refer to the rather 
extensive and important work within political science on the effectiveness of such bodies. Sec , for example, the 
contributions by Moran, Theobald & Willams and Williams in Doig, A. & Theobald. R. (2000). Corruption and 
Democratisation. London: Frank Cass. 
5 3 5 See World Bank (2000). Anticorruption in Transition, p. 79; Huther, J. & Shah. A. (2000). -Anti-Corruption 
Policies & Programs', pp. 7, 9; Pope. J. & Vogl, F. (2000). 'Making Anticorruption Agenc.is More Effective' 
Finance & Development. 37(2), pp. 6-9. These sources and others generally agree that anti-coii jption agencies can 
be effective but require certain conditions: an independent judiciary, for example. These conditions do not exist in 
many of the countries the Bank lends to and would therefore not provide an effective entry point for an anti-
corruption strategy. 
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appropriate in developing countries, despite success in Hong Kong and Australia, for example. 5 3 4 
Instead, the Bank's work focuses on institution and capacity building, in the f ive areas highlighted in 
Figure 4.4. There are a number o f tools the Bank uses to measure capacity and support institution-
building. These include diagnostic tools, country assistance programmes participatory learning and 
workshops. The rest o f this section focuses on these tools. 
Diagnostic Tools 
In order to help countries build effective anti-corruption programmes, the Bank has developed 
a series o f diagnostic tools ' to help the Bank and client countries deepen the knowledge o f governance 
settings and the constraints and opportunities these settings provide for development in general and 
Bank work in particular ' . 5 3 5 These include Institutional Governance Reviews (IGRs), anti-corruption 
Surveys, Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs), CPARs and CFAAs. 
IGRs are a group o f analytical tools being piloted by PREM that focus on policymaking, 
service delivery and accountability. 5 3 6 Pilots have been completed in Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia and 
Indonesia, while another f ive to seven others are currently planned or underway. Brief descriptions o f 
three pilots are available on l ine . 5 3 7 IGRs are designed to be country specific, 
[b]ut they share the common goals o f (1) focusing on performance by beginning wi th a 
problem (whether poor service delivery, corruption, or bad economic policies) and 
tracing its governance roots, (2) trying to use empirical methods and diagnostic toolkits 
(including analysis o f political economy issues) to understand current governance 
realities in the country concerned, and (3) using this deeper understanding to help shape 
feasible and effective programs o f institution-building for client countries and the 
Bank. 5 3 8 
Anti-corruption surveys aim 'to measure the economic and social costs o f corruption, the 
quality o f public service delivery and o f the business environment, and to identify public sector 
vulnerabilit ies ' . 5 3 9 The surveys, conducted by W B I wi th local partners and often funded by bilateral 
donors, are targeted at citizens, private firms and policymakers and consist o f (a) public officials 
surveys, (b) enterprise surveys, (c) household surveys and (d) specialised surveys (e.g., customs, 
forestry, media). These surveys are designed to focus on institutions and their clients, rather than the 
5 3 4 Sutch points to the lack of a 'benevolent colonial power' in most developing countries now, which would be 
capable of the sweeping reforms undertaken in Hong Kong. Interview with M . Helen Sutch, 8 January 2001, 
Washington DC. 
5 3 5 World Bank (2000). 'Key Instruments for Institutional and Governance Analysis'. Internet. Accessed 
November 2000. Available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/keyinstruments.htm. 
5 3 6 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, pp. 23-24. 
5 3 7 This includes Armenia, Bolivia and Morocco, located at http://wwwI.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/ 
IGRs.htm#IGR pilots. 
5 3 8 World Bank (2000). 'Institutional and Governance Reviews'. Internet Accessed November 2000. Available at 
http://www 1 .worldbank.org/publicsector/igrs.htm. 
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behaviour o f individuals and to provide quantitative rather than qualitative data. 5 4 0 These diagnostic 
surveys 'constitute a key component' o f the program and exist to provide new data that w i l l help 
countries prioritise areas o f concern when designing anti-corruption programmes. 5 4 1 These have been 
done in the ECA region in FY98 and are being done in the other regions throughout FY99 and FYOO. 5 4 2 
It should be noted that the OED has expressed concern over the usefulness o f these surveys which tend 
to only highlight 'high visibili ty corruption' or corruption ' l ikely to be identified by surveys', such as 
corporate bribes to government ministers that may not be very costly overall in comparison to less 
exposed forms o f corruption with a high overall cost, such as persistent tax evasion by corporations and 
the wealthy e l i t e . 5 4 3 
PERs have long been used by PREM to diagnose budget problems within the public sector, 
but during the 1990s began to focus on institutional and anti-corruption issues as w e l l . 5 4 4 For example, 
the PER for China (FY98) focused on public expenditure management, while the PER for Cambodia 
focused on corruption issues as w e l l . 5 4 5 Table 4.5 shows data for completed PERs. 
Table 4.5: P E R s Conducted by Region 5 4 6 
Region Number o f countries Public Expenditure Reviews completed 
Number o f countries Percentage o f total 
countries completed 
AFR 32 22 69 
EAP 12 10 83 
ECA 25 10 40 
LCR 22 6 27 
M N A 9 4 44 
SAR 5 4 80 
Total 105 56 53 
Source: World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 26. 
The use o f CPARs and CFAAs have already been discussed previously in this chapter. 
However, Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show similar data to the one above, for procurement and financial 
management respectively. 
5 3 9 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 24. 
5 4 0 WBI (1999). New Empirical Tools for Anti-Corruption and Institutional Reform: A Step-by-Step Guide to Their 
Implementation. Washington DC: World Bank. 
5 4 1 WBI (1999). New Empirical Tools for Anti-Corruption and Institutional Reform. 
5 4 2 Surveys in Paraguay, Cambodia, Latvia, Albania and Slovakia have been completed and are available to the 
public at http^/www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/diag_surveys.htm. 
5 4 3 Huther, J. & Shah, A. (2000). 'Ann-Corruption Policies and Programs', p. 6. 
5 4 4 World Bank (2000). 'Public Expenditure Reviews'. Internet. Accessed November 2000. Available at 
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/persJiun. See also, Swaroop, V. (1999). 'Public expenditure reviews: 
progress and potential'. PREM Notes No. 20, April. 
5 4 5 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, pp. 25-26. 
5 4 6 Completed in FY98 and FY99 or planned in FYOO. 
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Table 4.6: Summary of C P A R s in FY99 and Plans for FYOO 
Region Number Completed in F Y 9 9 Number Planned for FYOO 
AFR 5 (Mal i , Niger, Benin, Guinea, Mauritania) 6 (Nigeria, Uganda, Mozambique, Burkino 
Faso, Zambia, Tanzania) 
EAP 1 (Vietnam) 2 (Philippines, Indonesia) 
ECA 3 (Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania) 6 (Latvia, Russia, Albania, Slovakia, 
Poland, Kazakhstan) 
LCR 5 (Guyana, Dominican Republic [draft], 7 (Honduras, Panama, Peru, Ecuador, 
Uruguay, Haiti [draft], Guatemala [draft]) Colombia, Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago) 
M N A 2 (Jordan, Morocco) 3 (Lebanon, Yemen, Egypt) 
SAR None (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan started) 4 (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan) 
Total 16 28 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 27. 
Table 4.7: C F A A s and Country Profiles of Financial Accountability ( C P F A s f 





M N A 
SAR 
CPFA (19): Benin, 
Botswana, Burkino Faso, 
Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Ma l i , 
Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
C P F A ( l ) : China 
CFAA (2): Armenia, Latvia 
CPFA (1): Kazakhstan 
CFAA (2): Egypt, Yemen 
CPFA (5): Angola, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, South Afr ica , 
Uganda 
CPFA (1): Cambodia 
CPFA (5). Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, 
Pakistan 
CPFA (5): Cote d'lvoire, 
Guinea, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Rwanda 
CFAA (2): Korea, Thailand 
CFAA (2): Croatia, 
Moldova 
CFAA (2): Argentina, 
Colombia 
CPFA (3): Jordan, Lebanon, 
the West Bank and Gaza 
CPFA (2): India, Sri Lanka 
Source: World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 28. 
Country Assistance Programmes 
Prior to 1997, the Bank had never attempted to design anti-corruption programmes and had 
rarely addressed the issue even in an indirect manner within its economic and sector work. As the Bank 
itself has admitted, 'Whi le the Bank has helped countries reform economic policies and strengthen 
public institutions for many years, its involvement in explicit anticorruption strategies is n o v e l ' . 5 4 8 This 
is the most controversial o f all the Bank's anti-corruption work, both because o f its experimental nature 
and with regard to its non-political mandate. It is with that in mind that the Bank insists it only works 
with those countries who have asked the Bank for its advice and assistance with national anti-
corruption e f for t s . 5 4 9 It describes its work as 'demand driven', and points out a number o f caveats for 
its response to client requests for assistance: 
5 4 7 The short-form version of the CFAA. 
M 8 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 3. 
5 4 9 Even one rf the Bank's biggest partners in anti-corruption expressed concern regarding the potential for 
increased political conditionality and intervention in a sovereign country's political affairs. In 1996, TI said, 'We 
would not like to see the Bank dictating to governments and understand that it has no intention of doing so. Still 
less would we want to see elements of conditionality creeping in ' . Transparency International (1996). 'T I supports 
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• We emphasise a demand-driven approach to ensure there is a strong commitment f rom 
the top leaders in the country b a transparent, open, and participatory reform 
process. 
H We request the formation o f a 'steering committee' including the top leadership as well 
as representatives from civi l society and the private sector. This top-level committee 
is charged with designing a strategy and an action program, as well as monitoring 
their implementation through 'task forces' or 'technical committees'. 
• To ensure there is a good understanding o f the fundamental governance and anti-
corruption problems, we generally propose conducting empirical diagnostic work as 
an entry point. Our triangulated survey o f households, public officials and business 
enterprises, and a rigorous analysis o f the data gathered, helps us to suggest 
programs that wi l l begin to address the governance problems in the country. 
• We discourage 'one-off activities, emphasising a long-term commitment to an 
integrated program that addresses not only anti-corruption, but an overall 
governance program as w e l l . 5 5 0 
This approach protects the Bank from criticism that it is interfering in recipient countries' political 
affairs, and attempts to s implify the process o f measuring political commitment. 
PREM may be moving away from emphasising the significance o f this because i t feels that 
political commitment is impossible to measure. PREM used to focus attention on generating wi l l at the 
top, by f inding 'champions' in government. Speeches f rom politicians committing support do not 
necessarily translate into concrete action, so instead PREM is turning to supporting reform from the 
bottom up with civi l society (such as community empowerment efforts, particularly in the Afr ica 
region). Because it is prevented from lending directly to c ivi l society organisations by its Articles, it 
w i l l lend instead to localities and local governments. 3 3 1 This may suggest a differing approach to 
political w i l l taken by PREM and W B I , with W B I insisting that political w i l l at the top is essential to 
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its strategy. 
There is another apparent divergence in approach between PREM and W B I , and the two may 
be linked. The PREM strategy document acknowledges criticism about the 'technocratic' nature o f its 
work and discusses moves away f rom this approach; however, in the same document, W B I describes 
World Bank initiative'. 77 Newsletter. December. However, subsequent publications have called on the Bank do 
just this: to reduce lending levels for countries that 'do not have convincing anti-corruption reform programmes in 
place and which do not collaborate with external efforts to promote such programmes'. Transparency International 
(2000). 'World Bank needs to strengthen its anti-corruption work, says Transparency International'. Press Release, 
31 August. 
5 5 0 See http^/www.worldbank.org/wbiygovernance/overviewJrtm#whoarewe. 
5 5 1 Two examples are loans to Guinea (Capacity Building for Service Delivery and Rural Decentralisation) and 
Cameroon (Decentralisation). Interview with Cheryl Gray, 2 February 2000, Washington DC. 
5 5 2 Kaufmann, D. (1999). 'New Frontiers in World Bank Programmes'. Democracy Dialogue. June. Washington 
DC: USAID-CDG,pp.4-5. 
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its own approach as technocratic. Sutch believes that the work done by W B I is very different f rom 
the usual sectoral work being done, in that i t is much more sensitive and could be accused o f being 
very political (e.g., media t raining, 5 5 4 parliaments). Hence, W B I insists on focusing on the empirical 
and technical side o f its work to avoid criticism in this area and must have high-level political support 
to avoid accusations o f political interference. 5 5 5 
Early anti-corruption assistance was focused on the ECA region (Albania, Georgia, Latvia) 
and AFR region (Benin, Bhiopia, Malawi, M a l i , Tanzania, Uganda). Now the Bank is doing work o f 
some kind in all regions. As o f the 2000 fo l lowup report, the countries in which the Bank was doing 
anti-corruption work can be seen in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8: Countries Working with the Bank on Anti-Corruption Issues 
Albania Ecuador Mozambique 
Argentina Ethiopia Nicaragua 
Armenia Georgia Nigeria 
Azerbaijan Ghana Paraguay 
Balkans Stability Pact Guatemala Philippines 
Bangladesh Guinea Poland 
Benin India (some states) Romania 
Bolivia Indonesia Russia 
Bosnia Kazakhstan Slovakia 
Bulgaria Kenya Sri Lanka 
Burkina Faso Korea Tanzania 
Cambodia Latvia Thailand 
Cameroon Malawi Uganda 
Chad Mali Vietnam 
China Moldova Yemen 
Colombia Morocco Zambia 
Source: World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 29. 
However, the Bank makes it clear that, 
It is important to note that this is not a list o f countries that the Bank has singled out in 
which to investigate corruption, and that the occurrence o f a country on the list is in no 
way indicative o f the presence or absence o f corruption in that country. Rather, this is a 
list o f countries in which the Bank is working wi th governments and/or c ivi l society, at 
their invitation, to help understand and systematically address problems o f public sector 
performance and corruption. This work is conducted sometimes under the more general 
3 5 3 World Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions & Strengthening Governance, pp. 17, 151. 
5 5 4 Frank Vogl, formerly World Bank Director of Information and Public Affairs and now TI-USA, criticises 
WBI's work on media training, saying that the organisation lacks credibility, is inconsistent with its own research 
and is too open to unwanted influence. Bretton Woods Project (2001). 'World Bank warned: don't meddle with 
media'. Bretton Woods Update. 23(June/July), p. 8. 
5 5 5 Interview with'M. Helen Sutch, 8 January 2001,-Washington DC. This work is indeed proving controversial. 
Mark Tomlinson, World Bank Country Director of Nigeria, has recently called out for the government to remove 
its Official Secrets Act from its constitution to assist the media in the country to investigate corruption. Garba, 
K.A. (2001). 'How media can boost anti-corruption campaign, by World Bank chief. The Guardian (Nigeria), 15 
February. This can be seen as an example of Bank staff becoming too involved in a country's political affairs and 
ignoring the balance between the government's needs and the public's needs (or the donor institution's needs). 
125 
umbrella o f public sector institutional reform. Our work wi th client countries is 
continually expanding, and this list is thus not meant to be exhaustive. 5 5 6 
According to the 1997 report: 'The main thrust o f the Bank's support for countries' 
anticorruption efforts w i l l be in helping to design and implement government programs' . 5 5 7 Lending for 
public sector governance and institutional reform, for both adjustment and investment lending, rose 
f rom $4 bil l ion to $7.5 billion f rom FY97 to FY99. Lending for Technical Assistance (TA) during this 
time averaged $2 bil l ion to $2.5 bil l ion per year . 5 5 8 Some examples o f country programmes to 
strengthen governance and combat corruption can be found in Appendix 12. 
In Poland, the Bank focuses on 'minimising the extent to which [opportunities for rent-
seeking, discretion and accountability] can influence behaviour, rather than relying solely on 
prosecution o f corrupt individuals ' . 5 5 9 Sutch, one o f the first Bank Staff to conduct anti-corruption 
work in the f ie ld , found one o f the biggest challenges in both Poland and Latvia, was convincing first 
the prime minister, then the government and, f inal ly, the people that combating corruption means 
creating or strengthening institutions to prevent or minimise the level o f corruption that occurs in the 
first place. Instead, everyone saw fighting corruption as merely prosecuting the 'b ig fish'.560 Primarily 
because o f this public cynicism, co-operation between the Bank, the government and c iv i l society is 
vi tal . The strategy in Poland includes technical improvements (e.g., laws on lobbyists, improved 
procurement policies, Freedom o f Information law), the use o f a public conference to generate public 
interest and support, and surveys to highlight areas o f importance. 5 6 1 This is clearly an on-going 
project. 
In Latvia, Sutch was also at the forefront o f the Bank's anti-corruption work. As early as 
1996, Johannes Linn, VP for the ECA Region, spoke to Latvian Prime Minister Skele about Bank 
concerns wi th corruption in his country. According to Sutch, ' M r . Skele was wary. He said he would 
think about it carefully and that, i f he went ahead, he would not permit Latvia to be labelled as more 
corrupt than other countries because action was being taken there. He warned that he would walk away 
from the idea i f any publicity originated f rom the Bank ' . 5 6 2 After Wolfensohn's 'cancer o f corruption' 
speech, Mr. Skele felt more comfortable that Latvia would not be singled out for attention and 
requested Bank help to f ight corruption. He insisted the Bank work in secrecy though until he felt 
comfortable going public with the programme. 5 6 3 The Bank accepted this and worked with the Prime 
Minister in the way he required until he decided otherwise. The Bank facilitated first a closed seminar 
for selected parliamentarians, followed by a public conference when the political leadership determined 
5 5 6 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, pp. 28-29. 
5 5 7 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 27. 
5 5 8 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 29. 
5 5 9 World Bank (1999). 'Corruption in Poland: Review of Priority Areas and Proposals for Action'. Warsaw 
Office, October 11 (Internal document), pp. 1 -2. 
5 6 0 Interview with M . Helen Sutch, 8 January 2001, Washington DC. 
5 6 1 World Bank (1999). 'Corruption in Poland', pp. 28-29. 
5 6 2 Sutch, M.H. (1999). 'Building an Anti-Corruption Strategy in Latvia'. 4 June, Mimeo (Internal document), p. 
1. 
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the time was right. Diagnostic surveys conducted revealed that the police, tax and customs services 
needed to be the top p r i o r i t y , 5 6 4 and the Bank was fortunate enough to have a 'champion' to work with 
in the tax and customs area. 5 6 5 The Bank records improvements in the laws and practices in these areas 
resulting in an improvement in business and household attitudes towards these services as measured in 
user surveys. 5 6 6 Part o f this was the State Revenue Modernisation Project Loan in the equivalent o f 
$5.1 mil l ion, used to develop a 'sustainable state revenue service based on voluntary compliance and 
lower compliance cost ' . 5 6 7 Once again, the Latvian anti-corruption strategy is on-going, and there is 
still much work to be done. 
These two countries illustrate some o f the problems with the Bank's strategy in this area. 
These are examples o f two successful programmes, producing the kinds of results the Bank wants to 
see. But when does it end? Where is the 'exit strategy'? I f the Bank becomes this involved wi th each o f 
its member countries, w i l l there ever be a time when the Bank is not worried about corruption or 
capacity building? Sutch believes, 'Not in my working l ifet ime' . Institution building is so fundamental 
to its work, and there are countries so far behind others that there is a generation's worth o f work to be 
done. This is why i t is so important to build programmes at the country level. I t is one thing to say 
'work with c iv i l society', but what do you do when civi l society is too undeveloped to be helpful? For 
example, in Latvia Sutch first went in wi th a representative f rom T I whose only concern was starting a 
T I chapter. She kept trying to explain that there was not sufficient c iv i l society support for a successful 
chapter, and after two days in the country, the T I representative agreed with her. This is no longer the 
case, but it illustrates how long-term this process is. It is questionable whether the Bank w i l l be able to 
keep up momentum either at the country or institutional level in the long-term for this sort o f work to 
be effective. 
There are further methodological problems w i t h this approach. Civ i l society is itself a highly 
contested concept, and this thesis is not the place to discuss in detail the burgeoning discourse. 
However, i t is important to identify some key concerns regarding the World Bank's work in this area. 
The Bank has used the term extensively in its literature on good governance since the 1989 LTPS 
report, but has only recently offered a definition: 'C iv i l society consists o f the groups and 
organizations, both formal and informal, which act independently o f the state and market to promote 
diverse interests in society. ' 5 6 8 Civi l society, for the Bank, is seen as a tool which can be used to 
empower ordinary people to take control o f their own development, to hold the state accountable to its 
citizens and to provide for those services that the state is unable or unwil l ing to provide. 
5 6 3 Sutch, MM. (1999). 'Building an Anti-Corruption Strategy in Latvia', p. 16. 
5 6 4 Anderson, J. (1998). 'Corruption in Latvia: Survey Evidence'. Prepared for the Corruption Prevention Council 
under their Corruption Prevention Program, 16 December, p. 15. 
5 6 5 Sutch, M.H. (1999). 'Building an Anti-Corruption Strategy in Latvia', p. 21. 
5 6 6 Sutch, M.H. (1999). 'Building an Anti-Corruption Strategy in Latvia', p. 22. 
5 6 7 World Bank (1998). 'World Bank to Support Revenue System Modernisation in Latvia'. News Release No. 
99/2024/ECA, 3 December. 
5 6 8 World Bank (2001). What is Civil Society?'. Internet. 10 January. Accessed 10 August 2001. Available at 
http://www.woridbank.org/wbp/scapital/sources/civil 1 .htm#top. 
127 
According to Nagle and Mahr in their study on post-communist Europe, 'The term [civi l 
society] is often used loosely by Western political pundits to describe the new democracies, wi th l i t t le 
critical analysis regarding whether civi l society has been achieved and which elements might be 
lack ing ' . 5 6 9 Kasfir concurs, arguing that, 'This concept o f c iv i l society has been shaped to serve the 
goal o f better governance, particularly democratic reform, rather than a deeper understanding o f the 
relationship between social formations, the associations that represent them and the state' . 5 7 ° He further 
contends that donors and like-minded academics often systematically exclude from their arguments 
those segments o f civi l society that damage their hypotheses -those based on ethnicity or criminal 
gangs, for example, or those elements that might f ight against democratisation efforts. 
Abrahamsen discusses the placement o f c iv i l society within the discourse o f good governance, 
focusing predominantly on the World Bank's contribution. As she explains, ' I n the good governance 
discourse, c iv i l society emerges as the key link between economic liberalisation and 
democratisation.. . [ i t ] is regarded as a "countervailing power" to the state, a way o f curbing 
authoritarian practices and corruption, hence the concern for strengthening or nurturing c iv i l 
society ' . 5 7 1 She argues that the Bank's notion o f c iv i l society is a 'romanticised' one, in which 'there 
are no classes, no races, no genders, ethnic groups or oppressors', and is not only unlikely to bring 
about the Bank's desired changes but could exacerbate existing political and economic problems. 5 7 2 
Abrahamsen sees the Bank's view o f c iv i l society as 'romanticised', as opposed to merely 
simplistic or naive, because it uses particular language - 'empowerment', 'self-help', 'participation', 
'partnership', 'community', 'voice' - to create a powerful image o f the poor taking control o f their own 
destiny and development away from a neglectful, perhaps even abusive, and often over-burdened state. 
Recalling '[e]choes o f Gandhi at his spinning wheel', Francis calls this 'the manufacture o f a collective 
dream o f participation and community, behind the screen o f which the levers o f business remain quite 
intact ' . 5 7 3 Indeed, Abrahamsen argues, this discourse is merely a smoke-screen for the Bank's 
introduction o f 'cost recovery' schemes into adjustment programmes, where the poor are encouraged to 
'help themselves' by paying for basic health care, education and other public services 5 7 4 It does not 
enter into the Bank's argument that the poor, once 'empowered', may demand an increase in state-
provided services. Indeed, just the opposite is true: 'Wi th in the good governance discourse, then, 
empowerment is deprived o f its radical, political implications, and becomes instead a highly 
5 6 9 Nagle, J. & Mahr, A. (1999). Democracy and Democratisation, p. 64. For example, Jeffires points out that all 
World Bank discussions on civil society exclude any mention of trade unions. Jeffries, R. (1993). 'The State, 
Structural Adjustment and Good Government in Africa'. Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics. 
31(1), p.32. 
5 7 0 Kasfir, N. (1998). 'Introduction: The Conventional Notion of Civil Society: A Critique'. In Kasfir, N . (ed). 
Civil Society and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., p. 1. 
5 7 1 Abrahamsen, R. (2000). Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa. 
London: Zed Books Ltd., p. 52. 
5 7 2 Abrahamsen, R. (2000). Disciplining Democracy, p. 56. This finding is also reported in Heam, J. & Robinson, 
M. (2000). 'Civil Society and Democracy Assistance in Africa'. In Bumell, P. (ed). Democracy Assistance-
International Co-operation for Democratization. London: Frank Cass Publishers, pp. 241-262. 
5 7 3 Francis, P. (2001). 'Participatory Development at the World Bank: The Primacy of Process'. In Cooke, B. & 
Kothari, U. (eds). Participation: The New Tyranny?. London: Zed Books Ltd., pp. 81, 87. 
5 7 4 Abrahamsen, R. (2000). Disciplining Democracy, pp. 56-59. 
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instrumental term; the objective is to "capitalize on the energies and resources o f the local people", 
who should pull their weight and thereby make development projects more cost-efficient ' . 5 7 5 
While some scholars elaborate upon the problems with the Bank's definition and 
understanding o f c iv i l society and others o f the ideology behind its inclusion in the Bank's discourse, 
others critically examine the way i t is being funded. Ottaway and Carothers speak o f the problems in 
funding c iv i l society, done predominantly through the many NGOs that have cropped up in the past 
decade. Firstly, many o f the NGOs seem to have been created to correspond with donor funding 
priori t ies, 5 7 6 and secondly, NGOs have become 'attractive employment opportunities...for members o f 
educated elites displaced by political change as well as by economic crisis and restructuring'. 5 7 7 NGOs 
can also be state creations or dependencies, reflecting the f lexibi l i ty o f recipients in adapting donor 
trends to their own needs. As a result, these organisations may not be the vehicle for political change or 
the buttress against corruption that the donors desire. 5 7 8 The scope for corruption may actually be 
increased simply by the willingness o f donors to fund anti-corruption projects, with new opportunities 
for consultants, c ivi l servants, training agencies, NGOs and others to claim a unique role in the fight 
579 
against corruption. 
The main concern here for this thesis is rot to argue that civi l society does not have an 
important role in checking the power of the state. Instead, my intention is to highlight some o f the 
fundamental methodological weaknesses with the Bank's approach to fighting corruption through civi l 
society. Not only is this work extremely complex, it is also politically controversial. Funding NGOs 
and other c ivi l society groups to 'empower' citizens to hold the government to account raises questions 
o f sovereignty and the Bank's non-political mandate. 5 8 0 T I E the most often-cited civil society group 
with which the Bank works on corruption, but others include: IRIS, Global Coalition for Afr ica , Centro 
Latinoamcricano de Administracion para le DeSarrollo, Carter Center, Asia Foundation, Civ i l Service 
5 7 3 Abrahamsen, R. (2000). Disciplining Democracy, p. 59. This includes a partial quote from World Bank (1989). 
Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. Washington DC: World Bank, p. 58. 
5 7 6 Cooksey speaks of the problematic nature of TI's anti-corruption work, because ' T l chapters rely on donors for 
their core funding and other activities, and are therefore unlikely to want to bite the hand that feeds them'. 
Cooksey, B. (1999). 'Do Aid Agencies Have a Comparative Advantage in Fighting Corruption in Africa?'. Paper 
given at the 9* International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC), Durban, South Africa, 10-15 October, p. 16. 
This calls into question TI's ability to pursue avenues that might offend the donor community or contradicts other 
donor priorities, such as work with trade unions. 
5 7 7 Ottaway, M . & Carothers, T. (2000). 'Toward Civil Society Realism'. In Ottaway, M . & Carothers, T. (eds). 
Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, p. 299. 
5 7 8 One example is the 31" December Women's Movement (31stDWM), headed by the wife of former Ghanaian 
president Jerry Rawlings. It was originally part of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), Rawling's 
political party and was used to generate political support for Rawlings campaign from women. However, in the 
1980s, the 31 stDWM withdrew from the PNDC to become an NGO, in order to receive aid money. Its nature may 
have changed but its purpose remains the same. Sandbrook, R. & Oelbaum, J. (1997). 'Reforming Dysfunctional 
Institutions Through Democratisation? Reflections on Ghana'. Journal of Modern African Studies. 35(4), pp. 623-
625. 
5 7 9 In a recent Bank-sponsored email discussion group on anti-comiption strategies, no fewer than six individuals 
offered their services to the Bank as consultants. This is, of course, not evidence of corruption or even corrupt 
intent. It does however remind us that where demand has been created, there will always be 'experts' to f i l l that 
demand. 
3 8 0 Nelson, P. (1995). The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations: The Limits of Non-political 
Development. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., pp. 112-141. 
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College (UK) , Open Society Institute, Escola de Administracao Fazendaria (Brazil), Ford Foundation, 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Danish Center for Human Rights, Institute for Democracy in 
South Africa, National Democratic Institute, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(Sweden), Centre Quest-Africain des Media et du Developpment, Association o f Journalists 
(Tanzania), Uganda Management Institute, Radio Nederland and the Groupe de Recherche et 
d'Echanges Technologiques. 5 8 1 Most o f the civil society groups listed above would have been 
considered off- l imits for Bank funding in the recent past, being specifically linked to democratisation 
initiatives. 
In addition, different Bank objectives might also come into conflict. For example, cost 
recovery schemes for education and health, in which local schools and hospitals are allowed to charge 
fees for services, or local NGOs are given the resources to provide these services, have sometimes 
resulted in excessive charges and outright bribery. This must be taken into account when the Bank 
claims that its work on decentralisation and c iv i l society helps to f ight corruption. 
Participatory Learning and Workshops 
Training is represented in the main by the Anti-Corruption Core Course, piloted last year for 
seven African countries: Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda. This course is 
intended for Bank staff and clients, and the first pilot was held in four phases between June and 
November 1999. Participants included senior policy makers, public officials, legislators, the private 
sector, and c iv i l society linked to anti-corruption. The cost o f the course is $1,500, which includes 
tuition, course materials, meals and hotel accommodation in Washington D C . 5 8 2 Findings o f the course 
were presented in a workshop at the 9* IACC in Durban in October 1999 and have been published 
under the title Towards Collective Action to Improve Governance and Control Corruption in Seven 
African Countries?*1 W B I intends to continue the pilot in the other regions, starting in Latin America 
in 2000, followed in South Asia and Eastern Europe at a future unspecified date. Resource Team 
Members, as Bank staff involved in the project are called, included Wolfensohn; Joseph Stiglitz, Senior 
Vice-President and Chief Economist; 5 8 4 Robert McNamara, former Bank President; Vinod Thomas, 
5 8 1 For these and others, see World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, pp. 31-32. 
5 8 2 However, partial financial assistance is available. 
5 8 3 WBI (1999). Towards Collective Action to Improve Governance and Control Corruption in Seven African 
Countries. Prepared as background for the 4s Annual International Conference Against Corruption (1ACC), 
Durban, South Africa, 10-15 October. 
3 8 4 Stiglitz resigned in late 1999 in somewhat controversial circumstances, criticising the Bank's emphasis on 
growth over distribution and its use of conditionality. See Beattie, A. (1999). ' World Bank aid strategy flawed says 
Stiglitz'. Financial Times. 29 November, Lobe, J. (1999). 'Stiglitz Calls for More Open Debate, Less 
Conditionality'. World News: Inter Press Service, 30 November; Stiglitz, J. (1999). 'The World Bank at the 
Millennium'. The Economic Journal. 109(November): F577-F597. For an interesting expose of Stiglitz's 
acrimonious departure from the Bank following these criticisms, see Wade, R. (2001). 'Showdown at the World 
Bank'. New Left Review. January/February, pp. 124-137. His replacement has proven even more controversial: 
Professor Nick Stem, former chief economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
whose brother, Richard Stem, is the Bank's human resources vice-president. The Bank's rules specifically forbid 
the employment of close family members. This has led not only to external criticism but also to criticism from the 
Bank's staff association, who warn President Wolfensohn that such an appointment could be interpreted as 
nepotism and may 'ultimately demean the ability of staff to speak in a credible way with clients about corruption 
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Director o f W B I ; Maria Gonzalez de Asis and Jakob Svensson, Project Task Managers; Donald 
MacDonald, Distance Learning Manager; and Daniel Kaufmann, Senior Manager. 
Its aims are, (1) 'providing the participants with concrete tools to prepare and implement 
action programmes to fight corruption and improve governance', and (2) 'creating an environment in 
which participants from different segments o f society can work together to review results o f successful 
(and unsuccessful) practices and reforms.' Put another way, according to Wolfensohn: "The purpose o f 
this course is how it is you can develop programmes which we can support. Enthusiasm for the process 
differs, but it is a process. You are teaching staff from the Bank here too. It is a strong interactive 
process'. 5 8 5 With even more emphasis on the Bank's humble role, Kaufmann describes the Bank as a 
'facilitator', despite this not necessarily being the Bank's 'second nature ' . 5 8 6 There are six key features 
o f the approach taken by the course: (1) it is participatory; (2) it is driven by the country team; (3) it is 
intended to create public pressure; (4) the analysis translates into programme design; (5) the emphasis 
is placed on institutional reform; and finally, (6) 'the integration among the above components, 
internationalisation with the country leadership, and initiation o f concrete anti-corruption re forms ' . 5 8 7 
Fig. 4.5: The Ant i -Cor rup t ion Core Course 
Overall Architecture | Controlling Corruption: A n integrated strategy 
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 
FACE-TO-FACE DISTANCE L E A R N I N G 
SESSION • institutional reform 
•/ framework S refined matrix 
•S tools S coalition building 
PHASE3 
WORKSHOP 
<S presentation o f 
entire program reforms 




Ma t r ix 
Institutional 
reforms 
Source: WBI (1999). Towards Collective Action to improve Governance and Control Corruption in Seven 
African Countries, p. 24. 
In the first phase the Bank provided a blank matrix (see Appendix 13) as well as support and 
training. It is up to the country representatives themselves to identify key areas o f need and also to 
suggest solutions. Once again, the importance o f ownership by the borrowing country and the need to 
mobilise the public behind the anti-corruption campaign is evident. Following on from WBI 's research 
in this area, there is an emphasis on empirical studies, institution-building and the need for co-
and hamper our work in issues of governance'. Atkinson, M. (2000). 'World Bank accused d nepotism and 
corruption'. The Guardian. (London). 17 March, p. 28. Professor Stem was, however, appointed by Wolfensohn as 
chief economist in July 2000 despite such criticism. 
5 8 5 WBI (1999). Towards Collective Action to Improve Governance and Control Corruption in Seven African 
Countries, p. 14. 
586 (1999) Towards Collective Action to Improve Governance and Control Corruption in Seven African 
Countries, preface. 
5 8 7 WBI (1999). Towards Collective Action to Improve Governance and Control Corruption in Seven African 
Countries, p. 7. 
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ordination, between the Bank and the country and also with other countries. Appendix 14 provides a 
breakdown o f activities during Phase 1 which highlights areas o f emphasis and training. 
Phase Two was organised over a four-week period wi th two video conferences each week 
between W B I and two o f the countries involved. This allowed countries to share their findings with 
others in order to enhance the learning process and also to encourage competition among countries. 5 8 8 
Phase Two covered four main areas: the rule o f law, financial management and procurement, c ivi l 
service reform and customs reform. W B I provided training in the form o f case studies and wi th in -
country visits by relevant experts. The matrixes were completed by the end o f this phase. See Appendix 
15 for a summary o f matrix results. Most o f the seven participant countries prioritise different areas; 
however, some patterns do emerge. Four areas in particular are highlighted by at least two o f the 
countries: the importance o f political w i l l ; improving legal and judiciary systems and law enforcement; 
reform o f public sector institutions; and education o f the public and civi l society. As discussed 
previously, Phase Three saw the presentation o f these matrices and discussions at the 9*11 IACC in 
Durban, and from the quotes included in the programme brief, i t appears that participants were happy 
with the final results. Words used include 'unprecedented', 'tremendous help', 'new level o f 
understanding', 'fabulous', 'working together', and 'we look forward to continued partnership'. 5 8 9 
W B I says that the Core Course showed that a participatory approach 'can successfully help 
countries develop strategies to fight corrupt ion ' . 5 9 0 However, Phase Four, which is ongoing, w i l l be 
where the success or failure o f the approach w i l l be judged. Here, W B I uses the results o f the core 
course to help participant countries develop comprehensive anti-corruption programmes. This strategy 
involves two parallel activities. First, W B I creates a counsel or steering committee to start developing 
an anti-corruption plan, a process already completed in Ghana (see Box 4.1). A t the same time, W B I 
hires a local f i r m to implement its diagnostic surveys o f households, public officials and enterprises 5 9 1 
According to Zoido-Lobaton, 'The idea is to feed these diagnostics into the counsel [or steering 
committee] and help...support institutional reform...we use this [survey] data to generate more debate 
and to support different institutional reforms we think are important...[while] making this whole 
process as participatory as possible ' . 5 9 2 In order to keep the momentum going after the surveys have 
been conducted and the results have been made public during a WBI-organised workshop within the 
country, W B I tries to get the support o f the media and c iv i l society, the involvement o f the regional or 
country unit o f the Bank and permission from the government to implement any reforms. This kind o f 
work has already been done in Albania, Georgia, Latvia, Ecuador and Paraguay, and is currently being 
done in Thailand, Cambodia, Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Bosnia and Romania. 
M Interview with Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, 2 February 2000, Washington DC. 
5 8 9 WBI (1999)L Towards Collective Action to Improve Governance and Control Corruption in Seven African 
Countries,pp. 13-15. 
5 9 0 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 36. 
5 9 1 WBI (1999). New Empirical Tools for Anti-Corruption and Institutional Reform. 
5 9 2 Interview with Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, 2 February 2000, Washington DC. 
132 
Bos 4.1: The Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition 
The Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition was formed in January 2000 fol lowing the Core Course, and its 
members include the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice, the Serious Fraud 
Office, the National Institutional Reform Program, the Institute o f Economic Affairs , the Center for 
Democracy and Development (CDD), the Ghana Journalists Association, the Private Enterprise 
Foundation, and the Ghana Integrity Initiative - the local chapter o f T T . 5 9 3 The Coalition is designed to 
create 'a forum for interaction between the three arms o f government; public and private sector 
institutions; and c iv i l society groups working in the area o f anti-corruption' . 5 9 4 The work done by the 
Coalition includes, 
• Fostering co-operation between international organisations and donor agencies in their anti-
corruption efforts; 
• Encouraging the exchange o f information and joint ownership o f programmes to best utilise 
existing resources; 
• Helping create transparency in government, public and private enterprise and civi l society; 
• Helping organise seminars, surveys, etc.; and 
• Helping strengthen its members and any other anti-corruption bodies. 5 9 5 
W B I repeatedly refers to the Core Course as an example o f true country ownership. According 
to Zoido-Lobaton, 
The idea was to work with them to develop a strategy for their own country, so you have 
different matrixes and introduction to the matrixes, which the country themselves came 
out with . The main problem areas and what different groups, civi l society and 
government, could do to solve this problem. And this was particularly interesting 
because in the country teams, you've got people from government and people f rom civi l 
society working together, for in many countries the first time. The countries were 
teaching themselves, telling each other what they were doing. So the idea was, you 
know, they were comparing on strategies and you've got a little bit o f competition...and 
they can learn f rom one another, instead o f just coming f rom the Bank and saying "This 
is what you've got to d o . " 5 9 6 
Despite this, true 'ownership' o f this process by the countries themselves is questionable. 
Firstly, those attending the Course may or may not include high level government ministers, and heads 
o f state may have nothing to do with i t at al l . This means that team members must go back to their 
countries, matrix in hand, and encourage the necessary political w i l l needed to tackle many o f the 
5 9 3 Transparency International (2000). 'Country Activities'. 77Newsletter, September. 
5 9 4 WBI (2000). 'Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition'. Internet. Accessed November 2000, p. 2. Available at 
http://www.worldbank.crgAvbi/govemance/pdf7guide_4)dfs/08b-ghana_example.pdf. 
5 9 5 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 2. 
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highlighted problems. Secondly, the Bank has designed the Course, and i t is obvious from the matrix 
results that countries do not deviate f rom a Bank-selected agenda. Areas highlighted include political 
w i l l , rule o f law, the judiciary, the public sector, mass education, corruption surveys, ethics training, 
procurement, civi l society, financial management, customs, taxation and the media. These areas all f i t 
into the Bank's strategy as illustrated in Figure 4.4. Using Bank matrices, Bank research, Bank 
training, Bank facilities, Bank diagnostics and Bank funding, it seems unlikely that countries would 
develop programmes that did not correspond exactly with the Bank's own programme. Achieving 
'true' country ownership may be a little more d i f f icul t than the Bank imagines. 5 9 7 
Taking Corruption More Explicitly into Account in CAS, Country Lending Considerations, the Policy 
Dialogue, Analytical Work, and the Choice and Design o f Projects 
The 'key thrust' o f the Bank's mainstreaming activities is the inclusion o f governance and 
corruption issues in the Country Assistance Strategy ( C A S ) . 5 9 8 The CAS '(a) describes the Bank 
Group's strategy based on an assessment o f priorities in the country, and (b) indicates the level and 
composition o f assistance to be provided based on the strategy and the country's portfolio 
performance'. 5 9 9 It is discussed with the recipient government but not negotiated. The Bank's Anti-
Corruption Action Plan for FY99 required that all CASs took governance and corruption explicitly into 
account, 6 0 0 while the FYOO Action Plan places continuing emphasis on this ongoing project . 6 0 1 A study 
o f thirty-seven CASs completed f rom January 1998 to June 1999 show that 78% mention governance 
and corruption while two-third attempt to mainstream the issue. 6 0 2 The Bank insists there is still plenty 
o f room for improvement. '[TJhe CAS should outline the country's agenda for improving governance 
5 9 6 Interview with Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, 2 February 2000, Washington DC. 
5 9 7 There is an ongoing study on the effectiveness o f WBI's anti-conuption work, being conducted by Carolien 
Klein Haarhuis, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Utrecht. However, this wil l not be completed for up to two 
years. She has published some preliminary findings with her supervisor, Professor Frans Leeuw. These are mixed 
at best The researchers find that the underlying 'policy theory* o f WBI's work is strong, especially in the role of 
civil society and social capital as tools to fight corruption (although the evaluators do believe that it is perhaps 
overly dependent upon empirical studies). However, they do find three main flaws that lead them to question the 
programme's potential to achieve its goals: 
a Participation in the Core Course or workshop does not mean that those involved will implement this 
when they return to their home countries. This returns us to earlier questions regarding political wi l l . 
« The evaluators question how the diagnostic tools, such as workshops and surveys, can be effectively 
disseminated to the public, in order to raise awareness of corruption, in developing countries with 
inadequate communication infrastructure. 
» Finally, there is no reason to believe that knowledge equals action, that the information gathered by 
the diagnostic tools wil l necessarily lead to action. 
See Klein Haarhuis, C. & Leeuw, F. (2000). 'Fighting Corruption: Evaluating Impact and the World Bank 
Institute's Program Theory'. Mimeo, University of Utrecht, p. 7; Klein Haarhuis, C. & Leeuw, F. (2000). 
'Measuring and Explaining Variance between Anti-Corruption Policies'. Paper presented at the EES Conference -
Working Group Realist Evaluations, Lausanne, 12-14 October 2000, p. 6. 
5 9 8 See http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticomrot/resultsmainstreaming.htrn. 
5 9 9 World Bank (2000). 'What is a Country Assistance Strategy?'. Internet. Accessed November 2000. Available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/pic/casAvhatis.htm. 
6 0 0 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 57. 
6 0 1 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 63. 
6 0 2 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 38. 
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and combating corruption and should include a monitorable programme to assess progress'. As part 
o f the Bank's new information disclosure po l i cy , 6 0 4 the Executive Directors approved a new policy in 
June 1998 requiring CASs become available to the public, as long as the government concerned gives 
permission. I t is unlikely that a government w i l l deny such permission as i t sends out a strong signal 
that it is trying to hide something. Thus far, no country has refused permission to publish its C A S . 6 0 5 
After the CAS is completed, evaluation is done by several different departments, including 
individual sectors that monitor their own work (e.g., health, education, public sector, etc.) and the 
Operations Evaluation Department (OED). The CAS is 'owned' by the Country Director, who 
evaluates overall performance and then includes further concerns in the next CAS, three years later. On 
the ground, the Bank likes to use domestic NGOs to help monitor work in progress and w i l l seek out 
'committed partners' locally to assist its evaluation process. 6 0 6 Helen Sutch is currently working on 
providing more guidance for the inclusion o f governance and anti-corruption issues in the future, to 
provide cohesion that w i l l make evaluation o f results easier. Currently, Country Teams produce a draft 
CAS that is given to PREM to make suggestions. The next time PREM sees it is in its final draft form. 
She wants to give them guidelines to fo l low before they even begin w r i t i n g . 6 0 7 
6 0 3 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 38. 
6 0 4 World Bank (2000). 'World Bank Policy on Information Disclosure (Discussion Draft)'. Internet. Accessed 
September 2000. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/hnril/pic/disclosure/draftpolicy-cn.pdf. 
6 0 5 Interview with M . Helen Sutch, 8 January 2001, Washington DC. 
6 0 6 Interview with M. Helen Sutch, 8 January 2001, Washington DC. 
6 0 7 Interview with M . Helen Sutch, 8 January 2001, Washington DC. 
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Box 4.2: Ghana ' s C A S 
Ghana's CAS was completed in June 2000 and is available to the public. Concerns over 
corruption and governance are candidly discussed, and the Bank provides several recommendations for 
dealing with it . According to the CAS, ' I t is encouraging to note the importance that the Government 
attaches to governance issues, especially anti-corruption and decentralisation. Yet the pace o f 
decentralisation has been slow, and the Government is perhaps over-cautious in the speed at which it 
wishes to move. This w i l l continue to be a primary dialogue issue, but also calls for a major effort in 
capacity building. It is weak capacity, especially in financial management, that is the Government's 
greatest fear in decentralisation'. 6 0 8 The report also questions the Government's commitment to 
'speedy and transparent' privatisation and points out that the public sector is still bloated and inefficient 
wi th previous reforms unsustained. 6 0 9 Finally, problems in procurement are highlighted. 'There is a 
need for simple and transparent systems, including in public procurement. Excessive bureaucracy 
creates opportunities for corruption and identified corrupt officials are often not sanctioned...there is 
mistrust between Government and civi l society. The flow o f information is inadequate and there are 
few established mechanisms to promote a partnership between Government and civi l society ' . 6 1 0 The 
report concludes that the Government lacks the necessary political w i l l at the top to disengage from the 
public sector where appropriate, leaving it overextended and unable to best provide the public services 
for which i t should be responsible. 6" However, the Bank points to the quality o f leadership within 
Parliament, believing that Parliament w i l l play its necessary role in encouraging the executive to stand 
by r e f o r m . 6 ' 2 Upcoming projects to help address these problems and support anti-corruption efforts 
include helping build procurement capacity, carrying out a survey on corruption (WBI) , identifying 
areas for improvement in financial management through a new CFAA, and, o f course, taking 'a strong 
stand i f corruption is identified in our projects ' . 6 1 3 
6 0 8 World Bank (2000). 'Memorandum of the President of the International Development Association and the 
International Finance Corporation to the Executive Directors on a Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank 
Group for the Republic of Ghana'. CAS No. 2018S-GH, 29 June, p. 3. It is of course also possible that the central 
government fears losing control of resources. 
6 0 9 World Bank (2000). 'Memorandum...', pp. 3,5. 
6 1 0 World Bank (2000). 'Memorandum...', pp. 14-15. 
6 1 1 Since Ghana's CAS was completed, there has been a change in leadership. 1 asked Sutch what impact such a 
change could have on the CAS. She replied, 
On the CAS, there is frequently a discussion of political economy, including risks should the 
government change. In fact one of the main points of having a CAS is to provide a strategy that 
takes account of risks and uncertainties. There are normally three scenarios: the base case or most 
likely, the high case and the low case. I f there was slippage on specified policy or implementation 
triggers under a new government, then the country program would go into low case. This means 
that lending and other activities would be cut back, typically to more social and welfare sustaining 
activities. In the limit, lending and the country program would be suspended altogether (as has 
been done in a small number of cases). I f performance is better than expected at the time the 
strategy is adopted, it is possible to gear up to a higher level of activity whose nature wil l already 
have been envisaged and laid out in the CAS. 
Sutch, M.H. (2001). Email to the author. 11 December. It will be interesting to note any changes in this regard in 
the next CAS following a significant change in leadership with the step -down of President Jerry Rawlings. 
6 1 2 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 12, Annex C, p. 2. 
6 1 3 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 15. 
136 
The regions have an active role to play beyond the CAS process, and all regional VPs have 
incorporated the Bank's four-pronged plan into their own regional plans. For example, the East Asia 
and Pacific (EAP) Region has established an Anticorruption Advisory Group, consisting o f two former 
heads o f government f rom East Asia and figures f rom T I , the private sector and academia. The Group 
advises the Bank on practical matters and provides a forum for debate with the Country Directors and 
other Bank staff in the region. 6 1 4 The most recent meeting in February 2000 in Bangkok focused 
primarily on the private sector's role in combating corruption. 6 1 5 In the South Asia Region (SAR), a 
January 2000 country report entitled 'India: Policies to Reduce Poverty and Accelerate Sustainable 
Development', includes an entire chapter on good governance, focusing on the rule o f law, public 
sector reform, financial management, decentralisation, accountability and anti-corruption w o r k . 6 1 6 The 
ECA Region focuses on similar issues, within the context o f transition, i n a sector brief entitled 
'Poverty Reduction and Economic Management in Europe and Central A s i a ' . 6 1 7 The M N A Region 
provides a sector brief specifically on public sector management. 6 1 8 The LAC Region has by far the 
most advanced work within the Bank on public sector reform, wi th anti-corruption work f i rmly under 
the auspices o f the Public Sector Group . 6 1 9 This Group has produced several influential documents, 
including Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter!'10 
The AFR Region's website provides a brief regional overview that mentions the anti-
corruption work being done by W B I in the region; 6 2 1 however, unlike the other regions, there is nothing 
else on the website to suggest that anti-corruption has been 'mainstreamed' by the Region or that it 
considers governance work a priority. This is particularly interesting when one considers that 
governance and anti-corruption work in the Bank originated in the AFR Region and that a lot o f 
attention has been paid to the region by W B I and P R E M Brian Levy, Sector Manager o f the Public 
Sector and Capacity Building Unit (AFR), believes that corruption is merely an outcome of systemic 
failures in institutions. Hence, you need to go beneath corruption to ' f i nd a new layer'. Focusing on 
corruption, according to Levy, is not useful because it ignores the deeper issues at work. In the AFR 
Region, therefore, the emphasis is on 'capacity building', wi th two major thrusts: (1) institutional work 
on accountability, to ensure that money is spent on what it should be, and (2) getting money closer to 
6 1 4 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 41. 
6 1 5 World Bank (2000). 'Key Points from the EAP Anti-corruption Advisory Group Meeting: Third Meeting with 
EAP Management Team'. Internet Accessed November 2000. Available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/eapsocial/library/anticorrupt.pdf. 
6 1 6 World Bank (2000). 'India: Policies to Reduce Poverty and Accelerate Sustainable Development'. Internet 
Accessed November 2000. Available at 
http://WBLN1018.worldbank.org/sar/sa.nsf/Attachrnents/GoodGovernance/$File/chapt4.pdf. 
6 1 7 Worid Bank (2000). 'Poverty Reduction and Economic Management in Europe and Central Asia'. Internet. 
Accessed November 2000. Available at 
http://wblnOO 18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/66d6f5004ed085ca852567d 10011 a8b8/ 
2adefl 1666l0169b852567f50()043237?CT)eiiDocument. 
6 1 8 World Bank (2000). 'Public Sector Development'. Internet. Accessed November 2000. Available at 
http://wbln0018. woridbartk.org/iMa/mena.iisf/All/15E5A7D635C9 AB368525695200586920?OpenDocument. 
6 1 9 For further information on the LAC Region's work on good governance and corruption, see 
http://wbm0018.woridbarik.org/exterrial/lac/lac.nsf/45bla64^ 
567ee00568da9?OpenDocument. 
6 2 0 Burki, S. & Perry, G. (1998). Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter. Washington DC: Worid 
Bank. 
6 2 1 See http://www.worldDank.org/afr/overview.htm. 
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citizens, through increased participation and community empowerment. This fits perfectly with the 
CDF approach but does deviate from the way the other regions present their anti-corruption work. 
In order to retain interest within the Bank itself and to help build internal capacity and support 
for the mainstreaming process, the Development Research Group (DRG) and PREM each conduct 
research on corruption and distribute this throughout the Bank, as well as to the public. Appendix 16 
contains a fu l l list o f DRG and PREM publications as o f June 2000. Research at W B I tends to focus on 
areas such as learning how to measure governance and transparency 6 2 3 and is available for download as 
working papers, articles and case studies, or for purchase as books. W B I also provides links to several 
bibliographies on corruption, including those o f PREM, USA1D, Chr. Michelsen Institute, the 
Nathanson Centre for the Study o f Organised Crime and (Srruption, and so on. The fol lowing 
databanks are also available: Governance Research Indicators Dataset, Country Snapshots, Enterprise 
Surveys, Unofficial Economy Dataset, In-Country Diagnostic Surveys, Transition Economies, Data 
Graphs and Maps and Other Data Links. This data is provided for empirical research and learning 
activities. 
Case studies are used primarily as training material, but so far only three are available. 6 2 4 
Likewise, W B I has published only a few books, preferring to collaborate with other organisations both 
inside and outside the Bank . 6 2 5 Hence, the bulk o f WBTs research is in the form of working papers and 
articles, available for download wi th several translated into Spanish and Russian. This research is 
f i j n 
broken into the fol lowing categories: state capture, governance, corruption, the unofficial 
economy 6 2 9 transparency 6 3 0 and transition economies. 6 3 1 
6 2 2 Interview with Brian Levy, 9 January 2001, Washington DC. See also, World Bank (2000). 'Community 
Driven Development: A Vision of Poverty Reduction through Empowerment'. Mimeo - draft version only. 
6 2 3 See, for example, Isham, J., Kaufmann, D. & Pritchett, L. (1996). 'Governance and the Returns to Investment: 
An Empirical Investigation'. World Bank Working Paper No. 186; Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Zoido-Lobaton, P. 
(1999) . 'Aggregating Governance Indicators'. Washington DC: World Bank Institute. 
6 2 4 Gonzalez de Asis, M. (2000). 'Reducing Corruption: Lessons from Venezuela'. Washington DC: World Bank 
Institute; Larsen, A. & Ytzen, F. (1997). 'Investigative Journalism: Freedonia'. Washington DC: Economic 
Development Institute; Stapenhurst, F. (1997). 'Public Expenditure Management Kariba'. Washington DC: 
Economic Development Institute. 
6 2 5 For example, Kaufmann, D., Schloss, M. et al. (1998). New Perspectives on Curbing Corruption (a Joint 
TJ/WBl publication). Washington DC: World Bank Institute; KJitgaard, R., Maclean-Abaroa, R. & Parris, H.L. 
(2000) . Corrupt Cities: A Practical Guide to Cure and Prevention. Oakland, CA: ICS Press (with WBI); 
Stapenhurst, F. & Kpundeh, S. (eds) (1999). Curbing Corruption: Toward a Model for Building National Integrity. 
Washington DC: World Bank; Thomas, V. et al. (2000). The Quality of Growth. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
World Bank (2000). Anti-Corruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate. Washington DC: World 
Bank. 
6 2 6 For example, Hellman, J., Jones, G. & Kaufmann, D. (2000). 'Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, 
Corruption, and Influence in Transition Economies'. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2444, 
September; Hellman, J. et al. (2000). 'Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and 
Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies'. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 2312, April. 
6 2 7 For example, Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A & Zoido-Lobaton, P. (1999). 'Aggregating Governance Indicators'. 
Washington DC: World Bank Institute; Ng, F. & Yeats, A. (1999). 'Good Governance and Trade Policy: Are They 
the Keys to Africa's Global Integration and Growth?'. World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 2038, January; 
World Bank (1999). 'Can Corruption Be Measured? Bank Offers Diagnostic Tools to Measure and Combat 
Corruption in Member Countries'. Bank's World, June. 
6 2 8 For example, Gray, C. & Kaufmann, D. (1998). 'Corruption and Development'. Finance and Development. 
March; Kaufmann, D., Pradhan, S. & Ryterman, R. (1998). 'New Frontiers in Diagnosing and Combating 
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Adding Voice and Support to International Efforts to Reduce Corruption 
'Grand corruption' often has several international dimensions that donor agencies and 
borrowers need to take into account when designing anti-corruption strategies. Procurement often 
involves several businesses, both local and foreign. Money-laundering turns seemingly domestic forms 
o f corruption into international ones (e.g., money skimmed o f f a local construction contract sent to a 
numbered bank account in Switzerland). Because o f this international dimension, the Bank must be 
involved in anticorruption work at the international level for its own programmes to work at the 
country l eve l . 6 3 4 As it points out, 
International efforts play an important role in combating these dimensions o f corruption. 
Numerous international organisations and alliances are collaborating to promote global 
co-operation in criminalising international bribery, both in capital-exporting as well as in 
developing countries; to promote international co-operation in detecting and prosecuting 
transnational offences such as international money laundering; and to gather lessons o f 
experience from across countries, providing knowledge and training to governments that 
have less experience in combating corruption. 6 3 5 
A l l international organisations are limited in some way by their mandate and level o f resources, 
creating a need to focus on comparative advantage. 6 3 6 Even an organisation as large and well-funded as 
the Bank cannot combat all aspects o f international corruption single-handedly, even without the 
limitations put upon it by its Articles o f Agreement. Therefore, the Bank has developed partnerships 
with certain international organisations and initiatives to create a better environment for its own anti-
corruption programmes. The Bank describes its approach for supporting international efforts as, 
helping co-ordinate both cross-border and in-country anti-corruption efforts, 
forming strategic collaboration arrangements wi th other organisations, and 
Corruption'. PREM Note No. 7, October; Kindra, G.S. (1998). 'Social Marketing to Fight Corruption'. WBI 
Working Paper; Stapenhurst, F. (2000). 'The Media's Role in Curbing Corruption'. WBI Working Paper. 
6 2 9 For example, Friedman, E. et al. (2000). 'Dodging the Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity 
in 69 Countries'. Journal ofPublic Economics. 76(3), pp. 459-493; Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D. & Zoido-Lobaton, 
P. (1998). 'Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy'. American Economic Review. 88(2), pp. 387-392. 
6 3 0 For example, Florini, A. (1999). 'Does the Invisible Hand Need a Transparency Glove? The Politics of 
Transparency'. Paper read at the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Paris, 28-30 April; 
Vishwanath, T. & Kaufmann, D. (1999). 'Toward Transparency in Finance and Governance'. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, September. 
6 3 1 For example, Kaufmann, D. (1997). 'Why is Ukraine's Economy - and Russia's - Not Growing?'. Transition. 
April, pp. 5-8. 
6 3 2 Unless otherwise noted, this section draws on PREM's website. This is available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anricorrupt/supporting.hrm. 
W 3 A phrase attributed to Moody -Stuart, G. (1997). Grand Corruption: How Business Bribes Damage Developing 
Countries (J* ed.). Oxford: Worldview Publishing. 
6 3 4 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 43. 
6 3 5 See http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/supporting.htm. 
6 3 6 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 43. 
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• deepening its knowledge about corruption and disseminating i t internationally. 
The Bank's partners fall into the following categories: other multilateral development banks 
( M D B s ) , 6 3 8 international organisations, donor agencies, NGOs and the business community. I t is able 
to share 'lessons learned* among all the groups it works wi th and is also able to conduct co-ordinated 
activities with one or more partners. This section w i l l not touch upon the work done by other donor 
agencies, as this w i l l form the basis o f the next chapter. 
The MDBs, including the Bank, have formed a working group on governance, corruption and 
capacity building that looks at borrower performance criteria, improving the governance environment 
(e.g., new lending products, governance assessments, public expenditure management reform), 
improving project management, and examining specific anticorruption activities and procedures. 6 3 9 In 
addition, the A f D B and A D B have developed their own policies on corruption that closely mirror that 
o f the Bank . 6 4 0 The MDBs focus on accountability, transparency, combating corruption, participation, 
public sector reform, privatisation and legal and judicial reforms. However, the EBRD as an 
organisation is quite unlike any o f the other MDBs. The EBRD was founded on the principle o f 
supporting democracy within its member countries. Unlike the other MDBs, including the Wor ld Bank, 
i t has a legal mandate to address political issues in its work, specifically l imit ing its activities to 
countries that are liberal democracies or are moving in that direction. 6 4 1 However, it does not have a 
specific anti-corruption policy and does not at this time conduct any anti-corruption w o n t 6 4 2 
The Bank has been an observer o f the OECD Working Group on Bribery since 1998, which 
has sought to 'outlaw the bribery o f foreign public officials and end the tax deductibility o f foreign 
bribes ' . 6 4 3 This group produced the 'Convention on Combating Bribery o f Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions' i n November 1997, 6 4 4 which went into effect on 15 February 
1999. The Convention was originally signed by all twenty-nine member countries and f ive non-
6 3 7 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 44. 
6 3 8 These include the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). 
6 3 9 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 44. 
6 4 0 1 was told that this is 'not by coincidence' but a direct result of the G7 statement on corruption in 1996 that 
urged the regional banks to formulate policy based on the principles established by the World Bank. Stevens, A.M. 
(2001). Email to the author. 13 December. See, for example, AfDB (1999). 'African Development Bank Group 
Policy on Good Governance'. Internet. Accessed November 2000. Available at 
httpy/www.afdb.org/about/ocod/govemance.pdf; AfDB (1999). 'African Development Bank Policy on Good 
Governance Adopted by Board of Directors'. Internet. News Release COMU/B/32/99, Abidjan, 22 September; 
ADB (2000). 'Anticorruption Policy'. Internet. Accessed November 2000. Available at 
http://www.adb.org/DotMments/Policies/Anti IADB has no concrete policy on 
corruption, but there is still work being done. See, for example, Inter-American Development Bank (2000). 
'Conferencia sobre Transparencia y Desarrollo en America Latina y el Caribe'. Internet. Accessed November 
2000. Available at http://www.iadb.org/leg/Transparencia.asp. There is also lADB's website on the reform of the 
state, which does not actually mention corruption, available at http://www.iadb.org/exr/topics/modstate.htm. 
6 4 1 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 45. 
6 4 2 EBRD chooses to focus primarily on ensuring its own procurement procedures are transparent and maximise its 
own projects' efficiency. See http://www.ebrd.org/englisli/procure/main.htm. 
6 4 3 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, p. 46. 
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member countries, while twenty-six o f these countries have 'commitfted] themselves to ensuring that 
their national parliaments approve the Convention and pass legislation necessary for its ratification and 
implementation into national l a w ' . 6 4 6 Implementation is monitored by OECD with its findings publicly 
available. 6 4 7 The Bank has also been an observer at meetings o f the Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering (FATF) since 1997. FATF is 'an inter-governmental body which develops and 
promotes policies, both nationally and internationally, to combat money laundering. As a "policy 
making body" therefore, its primary goal is to generate the political w i l l necessary for bringing about 
national legislature and regulatory reforms in the area ' . 6 4 8 Although physically based in the OECD, it is 
an independent body. Its membership is similar to that o f the OECD Convention, 6 4 9 and has several 
groups that attend its meetings as observers, including other similar regional-based bodies and 
international organisations. 6 5 0 The Bank worked closely with the Organisation o f American States 
(OAS) on the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. 6 5 1 The Bank is also a member o f the 
International Chamber o f Commerce Standing Committee on Extortion and Br ibery , 6 5 2 the DAC 
Experts Group on Monitoring Performance in Good Governance, 6 5 3 the Council o f Europe's 
Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption, 6 5 4 the U N Office o f Drug Con t ro l , 6 5 5 and the Interpol 
International Groups o f Experts on Corruption 6 5 6 
The Bank has recently included a new anti-corruption N G O in its list o f partners, although it is 
not yet clear what the nature o f this connection wi l l be. The Partnership Fund for Transparency was 
6 4 4 OECD (1997). 'Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials h International Business 
Transactions'. Internet. Accessed December 1998. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf7cmis/bribery/20nov 1 e.htm. 
6 4 5 Members include the US, Germany, Japan, France, the UK, Italy, Canada, Korea, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Mexico, Australia, Denmark, Austria, Norway, Ireland, Finland, 
Poland, Portugal, Turkey, Hungary, New Zealand, Czech Republic, Greece and Iceland, while the non-member 
signatories include Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile and the Slovak Republic. 
6 4 6 OECD (2000). 'Welcome to the OECD Anti-Corruption Unit'. Internet. Accessed October 2000. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf7nocorTuptiori/uidex.htm. The signatories who have not yet committed themselves include 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal, New Zealand, Argentina and Chile. 
6 4 7 TI also independently monitors implementation of the Convention, and has produces country reports on several 
countries. These can be found at http://www.transparency.de/activities/oecd.htmI. 
6 4 8 FATF (2000). 'Welcome to the new FATF website'. Internet. Accessed October 2000. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/fan7index.htm. 
6 4 9 Korea, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are not members of FATF, while Argentina, the European 
Commission, the Gulf Co-operation Council and Hong Kong/China are. 
6 5 0 These include the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force 
(CFATF), the Council of Europe PC-R-EV Committee, Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering 
Group (ESAAMLG), Intergovernmental Task Force against Money Laundering in Africa (ITFMLA), AsDB, the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, EBRD, 1ADB, IMF, Interpol, International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), Organisation of American States/Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD), 
Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS), UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 
(UNODCCP), Worid Customs Organisation (WCO) and the World Bank. 
6 5 1 See http://www.OAS.org/. 
6 5 2 See httpy/www.iccwbo.org/home/menu_extortion_bribery.asp. 
6 5 3 See htip.7/www.oecd.org/dac/htrn/abourdac.htm. 
6 5 4 http://www.coe.fr/corruption/epresent.htm. 
6 5 5 See http://www.Mdcp.org/index.html. 
6 5 6 See Interpol (1999). 'Supporting the initiatives of the Interpol Group of Experts on Corruption'. General 
Assembly 68"" Session Resolution No. AGN68RES4, Seoul, 8-12 November. Available at 
http://ww.inteipol.int/ftiblicflCPO/Gen Interpol (2000). 
'Support further initiatives of the Interpol Group of Experts on Corruption'. General Assembly 69"1 Session 
Resolution No. AGN/69/RES/5, Rhodes, 30 October-4 November. Available at 
http://www.interpoI.int/Public/ICPO/GeneralAssembIy/ 
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launched at the 9"1 IACC in Durban by UNDP, and is a joint initiative between UNDP, who put up the 
$100,000 seed money for the project with a further $1 mil l ion f rom the U N Foundation, and TT. 6 5 7 The 
Fund is located in Washington DC and is run by Pierre Landell-Mills, who was responsible for 
introducing anti-corruption work into EDI in the early 1990s. According to a UNDP press release, 'The 
two main objectives o f the Fund are to assist c iv i l society organisations with expertise related to 
combating corruption; and to provide training to build their capacity, management and advocacy 
s k i l l s ' . 6 5 8 Projects approved thus far include the funding o f a panel o f independent experts to monitor a 
public auction in Bulgaria and funding the establishment o f an interactive website on procurement in 
The Global Coalition for Afr ica (GCA) is an intergovernmental forum o f African 
policymakers and international partners working to build consensus on development issues.6 6 0 GCA's 
work on corruption has been closely linked to the World Bank since GCA's inception, partly because 
Robert McNamara is its Co-Chairperson Emeritus and has served on its Board. Although the GCA has 
been concerned with governance issues since its inception in 1991, its 1997 Policy Forum meeting in 
Maputo, Mozambique was the first such meeting to be primarily concerned wi th corruption. 6 6 1 Prior to 
this meeting, McNamara and Jeremy Pope o f T I travelled to Afr ica to meet wi th the Presidents or 
Prime Ministers o f Malawi, Benin, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia and Mal i , who had requested GCA's 
assistance with anti-corruption work. Before leaving, McNamara discussed the matter with 
Wolfensohn, who offered his f u l l support to the in i t i a t ive . 6 6 2 These countries, along with Ghana, 
became the first countries to request support f rom the Bank for their anti-corruption programmes. 
However, it is debatable the degree to which the first countries 'volunteered'. According to a 
number o f news reports, 6 6 3 it would appear that McNamara convinced the leaders in these countries to 
send letters to Wolfensohn requesting anti-corruption assistance. According to GCA, McNamara 
'visited a number o f Afr ican countries to encourage them to strengthen their anti-corruption efforts* 
and 'suggested that they seek the assistance o f the World Bank to help them address corrupt ion ' . 6 6 4 
However, speaking in press conferences in Tanzania, he warned that the World Bank 'may not release 
AGN69/Resolutions/AGN69RES5 .asp. 
6 5 7 Interview with Pauline Tamesis, 8 February 2000, New York. 
6 5 8 UNDP (1999). 'UNDP Announces Launch of Partnership Fund for Transparency at Ninth International Anti-
Corruption Conference'. Press Release. 13 October. 
6 5 9 UNDP (2001). PACTBi-Annual Report to BMZ (August 2000-January 2001). New York: UNDP-PACT, p. 18. 
6 6 0 See http:/Avww.gca-cma.org/eabout.htm. 
6 6 1 See Global Coalition for Africa (1997). 'Corruption and Development in Africa'. Paper read at the 1997 Policy 
Forum, Maputo, Mozambique, 1-2 November. 
6 6 2 United States Information Agency (1997). 'Global Coalition on Africa to Help Fight Corruption'. Africa News 
Online. 17 November, p. 2, available at http://www.africanews.org/usafrica/stories/19971117_feat3.html. 
6 6 3 'Mkapa can't fight corruption singlehandedly'. Observer (Tanzania). 5 October 1997; 'Mkapa, MacNamara 
[sic] agree about corruption'. The Guardian (Tanzania). 3 October 1997, pp. 1 & 2; 'Ex-WB chief urges 
transparency'. Daily News. 4 October 1997; Djiwan, H. (1997). 'Kerekou est pret a lutter contre la corruption'. Le 
Citoyen. 3 September, p. 3; Djiwan, H. (1997). 'La guerre contre la corruption'. Le Citoyen. 2 September, p. 3; De 
Sousa, S. (1997). 'Conference-lebat de la Coalition mondiale pour l'Afrique (CMA) et Transparency International 
(TI): Pour consolider la moralisation de la vie publique'. Echos Nation. 2 September. 
6 6 4 Marshall, A. (2001). Email to the author, 13 April. 
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funds* i f corruption was not tackled. Because o f the importance the Bank places on its anti-
corruption work being 'demand-driven', it is vital that countries are not seen to have been coerced to 
sign up to the programme. 
The Bank's leading partner in c ivi l society continues to be T I , the world's only NGO devoted 
solely to combating corruption and one which grew out o f the Bank. The relationship between the two 
organisations has always been close, as we have seen wi th examples throughout this chapter. 
According to Gaining and Pope, 
T I was...interested in convincing the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund...to adopt a more assertive posture against corruption. Brown-bag lunches at the 
World Bank in Washington D.C., f rom 1993 onward consistently drew crowds that often 
extended down the corridors outside. In the field, a partnership was being created 
between T I and the World Bank's Economic Development Institute...in the form o f 
Petter Langseth.. .Within EDI , Langseth was able to demonstrate to sceptics i n the Bank 
that it was possible to become engaged in anticorruption work without courting 
controversy provided the work was implemented with a partner NGO. . .Several TT 
national chapters now work actively wi th the World Bank in the Bank's member 
countries, and there is a relatively free flow o f information between the international 
financial institutions and T I . 6 6 7 
When Wolfensohn committed the Bank to fighting corruption in 1996, T I quickly offered its 
support for increased partnership. T I is mentioned repeatedly in Bank documents and in interviews 
with Staff as an example o f the Bank's work with c iv i l society on combating corruption, and is often 
the only example provided. T I works mostly with W B I in the design and delivery o f workshops, and 
jo in t research and publications, while National Chapters work closely with Bank country staff. For 
example, TI-Latvia indicates that the World Bank is one o f its primary partners, along with the Latvian 
Ministry o f Justice, the OECD and the Council o f Europe, among others. 6 6 8 Tl-South Africa worked 
with the World Bank to support the 9* IACC in Durban. TT-Bangladesh and W B I , i n partnership with 
the Parliamentary Centre o f Canada, organised a seminar between parliamentarians and civi l society 
groups throughout South Asia, resulting in a draft code o f conduct for M P s . 6 6 9 
6 6 5 Mwambando, L. (1997). 'Reform tendering in IRP I I - MacNamara [sic]'. Observer (Tanzania). October. See 
also, Mwakisyala, J. (1997). 'Donors May Freeze Aid to Tanzania Over Corruption'. The East African. 6-12 
October, pp. 1 & 2; 'World Bank to set new conditions on aid to Tanzania - MacNamara [sic]'. Observer 
(Tanzania). October 1997, pp. 1 & 3. 
6 6 6 In a study of the World Bank undertaken immediately after McNamara's retirement, Ayres concluded: 'Instead 
of countries coming to the Bank with identifiable projects perceived as possible solutions to existing problems, the 
Bank went to countries with solutions and requested the identification of problems for potential funding'. I would 
suggest that McNamara's GCA trip can be construed as a continuation of this policy. Ayres, R. (1983). Banking on 
the Poor: The World Bank and World Poverty. London: The MIT Press, p. 215. 
6 6 7 Gaining, F. & Pope, J. (19990. 'The Global Coalition Against Corruption: Evaluating Transparency 
International'. In Schedler, A., Diamond, L. & Plattner, M. (eds). The Self-Restraining State: Power and 
Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., pp. 266-267. 
6 6 8 See http://www.delna.lv/english/index.htm. 
6 6 9 Transparency International (1999). ' T I Country Activities'. TT Newsletter, June, p. 14. 
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Conclusion: 'Overstretched and underloved?' 
The Bank's anti-corruption strategy is so ambitious and complex that it is impossible to 
describe in one or two words. I t is both highly technical and highly theoretical. It is involved at both the 
macro- and the micro-levels. It attempts to engage high-level government support while potentially 
undermining these same governments with its work at the grassroots level. It works extensively with 
international partners but is incredibly insular in its research base. It involves management, the regions 
and sectors, basically the entire Bank structure, but has no central authority to ensure there is co-
ordination or continuity. It decries politics while conducting work that is overtly political. The 
complexity o f the Bank's programme, combined with its lack o f true direction, raises questions o f its 
sustainability over the long-term which the Bank itself admits is needed to judge its success or failure. 
It is possible that the newly established Department for Institutional Integrity is a positive step 
towards ending the organisational and policy incoherence o f the Bank's anti-corruption work. I t is clear 
that the programme requires a vice-president to ensure continuity and an df lc ia l policy to provide 
parameters. But it needs those parameters to be much tighter in scope than they are currently. 
Finch suggests that the Bank wi l l become overstretched as it moves 'out o f areas in which 
supervision is easiest into social policy areas with oversight needs that have overstrained their 
personnel ' . 6 7 0 Recently reported dissent within Bank ranks brings many o f these issues to the front o f 
the discourse on the ongoing role o f the Bank. A leaked memo f rom the M N A Region, describes 
Wolfensohn as 'isolated from reality' and intolerant o f dissent, and also blames low morale within the 
Bank on inadequate resources.6 7 1 The memo is quoted as saying, 'The Bank today has no focus and is 
driven by an ever growing list o f mandates imposed on it through a variety o f means...President's 
favourite subjects [including the CDF with its good governance components]...Board sentiments as 
discerned f rom time to time, public pressures, ideas generated by internal constituencies, and even fads. 
These are all cumulative with nothing ever taken o f f . 6 7 2 The Observer reports that, 'The cause o f 
dissent within the bank seems to be that it is overstretching itself, delving deep into areas o f what is 
known as social development' . 6 7 3 
As far back, in relative terms, as 1997, Caufield wrote: 
Finch, CD. (1996). 'G7 Corruption Project'. The International Economy. 10(6), p. 26. 
6 7 1 Elliott, L. (2001). 'Leak reveals crisis at the World Bank'. The Guardian. (London), 31 January; World Bank 
(2001). 'Soul-searching uncovers hidden malaise at World Bank'. Development News. 31 January; Hoyos, C. 
(2001). 'James Wolfensohn's self-created storm'. Financial Times. 30 January. 
7 2 Cited in Wilks, A. (2001). 'Overstretched and underloved: World Bank faces strategy decisions'. Bretton 
Woods Project Briefing Paper, February, p. 3. 
6 7 3 The Observer (2001). 'Internal conflict leaves World Bank policy in disarray'. The Observer. (London), 4 
February, Business Sec, p. 3. 
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In recent years, the Bank has adopted - i f only superficially - virtually every suggestion 
its supporters and critics have offered, with one exception. The exception is Ryr i e ' s 6 7 4 
advice that the Bank practice "self-restraint". I t is now committed - at least on paper - to 
helping the private sector, women, and the poor; to working with non-govemmental 
organisations and the people directly affected by its projects; to increasing its lending for 
education, health, nutrition, and micro-enterprises; to protecting or improving the 
environment; to reducing military expenditures and corruption; to promoting openness in 
government, the rule o f law, and equitable income distribution and to doing it all 
"sustainably" 6 7 5 
OED's evaluation framework refers to the need for 'prioritisation' with anti-corruption work, but never 
questions the overall strategy which has the Bank with many fingers in many pies. 6 7 6 According to TT, 
in order to improve its anti-corruption work, the Bank must '[ajecept that other organisations, including 
c iv i l society, have comparative advantages in advocacy work and in rebuilding corrupted institutions; 
actively share the anti-corruption work with these other organisations in line with their particular 
experience and expertise' . 6 7 7 One might argue that TL, as the only NGO working exclusively on 
corruption, has a great deal to benefit from the Bank spinning o f f its anti-corruption work; however, 
there is something to be said for the Bank shedding some o f its workload in this field to ease pressure 
being placed on resources, staff and borrowers. 
Johannes Linn, the Bank's VP for the ECA Region, recently posed four questions regarding 
the risk o f overload: 
• First, by trying to address the roots o f poor governance, the Bank may overload the reform 
agenda and overstretch both its own limited capacities and those o f its counterparts. 
• Second, even the most committed reformers might shy away f rom undertaking a huge mass 
o f comprehensive and simultaneous reforms, including fiscal relations, c iv i l service, 
pensions, education and health, banking sector, regulatory institutions and so on. 
• Third, overloading the reform agenda can undermine the credibility o f genuinely reform-
minded governments. Can they be blamed for the slow progress o f institutional development 
that took decades to achieve in other countries? 
• Fourth, can the Bank really transfer the highest standards o f knowledge in so many areas, 
simultaneously in many countries? 6 7 8 
Caufield refers here to Sir William Ryrie, the former head of the IFC. According to Caufield, 'Ryrie...argued 
that the Bank was institutionally incapable of..."using its influence to bring about a reduction in state activity'". 
Caufield, C. (1997). Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and (he Poverty of Nations. New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, p. 279. 
6 7 5 Caufield, C. (1997). Masters of Illusion, p. 306. Cited also in Wilks, A. (2001). 'Overstretched and 
underloved', p. 1. 
6 7 6 Huther, J. & Shah, A. (2000). 'Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs', p. 2. 
6 7 7 Transparency International (2000). 'World Bank needs to strengthen its anti-corruption work'. 
6 7 8 Linn, J. (2001). 'The World Bank's New Approach to Good Governance: Promises and Risks'. Transition 
Newsletter. 12(2), p. 3. 
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He recommends greater selectivity, more flexibil i ty in defining conditionality and dividing work 
among bilateral partners based on comparative advantage. The fol lowing chapter w i l l look at the anti-
corruption work already being done by other major donors and explore the many opportunities for 
divestiture that the Bank has. 
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Chapter Five: The Significance of Comparative Advantage in Donor 
Work on Corruption 
In addition to work being done in partnership with the World Bank, several donors are 
involved in anti-corruption work o f their own. Given the scope and aim o f this thesis, it is neither 
possible, nor necessary, to study other donors in the same depth as I nave done for the World Bank. 
Bilateral donors have a negligible number o f publications and resources available on their anti-
corruption efforts. In this study, I have used semi -structured interviews, either face-to-face or by email, 
to f i l l i n blank spaces left by gaps in the literature and to determine the structure, location and nature o f 
the agencies' work, as well as the perceived area o f comparative advantage. This qualitative approach 
to interviewing has allowed me to set the direction o f the interviews, while allowing for improvisation 
depending upon interviewee response. 6 7 9 Appendix 17 shows an example o f the letter/email sent to all 
donors studied, wi th the exception o f U S A I D and UNDP, who were asked these questions in early 
face-to-face interviews. Appendix 18 shows an example o f the questions brought to these semi-
structured interviews. 
This chapter w i l l , in the first section, provide an overview o f major donors' programmes, 
highlighting the area identified by that organisation as its area o f 'comparative advantage'. The second 
section offers an evaluation o f these claims and how they impinge on the future work o f the World 
Bank. Finally, taking into account this evaluation, the third section offers evaluation o f the Bank's 
claims o f comparative advantage and offers suggestions for the future direction o f its anti-corruption 
programme. 
Comparative Advantage 
Comparative advantage is a term that finds its origins in economic theory. Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo 6 8 1 both wrote about the significance o f comparative advantage for international trade. 
The principle is a simple one: ' I f our country can produce some set o f goods at bwer cost than a 
foreign country, and i f the foreign country can produce some other set o f goods at a lower cost than we 
can produce them, then clearly it would be best for us to trade our relatively cheaper goods for their 
relatively cheaper goods. In the way both countries may gam from t rade ' . 6 8 2 Using Ricardo's own 
example, i f England has a comparative advantage in producing cloth and Portugal has a comparative 
advantage in producing wine, then each should emphasise production based on this advantage and trade 
with the other for the good in which i t has no advantage. 6 8 3 
See Arksey, H. & Knight, P. (1999). Interviewing for Social Scientists. London: Sage Publications Ltd. 
6 8 0 Smith, A. (1933). Inquiryinto the Natureand Causes of the Wealth ofNations. Orig. 1776. London: Dent. 
6 8 1 Ricardo, D. (1922). Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Orig. 1817. London: G. Bells & Sons. 
m Suranovic, S. (1999). 'The Theory of Comparative Advantage: An Overview'. Internet. Accessed 19 July 2001. 
Available at httpy/intemationalecon.com/vl.0/ch40/40c000.htral. 
6 8 3 Ricardo, D. (1922). Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, pp. 108-130. 
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The notion continues to reign supreme in orthodox economic circles and is also used in the 
discourse o f many areas - the role o f the private and public sectors, universities, NGOs and so on. It is 
o f virtually limitless application. 6 8 4 I t is thus natural that the term has found its way comfortably into 
the discourse o f aid. Donors have to just i fy their existence to sceptical publics by proving that their aid 
budget is being spent effectively. One way to do this would be for donors to co-ordinate resources 
based on geographical and/or sectoral lines (e.g., USAID agrees to fund Uganda while D f I D funds 
Ghana, or USAID funds healthcare while D f I D funds primary education). However, this is not feasible, 
in part since recipients o f aid do not want to rely on one donor, because o f the power that could yield to 
the donor in terms o f conditionality and leverage. 6 8 5 Also, decisions to fund certain countries or certain 
sectors may not make economic sense for the donor. The decision could be based on strategic interests, 
prestige o f the donor, current fashion, domestic concerns, and so on. Because o f this desire to be 
involved in many areas, donors claim either multiple or very broad areas o f comparative advantage, 
both as an agency and within individual sectors or countries. 
Despite the attention given to the notion o f comparative advantage by donors, diere has been 
little research done on it . There are many studies on aid effectiveness and the need for donor co-
ordination, but only one study, published in 1996 by Michael Dewald and Ro l f Weder, is devoted to 
the concept o f comparative advantage. Their paper concludes that comparative advantage would help 
bilateral aid become more efficient. With scarce resources available for aid and the constant threat in 
donor countries o f further public spending cuts, the authors argue that 'any proposal that either helps to 
increase the impact o f existing foreign aid flows, or to reduce spending while not affecting the intended 
results for the recipients o f aid, should be welcomed ' . 6 8 6 
6 8 4 A simple and unscientific internet search using the keywords 'comparative advantage' came up with 382,000 
hits. 
6 8 5 Mosley, P. (1987). Overseas Aid: Its Defence and Reform. London: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., pp. 103-105. 
6 8 6 Dewald, M. & Weder, R. (1996). 'Comparative Advantage and Bilateral Foreign Aid Policy'. World 
Development. 24(3), p. 549. 
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Table 5.1: Patterns of Specialisation Among Individual D A C Countries, 1991-1992 (in percent of 
total commitments) ' 













Food aid Program 
assistance 
Other*" 
Australia 41 9 8 5 4 18 15 
France 33 14 8 5 1 15 25 
Germany 24 18 6 7 2 4 40 
Japan 15 35 11 11 0 16 13 
Sweden 26 10 11 7 0 12 33 
Switzer- 18 9 13 3 5 6 46 
land 
UK 24 30 9 7 2 7 22 
USA 15 4 3 3 7 16 53 
Total 21 19 8 7 3 11 31 
DAC 6 1 
Source: Dewald, M. & Weder, R. (1996). 'Comparative Advantage and Bilateral Foreign Aid Policy', p. 551. 
Using the data found in Table 5.1, the authors highlight Switzerland and the relatively higher 
percentage it spends on agricultural support compared to other donors. Switzerland itself has a highly 
protected agricultural sector, which hardly prepares it to offer advice to developing countries on 
establishing an internationally competitive agricultural sector. This leads the authors to doubt the 
efficacy o f Swiss spending on agricultural projects. Instead, they find that the Swiss are renowned for 
their banking industry. 6 8 9 Because a country's financial sector is vital to the health o f its economy and 
necessary for economic development, 6 9 0 the authors argue that its real comparative advantage lies in 
assisting recipients' financial sectors, and leaving agricultural projects to other donors. 6 9 1 
Donors often develop what has been called ' flavour-o f-t he - month' syndrome 6 9 2 or 'aid 
fashion: a type o f "herd behaviour".. .as the swings o f intellectual analysis bring one or another type o f 
investment to the fore as desirable'. 6 9 3 For a number o f reasons — the needs o f the home market, media 
pressure, academic findings, political events, and so on - donors often want to fund the same things, 
both at the country and the sectoral level, at the same time. Recent examples include small-scale credit, 
support for NGOs, and o f course, democratisation efforts and anti-corruption work. This can lead to the 
problem of 'over-funding', which can 'encourage corruption in part by providing more aid than 
6 8 7 Consists of multisector ODA, debt relief, emergency assistance, support to private voluntary agencies and 
administrative costs of donors. 
6 8 8 Included are all DAC members. 
6 8 9 Dewald and Weder highlight the Swiss banking system in the context of its overall aid programme and without 
anti-corruption work in mind. Clearly, this would not be where the Swiss have a comparative advantage in anti-
corruption work because of the lack of transparency in its banking system. 
6 9 0 See World Bank (1989). World Development Report 1989: Financial Systems and Development. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
6 9 1 Dewald, M. & Weder, R. (1996). 'Comparative Advantage and Bilateral Foreign Aid Policy', pp. 553-555. 
6 9 2 Cooksey, B. (1999). 'Do Aid Agencies Have a Comparative Advantage in Fighting Corruption in Africa?'. 
Paper given at the 9s" International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC), Durban, South Africa, 10-15 October, p. 
8. Former Bank President Lewis Preston admitted to this in the late 1980s. Cited in Williams, D. & Young, T. 
(1994). 'Governance, the World Bank and Liberal Theory'. Political Studies. 42(1), p. 88. 
6 9 3 Cassen, R. (1994). Does Aid Work? (2 n d ed). Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 177. 
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governments can effectively absorb', while also encouraging recipients to play donors o f f against 
each other to receive the maximum financing and evade or minimise conditionalities. 
Dewald and Weder note that their research found that 'there were at least six and at most 12 
donor countries engaged in each recipient country, in 1992. Wi th respect to an individual sector, there 
were between two and six donor countries active in each o f the nine listed aid sectors o f an individual 
recipient country. Thus, both observations indicate that there exists a diversified relationship between 
recipient and donor countries wi th highly overlapping aid f l o w s ' . 6 9 5 Mosley refers to an often-cited 
example in Upper Volta (now Burkino Faso), where 350 separate aid missions arrived in 1983, each 
lasting an average o f two to three weeks and often requiring the assistance o f over thirty o f the 
administration's top staff. This led to a significant breakdown in government funct ioning. 6 9 6 He calls 
this 'administrative overload' caused by multi-donor competition for projects in recipient countries. 6 9 7 
Cassen refers to '"project proliferation": aid projects are planted here and there in an almost 
haphazard way and in excessive numbers, with a variety o f untoward consequences'. 6 9 8 Indeed, ' In 
several countries the donors not only fa i l to co-ordinate, but actually compete. They are all looking for 
projects o f a reasonable size and manageability, and go sometimes to unseemly lengths to secure them 
for their own aid programme rather than let them go to another agency. The aid projects themselves 
then compete for scarce resources in the recipient count ry ' . 6 9 9 Linn argues that ' . . . i t is important that 
each institution focus on its comparative strength. I f each institution tries to tackle the same problems 
undermining good governance, the risks o f overloading the agenda and overstretching capacities 
increases substantially'. 7 0 0 
N O R A D recognises the possibility o f this occurring in anti-corruption work, arguing that 
donors could begin 'over-bidding each other in their eagerness to support the "good cause"'. 7 0 1 It 
recommends cost-sharing and appointing a 'lead donor' as possible measures to avoid this. The World 
Bank would make an obvious choice as a lead donor in anti-corruption work, but its non-political 
mandate proves problematic. For al l donors except the Bank, anti-corruption work fits into an overall 
programme o f democratisation. As we have seen, the Bank admits the need for democratisation work, 
6 9 4 Cooksey, B. (1999). 'Do Aid Agencies Have a Comparative Advantage in Fighting Corruption in Africa?', p. 8. 
This builds on the economic notion of capital absorptive capacity, which is ' . . .a more or less absolute limit to the 
amount of capital, foreign or domestic, that can be productively employed in the sense of yielding some net return 
over and above depreciation and obsolescence'. Mikeseli, R (1968). The Economics of Foreign Aid. London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicholson, p. 100. la other words, a donor can throw only so much money at a problem before the 
recipient will become unable to use the funding productively because of a lack of capacity. According to Mikesell, 
this can result from, among other things, a lack of good government (p. 101). 
6 . 5 Dewald, M. & Weder, R. (1996). 'Comparative Advantage and Bilateral Foreign Aid Policy', 551. 
6 . 6 Mosley, P. (1987). Overseas Aid, pp. 100-101. 
6 9 7 Mosley, P. (1987). Overseas Aid, pp. 100-105. 
6 9 8 Cassen, R. (1994). Does Aid Work?, p. 175. 
6 9 9 Cassen, R. (1994). Does Aid Work?, p. 177. 
7 0 0 Linn, J. (2001). 'The World Bank's New Approach to Good Governance: Promises and Risks'. Transition 
Newsletter. 12(2), p. 3. 
7 0 1 NORAD (2001). Annual Report 2001. Oslo: NORAD, p. 23. 
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in the form o f support for elections and political parties, to effectively combat corruption, but it is not 
currently able to conduct this work itself. There is an obvious opening for work to be done by the other 
donors. Because o f this, some donors claim to have a comparative advantage in the political side o f 
anti-corruption work because o f their ability to work unhindered in the political sphere. 
This is not really an example o f comparative advantage. I f it was, then other donors would 
focus the bulk o f their anti-corruption work around election monitoring, assisting political parties and 
other explicitly political work and would leave the rest for the World Bank. Instead, other donors do 
very similar work to that already being done by the Bank, but on a smaller scale. There is thus a great 
danger of 'over-funding ' and unnecessary and unproductive duplication. 
The Need to ' Sp in -Of f Parts o f the World Bank's Anti-Corruption Programme 
Because o f the complexity o f structural adjustment, and also because o f its controversy, aid 
co-ordination has become an important priority for donors. In order to facilitate this co-ordination, 
donors formed a number o f country Consultative Groups (CGs), used to try to co-ordinate foreign aid 
programmes within individual countries, with the Wor ld Bank taking a leading role through its position 
as chair. A t CG meetings, issues arise that clearly violate the Bank's political mandate, but the Bank 
claims that i t is merely advising the borrower o f bilateral donor concerns. 7 0 2 Table 5.2 shows 
governance-related items discussed at forty-five CG meetings f rom October 1990 to January 1993. 
Table 5.2: Governance Content of Consultative Group Meetings, 10/90-1/93 
Topic Number of countries where this was discussed 
Military expenditure 12 
Transparency 13 
Human rights & democratisation 18 
Accountability 21 
Legal framework for development 22 
Public sector management 28 
Source: World Bank (1994). Governance: The World Bank's Experience Washington DC: World Bank, p. 43. 
Critics claim that the CG meetings provide the Bank with a 'smokescreen' for its own political 
agenda, because i t can often hide behind the bilateral donors. Gibbon exclaims, ' I n other words, 
although it can have nothing to do with political conditionality, or its co-ordination, the World Bank 
wi l l nonetheless chair Consultative Group meetings where it is discussed, tell recipients what decisions 
about it have been reached and link the continuation o f its own aid to donors' political concerns!'. 7 0 3 A 
recent high profile example o f this is that o f Kenya. After the CG meeting in 1991, the World Bank 
joined a group o f aid donors in suspending aid to Kenya. While bilateral donors called out for Kenya to 
introduce multiparty elections, the World Bank explained that its suspension o f funds was related only 
7 0 3 World Bank (1994). Governance, p. 41. 
7 0 3 Gibbon, P. (1993). 'The World Bank and the New Politics of Aid ' . In Serensen, G. (ed). Political 
Conditionality. London: Frank Cass, p. 55. 
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in that 'the Bank's assistance would not be able to fill the resulting financial gaps'. Similar 
arguments were made when lending to Nigeria was suspended fol lowing the execution o f activist Ken 
Saro-Wiwa, 7 0 5 and when the Bank cancelled loans following the overthrow o f the emperor in 
Ethiopia . 7 0 6 The Bank also suspended lending to Benin in 1989, calling for popular consent for reform 
and suggesting the use o f national conferences as a tool for ensuring this popular participation. 7 0 7 
However, one outcome o f CGs has been a discernible subordination o f the bilateral donors to 
the multilaterals, at both dialogue and policy level. According to Gibbon, 
Bilaterals were disadvantaged from forming independent judgements on the issues being 
discussed, since the great majority o f them had no independent sources o f economic 
information or means o f interpreting them. Nor was there any international forum where 
proposals could be made for revising I M F or World Bank recommendations, even i f the 
w i l l existed to do so. The new regime thus involved a decisive ( i f wil l ing) subordination 
o f the bilaterals [to the multilaterals], especially evident in the so-called "like-minded 
countries" - the Scandinavians, Canada and Ho l l and . 7 0 8 
This control over resources and modes o f output has impacted the bilaterals ability to direct the 
discourse on good governance and on corruption. 
As Uvin points out, 'Interestingly, the bilateral donors at present often refer to the World 
Bank's statements on good governance, but this is probably more a case of hiding in the skirts o f an 
international institution than a demonstration o f the impact, or quality, o f the Bank's ideas' . 7 0 9 It is the 
7 0 4 Fillip, B. (1997). 'The World Bank and Governance: A Process Approach to Policy Analysis', unpublished 
PhD Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, p. 100; also, Riley, S. (1992). 'Corruption and the Swollen African State: 
Economic Liberalisation & the New Political Conditionality', Paper given at the 51*1 International Anti-Corruption 
Conference (1ACC), Amsterdam. Early claims of a donor victory when Kenya announced multiparty elections 
have been replaced now with cynicism. According to the Economist, 'Over the past few years Kenya has 
performed a curious mating ritual with its aid donors. The steps are: one, Kenya wins its yearly pledges of foreign 
aid. Two, the government begins to misbehave, backtracking on economic reform and behaving in an authoritarian 
manner. Three, a new meeting of donor countries looms with exasperated foreign governments preparing their 
sharp rebukes. Four, Kenya pulls a placatory rabbit out of the hat. Five, the donors are mollified and the aid is 
pledged. The whole dance then starts again.' (1995). 'Aid for Kenya: Stop, go', The Economist 336(7928), 19 
August, p. 51, 
7 0 5 See Goshko, J. (1995). 'US Censures Nigeria's Execution of Nine Activists'. The Washington Post. 11 
September. 
7 0 6 Ayres, R. (1983). Banking on the Poor, pp. 71-72. The Bank did argue as early as 1954 that it 'cannot ignore 
conditions of political instability or uncertainty which may directly affect the economic and financial prospects of 
the borrower'. World Bank (1954). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1946-1953. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, p. 61. 
7 0 7 Fillip, B. (1997). 'The World Bank and Governance', p. 275. For a look at Benin's subsequent national 
conferences and the impact on corruption, written by a former Bank staff member, see Heilbrunn, J. (1999). 
'Corruption, Democracy, and Reform in Benin'. In Schedler, A., Diamond, L. & Plattner, M . (eds). The Self-
Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., pp. 
227-243. 
7 0 8 Gibbon, P. (1993). 'The World Bank and the New Politics of Aid ' , p. 39. 
7 0 9 Uvin, P. (1993). '"Do as 1 Say, Not as I Do": The Limits of Political Conditionality'. In Sorensen, G. (ed). 
Political Conditionality. London: Frank Cass, p. 67. 
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same wi th corruption. A l l donors use the Bank's limited and non-political definition o f corruption -
'the abuse o f public office for private g a i n ' 7 1 0 - without expanding upon it or adapting it to their own 
needs. Bilaterals often refer to research conducted by the Bank on corruption, rarely adding to it 
themselves or referring to work produced by others. The political dimension o f corruption, as the Bank 
calls it, is not incorporated into the definition by donors but is added on as an afterthought, despite this 
being the area where some see their niche as agencies 7 1 1 
Baylies contends that, '[The World Bank's] stance in advocating good government, and 
indeed contributing to the theorising o f a new orthodoxy, while off ic ia l ly distancing itself f rom some 
elements o f practice, has contributed to an ambiguous (even i f off ic ial ly delineated) division o f labour 
with respect to the new aid reg ime . ' 7 1 2 Although the Bank and other donors pay l ip service to the idea 
of comparative advantage, there is often little difference in the work being done on the ground. This 
has led to an overload in donor activity without any clear delineation o f duties or expertise and an 
inaccurate blurring o f the line between economic and political issues. I f we look at Table 5.3, which 
shows the areas that the Bank has specified are its own areas o f comparative advantage, we can f ind 
areas also specified by other donors (e.g., financial management, institution building) as well as work 
being conducted by other donors in addition to the work being done by the Bank. A l l o f this is being 
done in an ad hoc manner with little to no co-ordination. 
" ° World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank. Washington DC: 
World Bank, p. 8. 
7 1 1 The Dutch define corruption as 'using public goods or a public position for personal interests...covering 
bribery, misappropriation, fraud, extortion, smuggling, and cronyism.' See http://www.minbuza.nl. UNDP defines 
it as 'the misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit', and, two paragraphs down, 'Political 
systems are also characterised by high and low levels of corruption'. UNDP (1999). Fighting Corruption to 
Improve Governance. New York: UNDP, p. 7. NORAD points out the Bank's definition and then elaborates: 
'corruption is any transaction between private and public sector actors through which collective goods are 
illegitimately converted into private payoff. It claims that this emphasises the 'state-society relation' in a more 
precise way than the Bank does, but it is really little more than an elaboration of the Bank's definition. NORAD 
(2000). NORAD's Good Governance & Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2000-2001. Oslo: NORAD, p. 7. 
7 1 2 Baylies, C. (1995). '"Political Conditionality" and Democratisation'. Review of African Political Economy. 65, 
p. 326. 
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Table S.3: The World Bank's Perceived Areas of Comparative Advantage in Combating 
Corruption 
Areas of Comparative Areas of Expertise (sharing Areas Not Expecting 
Advantage advantage with others) Comparative Advantage 
(a) public economics (a) revenue policy and (a) police reform 
(economic analysis o f administration (b) criminal justice 
the role and (b) legal and judicial systems (including 
functioning o f the reform prosecutorial and 
public sector) (c) other accountability prison reform) 
(b) decentralisation and institutions (such as (c) general parliamentary 
inter-governmental ombudsmen and processes 
fiscal relations parliamentary oversight (d) political governance 
(c) core system-wide bodies) (including election 
administration and civi l processes or the 
service reform structure and financing 






building, particularly in 
social sectors and 
infrastructure 
(including regulation o f 
private sector delivery) 
Source: World Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions & Strengthening Governance: A World Bank 
Strategy. Washin gton DC: World Bank, p. 62. 
Table 5.4 shows areas claimed by some bilateral donors as their comparative advantage. Most, 
but not all, bilateral donors believe that comparative advantage is significant in the fight against 
corruption. There may be a link between the priority given to anti-corruption work by the donor and 
inclusion o f the principle o f comparative advantage in its literature or correspondence. 
Table 5.4: Other Donors' Perceived Areas of Comparative Advantage in Combating Corruption 
Donor Area o f Comparative Advantage 
UNDP 
U S A I D 
D f I D 
DIDC-Fin land 7 1 3 
N O R A D - Norway 
SDC - Switzerland 
The political side o f anti-corruption work 
Civ i l society 
The political side o f anti-corruption work 
Example o f best practice in the public sector 
Unique expertise and network o f 'resource-persons' 
No stated comparative advantage 
Donors even publicly debate the effectiveness o f their own work in the fight against 
corruption. Although N O R A D Director General Tove Strand exclaimed, ' . . .we have to make the fight 
against corruption a central element in all our assistance', 7 1 4 Mette Masst, the head o f anti-corruption 
work at the agency, observed, ' . . . I have no illusions that our work has led to a significant decline in 
7 1 3 Unlike other donors, DIDC believes that ' i t is difficult to say where "exactly" is the comparative advantage of a 
bilateral development agency". Ruohomaki, O. (2001). Email to the author. 3 September. 
7 1 4 NORAD (2000). NORAD's Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2000-2001. Oslo: NORAD, p. 
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corruption ' . 7 1 5 Even the World Bank insists, ' I n the area o f anti-corruption, for example, Bank 
interventions are unlikely ever to eliminate corruption, and even making a significant dent in the 
problem may be diff icult in certain countries no matter how well the Bank performs' . 7 1 6 In neither case 
does this fo l low through to the next logical step in the debate: why are these agencies doing this work 
in the first place i f it is unlikely to prove effective in bringing about the desired change? Although one 
can argue for the need to measure the impact o f doing something rather than nothing, there also needs 
an acceptance that in some countries anti-corruption work might be ineffective at best and destabilising 
at worst. Conducting such work with little chance for positive impact seems to be little more than 
social experimentation while adding to a recipient's external debt. 
The World Bank's involvement in anti-corruption work does violate its important non-
political mandate in part and also stretches its capacity as an organisation. Therefore, although there is 
a place for certain aspects o f the Bank's work, especially in preventing corruption within its own 
projects, other parts o f its strategy are o f dubious value and could be spun o f f to other donors i f this sort 
o f work is to be done. One solution would be to parcel o f f the sections in which another donor feels it 
has a comparative advantage. However, donors have a fundamentally flawed notion o f their own 
advantages as agencies and these need to be questioned before recommendations can be made. 
Additionally, it is unclear firstly, i f any other donors have the capacity to pick up such complex work, 
even in part, and secondly, i f some donors have any place in anti-corruption work at all . One 
assumption can be made from the start: we can assume that the donors studied do want a role in this 
work and would be loathe to withdraw support, even i f there is no evidence that their support w i l l be 
effective. This work has become too high profile and everyone seems to want to be in on it. 
Other Donors' Anti-Corruption Programmes 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
Anti-corruption work at UNDP is located within the Programme for Accountability and 
Transparency (PACT), which is located within the Institutional Development Group (IDG) which is in 
3. 
7 1 5 NORAD (2001). Annual Report 2001, p. 18. 
7 1 6 Because of this, the Bank warns that evaluation of the programme could prove difficult i f current standards are 
adhered to. Instead, 'Defining a standard for success is particularly tricky in such a situation. Rather than aim for 
the same percentage and standard of success in all types of projects the Bank undertakes, success should be 
measured in part against the difficulty of the challenges addressed, and i f possible against what would have been in 
place without the intervention'. World Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions & Strengthening Governance', 
p. 19. 
7 1 7 Although Japan is the largest overall bilateral donor in terms of funding levels, I have not included it in this 
study. This is because its work on corruption is negligible, except in ensuring that its own projects are as 
corruption-free as possible. This includes stringent procurement and bidding policies, hiring all consultants 
through competition and disclosure of all contract information. This last item is unique among donors. The only 
example of clear anti-corruption work I was able to uncover is the funding of trainees from developing country 
governments to a training course on Corruption Control in Criminal Justice held in Japan. Yamamoto, A. (2001). 
Email to the author. 11 December. 
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the Bureau for Development Policy (BDP). The organisational chart for PACT is illustrated in Figure 
5.1. 




PACT Global Secretariat 
New York 
PACT Regional Office PACT Regional Office 
Bratislava 
Since its establishment in 1995, funding for PACT has come originally f rom two main sources 
- the Danes and the Dutch. Originally called the A i d Accountability initiative, PACT was located in the 
U N Department o f Economic and Social Affairs . Its original mandate focused on aid accountability and 
co-ordination in Sub-Saharan Afr ica and the Baltic Region. In 1996, the programme moved to UNDP, 
and it was renamed PACT while the focus changed to financial accountability and transparency. Along 
with this mandate change came a change from a regional focus to a global focus, with the two original 
regional bureaus fal l ing under the global bureau. 
D A N I D A published an evaluation of PACT in 1999. The evaluation is not very positive 
about PACT 'S activities, especially regarding anti-corruption activities. I t acknowledges that a return to 
aid accountability is not really viable, and that 'PACT has built up a comparative advantage in 
addressing comprehensive public expenditure accountability issues'. 7 1 9 However, PACT has only two 
years experience in anti-corruption activities. Despite generating considerable media attention, the 
evaluation feels that 'PACT 'S comparative advantage in this f ie ld is close to non-existent'. 7 2 0 Keeping 
in mind the limited financing available, it recommends that anti-corruption be spun o f f into a separate 
programme for anti-corruption work alone. 
The Danes were not happy about this change from aid accountability and donor co-ordination 
to financial accountability and anti-corruption work, as well as the move f rom a regional to global 
focus. They were particularly unhappy about the work being done in Eastern Europe, which is not part 
7 1 8 DANIDA (1999). Evaluation Report: The UNDP Programme for Accountability and Transparency (PACT), 
Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 27. 
7 1 9 DANIDA (1999). Evaluation Report, p. 70. 
7 2 0 DANIDA (1999). Evaluation Report, p. 70. 
156 
o f its own mandate. They stopped funding PACT in 2000, although the Dutch continue to provide 
some funding, including the secondment o f a Dutch national, Fred Schenkelaars, as special advisor and 
some seed money for publications. 
Under D A N I D A , PACT's budget stood at $1 mil l ion per year, wi th approximately $100,000 
spent on anti-corruption and the remaining bulk spent on financial accountability projects. 7 2 1 PACT 
activities and finances had been impacted by the Danes pulling out o f financing commitments in the 
short-term. However, it successfully negotiated a new funding contract with the German development 
agency, Bundesministerium filer Wirtschaftliche Zusammensarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) , signed on 
27 June 20 0 0 . 7 2 2 B M Z set up a trust fund o f SI.25 mil l ion for projects to be conducted in a one-year 
period, although PACT has requested a six-month extension on this deadline. This is primarily for 
capacity building in BMZ' s priority countries - Bangladesh, East Timor, Mozambique and Nigeria, 
along with some Eastern European and CIS countries. It also provides funding for other non-country 
activities, such as seed money for the Partnership Fund for Transparency. 
UNDP is the only multilateral donor with a clear policy statement on corruption. It is 
published under the title, Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance, and is summarised below: 
UNDP is unwaveringly committed to the war against corruption. Minimising corruption 
is critical i f its mission to alleviate poverty and achieve social and people-centred 
development is to succeed. A multilateral development agency, UNDP support is not 
conditional. I t does, however, have a mandate to create an enabling environment for 
sustainable human development. Since corruption clearly works against such an 
environment, UNDP does support projects that address the fundamental elements o f the 
problem. 
UNDP sees corruption as a problem o f poor governance. Good governance is 
participatory, transparent and accountable - its social, political and economic priorities 
are reached by consensus and the poorest and most vulnerable have their say in matters 
affecting their well being and in the allocation o f development resources. Bad 
governance, r ife wi th bribery, corruption and maladministration, has the opposite 
e f fec t . 7 2 3 
Projects focus on institutional development and reform, public and private sector 
management, decentralisation, transparency and accountability, the media and independent watchdogs 
and building partnerships. 7 2 4 The report highlights six proposed areas o f intervention: 'partnership 
building and policy dialogue, capacity building, tailoring country interventions, dividing 
7 2 1 See the DANIDA evaluation for further budget details. 
7 2 2 UNDP (2001). PACT Bi-annual Report to BMZ (August 2000-January 2001). New York: PACT. 
7 2 3 UNDP (1999). Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance, p. 3. 
7 2 4 UNDP (1999). Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance, p. 4. 
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responsibilities among the relevant stakeholders within UNDP, creating a focal point within the UNDP 
through [PACT] and describing the internal mechanisms within the organisation to prevent and control 
corruption in UNDP's organisations'. 7 2 5 Specifically, PACT ' w i l l take the lead in developing policies, 
tools and methodologies; researching issues o f priority to UNDP; and documenting good practices 
based on country experiences'. 7 2 6 
Box 5.1: Examples of projects funded or assisted by P A C T 
• Production o f two major reports, 'Corruption and Good Governance Discussion Paper' and the 
jo int UNDP/OECD report on 'Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing 
Countries' 
• A learning module on corruption issues in the Asia Pacific region 
• UNDP (Europe)/CIS/UN Department o f Economic and Social Affairs sponsored conference on 
'Public Service in Transition: Enhancing Its Role, Professionalism, Ethical Standards and Values', held 
in Thessaloniki, Greece 
• UNDP (Romania)AJN Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) project, administered by 
the Ministry o f Justice to deal with corruption and crime 
o UNDP (Philippines)/Centre for Investigative Journalism project to strengthen the capacity o f 
investigative journalism 
• The Anti-Corruption Promotion Group in Georgia, a three-year temporary NGO 
• Technical assistance for Mongolia's Capacity Building for Governing Institutions Project 
• UNDP (Brazil)/Council of State Reform/Ministry o f Federal Administration and State Reform/UN 
Department o f Economic and Social Affairs sponsored colloquium on 'Promoting Ethics in the Public 
Service' 
• Organising five regional workshops at the 9 l h IACC in Durban 
One major project, originally initiated by PACT, has been the production o f the Country 
Assessment in Accountability and Transparency (CONTACT) manual, which the D A N I D A evaluation 
states 'is being recognised by outsiders as being a first i n providing an instrument for comprehensive 
assessment o f public expenditure accountability. Systematic use o f this tool at country level and follow 
up in the form o f technical assistance programming, planning and resource mobilisation holds the 
potential to achieve significant impact at country level in selected countries' . 7 2 8 A draft was completed 
in 1998, although it has not yet been finalised. This is a joint project wi th the World Bank, who wrote a 
majority o f the chapters, along with some input by USAID and the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), while PACT wrote the chapter on anti-corruption. PACT has recently 
finished reviewing the final manuscript, and it is due for publication by September 2 0 0 1 . 7 2 9 
7 2 5 UNDP (1999). Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance, p. 5; also pp. 19-23. 
7 2 6 UNDP (1999). Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance, p. 21. 
7 2 7 UNDP (1999). Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance, pp. 31-36. 
7 2 8 DANIDA (1999). Evaluation Report, p. 4. 
7 2 9 Tamesis, P. (2001). Email to the author. 19 June. 
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PACT has also been working on a joint project w i th OECD: country case studies with Benin, 
Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines and Bolivia. PACT is trying to analyse success from anti-corruption 
initiatives in those countries, although it is not clear what criteria it is using for evaluation. These case 
studies have been put on hold, however, presumably due to lack o f resources. Another initiative is the 
Partnership Fund for Transparency, set up 'to assist c ivi l society needs by providing short-term 
technical assistance to develop programmes to fight corrupt ion ' . 7 3 0 PACT is also working closely with 
W B I as collaborators on the fol low up to the Anti-Corruption Core Course in Africa. However, 
according to PACT, 'only Tanzania and Ghana seemed to have progressed further since both already 
had projects in place focusing on anti-corruption. It was harder to get collaboration going when we had 
to start f rom scratch. ' 7 3 1 
PACT also hosted events to try to co-ordinate action with other donors: the Maastricht 
Working Group Conference in Apr i l 2000; Global Forum I I , also held in the Netherlands in May 2001; 
and the 10 t h Crime Congress in Vienna, in Apr i l 2000. When the German money arrived, PACT 
planned on turning its attention to the role the U N can play in the international repatriation o f funds by 
corrupt dictators and leaders. However, the lead on money laundering within the U N has been taken by 
the U N Center for International Crime Prevention (UNCICP) which PACT claims has more resources 
and a clearer mandate to work on this issue. 7 3 2 
UNDP see anti-corruption work not as an afterthought, as the D A N I D A evaluation seems to 
imply, but rather as 'a part o f the evolution o f our mandate' . 7 3 3 I t feels that its comparative advantage 
lies not in financial accountability work, as the evaluation states, but rather wi th anti-corruption work 
and all its political components. 'The political decision came from higher levels where they said i f you 
have to make a choice to drop one [financial accountability or anti-corruption] because o f financial 
constraints, it would be financial accountability, regardless o f the results o f the evaluation, because o f 
that long institutional expertise in the political sphere' . 7 3 4 Budget figures may belie this strong 
commitment to anti-corruption; however, this may reflect the interests o f bilateral donors, like 
Germany, who are funding the programme, rather than those o f UNDP. 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
Anti-corruption at USAID is located within the Center for Democracy and Governance 
(CDG), established in 1994. The primary bureaus in U S A I D are the four regional bureaus: the Europe 
and Eurasia Bureau, the Latin America and Caribbean Bureau, the Asia and Near East Bureau and the 
Afr ica Bureau. A l l bureaus have equal standing, which is very important to AID ' s decentralised 
0 Interview with Pauline Tamesis, 8 February 2000, New York. See Chapter Four for more detail. 
1 Tamesis, P. (2001). Email to the author. 19 June. 
2 Tamesis, P. (2001). Email to the author. 19 June. 
3 Interview with Pauline Tamesis, 8 February 2000, New York. 
4 Interview with Pauline Tamesis, 8 February 2000, New York. 
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strategy. Because of this, the CDG 'act[s] as a center for technical leadership on technical issues 
[pertaining to anti-corruption] that cut across regions. We cannot direct the regional bureaus, but we 
can act as a point for advice for both bureaus and for missions in the f ie ld ' . 7 3 5 
An organisational chart for CDG is available in its 'User's Guide', and is replicated in Figure 
5.2: 
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Political 
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A F R ANE 
ENI L A C 
Civil Society Governance 
US AID operates in very decentralised way, with great autonomy given to the regional 
bureaus. With each bureau employing staff to deal with anti-corruption issues, it is very difficult to 
share lessons learned. In this area, the work done by CDG is vital for at least trying to have a consistent 
agency approach. However, because power is so decentralised, this is not how it works in reality. CDG 
act merely as consultants on projects, with varying degrees of success as to how often advice is taken 
into consideration when mission strategies are being designed. Although hardly ideal, it does at least 
seem in keeping with USAID's strong emphasis on regional autonomy. Projects are managed out of 
individual missions, so CDG's budget covers only its own research and costs. 
The agency's mission statement asserts that, 'USAID has taken a leading role in promoting 
and consolidating democracy world-wide...A key determinant for successful democratic consolidation 
is the ability of democratically-elected governments to provide "good governance'".737 Governance is 
one of four objectives in order to promote and consolidate democracy, including also the rule of law, 
elections and civil society. Anti-corruption work falls into the 'governance' objective. However, this 
approach is not meant to be 'reductive', reducing an inherently complex process into overly simplistic 
terms; for example, 'the Center's anti-corruption programming aims to improve governance in part by 
mobilising citizen action from civil society organisations'.738 Anti-corruption work (sometimes referred 
to as 'governmental integrity' work) is done in conjunction with work on democratic decentralisation, 
Interview with M. Eric Kite, 27 January 2000, Washington DC. 
USAID (1999). Center for Democracy and Governance: User's Guide. Washington DC: CDG, p. 4. 
See the Center's website at http://www.info.usaid.gov/democracy/. 
USAID (1999). Center Report on Assistance for Democracy Development. Washington DC: CDG, p. 3. 
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legislative strengthening, civil-military relations and effective policy implementation, in order to 
strengthen governance. Improved governance then strengthens democracy, the CDG's ultimate goal. 
Fighting corruption is not CDG's top priority; instead, it believes that its existing work on 
democratisation will reduce corruption. It does do some explicit anti-corruption work, but this 
represents only a small part of CDG's portfolio. USAID's first explicit anti-corruption programme 
came as early as 1989 with its Regional Financial Management Improvement (RFMI) Project in Latin 
America. Important initiatives under RFMI include computerisation of public records to eliminate 
'ghost' employees and a website to engage civil society in anti-corruption work. The project has been 
on-going since, but was renamed 'The America's Accountability and Anti-Corruption Project' in 1992 
to bring explicit attention to the anti-corruption side.7 3 9 
USAID has no formal policy on corruption, but puts forward the Handbook as representative 
of its strategy instead. The Handbook is used by the Bureaus to develop their own anti-corruption 
programmes, i f they believe it is important or possible. The Handbook is also used as a framework for 
analysis and overview by both internal auditors and outside contracted firms. 
USAID'S strategy is a two-track approach: institutional reforms and civil society reforms, 
together or one at a time, depending on level of political w i l l . 7 4 0 Put another way, 'USAID has 
developed a two-track response to the problem of corruption: (1) change the environment in which the 
public and private sectors interact and (2) mobilise public support for change'.741 Part one of this 
strategy includes the following: 
• Supporting legal and regulatory reform to reduce government's involvement in areas better 
handled by the private sector. 
• Streamlining government procedures to reduce the opportunities for corruption. 
• Improving accountability mechanisms. 
• Introducing incentives that wil l encourage officials to act in the public interest.742 
USAID (1999). Promoting Transparency and Accountability: USAID's Anti-Corruption Experience, 
Washington DC: Center for Democracy and Governance, p. 4. 
7 4 0 USAID documentation stresses the importance of political will. An example is given by a CDG staff member of 
the need for political will: in one country USAID put in a computer system to track customs operations only to 
have a high-level government official order that employees leave the computers turned off. Dininio, P. (1999). 
'Defining Anti-Corruption for USAID'. Democracy Dialogue. June. Washington DC: Center for Democracy and 
Governance, p. 3. However, it finds that political will is easier to generate in democracies. Indeed, 'Past experience 
has taught us that ownership of economic policy reform is greater among governments that are democratic, open 
and transparent'. See Atwood, J.B. (1998). 'Remarks at the Congressional Forum on Africa'. Washington DC, 11 
March. There is a training module CDG conducts for democracy officers in the field on how to get political will, 
which emphasises that it is 'an art not a science'. USAID has learned two lessons when it comes to political will: 
(1) do not make anti-corruption initiatives contingent upon a 'champion', and (2) even if political will is perceived 
to exist, always involve civil society in order to truly sustain reforms. Interview with M. Eric Kite, 27 January 
2000, Washington DC. 
7 4 1 USAID (1999). Promoting Transparency and Accountability, p. 5. 
7 4 2 USAID (1999). Promoting Transparency and Accountability, pp. 5-6. 
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Part two includes working with advocacy organisations, public-private enterprises (including 
NGOs) and the media. 7 4 3 This approach seems to fit in well with US foreign policy, with its emphasis 
on encouraging the private sector, past USAID experience in accountability funding and its strong 
network of civil society organisations. This focus on civil society is very important to USAID. 
According to Kite, 'donors have a propensity to fund the sorts of things that they're comfortable with 
in their own domestic context, and we happen to have so many interest groups in the United States, 
with the way our government works...that that's what we're comfortable with doing in the f i e ld . ' 7 4 4 It 
is this long-standing work on civil society that USAID claims is its comparative advantage in work on 
corruption. 
Box 5.2: Examples of projects funded or assisted by USAID 
• Ethics legislation in South Africa for standards of conduct and asset reporting by government 
employees 
• Conflict of interest law in Georgia for government officials 
• Improving the quality of judicial administration and training in Russia 
• Comprehensive analysis of the Egyptian cotton industry to aid privatisation efforts 
• Development of fourteen energy regulation agencies in through the Europe and Eurasia Bureau 
• Technical assistance and training for the Palestinian Monetary Authority 
• The reduction of red tape for starting businesses in Tanzania through the Investor Road Map 
project 
• Technical and institutional support of Supreme Audit Institutions in Benin 
• Assisting NGOs in Guinea Bissau to stage a televised debate on exchange rate policy 
• Support of Coalition 2000 in Bulgaria, an NGO that has developed an anti-corruption plan 
• The creation of the Latin American Journalism Center. 
Another specific anti-corruption initiative is a $2 million grant managed by TI to support anti-
corruption work and lessons learned workshops in nine countries: Bulgaria, Ukraine, Bangladesh, 
Philippines, Benin, Ghana, Mozambique, Colombia and the Dominican Republic.7 4 6 More countries 
interested in actively pursuing anti-corruption activities include Paraguay, El Salvador, Russia, Albania 
and West Bank/Gaza.747 CDG has also conducted several case studies in conjunction with the Center 
for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) 7 4 8 to gather some lessons learned: Nepal, 
Hungary, Bolivia and Argentina.7 4 9 
7 4 3 USAID (1999). Promoting Transparency and Accountability, pp. 11-15. 
7 4 4 Interview with M. Eric Kite, 27 January 2000, Washington DC. 
7 4 5 USAID (1999). Promoting Transparency and Accountability, pp. 6-20. 
7 4 6 US AID (1999). A Handbook on Fighting Corruption, CDG Technical Publication Series, p. 19. 
7 4 7 Interview with M. Eric Kite, 27 January 2000, Washington DC. TI is the only anti-comiption NGO and often 
receives donor support for these kinds of projects. 
7 4 8 Based at the University of Maryland, IRIS brings together over one hundred sixty researchers, predominately 
economists, lawyers and political scientists, to conduct research and offer advice on economic growth and 
governance in transition and developing countries. See http://www.iris.umd.edu/aboutiris.asp. 
7 4 9 Manzietti, L. (2000). 'Keeping Accounts: A Case Study of Civic Initiatives and Campaign Finance Oversight in 
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The US government completed an audit of USAID's anti-corruption work in 1999, and a copy 
of USAID's response to the auditor can be found in Appendix 19. Referring to item #2 in the memo, 
CGD has developed draft anti-corruption performance indicators of a qualitative nature, but these have 
not been officially approved for use.7 5 0 Referring to item #4, USAID have created a 'anti-corruption' 
code for the accounting system, but they are having problems getting field staff to actually use it. Field 
staff are used to coding things as 'public sector reform', for example, and continue to use codes with 
which they are comfortable.751 Further efforts have been made to improve the system, such as making 
anti-corruption a 'primary' rather than a 'secondary' budget code, but it is still not helping in tracking 
projects, such as for decentralisation, with a strong anti-corruption impact. Because of the complexity 
of this work, there is no real way to track i t . 7 5 2 
It is quite difficult to ascertain specific initiatives planned for the future, other than mission 
evaluations. Every year CDG sends out a mission from its office h Washington to local missions to 
conduct evaluations on anti-corruption needs and activities. Seven were done last year with a similar 
number planned this year, including Nigeria in March. These are not currently available and it is has 
not yet been determined i f they will be made so in the future. 
There are several countries USAID works in where political will does not exist and civil 
society is compromised, yet they have not, and most likely will not, exit. USAID will do what it can to 
work with civil society. However, it may have to limit its involvement in some cases because of a 
limited budget. Although it may be a direction USAID will move in, there is no conditionality related 
to anti-corruption now. As a matter of fact, 'there are lots of cases where we undertake projects because 
the department would like us to, where there's a directive that we should do something. In some cases, 
it's not the sort of thing where i f we were on our own as an agency that we would do. But that's the 
way things work ' . 7 5 3 USAID is part of the State Department and its work may be directed from above 
for political or strategic reasons. 
However, a recently enacted law could change the way USAID approaches anti-corruption 
work, making it an explicit objective in its own right, rather than as one of several objectives in 
democratisation programmes. In 2000, Congress passed the 'Microenterprise for Self-Reliance and 
International Anti-Corruption Act of 2000'. According to Sec.202(b), 'The purpose of this title is to 
ensure that United States assistance programs promote good governance by assisting other countries to 
combat corruption throughout society and to improve transparency and accountability at all levels of 
Argentina'. IRIS, November; Lanyi, A., Guevara, W. & Bell, S. (2000). 'Bolivian Customs Reform: A Case Study 
of Consolidating Democratic Institutions'. IRIS, November; Meagher, P. (2000). 'Changing Hands: A Case Study 
of Financial Sector Governance in Hungary's Market Transition'. IRIS, November; Meagher, P., Upadhyaya, K. & 
Wilkinson, B. (2000). 'Roads with Destinations: A Case Study of Governance and Rural Infrastructure in Nepal'. 
IRIS, January. 
7 5 0 Interview with M. Eric Kite, 8 January 2001, Washington DC. 
7 5 1 Interview with M. Eric Kite, 27 January 2000, Washington DC. 
7 5 2 Interview with M. Eric Kite, 8 January 2001, Washington DC. 
7 5 3 Interview with M. Eric Kite, 27 January 2000, Washington DC. 
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government and throughout the private sector'. Referring to the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
a recent US Department of Commerce report explained that US firms have lost an estimated $26 billion 
in contracts because of bribes paid by competitors in the last five years alone.755 The 'International 
Anti-Corruption and Good Governance Act of 2000' is just part of the continued pressure applied to 
US allies since 1977 in order 'to create a level playing field for American exporters'.756 
The Act is an amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, and it includes: 
o make combating corruption a principal goal of U.S. development assistance; 
» require that international technical assistance provided by the Department of Treasury 
also emphasise anti-corruption measures; 
• mandate that the U.S. Agency for International Development establish programs to 
combat corruption in countries where there is a significant foreign aid program or where 
the United States has a significant economic interest, and that have the most persistent 
problems with corruption; 
• enable the U.S. to fund anti-corruption programs in countries otherwise ineligible to 
receive U.S. foreign assistance; and, 
• require the President to submit an annual report to the Congress detailing U.S. diplomatic 
efforts to combat corruption and foreign countries' progress towards achieving this 
This bill was originally intended to help USAID, to put it at the forefront of US policy on 
fighting corruption overseas. However, a staff member gave me a mixed review of the bill. It is a 
'blessing', in that USAID now has explicit authorisation to do work that it has been doing all along 
without specific authorisation. It also allows USAID the flexibility to do anti-corruption work in 
countries where it is not allowed to work ordinarily, or in countries where a mission is no longer 
necessary because of high levels of economic development (e.g., Poland and the Czech Republic). 
However, the bill contains what the staff member calls 'potentially onerous' reporting implications 
with no additional funding available for new staff. 7 5 8 There are also worries about the nature of the 
annual reporting requirement, to be done in conjunction with the State Department. The report has the 
potential to become as high profile as the US annual human rights report, which has offended countries 
in the past for their inclusion. It is possible that the State Department will not want to risk offending 
countries which have strategic importance, such as the Ukraine or Nigeria, by their inclusion in a 
United States (2000). 'International Anti-Corruption and Good Governance Act of 2000 (short title)'. 
H.R.I 143-17. 
7 5 5 The original title of the Commerce report is 'Addressing the Challenges of International Bribery and Fair 
Competition'. Cited in US Committee on International Relations (2000). 'Committee Passes Gejdenson Anti-
Corruption Bill'. Press release, 29 June, Washington DC. 
7 5 6 US Committee on International Relations (2000). 'Committee Passes Gejdenson Anti-Corruption Bill'. 
7 5 7 US Committee on International Relations (2000). 'Committee Passes Gejdenson Anti-Corruption Bill'. 
7 5 8 Funding is a persistent concern for USAID. The total budget for official development assistance (ODA) has 
been unchanged at 0.10% of GNP since 1998, despite taking on new initiatives, and that includes activities 
managed by both USAID and the State Department. See http://www.oecd.org/dac/ for budget details. 
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corruption report, and will they instead exclude such countries so as not to offend. These could call into 
question the accuracy of the report. One option may be to make part of the report public but with 
'confidential attachments' in sensitive cases, but CDG would rather see a fully public and transparent 
process.759 So far an initial report has been issued by the State Department, as required by the Act, that 
sets out, briefly, US and global anti-corruption initiatives to date, but there is little that indicates a path 
going forward. 7 6 0 
United Kingdom Department for International Development (DfID) 
In 1999, Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short announced, 'My 
Department - the Department for International Development - is...giving increased priority to action 
against corruption and to working with governments which are committed to tackling corruption and 
reducing poverty.' 7 6 1 Despite this public commitment to anti-corruption, little co-ordinated or 
systematic work has been conducted by DflD until recently.762 Because of this, literature on DflD's 
anti-corruption programme is virtually non-existent, at least in the public sphere. I have therefore relied 
heavily on correspondence with Phil Mason, DflD's new Anti-Corruption Coordinator (ACC), 
appointed in September 2000, to build a profile of its work in this area.763 
The ACC is located in the Governance Department, and is responsible for overseeing DflD's 
anti-corruption work. He has three roles: 
• 'To co-ordinate anti-corruption activities within DfID divisions 
• To engage at the international strategic level (OECD, FATF, World Bank, UN, Commonwealth) 
and regionally 
• To engage in policy making issues in Whitehall: 
• Home Office (mutual legal assistant, UK corruption law) 
• Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) (OECD Convention/ UK business) 
• FCO/Treasury (money laundering)'.7 6 4 
In addition, Governance Advisors working in-country are responsible for delivering DfTD's governance 
agenda on the ground. 'The task of the ACC is to encourage/ensure that the anti-corruption perspective 
is embraced by all Governance advisors in the forms appropriate for their particular countries and in 
7 5 9 Interview with M. Eric Kite, 8 January 2001, Washington DC. 
7 6 0 US Department of State (2001). 'Report to Congress Pursuant to the International Anti-Corruption and Good 
Governance Act (Public Law 106-309)'. Washington DC: GPO. 
7 6 1 Short, C. (1999). 'Combating Corruption, Promoting Development'. Speech given at the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs Conference on Corruption as a Threat to World Trade & Investment, London, 19 March. 
7 6 2 DfID did fund two sgnificant academic studies during this time, which have been used to inform the 
development of its programme. The first was on anti-corruption strategies, with Liverpool John Moores 
University, headed by Professors Alan Doig and Robert Williams. The second was on corruption and democracy 
with the Institute for Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex, headed by Professor James Manor. 
7 6 3 Mason, P. (2001). Email to the author. 22 June. 
7 6 4 Mason, P. (2001). Email to the author. 22 June. 
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the light of the DfID Country Strategy for that country. Only at the multilateral level and in the 
domestic Whitehall domain, can the ACC be regarded as playing something akin to the lead role ' . 7 6 5 
Work currently under way focuses on three areas: work within Whitehall itself, joint work 
with other donors and support for international initiatives.766 In Whitehall, this includes ensuring the 
latest White Paper includes a commitment to tackling corruption.767 In addition, the ACC is working 
with the Home Office to co-ordinate its Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA), for developing and transition 
countries seeking to recover illegal funds deposited in UK banks. There are joint initiatives with DTI to 
increase awareness among UK businesses of the OECD anti-bribery convention. The ACC also 
supports the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) in its efforts to deter corruption through 
the use of sanctions. 
Work with other bilateral donors is mostly focused through the Utstein Group, a network of 
donors which includes the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway, formed at The Hague in May 
20 00. 7 6 8 The Utstein Group 'declared their commitment to concerted action to reduce the damaging 
effects of corruption on development, and their readiness to collaborate with those who share this 
commitment, in governments, civil society and the private sector, and other development agencies, 
both multilateral and bilateral'. 7 6 9 The group has produced an action plan, which includes commitment 
to the OECD anti-bribery convention, collaboration at the country level, especially with the World 
Bank on financial management and procurement issues and, finally, co-ordinated support for 
multilateral organisations, such as UNDP. In addition, the Utstein Group is developing a joint 'virtual 
resource centre', or online database, for experts and NGOs. 7 7 0 Other examples of DfTD support for 
international anti-corruption work can be found in Box 5.3. 
7 6 5 Mason, P. (2001). Email to the author. 22 June. 
7 6 6 DfID (2001). 'DfID Anti-Corruption Strategy: Summary of Activities'. Governance Department, mimeo. 
7 6 7 DfID (2000). Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor. White Paper on 
Development. London: DflD. 
7 6 8 Their first meeting was held at the Utstein Abbey in western Norway on 25-26 July 1999, hence the name. See 
Minbuza (1999). 'Utstein Abbey: Four Development Ministers on a Common Course'. Press statement, 26 July. 
7 6 9 DfID (2001). 'DfID Anti-Corruption Strategy', p. 2. 
7 7 0 DfID (2001). 'DfID Anti-Corruption Strategy', p. 2; Minbuza (2001). 'Fact sheet: Dutch development co-
operation and the fight against corruption'. Internet. Accessed 20 June. Available at 
http://www.minbuza.nl/english/menu.asp?Key=414054&Pad=257572. 
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Box 5.3: Examples of projects funded or assisted by Dfll) 
• Assisting WBI work in fourteen countries772 to 'build domestic support and political pressure for 
anti-corruption efforts 
• Anti-money laundering initiative for East & Southeast Asia, funded with the European 
Commission 
• Participant in an ADB/OECD anti-corruption strategy for the Asia-Pacific region 
• Providing start-up costs for the Commonwealth Business Council, to work with business groups on 
in-country anti-corruption strategies 
• Developing anti-corruption guidelines for civil society organisations 
• A joint forum with DTI to encourage codes of conduct and 'integrity pacts' for UK businesses 
• Funding TPs first 'Global Corruption Report' (with the Utstein Group) 
• Providing funding to expand the capacity of the OECD Convention Secretariat 
• Leading the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) re -vamped governance focus 
• In discussion with the BBC World Service to use radio for publicising anti-corruption issues 
• £5 million to strengthen Zambia's Anti-Corruption Commission (with Utstein Group) 
• £1.4 million to establish an Anti-Corruption Commission in Sierra Leone 
• Support for the Nigeria State and Local Government programme 
• One of many donors in the new Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia, to provide a co-
ordinated response to corruption in that country 
• Assisting the preparation of an anti-corruption strategy in the state of Andhra Pradesh, India 
• Signatory of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 
When asked about plans for future work, Mason provided the following list: 
• much more systematic collaborative efforts with other donors on the ground, building on the 
start made by the Utstein partners 
o more systematic help to developing countries in recovering stolen assets deposited abroad, in 
the main financial centres, such as the UK 
• a more robust approach to corruption by businesses overseas, making the OECD Convention 
work in practice and exploring the feasibility of collective sanctions by donors on companies 
found behaving corruptly 
• strengthening regional anti-corruption efforts, and encouraging the involvement of regional 
multilateral banks, such as ADB and AfDB and regional and other organisations, such as 
SADCC, GCA, Commonwealth 
7 7 1 DfID (2001). 'DfID Anti-Corruption Strategy', pp. 3-5. 
7 7 2 Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Russia, Ukraine. 
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• ensuring over the next two years' negotiation that the proposed UN Convention [on Corruption] 
takes a broad, governance approach to fighting corruption and not just a narrow criminal justice 
approach.773 
These are not really new initiatives, however, but rather a commitment to following on from the work 
currently being done. 
DflD sees its comparative advantage in its inherent nature as a bilateral donor. This includes 
being able to directly address political issues in country programmes, unlike the World Bank. Its 
funding is primarily in grant form, which recipients are more comfortable with for technical assistance, 
rather than taking out further loans. It also highlights its flexibility and ability to respond to changing 
conditions, as opposed to a very large organisation like the World Bank. 7 7 4 However, as with UNDP, i f 
the World Bank becomes more politically explicit in its work, the perceived comparative advantage 
would no longer exist. The Bank also has some funds available as grants for technical assistance, so it 
is questionable whether or not that can really be called a comparative advantage, as with the notion of 
DfTD responding quicker to changing conditions. It has taken DfTD four years after the World Bank 
announced its commitment to fighting corruption to actually formulate a strategy, far longer than other 
donors, and this calls into question how flexible it really is as an organisation or whether it has any 
distinctive role or comparative advantage. 
European Union (EU) 
The EU's response to anti-corruption work has been more measured than that of other donors 
for political reasons. Enlargement issues colour its dealings with Eastern Europe and CIS countries. Its 
relationship with Latin American and Southeast Asia is more limited than those of the US, which 
dominates aid and defence in those regions. Finally, it has long had a unique reciprocal agreement with 
the majority of developing countries through the Lome Agreement (now the Cotonou Agreement), 
based on a principle of equality and dialogue.775 
Democratisation and human rights have long been a concern of the EU, but this did not 
become firmly institutionalised until the Cotonou Agreement in June 2000. 'The promotion of human 
rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance are an integral part of [Cotonou]', including an 
emphasis on institutional capacity building. 7 7 6 The agreement is described as 'a mutual commitment to 
7 7 3 Mason, P. (2001). Email to the author, 22 June. 
7 7 4 Mason, P. (2001). Email to the author, 22 June. 
7 7 5 In February 1975, forty-six countries formed the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states and signed Lome 
I (so called because the negotiations were held in Lome, the capital of Togo) with the EC. Lome has since 
expanded into the seventy-seven countries. Lome V was recently re-negotiated in 2000 and has been renamed the 
Cotonou Agreement. On Lome, see Brittlestone, M. (1989). The EC and the Third World: The Lome Agreement. 
The European Dossier Series. London: PNL Press; Faber, G. (1982). The European Community and Development 
Co-operation. Assen: Van Gorcum and Company; Dickson, A. (2000). 'Bridging the Gap: Great Expectations for 
EU Development Co-operation Policies'. Current Politics and Economics of Europe. 9(3), pp. 275-296. 
7 7 6 European Commission (2001). The European Union's Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation 
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good governance, defined as the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic 
and financial resources for the purpose of equitable and sustainable development'.777 There is an 
explicit focus on corruption778 in the agreement with the ACP countries in this document; however, it 
also mentions good governance in relation to its agreements with Mediterranean countries, the Western 
Balkans and the Tacis (Eastern Europe and Central Asia) Region, but not corruption specifically. 
Only the EU's work with the ACP countries compares to the work done by the World Bank. 
Despite the rhetoric of 'partnership', Cotonou is more like a traditional donor-recipient relationship 
than Lome in the 1970s and 1980s, and certainly more so than the EU's relationship with other regions. 
This could explain why the existing literature is more open about dealing with corruption through 
Cotonou. 
EU-ACP co-operation includes: 
• 'a deeper dialogue with - and within - the ACP countries on human rights, democratic 
principles, the rule of law and good governance; 
• greater support in priority areas, including the drafting and introduction of measures to prevent 
and combat corruption'. 7 7 9 
These measures including 'criminalising international corruption, abolishing tax deductibility for 
bribes, making public procurement procedures more transparent and the effectiveness of the accounting 
rules.' 7 8 0 There is also the insistence that anti-corruption work 'should also be about creating special 
programmes for the vulnerable. It is not simply about setting up "democratic" mechanisms to facilitate 
for investors and financial and credit markets'.781 However, there is, at this time, little evidence 
available of work on the ground or how the EU's policy will translate into action. 
Nordic and Other Like -Minded Donors 
Several donor countries often work together on important issues because of a sense of shared 
values. They often draw on each other's work, making reference to it in annual reports and speeches, 
drawing attention to their shared uniqueness. In addition, unlike the US and UK, they share Executive 
in Third Countries. COM(2001)252 final, 8 May, Brussels, pp. 4-5. 
7 7 7 European Commission (2001). The European Union's Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation 
in Third Countries, p. 23. 
7 7 8 Corruption is defined by the EU as, 'any abuse of power or impropriety in the decision-making process brought 
about by some undue inducement or benefit'. European Commission (1997). 'Communication for the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament on a Union Policy Against Corruption'. COM(97)192 final, 21 May. 
7 7 9 European Commission (1998). 'Democratisation, State of Law: Action Plan'. From the 'Communication for the 
Commission on Democratisation, the Rule of Law, Respect for Human Rights and Good Governance: The 
Challenges of the Partnership Between the European Union and the ACP States'. COM(98)146? final, 12 March. 
7 8 0 European Commission (1998). 'Democratisation, State of Law: Action Plan'. See also, European Commission 
(1998). 'Commission Communication on Directives for the Negotiation of a New Development Partnership 
Agreement with the ACP Countries'. SEC(98)119, 28 January. 
7 8 1 Williams, M. (1999). 'The Lome Convention and Sustainable Human Development'. Internet. Accessed 9 
November. Available at http://www.eurosur.org/wide/lome5.htm. 
169 
Directors and voting power in the World Bank and have to act collectively to have any impact on Bank 
activities. Because of this, I have chosen to study these countries together: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
Norway, the Netherlands, Ireland and Switzerland. 
Each of the countries studied considers good governance to be one of the most important 
factors in alleviating poverty and promoting sustainable development. Definitions vary slightly, but 
most agree with Denmark, which states that good governance 'includes the creation of transparency, 
openness, and responsibility in political and administrative decision-making processes. The population 
must be guaranteed access to information on the decisions made by a country's authorities to ensure 
inter alia that resources are applied according to the needs of the population'.7 8 2 Irish Aid insists that 
good governance is vital, because 'development is about freedom and dignity as well as material well-
being'. 7 8 3 Human rights and democratisation, necessary components of good governance, are seen as 
essential to the growth of functioning civil societies. Finland insists that good governance will help 
reduce causes of conflicts and inequality, and promotes democracy by 'supporting the organisation of 
elections, the development of legislation and justice systems...better and more transparent governance, 
free media, freely operating organisations and human rights training'. 7 8 4 
Switzerland's policy includes positive measures, such as election support and the 
strengthening of legal and administrative structures, policy dialogue with partner countries, and even 
direct conditionality.785 NORAD also stresses the importance of 'active and informed dialogue 
with.. .partner countries' to develop a 'better reciprocal understanding' of good governance, and to 
ensure the support of the Norwegian people.7 8 6 SIDA defines its approach as providing 'support to 
those parts of the public sector and civil society which constitute the foundations of democracy, respect 
for human rights and good governance'.787 
The literature consulted contains several examples of these policies at work. DANIDA granted 
Mozambique US$8.62 million in 1996, for judicial reform, renovation of twenty district courts, and 
further education for judges and defence lawyers. In Uganda, DANIDA provided assistance to human 
rights groups, as well as support for the judicial system and civil service, decentralisation efforts, 
public auditing, and reform of the public sector. In Vietnam, it granted US$6.21 million for reform of 
the judicial system, in partnership with UNDP, in order to promote human rights and 
democratisation.788 In Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Uganda, Irish Aid included measures in its 
programmes to promote accountability at the local level, while in Tanzania it supported the local 
government reform programme to make it more accountable.789 Finland co-operated with UNDP in 
7 8 2 DANIDA (1997). Denmark's Development Assistance 1996. Copenhagen: DANIDA. 
7 8 3 Ireland Aid (1997). Irish Aid: Ireland's Official Development Assistance 1997, Dublin: Ireland Aid. 
7 8 4 DIDC (1998). Finland's Development Policy. Helsinki: DIDC. 
7 8 5 SDC (1997). Development Co-operation: Annual Report 1997. Berne: SDC; SDC (1998). Promoting Human 
Rights in Development Co-operation. Berne: SDC. 
7 8 NORAD (1994). Support for Democratic Development. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
7 8 7 SIDA (1998). Annual Report 1997. Stockholm: SIDA. 
7 8 8 DANIDA (1997). Denmark's Development Assistance 1996. 
7 8 9 Ireland Aid (1997). Irish Aid. 
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Kenya to support legislative reforms and promote human rights and democracy. In Burkino Faso, it 
supported the 1997 parliamentary election via a group of fourteen NGOs, which supervised local 
elections and provided unbiased information to voters. Finland also suspended new projects in 
Zanzibar and Zambia due to questionable elections and lack of electoral transparency in 1995. 7 9 0 
Irish Aid alone does not mention corruption as part of good governance, preferring instead 
terms such as 'transparency' and 'accountability'. However, with the exception of Norway, scant 
attention was paid to it by the other countries as well, at least in public, until 1999-2000. Irish Aid 
continues to focus on human rights and democratisation, and has provided IR£175,000 to WBI, partly 
for work on good governance.791 Its annual report does refer to corruption, but only in the context of 
the then on-going Lome negotiations.792 But it remains the only donor studied which does not 
specifically offer support for anti-corruption work, choosing instead to focus on human rights and 
democratisation work. 
As far back as 1997, Finland indicated support for Tanzania's upcoming election, and for its 
human rights commission and anti-corruption drives. It also noted that pressure from the Nordic 
countries pushed into the IFIs' strategies: 'reducing poverty, advancement of environmental and social 
issues, and action against corruption in lending procedures'.793 A 1999 report contained extensive 
coverage of good governance, democracy and human rights, but did not mention corruption.794 In 2000, 
a report highlights corruption as an area of concern, in the overall context of good governance, but no 
action is indicated.795 Dr. Olli Ruohomaki, Advisor in the Unit for Sector Policy at DIDC, highlights 
some anti-corruption initiatives currently undertaken by the agency in Box 5.4. 
Box 5.4: Examples of projects funded or assisted by DIDC 
• Currently finalising 'Guidelines for Anti-Corruption in Finnish Development Co-
• operation' (published only in Finnish with an English translation planned in the future) 
• Supporting the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative, including the secondment of a legal expert 
• Providing core funding for TI-Berlin 
• Channelling financial support through UNDP to a programme called Strengthening Capacities to 
Combat Corruption in Tanzania 
• Tackling corruption issues as part of its political dialogue with its partner countries 
• Allocating small grants through embassies in selected developing countries for local civil service 
initiatives aimed at anti-corruption advocacy 
• Actively promoting transparency within the EU and other multilateral organisations. 
7 9 0 DIDC (1998). Finland's Development Policy. 
7 9 1 Ireland Aid (2000). Ireland's Overseas Development Aid 1999. Dublin: Ireland Aid, p. 61. 
7 9 2 Ireland Aid (2000). Ireland's Overseas Development Aid 1999, p. 11. 
7 9 3 DIDC (1998). Finland's Development Policy. 
7 9 4 DIDC (1999). Finland's Policy on Relations with Developing Countries. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
7 9 5 DIDC (2000). Democracy and Human Rights: A pathway to peace and development. Helsinki: Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, p. 10. 
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Ruohomaki sees two areas in particular growing in importance: financial management and 
civil society. 'As sector-wide programming and budget support becomes an increasingly common 
modality for channelling aid, more attention needs to be placed on the fiduciary system of the partner 
countries' sector ministries. Hence, it is envisaged that work needs to be done to support the capacity 
building of financial accounting systems. Concomitantly, we place an importance on strengthening the 
role of civil society as an integral part of a functioning democracy'.797 He does not provide specific 
examples however. 
DANIDA explains that 'widespread corruption and lack of determination on the part of the 
government to enter into a dialogue with the opposition and grassroots movements' caused it to cut 
back Kenya's assistance. For remaining projects in Kenya, DANIDA keeps a tight control on its 
resources, usually channelling funds and such directly to individual projects. I also mentions of 
Tanzania's President Mkapa's commitment to combating corruption, but indicates no direct DANIDA 
support.798 Its 1999 annual report describes anti-corruption work as part of its strategy to promote 
democracy and human rights, with corruption 'occurfing] in the context of a lack of development'.799 It 
gave almost $105 million to democracy, human rights and good governance projects in 1999, seven 
percent of its total aid budget.800 
Partnership is a key concept for DANIDA's support. In building partnerships, it requires the 
recipient to pursue appropriate anti-corruption measures, among other things, which 'live up to our 
expectations'.801 Success will be rewarded with increased funding, and failure could be punished by 
sanctions. In Africa, 'The widespread corruption.. .gives cause for deep concern and is having a 
destructive effect on long-term development work. In co-operation with partners in the programme 
countries, Denmark will identify initiatives that can help to combat corruption and remedy tins 
unacceptable state of affairs ' . 8 0 2 It also claims a key role in bringing about the World Bank's new focus 
on corruption 8 0 3 DANIDA's language here is strong - almost scolding. The rhetoric of partnership 
seems incongruous with its language of conditionality. 
The same can be said of Finland's literature on good governance, in which it explains that in 
dealing with good governance, it will provide an open dialogue and advance international visibility of 
the issue, promote participation projects, ensure regular project assessment and reconsider those which 
are not attaining goals, and promote the status of women. It strongly promotes the concept of 
conditionality, stating, 
7 9 6 Ruohomaki, O. (2001). Email to the author. 3 September. 
7 9 7 Ruohomaki, O. (2001). Email to the author. 3 September. 
7 9 8 DANIDA (1997). Denmark's Development Assistance!996. 
7 9 9 DANIDA (2000). Denmark's Development Assistance 1999. Copenhagen: Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
8 0 0 DANIDA (2000). Denmark's Development Assistance Facts & Figures. Pamphlet. Copenhagen: Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs. 
8 0 1 DANIDA (2000). Denmark's Development Policy: Analysis. Copenhagen: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, p. 6 
(emphasis added). 
8 0 2 DANIDA (2000). Denmark's Development Policy, p. 38. 
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The conditionality of development aid - even in Africa - is primarily a pro-active means 
of influencing the structuring of a democratic society. Development aid advances the 
promotion of a favourable operating environment in the target countries. 
Conditionalisation means supporting the sectors that are expected to advance Finland's 
goals best. I f the political situation does not meet the requirements concerning 
democracy and respect for human rights set for partner countries, or i f the economic 
environment is unable to utilise external aid, Finland may conditionalise its aid by 
freezing or interrupting its donations.804 
Here we have reference to influencing the democratic process, Finland's goals rather than recipient 
goals and sanctions. There is, however, no direct reference to corruption. 
In 1997, Switzerland indicated its support for international anti-corruption strategies, 
explaining, 'Corruption is endemic in many countries and multilateral institutions are undertaking great 
efforts to verify the utilisation of their funds. Switzerland supports the efforts made by the OECD to 
compile codes of conduct concerning the fight against corruption in the industrialised countries'.805 It 
now has a Governance Division up and running, and has developed guidelines on combating 
corruption.806 Currently, its anti-corruption work is implemented at two levels: operational and 
thematic. 
At the operational level, SDC explains that the work varies depending on the type of 
operation. 'When the focus is on a project-approach, we are ensuring corruption-free activities through 
direct supervision of activities and resources or the indirect supervision by a supporting agency. In 
programme-approaches and general or earmarked budget support, emphasis is put on harmonisation of 
procedures between donor partners and governments, for instance, for procurement, budgeting and/or 
expenditure tracking'. 8 0 7 
At the thematic level, the Governance Division focuses on information sharing to identify best 
practices and networking with 'like-minded competence centres or agencies.'808 SDC also actively 
participates in international meetings to set global standards, such as the ICC Rules of Conduct and the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
The Dutch, apparent newcomers in the fight against corruption, have taken a unique role in 
this work. They do no work of their own on the ground, preferring instead to use multilateral channels 
DAN IDA (2000). Denmark's Development Policy, p. 92. 
DIDC (1998). Finland's Development Policy. 
SDC (1997). Development Co-operation 
SDC (1998). Combating Corruption: Guidelines. Bern: SDC. 
Burki, O. (2001). Email to the author. 15 November. 
Burki, O. (2001). Email to the author. 15 November. 
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for good governance work, including corruption. Instead, they focus on influencing the international 
debate, by hosting the workshop 'The Role of Bilateral Donors in Fighting Corruption' 8 1 0 and the 
'Global Forum on Fighting Corruption & Safeguarding Integrity I I ' , 8 " attended by the IFIs, 
governments, NGOs and anti-corruption experts, and especially through the Utstein Group, where they 
'namen hiermee het initiatief om corruptie op de internationale ontwikkelingsagenda te zetten'.8 1 2 
Norway stands alone in paying a great deal of attention to corruption throughout the entire 
period in the literature consulted. As far back as 1994, it identified local factors to take into account 
when designing a development co-operation strategy, which include, 'economic policies, growth and 
distribution (including taxation policies), the openness, skills, and capacity of the administration, the 
degree of corruption, and respect for democracy and human rights'. 8 1 3 Corruption was seen as a 
political (as opposed to economic) condition which affected NORAD's policies, stating, 'Public 
administration in many countries has...been seriously weakened by increasing inefficiency and 
corruption'. Finally, it described corruption as a 'threat to the rights of the individual, respect for law 
and order, and.. .economic growth'. 8 1 4 It the 1994 report, NORAD highlighted incidences of corruption 
in Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, and Nepal, but did not provide 
evidence of any direct support given by NORAD to anti-corruption strategies, nor did it indicate direct 
condemnation of such examples. 
Speaking to Parliament in May 1999, Hilde Frafjord Johnson, Minister of International 
Development and Human rights, set out a six-point 'Norwegian offensive' against corruption: 
• 'NORAD will become an international front-line organisation in the battle against corruption. 
• Corruption wil l be put on the agenda in our dialogues with our partner countries. 
• We will provide assistance to our partner countries in the battle against corruption. 
• International efforts to combat corruption must be better co-ordinated, more systematic and 
more effective. 
• NGOs must be drawn into the battle against corruption. 
• Sanctions will be imposed i f necessary.'815 
Like DANIDA, the language here is strong, punitive and quite unexpected in tone for a Nordic donor 
country. 
Minbuza (2001). 'Venturing against poverty: Policy memorandum on private sector development and poverty 
alleviation'. Internet. Accessed 20 June. Available at 
http://www.minbuza.nl/english/menu.asp?Key=414054&Pad=257572. 
8 1 0 Held in Maastricht, 25-27 April 2000. 
8 1 1 Held in The Hague, 28-31 May 2001. See http://www.gfcorruption.org. 
8 1 2 In English, 'took the initiative to put corruption on the international development agenda'. Minbuza (2001). 
Jaarverslag 2000 Internationale Samenwerking. Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. I am grateful to 
Dr. Anne-Sophie Darlington for her assistance with translation. See also, Minbuza (2001). 'Fact sheet'. 
8 1 3 NORAD (1994). Support for Democratic Development. 
8 1 4 NORAD (1994). Support for Democratic Development. 
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Director-General of NORAD, Tove Strand, has said, 'we have to make the fight against 
corruption a central element in all our assistance'.816 She indicates three objectives for its anti-
corruption plan: 
1. 'Intensify Norwegian assistance to good governance and the fight against corruption in our 
partner countries. 
2. Increase awareness and knowledge in the aid administration on how to prevent corruption 
in all of Norwegian-funded development co-operation. 
3. Establish mechanisms for systematic collection, analysis and dissemination of experiences 
drawn from efforts at preventing and combating corruption.' 8 1 7 
NORAD's work on corruption is now much more explicit and systematic. In February 2000, it 
launched its Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Action Plan and appointed 
Mette Masst to run it. NORAD refers to her as its 'corruption hunter'.8 1 8 This work is part of 
NORAD's overall work on peace, democracy and human rights, with a budget this year of NOK506.6 
million, almost ten percent of the budget total. 8 1 9 There is also an additional NOK1.25 billion budgeted 
over the next few years for specific work to improve transparency820 although the report does not 
indicate what kinds of projects will be funded with this money. Furthermore, this work is to be scaled 
down, from a discrete sector to an integrated part of NORAD's divisions and embassies' work. 8 2 1 
There are many similarities in these countries' approach towards development: a commit ment 
to poverty alleviation, a dedication to helping the world's poorest people, an acknowledgement of the 
value of dialogue, and the desire to create a cohesive sectoral policy. They also share a dedication to 
the promotion of good governance as a necessary factor in creating equitable, sustainable development. 
They do diverge when it comes to methods of ensuring a partner country's commitment to such 
policies, and they also diverge when it comes to the issue of corruption. Early on, with the exception of 
Norway, the remaining countries seemed hesitant to address the issue in a direct manner, falling back 
on terms like 'transparent' and 'accountable' government. The current environment encouraged these 
donors to establish publicly a more pro-active stance on the issue. 
This group of donors has historically been seen as more compassionate and less politicised 
than other donors, especially USAID. This has always been seen as its comparative advantage. 
Developing countries have had more confidence that these countries are truly interested in providing 
assistance, without a hidden (or not so hidden) political or economic agenda. They have been at the 
forefront of the efforts to improve human rights in its partner countries, but have been, for the most 
1 5 NORAD (2000). NORAD's Good Governance & Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2000-2001, p. 6. 
1 6 NORAD (2000). NORAD's Good Governance & Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2000-2001, p. 3. 
1 7 NORAD (2000). NORAD's Good Governance & Anti-Corruption Action Plan 2000-2001, p. 6. 
1 8 NORAD (2001). Annual Report 2001. Oslo: NORAD, p. 18. 
1 9 NORAD (2001). Annual Report 2001, p. 11. 
2 0 NORAD (2001). Annual Report 2001, p. 19. 
2 1 Gjelten, M. (2001). Email to the author. 22 October. 
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part, slow to embrace the anti-corruption agenda. Now that it has been institutionalised in most of these 
agencies, the language has, by and large, become more rigid, more punitive and more 'top-down', 
rather than a dialogue between equal partners. This raises the question of how this approach impacts on 
the comparative advantage in anti-corruption work claimed by some of these countries. 
Evaluation of Donor Claims of Comparative Advantage in Fighting Corruption 
USAID 
USAID claims that its comparative advantage in fighting corruption lies in its work with civil 
society.822 It is often argued that the US's advantage is rooted in its Tocquevillian grassroots tradition. 
'For the United States at least, civil society assistance is explained as a natural extrapolation cf 
domestic experience'.823 This does not withstand closer scrutiny. The US was not committed to support 
for general grassroots movements during the Cold War in the fear that leftist movements would prevail. 
It was only in countries with leftist regimes that the US supported civil society in order to challenge 
communist rule. When the Berlin Wall fell, all donors saw how civil society has the potential to bring 
about democratic change. Civil society thus became a major part of all donors' democratisation 
programmes. According to Ottaway and Carothers, 'The fact that many West European donors, who 
do not draw upon American-style Tocquevillian traditions, have gravitated to very much the same sort 
of civil society aid programs as the United States further casts doubts on the Tocqueville factor as a 
determining causal explanation'.824 
Despite the fact that many donors themselves do not fit the 'weak state/strong society' model 
found in the US, it is the goal of their work in developing countries, especially with civil society and 
decentralisation. The fact that European countries do this kind of work could be construed simply as 
evidence of the 'herd behaviour' Cassen describes is prevalent in donor work, 8 2 5 rather than providing 
an argument against the American claim to exceptionalism. Nonetheless, most donors have the same 
level of experience as the US with civil society work in the field, especially in the last decade, and 
USAID is unlikely to have any advantage over other donors. 
There is one area where USAID can clearly argue that it has a comparative advantage. The US 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was passed in 1977, making certain payments illegal for 
Nagle and Mahr define civil society as 'the space between the individual and the state. More important is the 
nature of the organisations and institutions, both independent and parastatal, which occupy that space and issues of 
utilisation and control of these mechanisms in the policy process'. Nagle, J. & Mahr, A. (1999). Democracy and 
Democratisation: Post-Communist Europe in Comparative Perspective. London: Sage Publications Ltd., p. 64. 
8 2 3 Carothers, T. & Ottaway, M. (2000). 'The Burgeoning World of Civil Society Aid'. In Ottaway, M. & 
Carothers, T. (eds). Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion. Washington DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, p. 6. 
8 2 4 Carothers, T. & Ottaway, M. (2000). 'The Burgeoning World of Civil Society Aid', p. 7. 
8 2 5 Cassen, R. (1994). Does Aid Work?, p. 177. 
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American companies doing business overseas. It was introduced in response to the Lockheed 
scandal, when it became clear that several US companies were involved in foreign bribery, as well as 
contributing large sums to foreign political parties in order to influence local governments. The FCPA 
was unique in that unlike other countries' laws regarding corruption, it made bribery by US citizens 
and employees of US-owned companies a criminal act, and made all questionable foreign payments 
subject to disclosure. It was established to protect American foreign interests overseas and its 
reputation, as well as to protect the natural workings of the free market.827 In 1994, the US sponsored 
the OECD Recommendation on Bribery in International Business Transactions to encourage member 
states to 'take concrete and meaningful steps' to eliminate bribery of foreign officials. 8 2 8 This became 
the 'OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions', which was adopted on 15 February 1999. 8 2 9 
One way USAID could work on corruption would be to strengthen its work with the private 
sector in its recipient countries, by encouraging companies to sign up to the OECD convention, helping 
draft anti-bribery legislation and supporting efforts to investigate and prosecute those companies and 
individuals who break anti-bribery laws. USAID has long supported private sector work, calling it 'the 
most efficient means of achieving broad-based economic development'.830 The World Bank does not 
currently incorporate the private sector into its work on corruption, instead focusing on the public 
sector, presumably because it is required to lend only to governments. USAID could thus focus on the 
'supply-side' of corruption (bribe-givers) while the Bank could focus on the 'demand-side' (bribe-
takers). 
See http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/; Jacoby, N., Nehemkis, P. & Eells, R. (1977). Bribery and 
Extortion in World Business: A Study of Corporate Political Payments Abroad. New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Co., Inc.; Kolthoff, E. (1993). 'Looking Into the Future: The Control of Corruption in a Perspective of Growing 
Internationalization'. Corruption and Reform. 7(2), pp. 105-109; Rosenthal, M. (1989). 'An American Attempt to 
Control International Corruption'. In Heidenheimer, A., Johnston, M. & LeVine V. (eds). Political Corruption: A 
Handbook. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 701-715; Sobel, L. (1977). Corruption in Business. 
New York: Facts on File, Inc.; US Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee National Export Strategy. (1996). 
Toward the Next American Century: A U.S. Strategic Response to Foreign Competitive Practices. Fourth Annual 
Report to the United States Congress. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
8 2 7 Critics at the time believed that the FCPA would drastically harm American companies' competitiveness 
abroad. Congress decided that the potential economic damage to exports would be minimal, and that the only 
companies who would be hurt would be those whose only means of competing was through the payment of bribes. 
Rosenthal, M. (1989). 'An American Attempt to Control International Corruption', p. 710. There has been some 
negative impact on American exporters. In 1994, it was estimated that one hundred thirty-nine commercial 
contracts valued at US$64 billion were awarded through the use of bribery. US companies lost thirty-six of those 
contracts valued at US$11 billion. US Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee National Export Strategy. (1996). 
Toward the Next American Century,^. 7, 113,& 115. 
82S Trade p r o m o t i on Coordinating Committee National Export Strategy. Toward the Next American Century, p. 
115. 
8 2 9 OECD (1997). 'Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions'. Internet. Accessed December 1998. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/bribery/20nov 1 e.htm. 




As we saw previously, DANIDA felt that UNDP did not have any comparative advantage in 
anti-corruption work, but rather that it 'has built up a comparative advantage in addressing 
comprehensive public expenditure accountability issues'.831 This incorporates assistance with systems 
of accounting, auditing and evaluation. According to a 1997 PACT project document, this includes: 
• Improvements to budget systems through better planning, expenditure management, 
training, information systems and audit functions. 
• Improvements to accounting systems through tetter trained accountants, modernised 
procedures and upgrading professional bodies of accountants.832 
These will enhance the quality of audits, in order to ensure that public funds are spent as authorised. 
However, with a current overall budget of $1.25 million, this work would need major new resources to 
become viable. Without it, it is difficult to see a distinctive role for UNDP in anti-corruption work. 
This work would fit in well with the Bank's existing work on financial management, which 
lacks the depth of its work on procurement. The Bank could continue to produce its diagnosis of a 
country's private and public financial management systems through the CFAA, but UNDP could step 
in to follow-up with improvements. However, with a current overall budget of $1.25 million, this work 
would need major new resources to become viable. Without it, it is difficult to see a distinctive role for 
UNDP in anti-corruption work. 
Indeed, the DANIDA evaluation referred to a database or inventory of UN projects on anti-
corruption. Unfortunately, this was stored on a laptop, which was stolen, and no backup copies had 
been made. PACT is currently working on rebuilding this database, with forty entered and 
approximately sixty to go. The target for completion was March 2000, but resource restrictions 
(especially personnel) have meant that it remains a work in progress.833 This situation serves to 
illustrate the lack of capacity at PACT, in terms of both knowledge and resources. It is unclear how 
any agency funded to compile a database would not know or not think about saving it onto a floppy 
disk and why this work is still unfinished over one and a half years after the original target date. This 
rather embarrassing story serves to highlight PACT'S inadequate capacity, and it could be argued that it 
would be more appropriate for UNDP to step aside and let better-resourced agencies conduct this work. 
8 3 1 DANIDA (1999). Evaluation Report, p. 27. 
8 3 2 UNDP (1997). 'Regional Strategy for Financial Accountability in Governance'. Internet. Accessed 23 July 
2001. Available at http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/efa/BRATIS%7El.html. 
8 3 3 Tamesis, P. (2001). Email to the author. 19 June. 
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DflD 
It is even more difficult to find an area of comparative advantage for DflD. It has no history of 
work on corruption and has come into it very late in the game. It does not have an extensive history of 
work on civil service reform, financial management, elections monitoring, and so on. The UK does 
however have a long history of involvement in off-shore banking centres. Of the seventeen countries 
listed by the FATF as non-co-operative, six are Commonwealth countries.834 However, Britain has 
been criticised for refusing to allow FATF to include its offshore dependencies - Guernsey, Jersey, the 
Isle of Man, the British Virgin Islands and Gibraltar - on this list . 8 3 5 I f it were to fully embrace the fight 
against money laundering, DfTD, working in conjunction with the Foreign Office, could have a strong 
role to play in supporting anti-money laundering initiatives in its recipient countries. This would 
complement USAID's work with the private sector, impacting on the 'supply-side' of corruption, by 
eliminating the places to hide moneys garnered by corrupt means. 
EU 
Likewise, the EU does not have a discernible comparative advantage in anti-corruption work. 
Its advantage as a donor lies in its tradition of dialogue and partnership, especially within the context of 
the Lome agreement. It has little experience with building institutional capacity and there is no reason 
for the EU to make this a key focus for its development work. 8 3 6 In addition, the corruption scandals 
that rocked the Commission in 1999 included extensive corruption within its own aid programme.837 
This brings into question the EU's mandate in consulting on institutional capacity when it clearly lacks 
it as an institution itself. Perhaps the EU would be better advised to re-build its own reputation and to 
ensure the integrity of its own funds, rather than trying to advise recipients on how to avoid corruption. 
FATF (2001). Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories: Increasing the Worldwide 
Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures. Paris: OECD, p. 4. The full list includes the Cook Islands 
(New Zealand - Commonwealth); Dominica (Commonwealth); Egypt; Guatemala; Hungary; Indonesia; Israel; 
Lebanon; Marshall Islands; Myanmar; Nauru; Nigeria (Commonwealth); Niue (New Zealand - Commonwealth); 
Philippines; Russia; St. Kitts and Nevis (Commonwealth); and St. Vincent and the Grenadines (Commonwealth). 
8 3 5 Komisar, L. (2001). 'After Dirty Air, Dirty Money'. The Nation. 18 June. 
8 3 6 The focus areas for EU aid include the link between trade and development; regional integration and co-
operation; support for macro-economic policies and the promotion of equitable access to social services; transport; 
food security and sustainable rural development; and institutional capacity-building, including good governance. 
EU (2001). 'The European Community's Development Policy - Statement by the Council and the Commission'. 
Internet. Accessed 23 July 2001. Available at 
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the fall of the European Commission 1999'. Crime, Law & Social Change. 31(3), pp. 193-208; Van Buitenen, P. 
(2000). Blowing the Whistle: One Man's Fight Against Fraud in the European Commission. London: Politico; 
Stichting Sociale Databank Nederland (2001). 'Het rapport van Paul van Buitenen over fraude van Europese 
functionarissen: How the European Commission deals with its internal irregularities and fraud'. Internet. Accessed 
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bill'. Internet. 19 November. Accessed 26 July 2001. Available at 
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Nordic and Other like -Minded Countries 
As with the EU, Nordic and like-minded countries have been known for their 'unselfish' and 
'generous' approaches to aid, and for their commitment to partnership and dialogue.838 Many of the 
donors, especially NORAD and DANIDA, have become increasingly paternalistic in their discourse on 
corruption, threatening sanctions unless their expectations and conditions have been met. No one would 
deny these organisations the right to ensure that their funds are spent as authorised, but this new 
'tough' approach does not sit well with their established reputations, which is where these 
organisations' comparative advantage as institutions lies. However, it does reflect the increasing 
emphasis on structural adjustment within Nordic aid programmes h the 1990s and also an increasing 
conservatism within Nordic politics in general.839 
This dichotomy has been noted in relation to the Nordics' concern with human rights and 
democratisation. Diamond refers to these donors as 'broad-based overseas development organisations, 
which have added democracy promotion onto more traditional development assistance'.840 This has 
been done without 'evidence of any strategic thinking in regard to their assistance to this sector of the 
policy'. 8 4 1 In an article on the Netherlands and Indonesia, Baehr argues that the joint objectives of the 
promotion and protection of human rights and in supporting the poorest countries with aid might come 
into conflict with one another, and do so regularly.8 4 2 In the case of Indonesia, Baehr questions the 
significance of the Netherlands use of conditionality in 1992, following Indonesia's human rights 
violations in East Timor. The amount of aid given by the Netherlands was so small that its efforts were 
ineffective in bringing about change.843 Even working together, the total amount of aid given by the 
Nordic and other like-minded countries only equals approximately twenty percent of total aid given by 
bilaterals in 1999.8 4 4 There is thus little evidence that a strong stance by the Nordics on corruption will 
have the desired outcome on the policies of aid recipients. 
8 3 8 Cassen, R. (1994). Does Aid Work?, p. 208; Mosley, P. (1987). Overseas Aid, p. 29. 
8 3 9 See NORAD (2001). Annual Report 2001; DANIDA (2000). Denmark's Development Policy, SIDA (2000). 
Annual Report Stockholm: SIDA; Bower, B. (2001). 'New Challenges to the Nordic Welfare Model'. CATO 
Policy Report. XXIII(3), pp. 1, 12-14; Betz, H-G & ImmerfaU, S. (eds) (1998). The New Politics of the Right: neo-
Populist parties and movements in established democracies. New York: St. Martin's Press; Andersen, G., 
Bjarkland, T. (2000). 'Radical Right-Wing Populism in Scandinavia: from tax revolt to neo-liberalism and 
xenophobia'. In Hainsworth, P. (eds). The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margin to the Mainstream. 
London: Pinter, pp. 193-223. 
8 4 0 Cited in Hearn, J. & Robinson, M. (2000). 'Civil Society and Democracy Assistance in Africa'. In Burnell, P. 
(ed). Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization. London: Frank Cass Publishers, p. 
252. Original: Diamond, L. (1997). Prospects for Democratic Development in Africa. Stanford: Hoover Institution 
on War, Revolution and Peace, p. 52, note 61. 
8 4 1 Hearn, J. & Robinson, M. (2000). 'Civil Society and Democracy Assistance in Africa', p. 252. 
8 4 2 Baehr, P. (1997). 'Problems of aid conditionality: The Netherlands and Indonesia'. Third World Quarterly. 
18(2), pp. 363-376. 
8 4 3 Baehr, P. (1997). 'Problems of aid conditionality', p. 374. 
8 4 4 OECD (2001). 'Development Assistance Committee International Development Statistics'. Internet. Accessed 
26 July. Available at http://www.oecd.Org/dac/htm/dacstats.htm#DCR2000. 
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This does not mean that there is no role for these donors to play in anti-corruption work. 
Their unique character allows them to participate in discussions with recipient countries on subjects 
that may be too delicate for other donors to broach, including anti-corruption work. Their use of grants 
rather than loans could allow the donors to help countries experiment with methods that may, or may 
not, reduce corruption. This could include training for journalists, educational theatre, support for 
watchdogs or ombudsmen, and so on. Results of these projects may be difficult to quantify, but costs 
are relatively low in comparison to support for public sector reform projects, for example. Working 
within a framework for co-ordination, such as the Utstein Group, these donors could offer one-off, 
small-scale support for such projects. 
The World Bank 
This thesis has argued that the World Bank's work on corruption is both unwieldy and, in 
parts, violates its non-political mandate. This does not mean that it should abandon the work as a 
whole, but rather it should systematically evaluate the usefulness of each part of it, preferably under the 
rubric of a new Vice-President. Based on the research conducted for this thesis, a number of measures 
for the World Bank to take forward can be identified. 
All donors have the responsibility to their tax-payers and to their recipients (especially when 
funding is in the form of loans) to ensure that the funds disbursed are spent as planned. Indeed, the 
Bank's Articles of Agreement demand this. The Bank's work on minimising corruption in its own 
projects is an important step forward. The Bank publicly accepts that its own work is not immune from 
corruption and that it has an obligation to its stakeholders to ensure that opportunities for corruption are 
minimised. This put the onus on other donors to show the same commitment within their own work. In 
doing so, the Bank has acknowledged the role that donors have played in helping to foster corruption in 
developing countries. 
There are critics who argue that because of the symbiotic relationship between aid and 
corruption, donors are not well-placed to combat it. Cooksey claims that because aid is caught up in 
corruption, it 'is not a problem that aid agencies can solve.. .with more aid' of the same kind. 8 4 5 Indeed, 
because aid so often is implicated in corruption scandals, more aid is exactly what the problem does not 
need. He argues that the status quo is unlikely to change, regardless of the Bank's efforts, for several 
reasons: because the Bank itself has 'a lot to hide, including corruption'; really tackling corruption 
would require a reduction in overall aid, the Bank's raison d'etre; and it requires admitting to failure at 
a time when many criticise the Bank's credibility, from conservative politicians in the US seeking to 
cut the Bank's funding to left-wing anti-capitalist groups protesting at the Bank's annual meetings.846 
Cooksey, B. (1999). 'Do Aid Agencies Have a Comparative Advantage in Fighting Corruption in Africa?', p. 2. 
Cooksey, B. (1999). 'Do Aid Agencies Have a Comparative Advantage in Fitting Corruption in Africa?', p. 3. 
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In addition to the charge that aid funds themselves can be targets for corruption, donors have 
been criticised for fostering adjustment policies that are open to widespread corrupt practices.847 Two 
areas singled out as 'high risk' are decentralisation and privatisation. Decentralisation is intended to 
bring political power and decision-making closer to the people, but it can also create an entirely new 
level of bureaucrats who may demand bribes or mismanage funds. Privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises has been open to all kinds of corruption, fro m the undervaluing of capital goods and shares 
to non-transparent bidding procedures. The Bank has accepted that these programmes have proven 
problematic, but blames failures on a lack of capacity within the countries themselves, rather than 
flawed adjustment programmes. In a report on corruption in transition countries, the Bank blames the 
high levels of 'state capture"848 on 'partial political and economic reforms'. 8 4 9 It is, once again, the 
inadequacy of the state in implementing these programmes, rather than the programmes themselves, 
that is to blame for the increased levels of corruption. Ultimately, according to the report, 'progress' in 
reform will have a 'powerful impact in reducing state capture',850 but it does not address the social and 
political costs in the interim. 
Despite these criticisms, it is unlikely that the Bank's work will ever be completely free from 
corruption, and the Bank itself acknowledges this. The sums involved are too large to put off all 
unscrupulous types. However, it can do what it can to strengthen its own systems of oversight and is 
doing so, as Chapter Four explained, focusing primarily on procurement and auditing, as well as 
strengthening its investigation and reporting procedures. It is vital that this work continues, and looks 
to be strengthened through the new Department of Institutional Integrity. 
In an earlier chapter, I expressed concern about the quality of the Bank's research on 
corruption and the manner in which it is used. However, it could be argued that a massive reduction in 
the Bank's programme, where it focuses on its own auditing and procurement procedures and discards 
its work on helping countries fight corruption, would remove the need for it to justify its anti-
corruption work through its own research. Indeed, the Bank has a tremendous amount of resources 
available for research - more than any other single institution - and several of the brightest minds in 
economics. In the early 1990s, it appeared that the Bank was interested in a more diverse subject base, 
commissioning research by the political scientist and expert on corruption, Michael Johnston, for 
In particular, see Harriss-White, B. & White, G. (1996). 'Corruption, Liberalisation and Democracy'. IDS 
Bulletin, 27(2), pp. 1-5; Hawley, S. (2000). 'Exporting Corruption: Privatisation, Multinationals and Bribery'. The 
Corner House Briefing No. 19, June; Haggard, S. & Kaufman, R. (eds) (1992). The Politics of Economic 
Adjustment. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Watt, D, Flanary, R. & Theobald, R. (2000). 'Democratisation 
or the Democratisation of Corruption? The Case of Uganda'. In Doig, A. & Theobald, R. (eds). Corruption and 
Democratisation. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., pp. 37-64; Bayart, J-F, Ellis, S. & Hibou, B. (1999). The 
Criminalisation of the State in Africa. Oxford: James Currey; Riley, S. (1998). The Political Economy of Anti-
Corruption Strategies in Africa'. In Robinson, M. (ed). Corruption and Development. London: Frank Cass 
Publishers, pp. 129-159. 
8 4 8 Defined by the report as 'the actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the public and private sectors to 
influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees, and other government policies to their own advantage as a 
result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials'. World Bank (2000). 
Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate. Washington DC: World Bank, p. xv (emphasis 
in original). 
8 4 9 World Bank (2000). Anticorruption in Transition, p. 32. 
8 5 0 World Bank (2000). Anticorruption in Transition, p. 32. 
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exam pie . 8 x ' However, as the complexity and breadth of its own prograrnme grew, its own research base 
narrowed. IF it were to retbcus its current research portfolio and fund more research in other fields -
political science, sociology, anthropology and so on - it is possible that it could produce a broader 
range of new material that could be used by the recipients themselves in truly home-grown anti-
corruption initiatives. 
The Bank could also perhaps continue its sometimes controversial but long-standing work on 
public sector reform (PSR) (sometimes referred to as civil service reform [CSR]). As its 2000 strategy 
points out, "The World Bank has had a mixed record in public sector reform to date. Analysis by 
[Operations Evaluations Department] and [Quality Assurance Group], as well as the experience gained 
during the past decade by the Bank's operational staff, show the extensive breadth and depth of Bank 
involvement and effort, with both successes and failures as outcomes' . 8 5 4 The report also highlights 
specific criticisms: overly technocratic; 'best practice' models used without taking country-specific 
needs into account; short-term demands overtake long-term goals; and a shortage in staff ski l l s . 8 3 5 A 
review published by OED finds that 'only 33 percent of closed CSR interventions and 38 percent of 
ongoing efforts achieved satisfactory outcomes'. 8 5 6 
Figure 5.4: Mechanisms to Enhance State Capability: Three Drivers of Public 
Sector Reform 
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In response, the Bank has put forward a more comprehensive approach to PSR with three 
important mechanisms: internal rules and restraints, 'voice' and partnership and competition. This can 
be seen in Figure 5.4. This is a good start for a 'slimmed down' approach to anti-corruption, where the 
Bank focuses its resources on PSR. However, the Bank should perhaps limit its involvement, even 
here. Both the 'Voice and Partnership' mechanism and judicial independence should be left to bilateral 
donors with the mandate to work on political issues, which these certainly are. This leaves 'Rules and 
Restraints' and 'Competitive Pressures' for the Bank. Without an effective and capable civil service, 
other Bank work on corruption is unlikely to prove effective. Indeed, I was told by a senior World 
Bank staff member that there is a fear that the anti-corruption programme can become too big, seen as 
an end in itself. An alternative is for the Bank to go back to a PSR agenda, rather than an anti-
corruption one, with the ultimate goal of helping LDCs develop more effective government. 
It could also be argued that the Bank's work on decentralisation should be spun off indefinitely. 
Decentralisation requires capacity beyond the current ability of many LDCs and is too open to abuse. It 
should not be part of PSR until there is greater capacity at the national level. It is also too political for 
the Bank to tackle. In Guinea, for example, the Bank is currently funding two programmes: the Village 
Community Support Programme and the Capacity Building for Service Delivery Programme. 
Decentralisation is a key factor in both, in order to foster governance, fiscal and administrative reform, 
according to the Bank. In its own words, 
Politically, the representatives of the elected CRD councils [thirty-three decentralised 
urban and rural communes] is being enhanced by broadening their membership to 
include representatives from a wide range of social, cultural, ethnic and economic 
groupings. Furthermore, Prefecture Development Councils (PDCs) are being established, 
with membership elected by and accountable to CRDs, and authority to advise on 
programmes and budget trade-offs across CRDs. Increasingly, regional administrations 
will become accountable to these PDCs, and not just to the hierarchies of central 
government. 
There are several assumptions here about the ideal nature of government - closer to the public, 
accountable to all - that does not take into account its appropriateness in this particular setting. These 
are not technical or purely economic factors, but fundamentally political decisions about power and the 
nature of the state. The Bank does not have the mandate to conduct this sort of work, nor should it. 
The Bank has been very successful in bringing international attention to the issue. The Bank is 
the only donor with the kind of resources and scale to deliver this kind of impact. It agrees that its 
comparative advantage here lies with high-level policy dialogue.856 DfID also points to the Bank's 
August. 
8 5 5 World Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions & Strengthening Governance, p. 47 (emphasis in original). 
8 5 6 World Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions & Strengthening Governance, pp. 55-56. 
184 
advantage here, arguing that the Bank, in particular, has 'the clout they can bring at the highest 
levels'. 8 5 7 Pressure from the World Bank has significantly contributed to the efforts to combat the 
'supply-side' of corruption, resulting in, for example, the OECD anti-bribery convention, the TI Bribe 
Payers Survey, a higher profile for FATF's work on money laundering, attempts to standardise 
accounting practices world-wide, and a number of conferences and forums, all of which contribute to 
the growing international consensus on the developed world's role in corruption, an important step 
forward in the donor discourse. 
Conclusion: The Rhetoric of Comparative Advantage 
As this chapter has shown, it is difficult to see how donor rhetoric regarding comparative 
advantage in anti-corruption work translates into policy on the ground. The concept itself is very 
problematic. As argued by Dewald and Weder, it makes sense, fiscally and organisationally, for donors 
to fund work based on their particular strengths and leave areas where they are weak to others. 
However, that is not how aid works in reality. Donors involve themselves in areas like corruption for a 
number of reasons, and the reasons can rarely be explained by comparative advantage. Donors can 
thus be accused of inconsistency: they themselves point to the significance of comparative advantage, 
but rarely seem to have an understanding of the principle or apply it in practice. There are two 
solutions: either donors find their real areas of advantage and then fund projects appropriately, or they 
stop using the rhetoric of advantage and admit that they fund their particular anti-corruption projects 
for other more pragmatic reasons, despite the potential downfalls of this approach. In the meantime, we 
need to be cautious in evaluating claims for comparative advantage when there are political or other 
extraneous reasons for making such a claim. 
Mason, P. (2001). Email to the author. 22 June. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
This chapter will summarise the main findings of this thesis and set out the implications of the 
findings for the World Bank and its partners in combating corruption. 
Main Findings: Why and How the Bank Arrived at Its Position on Anti-Corruption 
This thesis started with two main research questions. Firstly, i f the Bank has long claimed that 
work on corruption was forbidden by its Articles of Agreement, how and why did it arrive at its current 
position? In this thesis, I have shown that it was the result of changes in both the theoretical and 
political environments, including a changing ideological climate following the end of the Cold War; 
external pressures from donor governments and NGOs; internal pressures from key Bank staff, 
especially its new president, James Wolfensohn; and also pragmatic institutional concerns. 
Up to the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the general consensus among academics, politicians 
and aid agencies was that democracy was a product of development and was unsustainable in a poor 
country. Moreover, it was believed that a strong, authoritarian government was a better facilitator of 
the sometimes painful development process, especially following the austerity measures imposed 
through structural adjustment. This changed, however, with the increasing importance of democratic 
peace theory, which argues that democracies do not go to war against other democracies and are more 
stable overall than authoritarian regimes. Stability has long been seen as key to the development 
process, and in fact was seen by Huntington as more significant than regime type. 8 5 8 
At the same time, the political environment in which the Bank operated changed dramatically 
following the end of the Cold War. Support for authoritarian regimes dried up when bilateral donors no 
longer needed their support to provide a bulwark against communism. The 'peace dividend' that was 
predicted never appeared, and aid budgets decreased in the post-Cold War period. Some governments 
in developed countries combined 'aid fatigue' with a renewed interest in human rights and demanded 
less aid spent better. Many critics in academia and NGOs denounced the Bank practice of providing 
support for repressive regimes. Finally, many LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Asia 
chose to democratise in the immediate post-Cold War period, and the Bank had to change the way it 
operated and rationalised its programmes to take all of this into account. 
Finally, there were pragmatic reasons behind the Bank's interest in corruption. The failure of 
structural adjustment to bring about the desired changes was blamed on the inadequacy of recipient 
government institutions, including a failure to tackle problems with corruption. 
Huntington, S. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
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In addition, there were internal reasons why the Bank became interested in corruption. Certain 
individuals, predominantly found in the AFR Region, brought about pressure to address corruption in 
the region. In particular, this includes Peter Eigen, who left the Bank to form Transparency 
International when he was told that he could not deal with corruption from within the Bank; Petter 
Langseth, who started working on corruption in Uganda without a clear mandate from the Bank to do 
so; and finally, some Executive Directors, particularly the US and Scandinavians, who put pressure on 
the Bank's leadership. Leadership was also key, and the Bank's work on corruption really took off 
following the appointment of Wolfensohn as Bank president in 1996, who has staked his reputation on 
the anti-corruption programme. 
Despite all of this, the Bank's non-political mandate was still seen as a barrier to explicit work 
on corruption. However, once the General Counsel provided an interpretation of the Articles that 
allowed for good governance work and some scope for work on corruption, there was an easy 
progression to more in depth work than was originally envisioned by Shihata, who retired as Counsel 
soon after Wolfensohn arrived. Individual actors, such as Langseth and Eigen, proved that working on 
corruption could be uncontroversial as long as it was done with the full consent of the government and 
while working in partnership with a like-minded partner in civil society (usually a local TI chapter). 
Wolfensohn cleared the way for a new interpretation of the Articles by declaring that corruption is an 
economic issue and not a political one, hence opening the door for explicit anti-corruption work, and a 
great deal of research has been done by the Bank to support his stance. Despite this, there are internal 
conflicts regarding the direction in which the programme should develop, and it is not entirely clear i f 
the Bank's staff, both in Washington and in the regions, are as committed to the work as its president. 
Main Findings: The Components That Make Up the Bank's Anti-Corruption Programme 
The second major research question looked at the components that make up the Bank's 
programme. These are based around a four-pronged strategy: preventing corruption within Bank-
financed projects, helping countries establish anti-corruption programmes of their own, mainstreaming 
anti-corruption work into the Bank's practices, and finally, providing support for international 
initiatives. This same four-pronged strategy came out of the 1997 strategy document and has continued 
to provide a basic framework for the Bank's programme. The vague nature of this document has 
allowed significant movement for the development of the programme, including several new 
procedures and products to accommodate the new work. My examination of the components of the 
Bank's anti-corruption programme led to the following major findings. 
Firstly, the programme lacks a sound theoretical foundation. It is based upon work that sees 
democracy as a pre-condition of development, with concomitant ideas regarding institutions, power, 
actors and the role of the state. However, the Bank has only taken on board one half of the debate 
regarding this relationship. The Bank is unwilling (or unable) to acknowledge the vast and well-
respected literature on the 'developmental state', with its focus on a strong bureaucracy and weak civil 
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society. Indeed, there is also little consensus among academic studies of the appropriateness of using 
civil society in an attempt to combat corruption, or on the effectiveness of donor support for civil 
society. This is due in part to the Bank's preference for economic studies over political ones. It has 
announced that corruption is an economic issue, not a political one, and its research base reflects this. 
Its research base wil l thus always be flawed i f it maintains this distinction, as it is not possible to 
address the issues contained within its current anti-corruption programme from a purely economistic 
base. 
In this same vein, the programme is justified largely by the Bank's own research. This calls 
into question the value not only of the research but of the work itself. It is not necessarily the case that 
the evidence located within the Bank's research has been devised in order to support work already in 
existence or work that is planned. However, because Bank reports and Bank papers rarely refer to 
outside work, it is open to that accusation. It also calls into question the value of any internal evaluation 
of the programme that is based upon the same research. 
Secondly, there are some parts of the programme that are valid and important for the Bank to 
undertake, but there are others that need to be discarded or spun off to other agencies for two reasons: 
either they violate the Bank's non-political mandate or they overstretch the Bank's capacity. 
The work being done within the Bank to minimise corruption in its own projects is valuable 
and, some would say, long overdue. There have been significant improvements in procurement and in 
staff training and ethics. The anonymous hotline and protection of whistleblowers is also important and 
welcome. Most importantly, the Department of Institutional Integrity is an important sign that the Bank 
intends to permanently institutionalise these procedures. 
In addition, much of the work being done to mainstream concern with corruption into the 
Bank's lending is significant, particularly through the CAS process. This is not a legally binding 
document and the Bank cannot hold the borrower to recommendations made within it; however, it 
provides a forum for open debate between the borrower and the Bank about concerns that the Bank has 
with corruption within that country. Also, the CAS is open to input from civil society groups and 
individuals, both inside the country and from outside (e.g., international ejperts). It provides open and 
transparent documentary evidence that the Bank has raised concerns about corruption with the 
recipient. This can protect the Bank from criticism that it is not doing anything about corruption, and it 
can also provide the Bank with a defence i f it feels that it cannot continue working in a country because 
corruption makes its work unfeasible. It can also provide an impetus for debate within the country 
because it is available online for anyone to access. 
Finally, the Bank has proved to be an important voice for bringing about awareness in the 
international sphere. It has been especially influential in appealing to those involved on the 'supply-
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side' of corruption: helping support the OECD anti-bribery convention, assisting FATF bring attention 
to money-laundering, calling for international standards for accountancy to assist audits, and so on. 
On the other hand, its work on developing anti-corruption programmes in borrowing countries 
often violates the Bank's non-political mandate, overloads its capacity and is not proving particularly 
effective. None of the participants in the Core Course have produced a corruption programme in their 
home country that did not already exist. This may be due in part to the fact that it is questionable how 
many of the original countries 'volunteered' to take part and how many had their arms gently twisted 
by McNamara during his visit to drum up support. The Bank has not been able to successfully deal 
with the issue of political wil l , and this is likely to continue to prove problematic in work of this kind. 
The diagnostic surveys are of questionable value in a developing country setting. Information has value 
in and of itself, of course, but it is important that the information be used to inform anti-corruption 
strategies, and it is unclear at this point how often this is occurring and how effective it is when it does. 
The clearest conflict with the Bank's mandate is in its work on community empowerment and 
civil society. Shihata, the former General Counsel, allowed for work on popular participation, but only 
'in the design and implementation of a specific development project or program (as opposed to popular 
participation in general)'.8 5 9 This has not been updated to allow for more general work. This is heavily 
value-laden work conducted by an institution that has always claimed its work is value-neutral. It 
assumes that certain ways of organising society are more worthy than others, but also that this is not an 
inherently political decision. Referring back to the words of Tshuma: '"...the Bank is involved in a 
process of social restructuring which involves the use of state power and is therefore political'" . 8 < s o 
The concern here is not just that this work is inherently political and violates the Bank's 
mandate, but also that the Bank may not stop here but will continue up the ladder of political 
conditionality. Previous chapters have examined the increasing 'creep' of the language of 
democratisation into the Bank's work on corruption. Indeed, an entire chapter in the latest World 
Development Report, the barometer of the changing direction of Bank strategy, is dedicated to a 
discussion of political institutions, and in particular, democratic institutions.861 One section looks at the 
relationship between electoral rules and corruption, arguing that elections can act as an effective 
deterrent against corruption. 'Citizens who are fed up with cronyism and corrupt politicians can express 
their dissatisfaction at the ballot box. ' 8 6 2 This is providing, of course, that elections are free and fair and 
that electoral rules are in place to punish the corrupt and to allow political parties, new and old, to act 
as effective opposition.863 
8 5 9 Shihata, 1. (1991). 77ie World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, pp. 93. 
8 6 0 Cited in Weaver, C. (2000). 'The Discourse of Law and Economic Development in the World Bank'. Paper 
presented at the MacArthur Conference on the Changing Role of Law in Emerging Markets and New 
Democracies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 24-26 March, p. 19. 
8 6 1 World Bank (2001). World Development Report 2002. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
8 6 2 World Bank (2001). World Development Report 2002, p. 108. 
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Although this may be true in theory, recent empirical evidence from developed countries 
shows that the electorate, faced with cronyism and corrupt politicians, is more likely to withdraw from 
the political process, most often by refusing to vote. 8 6 4 There is little reason to believe that this would 
be different in the developing country context. This makes elections an improbable check on 
corruption, in practice i f not in theory. There is another concern, voiced by Richard Holbrooke, US 
Ambassador to the UN, referring to the 1996 elections in Bosnia, but relevant to this discussion as well. 
'Suppose the election was declared free and fair,' and those who were elected are 'racists, fascists, 
separatists, who are publicly opposed to [peace and reintegration]. That is the dilemma'. 8 6 5 
Democratically elected politicians can be just as bad as non-democratically elected ones. There is no 
guarantee, especially in new or transitional democracies, but even in established ones, that elected 
leaders will act with integrity. 
Moreover, as shown in Chapter Three, there is no reason to believe that democratisation in 
developing countries will foster economic growth or development. Cox reminds us that 
'[d]emocratisation and "people power" can move to the right as well as to the left', bringing a 'danger 
of authoritarian populism, of reborn fascism'.8 6 6 We can see moves in this direction already in Russia, 
where corruption is often cited as a reason to return to the 'good old days' of authoritarian rule. On the 
other hand, democratisation can move to the left, with civil society calling out for renewed forms of 
socialism, strong trade unions, increased social welfare and protection from the 'ravages' of structural 
adjustment and the free market. 
Neither of these outcomes, which are just as likely or as predictable as any other, are 
discussed by the Bank as a possibility within the context of its anti-corruption programme. Indeed, the 
only potential outcome discussed is that corruption will be reduced, institutions will be strengthened, 
markets will flourish and development will result. This is largely due to the economistic approach 
taken by the Bank, which tries to exclude the political from essentially political issues. It is not possible 
to discuss the many issues covered in this thesis - civil society, institution building, free media, judicial 
reform, community empowerment, electoral rules and so on - in a purely economic manner, which 
excludes considerations of power structures, class and ethnic divisions, historical trajectories, so 
essential to a more political approach. This is a major constraint on the effectiveness of its anti-
corruption programme, and it will be a major constraint on any democratisation work that the Bank 
undertakes i f it does indeed 'push the envelope' on this. 
As I have shown, there is a wide range of sources that claim that the Bank's non-political 
mandate is actually a myth and one that cannot withstand the current move towards political 
8 6 3 World Bank (2001). World Development Report 2002, p. 109. 
8 6 4 See, for example, Pharr, S. & Putnam, R. (2000). Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral 
Countries. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
8 6 5 Cited in Zakaria, F. (1997). 'Illiberal Democracy'. Foreign Affairs. 76(6), pp. 22-43. 
8 6 6 Cox, R.W. (2000). 'Political Economy and World Order: Problems of Power and Knowledge at the 
Millennium'. In Stubbs, R. & Underhill, G. (eds). Political Economy and the Changing Global Order. (2n d ed). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 29. 
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liberalisation. This makes its approach to combating corruption problematic, as it allows only partial 
analysis of the issue. This impacts the research that the Bank conducts, which seems stuck in a 
quagmire of trying to separate the economic from the political in an area in which both are intertwined 
and cannot effectively be separated. This negatively impacts the way the Bank designs country 
strategies and implements projects. This entire history of the Bank's work on anti-corruption is plagued 
by the distortion of its non-political mandate. Despite Wolfensohn's attempt to redefine it as a purely 
economic issue, it is still also political. The Bank is still tied by its non-political mandate, and the 
ongoing conflict weakens the programme. 
Increasingly, there seems to crucial components of the Bank's own programme that it decrees 
must be spun-off to a 'partner', either another donor or an NGO. However, this assumes that there is a 
partner both willing and able to conduct the work that the Bank deems too political for it to do itself. 
Chapter Five looked at the capacity of other donors and found that few have the capacity to take on the 
above work with any degree of success in comparison to the Bank. Although they lack the restrictive 
non-political mandate and are allowed to do this work i f they so choose, they lack the resources to do it 
on a scale that would prove effective. 
Implications of the Findings 
Moreover, there is the danger of increased controversy for the Bank itself as it becomes an 
increasingly visible political actor, as it too closely associates itself with the anti-corruption agenda. 
Any failures could be placed at the Bank's doorstep, and not only those directly linked to a Bank 
project. For example, in Indonesia, President Wahid has stepped down following attempts to impeach 
him on charges of corruption. He has been replaced by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of former 
dictator Sukarno, with close links herself to the military. I f the situation in Indonesia were to de-
stabilise, the Bank itself could be implicated because of the role it has played, not only in bringing 
attention to the problem, but by threatening to withdraw aid unless corruption is tackled. 
Indeed, a recent article in the Guardian newspaper points to Wahid's efforts to fight 
corruption as one of the reasons why he was impeached. 
But just as the manner of Abdurrahman Wahid's ascent was less than totally satisfactory, 
so too is his downfall. He was not voted out of office. He lost no election. Instead he was 
impeached by the very assembly that perversely thrust him into power. The reasons were 
personal and political, not strictly constitutional. By attempting, however ineffectively, to 
tackle state corruption, prosecute human rights abuses and devolve power from the 
centre, Wahid alienated the military, the internal security forces, the Suharto-era 
government apparatus, and influential elements of the business elite. 8 6 7 
'Great Expectations - Indonesia's New Leader Has a Lot to Prove'. The Guardian (UK). 25 July 2001. 
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Although there is no reason to suggest that Wahid was innocent o f the charges o f fraud put before him 
by the Parliament, the situation has no easy villains or heroes, and the Bank places itself in an awkward 
position by putting itself at the forefront o f the corruption discourse in countries like Indonesia. Indeed, 
it has itself been accused o f complaisance in allowing an estimated twenty percent o f its loans to 
Indonesia to be embezzled by corrupt o f f i c i a l s . 8 6 8 George Monbiot accused the Bank o f 'colludfing] in 
the theft, covering up for the government in order to save f ace ' . 8 6 9 I t is one thing to ensure that Bank 
funds are properly accounted for, but it is an entirely different matter when the Bank plays a role in 
bringing down the government. 
In his evaluation, Thornburgh highlights the potential for political volatility that the Bank's 
anti-corruption work could bring about. He says, 
...neither the Sanctions Committee nor any other component o f the Bank has been 
charged wi th addressing a situation in which an errant government off icial , and possibly 
even a national government, is found to have engaged in fraudulent or otherwise corrupt 
activities involving Bank funds...such an issue would be as delicate as any the Bank 
must face, and understandable that is one reason that the Bank has not yet attempted to 
resolve it. But the sensitivity o f the matter would arise directly only when evidence o f 
official wrongdoing has been clearly established and the question is presented whether 
legitimate political and practical considerations may preclude the Bank from initiating 
any action as a result o f the f i n d i n g . 8 7 0 
Thornburgh is concerned here wi th Bank policy - would the Bank pursue action against a national 
government for misuse o f its funds, and i f so, how would it do so? This seems to be worrying about 
finding a band-aid when someone has cut o f f their arm. The concern should not be over how the Bank 
w i l l recover the funds that have been misused, but rather how it w i l l deal wi th the political and 
economic collapse that could result f rom such high-level corruption and the attention brought to it by 
the Bank itself. 
In several cases in the past few years, the Bank has been linked to turmoil resulting f rom high-
level charges o f corruption. In Papua New Guinea, Dan Weise, a Esident World Bank off icial was 
expelled f rom the country and barred f rom re-entry, after senior government officials accused him ' o f 
attempting to sabotage government policies', including his strong stance on corruption. 8 7 1 This put the 
Bank's Governance Promotion Adjustment Loan, valued at $90 mil l ion, at risk. Negotiations between 
the Bank and Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta were successful, and the Bank reaffirmed 
8 6 8 Aglionby, J. (1998). '"20pc" of World Bank loans to Indonesia stolen'. Guardian (UK). 21 August, p. 14; 
Aslam, A. (1999). 'World Bank's Guilt on Indonesia Corruption'. InterPress Service. 15 February. 
8 6 9 Monbiot, G. (2000). 'To keep them destitute and starving - the World Bank's practices allow the rich to steal 
from the poor'. Guardian (UK). 13 April, p. 22. 
8 7 0 Thornburgh, R., Gainer, P. & Walker, C. (2000). 'World Bank: Concerning Mechanisms to Address Problems 
of Fraud and Corruption'. Report to Shengman Zhang, Managing Director and Chairman of the Oversight 
Committee on Fraud and Corruption, 21 January (rev.), (internal document), p. 36. 
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commitment on the funding, providing that Mr. Weise would be employed by the Bank as a consultant 
on the loan, albeit based in Sydney. 8 7 2 
In the Philippines, the Bank was required to make an off icial statement after receiving a 
number o f calls to respond to allegations o f corruption against high-level officials, prior to the 
impeachment o f former President Joseph Estrada. 8 7 3 The Bank expressed concern about the situation 
but expected the government to deal with the problem as mandated. 8 7 4 The Bank has been very active 
in denouncing corruption in the Philippines and was in the process o f completing a major report on the 
subject. I f found guilty, President Estrada could face the death penalty. 
In Kenya, long-time government opponent Dr. Richard Leakey stepped down as Head o f the 
Public Service, fol lowing a vote o f no confidence. 8 7 5 Prior to this, Kenya's Constitutional Court ruled 
that the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority ( K A C A ) was unconstitutional, suspending the body and all 
on-going investigations. K A C A had been an I M F and World Bank requirement for reinstatement o f 
lending and lacked the mandate and support o f parliament. 8 7 6 
In Uganda, claims were made that Vice President Specioza Wandira Kazibwe had 
mismanaged a World Bank-funded valley dam project, worth $3.4 mill ion. Dr. Kazibwe defended 
herself against the charges, passing the blame on to her predecessor as well as her deputy, the current 
Minister o f Works 8 7 7 She was backed by President Museveni, who suggested that malice may have 
had a role to play in the way MPs jumped on the allegations. 8 7 8 Dr. Kazibwe was also the head o f the 
government's Anti-Corruption Unit, and had upset many MPs and important citizens with her high-
profi le investigations 8 7 9 However, the allegations were never proven and she remains in her post. 
These examples are intended to show the problematic nature o f the Bank's response to 
allegations o f corruption in its borrowing countries, and even within its own projects. In Indonesia and 
the Philippines, supporters o f the two deposed leaders rioted in the streets during the investigations, and 
it is still uncertain whether these fledgling democracies can withstand the crises. In Kenya, anti-
corruption initiatives have been forced upon a parliament and leadership unwil l ing to support them, 
resulting in their failure. In Uganda, the World Bank's star pupil on corruption, allegations o f fraud 
8 7 1 Korimbao, D. (2001). 'World Bank director Weise expelled'. The National (PNG). 9 February. 
8 7 2 World Bank (2001). 'Joint Statement by the Government of Papua New Guinea and the World Bank'. Press 
Release, 18 February. 
8 7 3 CBS News Worldwide (2000). 'Philippines Corruption Trial Set'. Internet. 7 December. Accessed 31 July 
2001. Available at http://www.kyw.eom/now/story/0,1597,255307-412,00.shtml 
8 7 4 World Bank (2000). 'World Bank Statement on Allegations of Corruption Against High Public Officials in the 
Philippines'. Press Release No. 2000-4/EAP, 17 October. 
8 7 5 'Civil service shuffle may herald change'. Daily Nation (Kenya). 29 March 2001. 
8 7 6 Integrated Regional Information Networks. (2001). 'Kenya: Court rules anti-corruption body "illegal"'. 
Internet. 15 January. Accessed 31 July 2001. Available at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/cea/countrystories/kenya/20010115.phtml. 
8 7 7 World Bank (1999). 'Ugandan VP Defends Herself Against Mismanagement Claims'. Development News. 1 
April. 
8 7 8 Osike, F. ( 1999). 'Museveni Backs VP Kazibwe and Blasts Ministers'. Internet. 25 November. Accessed 31 
July 2001. Available at http://www.ovpuganda.net/content/nandi/news/1999251 l.htm. 
8 7 9 'Ugandan Graft Check on NGOs, Village Leaders'. The East African. 10 December 1997. 
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appear to have been minimised or swept under the carpet. In each o f these cases, the World Bank's 
anti-corruption activities have been tentative and confused, demanding that national governments be 
seen to be doing something about corruption and supporting investigations into fraud, and then pulling 
away at the last minute when the investigations bear fruit . The Bank issues statements about 
unacceptable high-level corruption, as it did in Indonesia, while distancing itself from the leadership 
changes and political turmoil that result. 
This thesis has explained how and why the World Bank became involved in combating 
corruption, and examined its chosen methods o f dealing with it. I have argued in the thesis that the 
Bank's understanding of, approach to and its preferred ways o f dealing with corruption are inadequate, 
incoherent and flawed. This is not to say that the Bank should not be concerned about corruption. I t has 
an obligation to protect the integrity o f its own funds, and reducing corruption is in the best interest o f 
its borrowers and its other shareholders. It can do this by pushing more resources at its procurement 
division, ensuring that the bidding process is as transparent as possible; by doing more on-site 
inspections o f projects; by making its own documents more freely available for external review; and by 
strengthening its existing work on public sector reform. This work is less controversial than its work on 
community empowerment, more likely to be effective than its work on diagnostic tools, and does not 
require a dramatic rethink o f the Bank's Articles o f Agreement and its non-political mandate. 
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Appendix l:The Organisational Structure of the Bank and Its 
Articles of Agreement880 
The Bank's management consists o f a Board o f Governors and its Executive Directors. The 
Board consists o f one governor and one alternate governor appointed by each member country. The 
governors meet only occasionally, usually at the joint annual meeting o f the Bank and IMF. They may 
delegate dl business to the executive directors except for the following: (1) the admission o f new 
members; (2) the increase or decrease o f capital stock; (3) the suspension o f a member; (4) 
interpretations o f the Articles o f Agreement; (5) approval o f formal agreements with other international 
organisations; (6) the distribution o f net income; and (7) the liquidation o f the Bank (Art . V . Sec. 2). 
Each member has two hundred f i f t y votes plus one additional vote for each share o f stock held, wi th 
voting decided by majority (Art. V . Sec. 3). The executive directors, also appointed by each member 
country, are responsible for the day-to-day business o f the Bank, with twelve directors in total, f ive o f 
which are appointed by each o f the f ive members having the largest number o f shares.8 8 1 The 
remaining seven are elected by the governors other than the top five shareholders, f rom a pool o f 
candidates appointed by each o f the remaining member countries (Art . V . Sec. 4). Governors serve a 
term o f f ive years, while directors serve two-year terms, and each may be re -appointed for an unlimited 
number o f terms. The president is selected by the directors, and serves as their chairman. He or she 
may only cast deciding votes in cases o f equal division, and may be removed at any time by the 
directors (Art. V . Sec. 5). A l l Bank presidents have been American citizens, including current President 
James Wolfensen, born in Australia but now a naturalised American citizen. 
Article I o f the Articles o f Agreement o f the IBRD states that the purpose o f the Bank is, 'To 
assist in the reconstruction and development...of members by facilitating the investment o f capital for 
productive purposes...to promote private foreign investment...[and] to promote the long-range 
balanced growth o f international trade... ' . Membership is limited only to those countries already 
members o f the I M F (Art . I I . Sec. 1(a)). Authorised capital was originally limited to $10 bi l l ion, 
divided into 100,000 shares having a par value o f $100,000 each (Art. I I . Sec. 2(a)), but has since been 
increased, as o f 27 Apr i l 1988, to 1,420,500 shares, or $14,205 mil l ion (Art. I I . Sec. 3(b) . l ) . 
World Bank (1944). Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(amended 1989). Internet. (4 November 1998). Available: 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/backgrd7ibrd/arttoc.htm. 
8 8 1 The five largest shareholders in 1946 were the US (30.73%), the UK (12.72%), China (6.01%), France (5.28%), 
and India (4.08%) (Note: India took the place of the Soviet Union who declined membership). The five largest 
shareholders as of June 1992 are the US (17.49%), Japan (8.01%), Germany (6.19%), France (5.93%), and the UK 
(5.93%). 
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Table A . l : Change in I B R D Membership and Voting Power, 1953-1971 
Regions: % o f Votes (31/12/53) % o f Votes (30/6/71) 
North America 34.95 27.74 
Europe 35.94 31.26 
Latin America/Caribbean 6.94 7.43 
Asia/Australasia 17.59 18.77 
Middle East/North Africa 3.11 5.62 
Sub-Saharan Afr ica 1.47 7.34 
Total 100.00 100.00 
Sources: World Bank (1954). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1946-1953. Baltimore: 
The John Hopkins Press, pp. 231 -232; Mason, E . and Asher, R. (1973). The World Bank Since Bretton Woods Washington 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution., 1973, pp. 800-802. 
Currently, the Bank makes loans to developing countries through four agencies, which make 
up the 'World Bank Group ' : 8 8 2 the IBRD, which deals with loans to middle-income countries at 
commercial rates o f interest; the International Development Association ( IDA) , which loans to the 
poorer countries at more favourable rates o f interest and repayment; the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), which focuses on private projects and capital; and the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency ( M I G A ) , which encourages direct investment. 8 8 3 
A t the inaugural meeting in Savannah, it was determined that the US's capital subscription 
of $3.2 bi l l ion entitled it to 35% o f the Bank's votes, w i th the U K second at 14%. White, the US 
founder, insisted that the Bank represented all member countries, and was not just a 'rich man's club', 
but he took pains to avoid the 'one-country-one-vote' policy o f the U N General Assembly. 8 8 4 
Membership in the Fund was considered a prerequisite for joining the Bank, possibly because, 
according to Luxford, " ' . . .we wanted to force countries to agree to standards in the monetary field as a 
condition to get the benefits o f the B a n k ' " . 8 8 5 
Although the Bank is technically an agency of the U N , an agreement signed in 1947, makes it 
a very specialised agency. Unlike the FAO or WHO, for example, the Bank is completely independent 
f rom the U N . I t finances itself, and is able to safeguard information about its members and clients f rom 
the U N and others. The U N cannot interfere in loan decisions, but is able to make technical 
recommendations for relevant development projects. 8 8 6 
This thesis is only concerned with the IBRD and the IDA as the primary lenders to developing countries. 
8 8 3 Williams, M. (1994). International Economic Organizations and the Third World. London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, pp. 101-109. 
8 8 4 Oliver, R. (1971). 'Early Plans for a World Bank'. Princeton Studies in International Finance, Princeton 
University. No. 29, September, p. 5. 
8 8 5 Cited in Mason, E. and Asher, R. (1973). The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, p. 19. 
8 8 6 Mason, E. and Asher, R. (1973). The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, p. 58. 
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Appendix 2: World Bank Organisation Chart, 1 September 2000 
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Appendix 3: Methodology 
Document Categories Characteristics 
Analytical documents 
(a) Main strategy papers (3) 
(b) Discussion papers (29) 
(c) Books/articles (18) 
(d) Conference reports (16) 
Period covered: 1983-2001 
Off ic ia l Bank perspective 
Individual Bank staff members' perspective 
either in their off icial or unofficial capacity 
Outside perspectives f rom 
consultants/conference participants 
World Development Reports (18) Period covered: 1983-2001 
Annual reports highlighting the Bank's 
perspective about economic problems facing 
borrowing countries 
Annual Reports (18) Period covered: 1983-2001 
Annual reports highlighting the Bank's 
performance and strategy in a given period 
Speeches (8) Period covered: 1996-2000 
Speeches from past and present Bank presidents 
as well as other top Bank officials 
Press Releases (14) Period covered: 1997-2000 
Internet sites (40) Period covered: 1997-2000 
Important sources o f background information 
Internal Documents (5) Period covered: 1998-2000 
Country specific documents 
(a) Country Assistance Strategy documents (3 
CASs) 
(b) Institutional Governance Reviews (3 IGRs) 
(c) Comprehensive Development Framework 
documents (1 CDF) 
Period covered: 1997-2001 
Full CAS reports available only since 1998 
5 IGR pilots undertaken during period 
covered 
12 CDF pilots undertaken during period 
covered but only one is available 
1. Analytical Documents 
There are three main strategy papers on anti-corruption work at the Bank. The first, published 
in 1997, sets out the initial strategy. This was followed by a 2000 progress report and a another 
report in 2000 on the Bank's strategy on institutional reform and governance, wi th a heavy anti-
QOQ 
corruption component. 
2. World Development Reports (WDRs) 
These reports provide vital indicators o f the direction in which Bank policy is heading. Going 
back as far as 1983, one can f ind early references to concern with corruption, but this did not become a 
named Bank priority unti l the 1997 W D R on the changing role o f the state. 
3. Annual Reports 
8 8 7 World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank. Washington DC: 
World Bank. 
8 8 8 World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption: Progress at the World Bank Since 1997. 
Washington DC: World Bank. 
8 8 9 World Bank (2000). Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank Strategy. 
Washington DC: World Bank. 
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These provide valuable statistical information (budgets, lending portfolios) as well as 
performance indicators o f programmes. By comparing these to the previous year's WDR, one can 
establish i f the rhetoric spelled out in the W D R has translated into Board action or funding. 
4. Speeches 
Wolfensohn, the Bank's current president, uses speeches as a way to get his message out to as 
many people as possible, and he has spoken on a considerable number o f occasions about the Bank's 
corruption work. I have also consulted speeches by other Bank staff, but Wolfensohn, as the Bank's 
head and the anti-corruption programme's champion, remains my primary focus throughout. 
5. Press Releases 
The Bank's external relations team uses press releases to get information out to journalists and 
researchers about significant changes in policy or interesting developments. Relevant press releases for 
this thesis include, for example, those on changes to staff rules, the termination o f Bank employees and 
consultants for corruption, and announcements o f new relevant research. 
6. Internet Sites 
Because o f the internet's informal and transient nature, monitoring changes to key websites 
also highlights important patterns rf change in strategy. Although the complexity o f the Bank's 
programme has meant that a large number o f sites have been consulted or monitored, the two that are 
particularly relevant are http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/ and 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/. 
7. Internal Documents 
For obvious reasons, these are few and far between, and I am grateful for the generosity o f 
employees who have given me unpublished materials. Some o f these have proven very important and 
are referred to in the text as 'internal document'. 
8. Country-specific Documents 
When possible, I have tried to complement my examination o f the Bank's anti-corruption 
programme wi th real-life examples o f work being done in countries. I have tried to provide examples 




World Bank First Round (January-February 2000) - 7 
interviewees 
Second Round (January 2001) - 6 interviewees 
Phone Interviews (2001) - 2 interviewees 
Personal Correspondence - 7 correspondents 
United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) 
First Round (February 2000) - 1 interviewee 
Personal Correspondence - # correspondents 
United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) 
First Round (January 2000) - 1 interviewee 
Second Round (January 2001) - 1 interviewee 
Other Bilateral Donors Personal Correspondence - 6 correspondents 
Academics January-February 2000— 3 interviewees 
Personal Correspondence - 3 correspondents 
Miscellaneous Personal Correspondence - 3 correspondents 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted in the US, U K and Europe over a two-year period. 
Initial contact was made via letter or email. In most cases, I had a small number o f questions prepared 
but allowed the interview to fol low the direction in which the interviewee wanted to take it. This 
produced some surprising and very positive results. I did tape a small number o f interviews, but the 
majority were untaped, relying instead on my notes. Although this had its drawbacks, i t allowed for a 
more open and frank discussion, especially among World Bank staff. 
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Appendix 4: List of Interviews and Correspondents 
Institution Name Affiliation 
ADB 
Bretton Woods Project 
Colgate University 






University o f Maryland at 
College Park 
U S A I D 
World Bank 




Oll i Ruohomaki 
Aileen Marshall 
Aiichiro Yamamoto 
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP Dick Thornburgh 
N O R A D Mark Gjelten 
Olivier Burki 
The R A N D Graduate School Robert Klitgaard 
Pauline Tamesis 
Herb Werlin 
M . Eric Kite 
Anita Baker 
Paul Collier 
Senior Audit Specialist 
(Financial Investigator) 
Anticorruption Unit 
Office o f the General Auditor 
Project Co-ordinator 




Unit for Sector Policy 
Senior Advisor 
Resident Representative 
U K Office 
Counsel 
Advisor on Human Rights 




Dean and Ford Distinguished 
Professor o f International 
Development and Security 
Programme Co -ordinator 
Programme for Accountability 
& Transparency 




Center for Democracy & 
Governance 
Manager 
Office o f Business Ethics & 
Integrity 
Director 
Development Research Group 






Public Sector Group 
Poverty Reduction & Economic 
Management Thematic Group 
Public Sector Specialist 
Public Sector Group 
Poverty Reduction & Economic 
Management Thematic Group 




Public Sector Reform and 
Capacity Building 
Africa Region 





U K Executive Director 
Manager 
Procurement Policy and 
Services Group 














Latin America & the Caribbean 
Region 
Public Sector Management 
Specialist 
Governance, Regulation & 
Finance 
World Bank Institute 
Mike Stevens 
M . Helen Sutch 
Lead Specialist 




Public Sector Group 
Poverty Reduction & Economic 
Management Thematic Group 
Skip White Co-Manager 
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Investigations Unit 
Department for Institutional 
Integrity 
Pablo Zoido-Lobaton Development Economics 
Research Group 
Governance, Regulation & 
Finance 
World Bank Institute 
Yale Law School Susan Rose-Ackerman Henry R. Luce Professor o f 
Jurisprudence 
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Appendix 5: EDI Documents With Anti-Corruption Component 
(1990-1997) 
Year Author(s) Title Description (if available) 
1990 Adamolekun, L . & 
Shields, E. 
'C iv i l Service 
Improvement' 
EDI Review article indicating results o f 1989 
workshop organised by EDI , involving senior 
officials from twenty countries and five 
international organisations 
1995 Langseth, P., 
Nogxina, S., 
Prinsloo, D. , & 
Sullivan, R. (eds) 
'C iv i l Service Reform in 
Anglophone Afr ica ' 
Report o f the proceedings o f a workshop held in 
South Africa, 24-28 Apr i l 1995; Convened by 
EDI , in collaboration with the British Overseas 
Development Administration (ODA), the 
Ministry o f Public Service and Administration, 
the Public Service Commission (PSC) and the 
South African Management & Development 
Institute (SAMDI) 
1995 Langseth, P. 'C iv i l Service Reform in 
Uganda: Lessons 
Learned' 
EDI Working Paper, based on author experience 
and the outcomes o f the 'Workshop on 
Enhancing Ethics, Transparency, and 
Accountability and Co mbating Corruption, held 
in Mukono, Uganda, in December 1994 
1995 Langseth, P. & 
Simpkins, F. (eds) 
'Integrity Workshop in 
Uganda I I : Final 
Workshop Proceedings' 
Proceedings o f a workshop convened by the 
Inspectorate o f Government, Uganda, 27-28 
November, Facilitated by Transparency 
International and E D I and funded by D A N I D A 
and E D I 
1995 Pope, J. & Langseth, 
P. (eds) 
'Investigative Journalism 
in Uganda I ' 
1995 Ogoso Opolot, E. & 
Langseth, P. (eds) 
'Investigative Journalism 
in Uganda I F 
1995 Langseth, P. & 
Cooksey, B . (eds) 
'The National Integrity 
System in Tanzania 
(Arusha I ) ' 
1995 Beschel, R. & El-
Kayed, Z. (eds) 
'Jordan Integrity in 
Government Seminar' 
1996 Cockcroft, A . 'Service Delivery 
Survey: Corruption in the 
Police, Judiciary, 
Revenue & Lands 
Services' 
Report o f the Presidential Commission on 
Corruption, Government o f Tanzania; Funded 
by EDI , with technical support from 
Transparency International, CIET International, 
and the Tanzania Food & Nutrition Centre 
(TFNC) 
1996 Bruton. H . & H i l l , C. 
(eds) 
'The Evaluation o f Public 
Expenditure in Af r ica ' 
E D I Learning Resources Series, which shares 
lessons learned through a series o f comparative 
case studies 
1996 Langseth, P. & 
Simpkins, F. (eds) 
'Uganda International 
Conference on Good 
Governance in Afr ica: 
The Inspectorate o f Government, Government 
of Uganda in co-operation with Transparency 













Simpkins, F. (ed) 
Langseth, P. & 
Simpkins, F. (eds) 
Cooksey, B., 
Langseth, P. & 
Simpkins, F. (eds) 
Langseth, P. & Gait, 
K. (eds) 
Aderinwale, A . (ed) 
Simpkins, F. & 
Langseth, P. (eds) 
Sharkey, K. & 
Aflala, B. (eds) 
Langseth, P., 
Stapenhurst, R. & 
Pope, J. 
Langseth, P. & 
Stapenhurst, R. 
Langseth, P., Kato, 
D., Kisubi, M . & 
Pope, J. 
Kpundeh, S. & 
Langseth, P. (eds) 
1997 Kpundeh, S. & 
Langseth, P. (eds) 
Empowering Civ i l 
Society in the Fight 
Against Corruption' 
'Investigative Journalism 
in Tanzania V 
'Good Governance for 
Private Sector 
Development & 
Investment in the Middle 
East & North Afr ica ' 
'The National Integrity 







Meeting, May 1996)' 
'Afr ican Parliamentarians 
Meeting: The Sustenance 
o f Political Liberalisation 
in Afr ica ' 
'Investigative Journalism 
in Uganda in & I V : First 
& Second Workshops 
f rom Women Journalists' 
'Compte-Rendu de 
l 'Atelier Regional de 
Fromation des 
Journalistes' 
'The Role o f a National 
Integrity System in 
Fighting Corruption' 
'National Integrity 
System Country Studies' 
'Good Governance in 
Africa: A Case Study 
from Uganda' 




'Good Governance for 
Private Sector 
EDI Working Paper, explaining how to establish 
a 'national integrity system' 
E D I Working Paper, utilising a comparative 
case study between Uganda and Tanzania 
EDI Working Paper, with focus on 
decentralisation, civil society and service 
delivery 
Uganda Workshop for Parliamentarians, 13-14 
March, Kampala; Organised by the Speaker o f 
the House o f the Parliament o f Uganda, in 
collaboration with Transparency International 
and TT-Uganda, and funded by D A N I D A and 
EDI 
16-19 March, Entebbe; Sponsored by the 
Government o f Uganda (Ministry o f Public 
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Development in Africa: 
A Regional Ministerial 
Seminar' 
Service), and Uganda Manufacturers 
Association, facilitated by E D I , and funded by 
the Ministry o f Public Service, Uganda, CIDA, 
and EDI 




Fictitious case study 
1997 Simpkins, F. & 
Stapenhurst, R. (eds) 
'Investigative Journalism 
Workshop in Mauritius' 
1997 Stapenhurst, R. & 
Simpkins, F. (eds) 
'Investigative Journalism 
in Tanzania I I ' 
1997 Stapenhurst, R. & 
Simpkins, F. (eds) 
'Advanced Investigative 
Journalism in Uganda' 
1997 Stapenhurst, R. 'Public Expenditure 
Management: Kariba' 
1997 Kpundeh, S., van 
Ham, M . & 
Simpkins, F. (eds) 
'The National Integrity 
System in Malawi ' 
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Appendix 6: P R E M Anti-Corruption Website 
httpV/www I .worldbank.orj^publicseclor/anticorrupl/ 
T H E W O R L D B A N K G R O U P A World frte of Povorly "i^sLJ 
*- Topics and Sectors 
Anticorruption 
There is increasing evidence that corruption undermines deve lopment . It also hampers the effect iveness with v\ 
domest ics savings and external aid are used in many developing countr ies, and this in turn threatens to underrr 





Governance: A World 
Tools & Resources 
- Prog^arJtHe'W6rld 
nf f l t^s^Orfonq ••/• 
Resea 
| > B a r m _ 
i • About- Us" & Feed ba ck 
Click here lo sec what's uew 
The four main themes of the Bank's Ant i-Corrupt ion strategy: 
- Prevent ing Corruption in Bank Projects 
Includes How to Report Fraud and Corruption 
* Helping Countr ies Reduce Corrupt ion 
• Includes Learning Programs and Lending & Technical Assistance 
• Related Governance and Public Sector Reform Websites: 
Decentral izat ion. Legal Institutions of the Market Economy. Public 
Expenditure On-l ine, State Owned Enterprise Reform 
* Mainst reaming Ant i -Corrupt ion in Bank Proiects 
' Support ing International Efforts 
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Appendix 7: Blank C D F Matrix 
THE ACTIVITIES OF PARTNERS IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
r. C/3 
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Appendix 8: C D F Matrix - Bolivia 
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Appendix 9: Sample Master Bidding Documents 
Bid S u b m i s s i o n S h e e t 
Input of Information to be completed by Bidder 
Bid Submission Sheet 
Date: [insert date (as day, month and year) of 
Bid Submission] 
ICB No.: [insert number of bidding process] 
Invitation for Bid No.: [insert No of IFB] 
Alternative No.: [insert identification No i f this 
is a Bid for an alternative] 
To: [insert complete name of Purchaser] 
We, the undersigned, declare that: 
(a) We have examined and have no reservations to the Bidding Documents, including Addenda No.: 
[insert the number and issuing date of each Addenda]; 
(b) We offer to supply in conformity with the Bidding Documents and in accordance with the 
delivery schedule specified in the Schedule of Supply the following Goods and Related Services 
[insert a brief description of the Goods and Related Services]; 
(c) The total price of our Bid, excluding any discounts offered in item (d) below, is: [insert the total 
bid price in words and figures, indicating the various amounts and the respective 
currencies]; 
(d) The discounts offered and the methodology for their application are: 
Discounts. I f our bid is accepted, the following discounts shaU apply. [Specify in detail 
each discount offered and the specific item of the Schedule of Supply to which it applies.] 
Methodology of Application of the Discounts. The discounts shall be applied using the 
following method: [Specify in detail the method that shall be used to apply the discounts]; 
(e) Our bid shall be valid for a period of [specify the number of calendar days] days from the date 
fixed for the bid submission deadline in accordance with the Bidding Documents, and it shall 
remain binding upon us and may be accepted at any time before the expiration of that period; 
(f) I f our bid is accepted, we commit to obtain a performance security in accordance with the Bidding 
Documents in the amount of [insert amount and currency in words and figures of the 
performance security] for the due performance of the Contract; 
(g) Our firm, including any subcontractors or suppliers for any part of the contract, has nationals from 
eligible countries [insert the nationality of the Bidder, including that of all parties that 
comprise the Bidder, i f the Bidder is a consortium or association, and the nationality each 
subcontractor and supplier] 
(h) We are not participating, as Bidders, in more than one bid in this bidding process, other than 
alternative bids in accordance with the Bidding Documents; 
World Bank (1999). 'Master Bidding Documents: Procurement of Goods & User's Guide', October. Available 
at http://www.worldbank.org/html/opr/procure/mdbgoods.html. 
210 
(i) Our firm, its affiliates or subsidiaries—including any subcontractors or suppliers for any part of 
the contract—has not been declared ineligible by the Bank, under the Purchaser's country laws or 
official regulations or by an act of compliance with a decision of the United Nations Security 
Council; 
(j) The following commissions, gratuities, or fees have been paid or are to be paid with respect to the 
bidding process or execution of the Contract: [insert complete name of each Recipient, its ful l 
address, the reason for which each commission or gratuity was paid and the amount and 
currency of each such commission or gratuityl 
Name of Recipient Address Reason Amount 
(If none has been paid or is to be paid, indicate "none.") 
(k) We understand that this Bid, together with your written acceptance thereof included in your 
notification of award, shall constitute a binding contract between us, until a formal contract is 
prepared and executed. 
(1) We understand that you are not bound to accept the lowest evaluated bid or any other bid that 
you may receive. 
Name: [insert complete name of person signing the Bid] In the capacity of [insert 
legal capacity of person signing the bid] 
Signed: [insert signature of person whose name and capacity are shown above] 
Duly authorized to sign the Bid for and on behalf of: [insert complete name of Bidder] 
Dated on day of , [insert date of signing] 
B i d S e c u r i t y 
Date: 
ICB No.: 
Invitation for Bid No.: 
To: 
Whereas : (hereinafter 
"the Bidder") has submitted its bid dated for ICB No. 
for the supply of 
hereinafter called "the Bid." 
KNOW ALL PEOPLE by these presents that WE of 
. having our registered office at 
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. (hereinafter "the Guarantor"), are bound unto 
(hereinafter "the 
Purchaser") in the sum of for which 
payment well and truly to be made to the aforementioned Purchaser, the Guarantor binds itself, its 
successors, or assignees by these presents. Sealed with the Common Seal of this Guarantor this 
day of , . 
THE CONDITIONS of this obligation are the following: 
1. I f the Bidder withdraws its bid during the period of bid validity specified by the Bidder in the 
Bid Submission Sheet, except as provided in ITB Sub-Clause 20.1; or 
2. I f the Bidder, having been notified of the acceptance of its bid by the Purchaser, during the 
period of bid validity, fails or refuses to: 
(a) execute the Contract; or 
(b) furnish the Performance Security, in accordance with the ITB Clause 44; or 
(c) accept the correction of its bid by the Purchaser, pursuant to ITB Clause 31. 
We undertake to pay the Purchaser up to the above amount upon receipt of its first written demand, 
without the Purchaser having to substantiate its demand, provided that in its demand the Purchaser 
states that the amount claimed by it is due to it, owing to the occurrence of one or more of the above 
conditions, specifying the occurred conditions. 
This security shall remain in force up to and including twenty-eight (28) days after the period of bid 
validity, and any demand in respect thereof should be received by the Guarantor no later than the above 
date. 
Name In the capacity of _ 
Signed 
Duly authorized to sign the bid security for and on behalf of _ 
Dated on day of _ 
A g r e e m e n t 
THIS AGREEMENT made the day of , , between 
of (hereinafter "the 
Purchaser"), of the one part, and of 
(hereinafter "the Supplier"), of the other part: 
WHEREAS the Purchaser invited bids for certain Goods and Related Services, viz., 
. and has accepted 
a Bid by the Supplier for the supply of those Goods and Related Services in the sum of 
(hereinafter "the Contract 
Price"). 
NOW THIS AGREEMENT WITNESSETH AS FOLLOWS: 
1. In this Agreement words and expressions shall have the same meanings as are respectively 
assigned to them in the Contract referred to. 
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2. The following documents shall be deemed to form and be read and construed as part of this 
Agreement, viz.: 
(a) the General Conditions of Contract; 
(b) the Special Conditions of Contract; 
(c) the Schedule of Supply; 
(e) the Bid Submission Sheet and the Price Schedules submitted by the Supplier; 
(f) the Purchaser's Notification to the Supplier of award of Contract; and 
(g) • 
3. In consideration of the payments to be made by the Purchaser to the Supplier as indicated in 
this Agreement, the Supplier hereby covenants with the Purchaser to provide the Goods and Related 
Services and to remedy defects therein in conformity in all respects with the provisions of the Contract. 
4. The Purchaser hereby covenants to pay the Supplier in consideration of the provision of the 
Goods and Related Services and the remedying of defects therein, the Contract Price or such other sum 
as may become payable under the provisions of the Contract at the times and in the manner prescribed 
by the Contract. 
IN WITNESS whereof the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed in accordance 
with the laws of on the day, month and year indicated above. 
Signed by . . (for the Purchaser) 
Signed by (for the Supplier) 
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Appendix 10: World Bank Listing of Ineligible Firms (as of Apri l 
2000) 8 9 1 




Canadax Technologies of Verdun, 
Quebec, Canada 
Pierre Savignac of Verdun, 
Quebec, Canada 
Pradeep S. Nair of London, UK 
Crown Sakura Ltd. of London, UK 
Chase Berkeley Cavendish Ltd. of 
London, UK 
Amani B.P. Ltd. of London, UK 
Berga, SPA of Quinto di Treviso, 
Italy 




























Nepostel Consultancy BV of June 25, Permanent 
Leidschendam, The Netherlands 1999 
All Nippon Engineering Corp. October 27, Permanent 
(ANEC) of Yokohama, Japan 1999 
Penmacs Corp. of Yokohama, October 27, Permanent 
Japan 1999 
Nikko Research Center Ltd. of October 27, October 26, 
Tokyo, Japan 1999 2004 
Nikko Research Center (America) October 27, October 26, 
of Washington DC, USA 1999 2004 
International Access Corp. of October 27, October 26, 
Washington DC, USA 1999 2004 
Labh Singh Gill of Warwickshire, February 11, Permanent 
UK 2000 
Vikram Deepak Gursahaney of 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Gurpreet Singh Malik of Lagos, 
Nigeria 










Available at http://www.worldbank.org/htral/opr/procure/debarr.html. 
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Kamal Sharda of Lagos, Nigeria February 11, 
2000 
Permanent 
Agricultural Development Services 




Ana Exports Ltd. of London, UK February 11, 
2000 
Permanent 
Coldline Inc. of New Jersey, USA 
Consultants for International 
































Engineering Projects International 




First Fuji Ltd. of Isle of Man, UK February 11, 
2000 
Permanent 





Infotek & Co. of London, UK February 11, 
2000 
Permanent 





International Development Projects 




Inter-Russ Ltd. of Isle of Man, UK 


















Norsk-Agro Ltd. of London, UK February 11, 
2000 
Permanent 
Resource Development Ltd. of Isle 



















Shivind Ltd. of Isle of Man, UK February 11, 
2000 
Permanent 




















Agric-Canada of UK February 24, 
2000 
Permanent 
Karitex Ltd. of Nigeria February 24, 
2000 
Permanent 



















Appendix 11: W B I Anti-Corruption Website 
hup:, www. woriubaiiK.org/wbi/ governance; 
T H E W O R L D B A N K Q R O U P A World Free ol Pnvnrly 
W O U L D 
S A N K 
INSTITUTE Governance & Anti-Corruption Resource Center 







Overview & Strategy 
e-qovemance 
Learning Products. 
Anti-corruption Courses . 
Diagnostic Tools 
Parliamentary Programs 
Poverty & Sectoral 
Our purpose 
To support pamcipatory 
learning and action 
programs for capacity 
building, govgrnancs. and 
corruption control 
New This Month 
Other Languages 
Conferences and Events 




Finance & Governance 
Public Sector Reform 
Public Expenditure Mqt 
Municipal Reform 
Regulatory Reform 
The Quailty ol Growth; 
A New Book Showcasing 
Governance ior Development 
Mew Research on State Captun: 
inii Grand Corruption 
Go Transnational:, Misbehave 
in Transition Economies" 
Stale Capture in Transition 
le3tured in Financial Times 
Governance Marters 
Articles and Data 
Publications and Research. 
Woiiong Papers & Articles Books 




Other Data Resources 
cnterpnse Surveys 
Diagnostic Surveys 
Resources and Partners 
At the World Bank Art & Governance 
Partners and Links Feedback Received 




Data Graphs & Maps 
Recursos en espanol 
Ressources en francais 
He i O'-IHuK>- nn P V C I K W 
Article on Governance 
and Ami-Corruoriun at IMF's r&D 
T a k e a o n e - m i n u t e survey 
(and get instant results!) 
Subscribe to our newsletter 
and receive updates 
Enter email address: 
GO! 
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Appendix 12: Inventory of World Bank Anti-Corruption Activities 
A Partial Inventory of the Bank's Governance and Institutional Reform Programs FY98. FY99. and FYOO ( 1 " half) 
A Partial Inventory of the Bank's Governance 
and Institutional Reform Programs 
FY98, FY99, and FYOO ( 1 s t half) 
Countries with Programs to Strengthen Governance 
A Partial Inventory of the Bank's Governance and Institutional Reform Proerams FY98. FY99. and FYOO ( l " half) 
Strate%\ Research and Good Practice Dt>cum \ Participation in International Effons 
B A N K W I D C A C T I V I T I E S 
( F Y 9 Q - 0 0 I Publ ic Sector Strategy Paper T h e Wor ld Bank: A d d r e s s i n c me C h a i l e n c e o f 
R e f o r m i n g Publ i c Institutions and Strengthening G o v e r n a n c e " 
P R E M Noies 
( F Y 9 8 ) P R E M Note 4 " C o r m p u o n and development" 
( F Y 9 9 ) P R E M Note 7. "New frontiers tn diagnosing and combat ing corruption" 
[ F Y 9 9 ) P R E M Note 19: " U s i n g an ombudsman to oversee publ ic o f f i c ia l s ' 
( F Y 9 9 ) P R E M Note 23. " U s i n g surveys for public sector re form" 
f F Y 9 9 ) P R E M Note 24: "Fostering institutions IO contain corrupt ion" 
( F Y 9 9 1 P R E M K o i e 25: "Assess ing borrower ownership using reform readiness anaivs i s ' 
( F Y O O l P R E M Note 26: "The law and economics o f j u d i c i a l r e form" 
I F Y O O ) P R E M Note 29' "Assess ing political commitment io t"ichtint> corruption 
I f F Y O O I P R E M Note .10 "Mobi l i z ing c i v i l society io fight corrupt ion in BanL'taoesr," 
( F Y O O ) P R E M Note 31 "Rethinking c iv i l servrcc re form" 
i F Y O O l P R E M Note 33 " A n a n n - c o m j p l i o n strategy for revenue administrat ion' 
| ( F Y O O i P R E M Note 34 "Reducing coun delays F ive lessons from the l - n n c d S u i r - ' 
T r a i n i n g W o r k s h o p s 
( F Y 9 8 } 48 Integrity A w a r e n e s s S e m i n a r ; at 
headquarters and resideni miss ions 
( F Y 9 9 ) Ann-corrupt ion Diagnostic Tools / P R M P S . 
WBI) 
( F Y 9 9 l Mainstre-aminc Ann-corrupt ion in the C A S 
f P R M P S . W B I ) 
| F Y 9 9 ) ReOuc inc CorruDl ion: A Search for L e s s o n 1 
o f E x p e n e n c e I P R M P S . W 8 I ) 
( F Y 9 9 ) Regional Onentat ion Workshops in A F R . 
E A P . E C A . L A C . M N A ( R e g i o n s . W B h ' 
Preparation for S A R ( F Y O O ) 
l F Y 9 9 ) N e > * t m p t o v e e O n e n i a n o n E t h i c -
c o m n o n e n i f O P F . i 
I F Y 9 8 - 9 9 - 0 0 ) Observer status ai 
O E C D W o r k i n g G r o u p on Br ibery . 
International C h a m b e r of 
C o m m e r c e Standing C o m m i n e e on 
Extort ion and Bribery . 
D A C Experts G r o u p on M o n n o n n c 
Performance ui G o o d G o v e r n a n c e . 
Untied Nauons O f f i c e o f D r u e 
Contro l , and 
Interpol International Groups of 
Experts on Corrupt ion 
1 F Y 9 H - 9 9 - O 0 I Participation on M D B 
W o r k i n g G r o u p on G o v e r n a n c e , A n i i -
corruption and C a p a c i t y Bui ld ing . 
unite Sector Group 
PREM 
XnaM.c and Adv,s«o ActM«»es: APL: Atupuftlc Program Loan: ASKM : Asi-Eurupc .M«wn£; CAS ( oun<n Ass.s.ance Sir.^v: CAS-PR: CAS Progress Report: CDF: Comprehensive 
I r i ' T r " ' Fr*mr"ork- C E , N ; Co"«!? Econom.c Memorandum: C F A A : Counin Financial Accountability Assessment: CPAR: Coun<r> Procuremen. Assessment Review. CPFA: Countr, 
f F , » a n ™ ' A " ° " n ' * b ' l , T > : D , n , i h Coverntncc TrU S l Fund: I C A C : Independent Commission Again*. Corruption: IDF: insri.unon.l Development Fund; ICR: Institutional and 
|*ern.nec Rev.rw: OPE: Office of Professional E.hies: PER: Public Expenditure Review; PF.RC: Public Expendhure Reform Credit: PRMPS: PREM Public Sector Anchor: S A L : Structural 
usi mem Loan: SOE: Siaee Owned Enterprise: S S R : Social and Structural Review: T A : Technical Assistance: WBI: World Bank institute 
Source World BanK (2000> An Invenlorv of the Banks Antt-Corruption. Governance, and Institutional 
Reform Activities Internet. Accesses 18 October Available at hnp://wwwiworidbank.org/ouDlicsector/ 
anticorrupt/inveniory.ntm 
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3 9 2 WBI (1999). Towards Collective Action to Improve Governance and Control Corruption in Seven African 
Countries, p. 19. 
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Appendix 14: Phase 1, African Anti-Corruption Core Course 
Session Methodology 
Day 1: Impact and how 
corruption affects your country 
Day 2: Tools and processes for 
diagnostics and design 
Day 3: Coalition building 
Session 1: Introduction, 
Welcome and Keynote Speech 
Session 2: Overview of an 
action program and participant 
expectations 
Session 3: Designing anti-
corruption programs - the 
participant's experience 
Session 4: Why combat 
corruption? 
Session 5: Initiating a program 
to fight corruption 
Session 6: Overview of survey 
approach 
Session 7: Expert assessment 
Session 8: From diagnostics to 
design 
Session 9: Involvement 
processes - civil society, private 
sector, parliament and the media 
Providing an overview of the 
Bank's 'integrated approach', 
including: managing an action 
program, diagnostics, 
prioritisation, dissemination, 
political will, institution-specific 
diagnosis, reform measures, 
implementation plans and 
monitoring systems. Open the 
floor for participant discussion. 
Selected participants discuss 
their prior experience with anti-
corruption work. 
Reviewing existing data and 
research on corruption and 
providing an overview of 
participating countries' 
institutional arrangements and 
perceptions of corruption. 
Case study to highlight causes, 
consequences and feasibility 
Discusses how empirical 
surveys can be used 
Discusses how expert 
assessment can be integrated 
with empirical surveys 
Small discussion groups take 
simulated survey results to 
prepare a matrix which 
identifies priority areas for 
reform 
Reviews participatory tools, 
such as national workshops and 
information campaigns 
WBI (1999). Towards Collective Action to Improve Governance and Control Corruption in Seven African 
Countries, pp. 25-28. 
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Day 4: Agency-specific surveys 
and monitoring strategies 
Day 5: Field visit and closing of 
the first phase 
Session 10: Anti-corruption 
institutions and agencies - role, 
impact and who should run 
them 
Session 11: Political will 
Session 12: 
action plan 
Revision of the 
Reviews bodies such as anti-
corruption commissions, 
oversight committees, watchdog 
agencies, auditor generals and 
ombudsmen, when they work 
and when they don't 
Reviews tools to mobilise and 
sustain political will 
Small discussion groups revise 
matrices to fit their countries 
Session 13: Agency-specific Includes public expenditure 
surveys and other tools reviews and price comparisons 
Session 14: Monitoring Discusses importance of 
techniques monitoring government bodies 





Participants complete the matrix 
Reviews methods used by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), the Serious Fraud Office 
(UK) and Controle de 
Corruption (France), and a tour 
of FBI headquarters 
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Appendix 15: Country Matrix - Anti-Corruption Core 
Course 1999894 
Benin Ethiopia Ghana Kenya 
(1) strengthening the (1) codes of conduct indicates problems (1) rule of law; 
political will; for elected instead of priorities: (2) financial 
(2) enforcement of officials, political (1) weak political management; 
laws; appointees, the will; (3) public 
(3) judiciary and legal judiciary and civil (2) 'mixed signals' procurement; 
system review; servants; from the (4) public sector 
(4) public sector (2) to develop Executive; reform; 
institutions reform; specific evidence (3) weak institutions (5) customs (pp. 194-
(5) addressing and procedural and rule of law; 196). 
education and laws for (4) entrenched 
communication (p. corruption; patronage; 
87). (3) strengthen the (5) weak private 
capacity of sector; 
police, prosecutor (6) weak civil 
and judiciary to society; 
investigate and (7) pervasive 




(5) establish ethics 
central body to 
'lead and co-




Malawi Tanzania Uganda : - • ' 
(1) rule of law; (1) restore (1) rule of law; 
(2) financial confidence in the (2) financial • c - - ' ;• . 
management; judiciary and law management; - ** • ••' - - : 
(3) public procurement; enforcement; (3) public 
(4) public sector (2) reduce 'leakage' procurement; 
reform; and increase (4) public sector B =- ' J -• . i •.... 
(5) customs (pp. 210- revenue reform; " . , * 7 ' 
213). collection; (5) customs (pp. 249- " • '•"* " 




(4) create public •'if '' 1 . . . • *V i 
awareness; : ~ . 
(5) increase civil 
servant * V ' ' W i - ! 
remuneration '" ! ; , ' - . ' •' V - V ' 
while holding 
them accountable 
for their actions; ' • : ? " ' • 
(6) support the media 
(pp. 237-238). ' . ' <' -. . . • • 
8 World Bank (1999). Towards Collective Action to Improve Governance and Control Corruption in Seven 
African Countries. 
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Appendix 16: World Bank Strategy, Research and 'Good Practice' 
Documents895 
(FY99-00) Public Sector Strategy Paper: "The World Bank: Addressing the Challenge of Reforming 
Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance' 
PREM Notes: 
(FY98) PREM Note 4: 'Corruption and development' 
(FY99) PREM Note 7: 'New frontiers in diagnosing and combating corruption' 
(FY99) PREM Note 19: 'Using an ombudsman to oversee public officials' 
(FY99) PREM Note 23: 'Using surveys for public sector reform' 
(FY99) PREM Note 24: 'Fostering institutions to contain corruption' 
(FY99) PREM Note 25: 'Assessing borrower ownership using reform readiness analysis' 
(FYOO) PREM Note 26: "The law and economics of judicial reform' 
(FYOO) PREM Note 29: 'Assessing political commitment to fighting coiruption' 
(FYOO) PREM Note 30: 'Mobilizing civil society to fight corruption in Bangladesh' 
(FYOO) PREM Note 31: 'Rethinking civil service reform' 
(FYOO) PREM Note 33: 'An anticorruption strategy for revenue administration' 
(FYOO) PREM Note 34: 'Reducing court delays: Five lessons from the United States' 
(FY99-00) DRG and other research papers: 
• 'Aggregating Governance Indicators' 
• 'Governance Matters' 
• Review paper on the consequences of corruption 
• ' Assessing Political Will and Opportunity for Anti-Corruption' 
• 'Corruption and Political Finance in Africa' 
• 'Corrupiton, Public Finances and the Unofficial Economy' 
• 'Making Voice Work: The Report Card on Bangalore's Public Service' 
• 'Moral Hazard and Optimal Corruption' 
• 'Regulatory Discretion, Corruption and the Unofficial Economy' 
• 'Decentralisation Data Project' (Danish Governance TF) 
• ' Does "Grease" Payment Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?' 
o 'Corruption, Composition of Capital Flows and Currency Crisis' 
• 'Rotten Bureaucracy and Endogenous Capital Controls' 
• 'Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much?' 
• 'The effects of corruption and taxation on growth: Firm level evidence' 
• 'The cost of doing business: Ugandan firms' experience with corruption' 
Training Workshops: 
(FY98) 48 Integrity Awareness Seminars at headquarters and resident missions 
(FY99) Anticorruption Diagnostic Tools (PRMPS, WBI) 
(FY99) Mainstreaming Anticorruption in the CAS (PRMPS, WBI) 
(FY99) Reducing Corruption: A Search for Lessons of Experience (PRMPS, WBI) 
(FY99) Regional Orientation Workshops in AFR, EAP, ECA, L A C , MNA (Regions, WBI). 
Preparation for SAR (FYOO) 
(FY99) New Employee Orientation: Ethics component (OPE) 
(FY99-00) Procurement Innovations Workshop (Danish Governance TF) 
Adapted from World Bank (2000). Helping Countries Combat Corruption, pp. 100-101. 
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Appendix 17: Sample Letter sent to Donors 
20 June 2001 
Ms. Eveline Herfkens 
Minister for Development Co-operation 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
PO Box 20061 
2500 EB The Hague 
The Netherlands 
Dear Ms. Herfkens: 
I am a PhD student in the Department of Politics at the University of Durham (UK), 
researching the World Bank's anti-corruption programme. I would like to take the opportunity 
to ask you a few questions about the work being done by the Ministry on corruption. If it is 
not possible for you to answer my questions, perhaps you could redirect this letter to the most 
appropriate person. 
My questions are as follows: 
1. Where is anti-corruption work located at the Ministry for Development Co-operation? 
2. Is there an organisational chart available? If not, can I have a list 
of staff and responsibilities? 
3. What work is currently being done? 
4. Where does the Ministry envision its work on corruption in the future? 
5. What does the Ministry see as its 'comparative advantage' for corruption, in 
comparison to other donors, such as the World Bank, USAID and UNDP? 
The last question is of particular importance. The bulk of my thesis is on the World Bank; 
however, a chapter looks at other major donors to see if there is an overlap in programming in 
areas where other agencies may have a comparative advantage (e.g., civil society work and 
USAID). In cases of clear (or even perceived) comparative advantage, I may make 
recommendations in my thesis for the Bank to spin off some of its rather bulky programme to 
other donors with greater capacity in a particular field. 
If you would like more background information on my research before answering these 
questions, please feel free to contact me here by email or by phone at 444-191-374-7366. 




Appendix 18: Sample Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
Organisation: 
• Organisation chart (within UNDP & PACT) 
• Budget 
• Same funding sources as in evaluation? 
• List of projects 
PACT: 
• History: how did governance become an issue? 
• 3 focus points 
aid accountability 
public expenditure accountability ('centre of excellence') 
anti-corruption 
n Donor co-ordination 
• CONTACT: what is it? How is it used? 
Anti-Corruption: 
• Database and inventory of UN projects on corruption 
• 3 focus points 
partnerships & advocacy 
co-ordination & policy dialogue 
strengthen capacity 
• How will PACT achieve objective - 'cause, consequences and reform strategies for 
combating corruption are also to be examined' 
• How to assess political commitment 
• Evaluation recommendation to 'spin-off anti-corruption work - PACT response? 
• What is PACT'S comparative advantage? 
Future? 
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Appendix 19: USA1D Memorandum on the Status of Anti-
Co rruptionEfforts 
iVTEMORAfTDUM — 
T O : AiG/A, Everette 3. Orr 
F R O M : AA /PPC, Thomas H. Fox 
S U B J E C T : Status of U S A I D ' j Anri-corruptlon Efforts In Assisted Countries (Audit Report No. 9-
000-98-002-P) 
We are pleased to provide you with an update of our actions to implement the Recommendations In the 
IG's audit of USAID's ami-corruption efforts. 
The IG's report recommended chat the Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (PPQ and the Bureau 
for Management (M), establish a timetable for developing an agency-wide policy to unify and guide the 
agency's anti-corruption effort. I wuuid like to outline tho actions, based on tbe IG 's Recommendations, 
that we have taken to date, and the timetable for the remaining actions. 
1. Define what types of activities arc considered anti-corruption activities and what are the pnoncv 
program areas. 
USAID has developed a technical publication called " A Handbook on Fighdns Corruption" to isiist 
Bureaus, Missions, and their partners in designing ano-corruption initiatives. The handbook describes the 
development problems posed by corruption and indicates alternative stratc^us for addressnnj the root 
causes. This publication was prepared in February 1999. A short policy statement will be prepared by 
December \. 1999. j 
2. Establish anti-corruprioc performance measures to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of these 
activities. 
PPCs Cater for Development, Information,, and Evaluation wyi be developing performance measures for 
the anti-corruption activities. We expect the initial design of the performance measures to be compiotcd by 
January 1,2000. 
3. Outline and discuss the importance of strategy development and programming guidance at the bureau 
level and consider requiring a discussion of corruption in program design documents. 
nie handbook on fighting corruption provides a framework for selecting among the different measures to 
address anti-corruption problems in a specific country. This framework includes the methodology for 
assessing the nature of the corruption problem and the opportunities and constraints for addressing It. The 
framevojk links the assessment to the strategy, offering guidelines fur prioritizing and sequencing anti-
corruptioc activities in variovs situations. 
4. Implement a system for identifying the obligations and «xp«nditurt3 of the agency's anti-corruption 
activities. 
PPC and M are in the process ; f designing a set of codes that can Identify obligations and expenditures for 
anti-corrupt'on activities. We expect to comoJeto this element of the Recommendation bv November !, 
1999. 
If your staff wouid like to discuss our responses in more detail, please feel free to contact Mr. Robert A. 
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